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# BAPTISM

IN ITS

MODE AND SUBJECTS CONSIDERED;

AND THE

## ARGUMENTS

OF

MR. EWING AND DR. WARDLAW REFUTED.

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BY ALEXANDER CARSON, A. M.

MINISTER OF THE GOSPEL, EDINBURGH.

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TOGETHER WITH

A REVIEW OF DR. DWIGHT ON BAPTISM.

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BY F. L. COX, L. L. D. OF LONDON.

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1832.



# PUBLISHER'S PREFACE

TO THE AMERICAN EDITION.

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IF it be demanded, why add another, to the already multiplied number of works on the question of Baptism?—The reply is, that such an one as this, both for research, and acuteness, has not existed, and by the learned portion of community has long been considered a desideratum; for, while Pengilly is deservedly entitled to the highest commendation, for those who have but little leisure, and are unaccustomed to a long course of critical reading, or close reasoning; yet it fails to convince men, who love a large book and a hard argument.

I fancy that in giving an edition of this work to our American churches, I not only serve the cause of Christ, and of truth, but also render a service to every critical scholar, and every candid theologian. An honest expectation is entertained that even our opponents in perusing these pages will be gratified, and instructed; if not in fact fully convinced.

Never before has been presented in one volume the views of five such men; Wardlaw, Ewing, Dwight, on one side; with Cox and Carson on the opposite. Where could advocates be selected more competent to the pleading of the case? And if they have not traversed the field of argument with a searching and overturning power, who will attempt to follow, and supply their deficiencies?

No one, it is believed, has made that deep and thorough research into the writings of the Greeks, in or-

der to settle the *usus loquendi*, of the words βαπτω, and βαπτίζω, as has Mr. Carson, and a debt of gratitude is certainly due to his indefatigable labours. It adds a vast weight of evidence to that already ponderous mass, which bears so heavily on *one* side of this long disputed question. On a careful perusal, this book will exhibit merits of no ordinary character. The whole strength of every position taken by Pedobaptists, is admitted, and met with candid consideration, and unless we greatly err, with refutation and ruin.

Mr. Carson has adduced one idea, that is entirely original, namely, that βαπτω is the word invariably used to signify to dip, or to dye, while βαπτίζω is the word invariably used to signify to dip only, and this is the only word ever used to express the Gospel ordinance in question. Such being the fact, our assurance is doubly sure, that we are on the side of truth. The popping system, which is exposed in this work, will, without doubt, be considered both novel and diverting. But oh, what deep-felt pity should possess our minds, at the thought that such good, and eminent men, as Ewing, and Wardlaw, could be capable of fathering such figments of the imagination.

There are a few slight alterations, in no way affecting the argument or sense, which we presume every judicious reader, on comparison, would sanction in an American edition. If the circulation of this work should be as useful and extensive as he anticipates, it will in some good degree alleviate the unhappiness which results from an inability to serve his blessed Master in the public ministry of the Everlasting Gospel.

March, 1832.

## P R E F A C E .

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NOTHING can be farther from the intention of the following Work, than to widen the breach among Christians of different denominations, or to minister to the increase of a sectarian spirit. There are two extremes which I wish to avoid—on the one hand, a spirit of liberalism that supposes the Christian his own master, and hesitates not to sacrifice the commandments of God to the courtesies of religious intercourse—on the other, that sort of dogmatism, that finds all excellence in its own party, and is reluctant to acknowledge the people of the Lord in any denomination but its own. Liberality of sentiment is not a phrase which I admit into my religious vocabulary; for though I love and acknowledge all who love the Lord Jesus, I hold myself as much under the law of God in embracing all the children of God, as in forming the articles of my creed. My recognition of all Christians I ground on the authority of Jesus. To set at naught the weakest of Christ's little ones, I call not illiberal, but unchristian. To disown those whom Christ acknowledges, is antichristian disobedience to Christ. But while I gladly admit, that many who differ from me with respect to Baptism, are among the excellent of the earth, I cannot, out of compliment to them, abstain from vindicating this ordinance of Christ. This would



show greater deference to man than to God. "Every plant," says Jesus, "that my heavenly Father hath not planted, must be plucked up." To permit the traditions of men to pass for the ordinances of God, is injurious to the edification of Christians, and disrespectful to Christ.

Some are diverted from the examination of this subject, by considering it as a thing of small moment, and that time is better spent in schemes of general usefulness. That Baptism is a thing of small moment, is an opinion that is not likely to have been suggested by the accounts of it in the Scriptures. It is an ordinance that strikingly represents the truth that saves the soul; and is peremptorily enjoined on all who believe. But were it the very least of all the commandments of Jesus, it demands attention and obedience at the hazard of life itself. Nothing that Christ has appointed, can be innocently neglected. To suppose that schemes of general usefulness ought to take place of the commandments of God, is a direct affront to the wisdom and power of Jehovah. Saul alleged that he had substantially obeyed the word of the Lord, though he spared Agag, the king of Amalek, and a part of the spoil for a burnt-offering; but the answer of the prophet ought for ever to deter from the exercise of a discretionary power, with respect to the commandments of God. "Hath the Lord as great delight in burnt-offerings and sacrifices, as in obeying the voice of the Lord? Behold, to obey is better than sacrifice; and to hearken, than the fat of rams. For rebellion is as the sin of witchcraft, and stubbornness is as iniquity and idolatry: Because thou hast rejected the word of the Lord, he hath also rejected thee from being king."

Many seem alarmed at controversy, and shrink from it as opposed to the spirit of the gospel. It is, no doubt, a grievous thing, that controversy should be necessary. But as long as error exists, it is impossible to avoid controversy, except we value peace more than truth. Can we forget that the whole life of Christ and his apostles was a scene of never-ending controversy? He who was love itself, contended constantly against the errors of his time. There is not a truth nor an ordinance of the gospel that Christians can hold without opposition. From the manner of revelation, it seems evidently the design of God to manifest what is in man: and to leave an opening to discover the opposition to his wisdom in the minds even of his own people, as far as it exists. The arguments that are opposed to the truth on any subject of revelation, have their effect on the mind, not from their intrinsic weight, but from their adaptation to the corruptions of the heart. We yield to them, because what they are designed to establish is more agreeable than that to which they are opposed. Of this we have a remarkable example in the disobedient prophet at Bethel. When he was sent to denounce the judgments of the Lord against Jeroboam's altar, he was forbidden to eat or drink in the place. Yet, after refusing the hospitality of the king, he suffered himself to be deceived by another prophet. "Come home with me, and eat bread. And he said, I may not return with thee, nor go in with thee; neither will I eat bread, nor drink water with thee in this place. For it was said to me, by the word of the Lord, Thou shalt not eat bread, nor drink water there, nor turn again to go by the way that thou camest. He said

unto him, I am a prophet also, as thou art, and an angel spoke unto me by the word of the Lord, saying, Bring him back with thee into thine house, that he may eat bread, and drink water. But he lied unto him. So he went back with him, and did eat bread in his house, and drink water."

Many things might be plausibly said to justify or excuse this unhappy man. But the Lord did not excuse him. "Thus saith the Lord, Forasmuch as thou hast disobeyed the mouth of the Lord, and hast not kept the commandment which the Lord thy God commanded thee, but camest back, and hast eaten bread, and drunk water, in the place of the which the Lord did say to thee, Eat no bread, and drink no water ; thy carcase shall not come unto the sepulchre of thy fathers." It behoves those who change the mode and the subjects of baptism, to consider this awful example. If Christ has commanded his disciples to be baptized on their belief of the truth, who can change it into the baptism of infants? If he has commanded them to be immersed, who can change it into pouring or sprinkling ?

In stating the evidence on my own side, and in refuting the arguments of my opponents, I have from first to last proceeded as if I were on oath. I have never allowed myself to use artifice, or to affect to despise an argument which I found myself unable to answer. This is a resource in many controversialists, that is both disingenuous and mean. I have not used one argument to convince others, that has not with myself all the weight which I wish it to have with them. I am not conscious of forcing one line in the word of

God. I have no temporal interest to serve, by establishing my views of baptism. Interest and reputation are both on the other side.

False first principles, and false canons of interpretation, lie at the bottom of most false reasoning and false criticism. This is remarkably verified in the reasonings and criticisms of Mr. Ewing and Dr. Wardlaw, which I have examined. The reader will find innumerable instances in which I substantiate this charge. Criticism can never be a science until it founds on canons that are self-evident. When controversy is conducted on both sides in this way, truth will soon be established. My dissertation on the import of the word βαπτίζω, I submit with confidence to the judgment of the really learned. If I have not settled that controversy, there is not truth in axioms.

I earnestly entreat my brethren to consider the subject with patience and impartiality. Though it may injure the temporal interest of many of them, yet there is a hundredfold advantage in following the Lord. It would give me the greatest pleasure in being the means of leading others to correct views on this subject. But I know human nature too well to be sanguine. Something more than the strength of argument is necessary to bring even Christians to understand the will of their Lord. However, should I not make a single convert, I am not disappointed. My first desire is to approve myself to my Lord. If I please him, I hope I shall be enabled to bear not only the enmity of the world, but the disapprobation of Christian brethren. I expect my reward at his appearing. The motto I wish to be engraven on my heart is, "Occupy till I come."

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# ON BAPTISM.

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## MEANING OF THE WORD *Βαπτω*—DIFFERENCE BETWEEN *Βαπτω* AND *Βαπτίζω*.

THE word *Βαπτω* from which is formed *Βαπτίζω* signifies primarily to dip ; and as a secondary meaning obviously derived from the primary, it denotes to *dye*. Every occurrence of the word may be reduced to one or other of these acceptations. It has been said, that it signifies also to wash, but though this is given by the lexicographers as one of its meanings, and is admitted by many Baptist writers, it is not warranted by a single decisive example, either in the Scriptures or in classical authors. It has also been said that it is a generic word, and without respect to mode, or inclusive of all modes, denotes any application of water. So far from this, the idea of water is not at all in the word. It is as applicable to every fluid as to water. Nay, it is not confined to liquids, but is applied to every thing that is penetrated. The substance in which the action of the verb is performed, may be oil, or wax, or mire, or any other soft matter, as well as water. Except when it signifies to dye, IT DENOTES MODE, AND NOTHING BUT MODE.

*Βαπτω* and *Βαπτίζω* are considered by most writers as perfectly identical in their signification. On the other hand, there are writers on this subject, on both sides of the great question, who have assigned a difference of meaning, which is merely fanciful. Some have alleged, that the termination *ζω* makes *Βαπτίζω* a dimi-

nutive; but utterly without countenance from the practice of the language. Others have erred as far on the other side, and equally without authority make βαπτίζω a frequentative. The termination ζω has no such effect as either class of these writers suppose; and the history of the word, both in sacred and classical use, justifies no such notion. It is true, indeed, that early church history shows that Baptism was performed by three immersions; but it is equally true, that this is neither scriptural, nor indicated by the termination of the verb. Even had Christ appointed trine immersion, the frequency could not have been expressed by this word. (We should recollect that the word was not formed for this religious ordinance; but being taken from the language, must be used in the common sense.) The termination ζω does not make a frequentative according to the practice of the language in other words; and the verb βαπτίζω is not used as a frequentative by Greek writers. It could not become such, then, in an ordinance of Christ. When Tertullian translates it by *mergitare*, he might wish to countenance the trine immersion; but it is strange that he should be followed by Vossius and Stephens. It is strange also to find some Baptists still speaking of βαπτίζω as a frequentative verb, since they cannot suppose that it is such in the ordinance of Baptism. It is a sufficient induction from the actual history of a language, and not speculations from theory, that can settle a question of this kind.

The learned Doctor Gale, in his *Reflections on Mr. Wall's History of Infant Baptism*, after giving us a copious list of quotations, in which βαπτω and βαπτίζω are used, says: "I think it is plain from the instances already mentioned, that they are ἰσοδυναμῶν, exactly the same as to signification." As far as respects an increase or diminution of the action of the verb, I perfectly agree with the writer. That the one is more or less than the other, as to mode or frequency, is a perfectly groundless conceit. Yet there is a very

obvious difference in the use of the words ; and a difference that naturally affects the point at issue. This difference is, βαπτω IS NEVER USED TO DENOTE THE ORDINANCE OF BAPTISM, AND βαπτίζω NEVER SIGNIFIES TO DYE. The primitive word βαπτω has two significations, the primary to *dip*, the secondary to *dye*. But the derivative is formed to modify the primary only ; and in all the Greek language, I assert that an instance is not to be found in which it has the secondary meaning of the primitive word. If this assertion is not correct, it will be easy for learned men to produce an example in contradiction. That βαπτω is never applied to the ordinance of Baptism, any one can verify, who is able to look into the passages of the Greek Testament, where the ordinance is spoken of. Now, if this observation is just, it overturns all those speculations that explain the word, as applied to Baptism, by an allusion of dyeing ; for the primitive word that has this secondary meaning is not applied to the ordinance ; and the derivative word, which is appointed to express it, has not the secondary signification of *dyeing*. Βαπτω has two meanings, βαπτίζω in the whole history of the Greek language has but one. It not only signifies to dip or immerse, but it never has any other meaning. Each of these words has its specific province into which the other cannot enter ; while there is a common province in which either of them may serve. Either of them may signify to dip generally ; but the primitive cannot specifically express that ordinance to which the derivative has been appropriated ; and the derivative cannot signify to *dye*, which is a part of the province of the primitive. The difference is precise and important. Most of the confusion of ideas on both sides of the question, with respect to the definite meaning of the word Baptism, has arisen from overlooking this difference. Writers, in general, have argued from the one word to the other, as if they perfectly corresponded in meaning.

To show that derivatives in ζω are equivalent to



their primitives, Dr. Gale gives us a number of examples. Βλυω, βλυζω. Θυω, θυαζω. Βορβορω, βορβοριζω. Ορκοω, ορκιζω. Αλεγω, αλεγιζω. Καναχεω, καναχιζω. Εθω, εθιζω. Ηθω, ηθιζω. Now, in every thing essential to his purpose, this is perfectly true; and in innumerable instances, no variation may be capable of being traced. Yet I apprehend that such derivatives were not introduced merely to vary the sound, but that they were originally designed to modify the action of the primitive verbs. The termination ζω, when employed to form a derivative, appears to me to have served some such purpose, as the Hebrew causal form, and to denote the making of the action of the verb to be performed. Mere speculation is of no value. The most ingenious theory, not confirmed by the use of the language, ought to have no authority. To ground any thing on conjectures, with respect to a subject that concerns the faith or obedience of the people of God, would be not only unphilosophical but impious. But that my observation is just, may be fully verified by examples. There cannot be the smallest doubt, that the Greeks did form derivatives on this plan. Could I produce no other instance, the following from Ælian's *Varia Historia*, would be sufficient to establish my doctrine. It occurs in the anecdote he relates with respect to the beneficence of Ptolemy Lagides. Πτολεμαιον φασί του Λαγου, καταπλουτιζοντα τους φιλους αυτου, υπερχαιρειν. Ελεγε δε αμεινον ειναι πλουτιζειν, η πλουτειν. "They say that Ptolemy, the son of Lagus, took great delight in enriching his friends. He said that it is better to enrich others than to be rich," 197. Here πλουτew is to be rich; and πλουτιζω to make rich.

We have another instance in Heraclides, εξων πολλους εδειπνιζε; "of whom he provided many with a supper." Δειπνew is to *sup*, δειπνιζω signifies to give a supper.

Such then indubitably was originally the use of derivatives with this termination, though in many cases

they and their primitives may be interchangeable ; and although in some the distinction cannot at all be traced.

In this view βαπτίζω would signify originally to make an object dip. Its use then, would be to apply to the dipping of things too heavy to be sustained by the dipper. Its use in classical occurrence, I think, will accord with this. Compared with its primitive, its occurrence in profane writers is very rare, and it generally applies to objects that are too heavy to be lifted or borne by the dipper. It applies to ships which are *made to dip* by the weight of the lading. As to the general idea of dipping, the primitive and the derivative are interchangeable. The primitive may be used with respect to the largest body that can be immersed ; but it will not express the modification denoted by the derivative. The derivative may be applied to the smallest object that is dipped, for it is evident, that if we dip an object in any way, we cause it to dip or sink. I shall illustrate this observation farther when examples actually come before us. In the mean time I observe, that whatever may originally have been the modification of the termination in question, the difference in the use of βαπτω and βαπτίζω is clearly established. To ascertain a difference, and to account for that difference, are two very different things. In the former our success cannot be doubted, whatever may be thought with respect to the latter.

From some instances in the application of this word, Dr. Gale was induced to suppose that it does not so necessarily express the action of putting under water, as that the object is in that state. But this is evidently inconsistent with the essential meaning of the word ; and not at all demanded by the examples on which he founds it. "The word βαπτίζω," says he, "perhaps does not so necessarily express the action of putting under water, as in general a thing being in that condition, no matter how it comes so, whe-

ther it is put into the water, or the water comes over it." Now, were this observation just, every thing lying under water might have this literally applied to it. But every one acquainted with the Greek language must acknowledge that the word has not literally such an application. In any particular instance when this word is applied to an object lying under water, but not actually dipped, the mode essentially denoted by it is as truly expressed as in any other instance of its occurrence. Indeed the whole beauty of such expressions consists in the expression of a mode not really belonging to the thing expressed. The imagination, for its own gratification, invests the object with a mode that does not truly belong to it; and if that mode were not suggested to the mind, the expression would lose its peculiar beauty. Common conversation exemplifies this mode of expression every day; and mere children understand its import.

The very example alleged by Dr. Gale is formed on this principle. It is brought from the works of Aristotle. "The Phenicians who inhabit Cadiz, relate, that sailing beyond Hercules's Pillars, in four days, with the wind at east, they came to a land uninhabited, whose coast was full of sea-weeds, and is not laid under water, βαπτίζουσι, at ebb; but when the tide comes in, it is wholly covered and overwhelmed." Now, though the water comes over the land, and there is no actual exemplification of the mode expressed by this word, yet it still expresses that mode; and the word has been employed for the very purpose of expressing it. The peculiar beauty of the expression consists in figuring the object, which is successively bare and buried under water, as being dipped when it is covered, and as emerging when it is bare. In the same style we might say, that at the flood, God immersed the mountains in the waters, though the waters came over them.

No example can more clearly disprove the notion,

that this word denotes to pour or sprinkle a little water on an object. The thing here supposed to be baptized, was wholly buried under water. The beach is said to be baptized when the tide comes over it. Can any child, then, be at a loss to learn from this, that baptism means to lay under water? Should we say that God baptized the earth at the flood, we would use an expression exactly like the above. Who then can be at a loss to know the meaning of the word baptism?

This example tends to confirm my observation with respect to the peculiar import of derivatives in ζω. This was a large object, that was not supposed to be taken up and dipped, but to be caused to dip, as it were by sinking.

The distinction which I have observed between the use of βαπτω and βαπτίζω, will enable us to refute the interpretation of the word baptism by Mr. Robinson of Cambridge, an Arian Baptist. "The English translators," says he, "did not translate the word baptize, and they acted wisely; for there is no one word in the English language which is an exact counterpart of the Greek word, as the New Testament uses it, containing the precise ideas of the evangelists, neither less nor more. The difficulty, or rather the excellence of the word, is, that it contains two ideas, inclusive of the whole doctrine of baptism. Baptize is a dyer's word, and signifies to dip, so as to colour. Such as render the word d.p, give one true idea; but the word stood for two, and one is wanting in this rendering. This defect is in the German Testament, Matt. iii. 1. In those days came John *der Tauffer*, John the Dipper; and the Dutch,—In those days came John *een Dooper*, John the Dipper. This is the truth, but it is not the whole truth. The Saxon Testament adds another idea, by naming the administrator, John *le Fulluhtere*, John the Fuller. The Islandic language translates baptism *skirn*, scouring. These convey

two ideas, *cleansing* by *washing*, but neither do these accurately express the two ideas of the Greek baptize ; for though repentance in some cases accompanies baptism, as it does prayer, yet not in every case. Jesus was baptized in Jordan, but he was not cleansed from any moral or ceremonial turpitude by it, nor was any repentance mixed with his baptism. Purification by baptism is an accident, it may be, it may not be,—it is not essential to baptism. The word, then, conveys two ideas, the one literal, *dipping*, the other figurative, *colouring* ; a figure, however, expressive of a real fact, meaning that John, by bathing persons in the river Jordan, conferred a character, a moral hue, as dyers, by dipping in a dying vat, set a tinct or colour ; John, by baptism, discriminating the disciples of Christ from other men, as dyers, by colouring, distinguish stuffs. Hence, John is called, by early Latins, John *Tinctor*, the exact Latin of Joannes Baptistes, John the Baptist.”

Mr. Robinson was a man of talents and of extensive reading : But whatever other accomplishment he might possess, the above specimen shows that he was no critic. Such a combination of the primary and secondary meaning of a word, is unphilosophical ; and I am bold to say, that in no language was it ever really exemplified. It is a mere speculation, and a speculation that no man at all acquainted with the philosophy of language could indulge. Did Mr. Robinson suppose, that βαπτίζω had this double import in common and classical use ? If he did, he must have paid no attention to the various occurrences of the word ; for in no instance is his observation verified. Did he suppose that the word, in its appropriation to the ordinance of baptism, received this new meaning ? If he did, he supposes what is absurd, and what cannot be exemplified in any word in the Bible. If words could receive such an arbitrary appropriation in Scripture, the Book of God would not be a revelation. Words

must be used in Scripture in the sense in which they are understood by those who speak the language, otherwise the Bible would be a barbarian both to the learned and to the unlearned. "Baptize," he says, "is a dyer's word." Baptize is not a dyer's word. *Bapto*, in a secondary sense, signifies to dye; but *βαπτίζω* never does. It is strictly univocal. What a ridiculous thing to suppose that, by immersion in pure water, Christians received a discriminating hue, like cloth dipped in the dyer's vat! What mark does it impress? What portion of Scripture is it that has suggested this Arian whim? Are we to take the explanation of the import of an ordinance of Christ from the creations of genius, rather than from the explicit declaration of the Apostles? Such a meaning the word in question never has. Such a combination of primary and secondary meaning no word in any language could have. Such a meaning has nothing in the ordinance to verify it. It is the mere arbitrary conceit of this Arian Baptist, who wishes to make baptism any thing rather than an emblem of washing away sin through the blood of Jesus Christ. It is infinitely more important to resist such explanations of baptism, even though their authors should agree with us with respect both to the mode and subjects of that ordinance, than to combat the opinion of our brethren who on these points differ from us. It is the truth itself, and not any ritual ordinance, that our Lord has appointed to be the bond of union among his people. A disproportionate zeal for baptism may sometimes lead to danger of seduction from the gospel,—by fraternizing with its corrupters, from agreement with them in a favourite ordinance. Mr. Robinson's History of Baptism is not so valuable to confirm Christians in the Scriptural view of this divine institution, as it may be dangerous to their faith, by a constant endeavour to infuse the poison of Arianism.

Dr. Cox has favoured us with the opinion of the

celebrated Greek scholar, Professor Porson, with respect to the difference between βαπτω and βαπτίζω. "My friend Dr. Newman has recorded a conversation which he once held with Professor Porson, in company with a much respected friend, and which, as a corroborative testimony of no mean consideration, may properly be inserted in this place. It is with melancholy pleasure I add of that friend, (now, alas, no more !) that he was also dear to my heart, even from the days of early companionship at school ; and that he was eminently distinguished for his attainments. Not long before the death of Professor Porson, I went, in company with a much respected friend, to see that celebrated Greek scholar at the London Institution. I was curious to hear in what manner he read Greek. He very condescendingly, at my request, took down a Greek Testament, and read, perhaps, twenty verses in one of the gospels, in which the word βαπτω occurred. I said, 'Sir, you know there is a controversy among Christians respecting the meaning of that word.' He smiled and replied, 'The Baptists have the advantage of us!' He cited immediately the well known passage in Pindar, and one or two of those in the gospels, mentioned in this letter ; I inquired, whether, in his opinion, βαπτίζω must be considered equal to βαπτω, which, he said, was to tinge, as dyers. He replied to this effect ; that if there be a difference, he should take the former to be the strongest. He fully assured me that it signified a *total immersion*. This conversation took place August 27, 1807."

I should like to know in what respects this eminent scholar considered βαπτίζω to be a stronger term to denote *immersion*, than its primitive βαπτω. I wish we had his opinion more in detail on this subject. As expressive of mode, the derivative cannot go beyond its primitive. As to *totality of immersion*, the one is perfectly equivalent to the other. But, as I observed before, βαπτω has two senses, and βαπτίζω but

one ; and therefore, in this respect, the word used, with respect to the ordinance of baptism, is stronger in support of immersion as being univocal. Perhaps this was the meaning of the professor. The additional modifying meaning, which I pointed out in the derivative, adds nothing to the strength of signification as to mode, though it sufficiently accounts for the use of the derivative to the exclusion of the primitive, in every instance, with respect to the ordinance of baptism.

The just and most obvious method of ascertaining the meaning of a word, is to examine its origin and use in the language. It may wander far from its root, but if that root is known with certainty, the connexion may still be traced. The derivative, however, may reject ideas contained in the primitive, or it may receive additional ideas, which can be learned only by being acquainted with its history. That βαπτίζω is formed from βαπτω is a thing beyond dispute. But as I have shown that they are not perfectly coincident in their application, I shall examine them separately, contrary to the general practice of writers on both sides of the question. I shall give a copious list of examples, as it is from this that my readers will be enabled independently to form their own judgment. This method will doubtless appear tedious and uninteresting to many, but it is the only method entitled to authority. For a writer on controverted subjects, to give merely his own opinion of the import of his documents, accompanied with a few examples as a specimen of proof, would be the same as if an advocate should present a judge and jury with his own views of evidence, instead of giving them all his facts and circumstances in detail, to enable them to decide with knowledge. A work of this kind is not for amusement, but requires patience and industry in the reader, as well as in the writer. If the one has ransacked documents to most readers inaccessible, to collect evidence, the other should not grudge the toil of examin-



ing the evidence, seeing it is only by such an examination that he can have the fullest conviction of the truth. Is the meaning of this word to be eternally disputed? If one party says that it has this meaning, and another that, while a third differs from both, and a fourth is confident that all three are wrong, what method can legitimately settle the controversy, but an actual appeal to the passages in which it is to be found? These are the witnesses, whose testimony must decide this question: and consequently the more numerous and definite the examples, the more authoritative will be the decision. And as it is possible to tamper with evidence, the witnesses must be questioned and cross questioned, that the truth may be ascertained without a doubt. Instead therefore of making an apology for the number of my examples, and the length of the observations that ascertain their meaning, the only thing I regret is, that I have not every passage in which the word occurs in the Greek language. Never was the meaning of a word so much disputed; no word was ever disputed with less real grounds of difficulty.

As it has been supposed by some to be a generic word, signifying every application of water without any respect to mode, I shall first give a specimen of examples, showing that it not only signifies mode, but that the idea of water is not in the word at all. The nature of the fluid is not expressed in the verb, but is expressed or understood in its regimen.

Near the end of the Sixth Idyl of Theocritus, the word is applied to the dipping of a vessel in honey.

‘Α παις ἀνδ’ ὕδατος ταν καλπιδα κηρια βαλῃαι.

“Instead of water, let my maid *dip* her pitcher into honey combs.”

Here such abundance of honey is supposed, that in the morning, the maid servant, instead of going to draw water, will dip her pitcher into honey combs. Not water then, but honey is the substance, with re-

spect to which the verb in question is here applied. And that dipping is the mode, there can be no question. It would be absurd to speak of pouring, or sprinkling, or washing, or wetting, an urn into honey cubs.

Aristotle also applies it to the dipping of hay into honey for the curing the flux in elephants. *Και τον χορτον εις μελι βαπτοντες*, "Dipping hay into honey, they give it them to eat." *Hist. Animal. Lib. viii. 26.* Though it would be possible to sprinkle hay with honey, yet it would be absurd to speak of sprinkling or pouring hay *into* honey. The preposition *Εις*, with which the verb is connected, forbids it to be translated by any other word but *dip*, even were it possessed of different significations.

The same author, in his treatise on the soul, applies the word to wax. *Ει εις κηρον βαψεις τις, μεχρι τουτου εκινηθη, εως εξαψε.* "If one dip any thing into wax, it is moved as far as he dips." *Lib. iii. 12.* This surely is not an application of water. Nor can the mode be any other than dipping. Neither pouring nor sprinkling, washing nor wetting, can be imported here.

In the last line of the first Idyl of Moschus, the word is applied to immersion in fire. Speaking of the gifts of Cupid, it is said, *τα γαρ πυρι παντα βεβαπται.* "For they are all dipped in fire." This is a baptism in fire, and beyond dispute dipping was the mode.

Ælian applies the word to ointment: *στεφανον εις μυρον βαψας*, *Lib. xiv. Cap. xxxix.* "Having dipped a crown into ointment."

The learned friend who writes the Appendix to Mr. Ewing's Essay on Baptism, translates this example thus: "having tinged (imbued or impregnated) with precious ointment a crown (or garland,)—the crown was woven of roses." This translation, however, is not made on sound principles of interpretation. It rests on no basis. The author has not produced one instance in which the word *βαπτω* incontestably

and confessedly must signify to *imbue*, except in the sense of *dyeing*. To *tinge* a crown of flowers, is not to imbue it with additional fragrance, but to colour it. The author violates both the Greek and the English. When we speak of the *tinge* of a flower, we refer to its colour, not to its perfume. To *tinge with ointment* to give a fragrant smell, is not an English expression. The translation labours under another disease. Εἰς μύρον cannot be translated *with ointment*; but must be rendered *into ointment*. To *tinge into ointment* is a solecism. The verb then cannot here be translated *tinge*, or *imbue*, or *impregnate*, even though it had these significations in other places. The expression cannot bear any other translation than—"He dipped the crown into ointment." The learned writer thinks it improbable that a crown of roses would be dipped in viscid oil in order to improve its fragrance. I admit that it would not be to my taste. But does the gentleman forget that it was the oddity of the thing that induced the historian to mention it? Had it been a common thing, it would not have had a place in *Ælian's* anecdotes. The person to whom it was presented, observed that he accepted it as a token of the good will of the giver, but that the natural fragrance of the flower was corrupted by art. It is no improvement to gild a statue of exquisite workmanship. Shall we therefore force the words of the historians, that assert this of a certain Roman emperor, to assume another sense? Shall we say, that it was no improvement to the statue to be gilded, the language must signify merely that it was washed? To proceed on such principles of interpretation, would render the precise meaning of language utterly unattainable. It is absurd and chimerical in the highest degree. In some points of view, I respect this writer very much. But he reasons without first principles, and therefore has no basis for his conclusions. He is extensively acquainted with Greek literature; but had he all the writings of the ancients in his memory, he cannot be

a critic, so long as he multiplies the meanings of words in an arbitrary manner, according to his view of particular exigencies. In his very next example, he makes the word βαπτω signify to *purify*, from a different exigency. Jamblichus, in his life of Pythagoras, relates as one of the directions of the philosopher to his disciples,—οὐδε εἰς περιρραντηριον εμβαπτειν, which the writer of the Appendix translates “not to *purify* in the perirranterion.” Here, again, he proceeds without first principles. He has not alleged one instance in which the verb must signify to *purify*. He has, then, no ground-work on which to rest this assumption. And the preposition εἰς, occurring here both separately and in conjunction with the verb, determines that the action of the verb was directed *into* the perirranterion, or bason. Besides, as a matter of fact, they did not purify *in* it, but *out* of it. Persons sprinkled at the door of a Roman Catholic church, are not said to be purified *in* the vessel that contains the holy water. But the writer alleges that the perirranterion was too small for *dipping*. Very true, if it is meant that it was too small to dip the body in; but it was not too small to dip the thing that is here understood to be dipped, that is, the sprinkling instrument. Had the writer considered that the phrase is elliptical, as referring to a thing so well known that the regimen of the verb is understood without being expressed, he would have had no necessity for giving a new and an unauthorized meaning to the word βαπτω. In the next direction mentioned by Jamblichus, we have a similar ellipsis: οὐδε βαλανείω λουεσθαι. “Nor to bathe in a bath,” that is, to bathe the body in a bath. We ourselves use the same ellipsis. Pythagoras prohibited these things to his disciples, because it was not certain that all who had fellowship with them in the perirranterion and bath were pure. *Do not dip in the perirranterion*: do not use the perirranterion; do not dip the sprinkling instrument in order to purify. Nothing can be more unphilosophical than the con-

duct of this writer. As often as he meets a difficulty, he gives a new meaning to suit the situation. Now, though I could make no sense of the passage at all, I would resolutely refuse to adopt any meaning but one that the word confessedly has in some other place. It is not enough to say that such a translation will make sense, it must be the sense that the word is known to express.

Another difficulty with respect to a passage in Suidas, de Hierocle, induces this writer to translate βαπτω, to *wet*. He might as well translate it, to *dry*. A person was scourged before the tribunal, *ξεομενος δε τω αιματι βαψας κοιλην την χειρα, προσβραινει την δικασλημαν*, "and flowing with blood, having wetted the hollow of his hand, he sprinkles it on the judgment seat." The word, however, never signifies to *wet*; and even this translation does not suit the writer's own commentary. He explains it as referring to the catching of the blood flowing from his wounds, or letting the pouring blood fill the hollow of his hand. To *wet* is far enough from representing such a process. There can be no doubt that the word βαπτω is here to be translated in its usual sense. "And having *dipped* the hollow of his hand, he sprinkles the tribunal." It may be difficult easily to conceive the process, but of the meaning of the expression there can be no doubt. If the blood was flowing down his body, he might strike the palm of his hand on his skin, and gather up the blood in the hollow of his hand. Whatever was the way in which the operation was performed, the writer calls it a *dipping* of the hollow of his hand. There is, no doubt, something hyperbolical in the expression.

In the Nubes, Aristophanes represents Socrates as ludicrously dipping the feet of a flea into wax, as an ingenious expedient to measure its leap.

Κηρον διατηξας, ειτα την φυλλαν λαβων,  
Ενβαψεν εις τον κηρον αυτης τω ποδε.

"Having melted the wax, he took the flea and dipped

its feet into the wax." Here the liquid is wax, and the mode can be nothing but dipping. Such an instance determines the meaning of the word beyond all reasonable controversy.

But, though the word is most usually and properly applied to fluids, it is often applied even to solids that are penetrated. Dionysius of Halicarnassus applies it to the thrusting of a spear, βαψας, between the ribs of a man. In like manner, we might say that a soldier *plunged* his sword into the bowels of his enemy.

In Mat. xxvi. 23, the action of putting down the hand into a dish is expressed by this word, when the hand was not actually immersed in the fluid at the bottom. Εμβαψας την χειρα. "Who dipped his hand in the dish." Now, it is true that, according to ancient manners, the fingers were actually dipped in taking up food from the dish; yet it is quite proper to speak thus of the action of putting down the hand in the inside of a bowl or dish. An excise officer might be said to *dip* a vessel even when empty; and we speak of *plunging* into a wood. Miners also speak of *the dip* of a rock as being north or south, by referring to the direction of its *sinking* or *slope*.

Lycophron represents Cassandra, foretelling the death of Clytemnestra by the hand of her own son, as saying, "with his own hand he shall *dip* his sword into the viper's bowels."

Εἰς σπλαγχν' ἐχιδνης αὐτοχειρ βαψει ξίφος.

Here the word is applied to the penetrating of solids, in the sense of thrusting or piercing. In like manner we speak of *burying* a weapon in the bowels. *Pouring*, *sprinkling*, *washing*, have no countenance here, but are entirely excluded.

Ajax is represented by Sophocles as *dipping* his sword into the army of the Greeks. Εμβαψας ἑρχος το πρὸς Ἀργείων στρατῷ. In all such instances, there is a figurative stretch of the word, with a fine effect on composition; but the whole beauty of the expression

consists in the reference to the proper and modal meaning of the term.

Having proved the application of the word to mode, without respect to the nature of the fluid, I shall now at random produce examples.

In the thirteenth Idyl of Theocritus we have an example of it, in the account of the drowning of the boy Hylas, who went to a fountain to draw water for the supper of Hercules and Telamon. *Ἡτοι οὐρυὸς σπερχε ποτῶ πουλχανόεα κρῶσσον, βαψαι σπειγομενος.* "The youth held the capacious urn over the water, hasting to *dip* it," &c. Can any thing be more definite than this? Can any one be at a loss to know how a pitcher is filled with water at a fountain? Can an unprejudiced reader demand a clearer example than this, to show the modal meaning of *βαπτω*? Even the unlearned reader may judge for himself in this matter. Indeed, from the connexion in which the word is found, he may, in almost all the examples, judge whether the translation of the term is natural or forced. I hope, then, the unlearned reader will not pass over even this part of the subject as altogether beyond him.

The word occurs in the Hecuba of Euripides.

*Συ δ' αὖ λαβούσα τευχὸς ἀρχαία λατρί,  
Βαψας' ἐνεγχε δέυρα ποντίας ἀλας.*

"Take a vessel, ancient servant, and having *dipped* it in the sea, bring it hither."

Dr. Gale informs us, that the explanation of the word in this place, by one of the Greek scholiasts, is, — *βαπτειν εἰς τὸ χάλαν τι εἰς ὕδωρ, ἢ εἰς ἑτέρον τι υγρὸν.* "Βαπτειν signifies to let down any thing into water, or any other liquid." Can we wish for better authority for the meaning of a Greek word?

Aristophanes, in the play entitled *Εἰρηνη*, affords us an example of the word.

*Φερε δὴ τὸ δάσιον τοδ' ἐμβαψω λαβὼν.*

"Bring the torch, that I may take and dip it."

Dr. Gale observes that the Greek Scholiast and Florent. Christianus, preceptor to Henry Fourth, of France, refer this to the manner of purifying among the Greeks, by dipping a lighted torch in water, and so sprinkling the persons or things to be purified. This explains the Pythagorean precept, quoted in Mr. Ewing's Appendix.

Dr. Gale has given us some fragments of this author, preserved by Harpocratian, where the general meaning is more obscure, but in which the peculiar meaning of this word is not at all doubtful. "When I have *dipped* βαψας, I will cite the strangers before the judges." "This passage would have been very obscure," says he, "and I do not know whether any thing would have given light to it, if Suidas had not attempted it; for I take this to be the passage he refers to, when he says, 'when I have *dipped* the oar,' &c. which helps us to the sense of the word βαψας in this place, though it does not clear up the whole. "Or perhaps," says he, "it may be a metaphor taken from the dyers, who say, for instance, I will dip it, and make it a black." Athenæus has preserved two other fragments of the same author, in which the word occurs; one is, "what a wretch am I, to be thus dipped over head and ears, αρεσπαθη, in brine, like a pickled herring." We have, therefore, the authority of Suidas, that βαπτειν applies to the dipping of an oar in the water.

Aristotle, speaking of a kind of fish, says: Και τας μεταβολας δ' ουκ υπομενουσι τας ισχυρας, οιον και τοις θερουσιν εαν βαπτωσιν εις ψυχρον. "They cannot bear great changes, as the *immersion* of them into cold water, even in summer." Can any thing be more decisive? We could not speak of *sprinkling*, or *pouring*, or *wetting* a fish into water.

Speaking of the remedy for the bite of a certain kind of snake in Africa, he says: ου και λεγεται ακος ειναι λιθος τις, ον λαμβανουσιν απο ταφου βασιλιδως των αρχαιων, και εν εινω αποβαλσαντες, τινουσι. "Of which the remedy



is said to be a certain stone which they take from the sepulchre of a king of ancient times, and having *immersed* it in wine, drink." Here the virtue of the stone is supposed to be extracted by the wine in which it is *dipped*. They do not *sprinkle* the stone with wine, nor *pour* wine upon it, but they *dipped* the stone, and then drank the wine in which it was *dipped*. Even the unlearned reader can be at no loss with respect to the mode imported by the word in this process.

The same author applies the word *αποβαρη* to the immersion of animals in a pool of Sicily, which had the property of resuscitating them when put into it after suffocation. What can be more satisfactory than this? If any thing can be more decisive, it is an example from the same author, in which he tells us, that it is the custom of some nations to *dip* their children, *αποβαπτειν*, into cold water, soon after birth, in order to harden them.

Herodotus decisively fixes the meaning of this word, when he applies it to the Scythian ceremony of dipping certain things in a mixture of blood and water, in concluding an alliance. "The Scythians, in concluding a league with any one, make it in the following manner. Having poured wine into an earthen vessel, they mingle with it the blood of the parties, making a slight incision in the body by a knife or a sword. After this, they dip into the vessel a scimitar, and arrows, a hatchet, and a javelin. When they have done this, they utter many imprecations; and they who make the league, with the most distinguished of the company, drink the mixture." The phrase *αποβαφαντες ες την κυλικα*, can mean nothing but *dipping in the bowl*. *Pouring, sprinkling, washing, wetting*, and all other fancies are entirely excluded.

The setting of a constellation is termed, by Aratus, *dipping, βαπτων, into the sea*. Is there any doubt with respect to mode in this example? When the sun, moon, and stars descend below our horizon, when we stand on the shore, they appear to *dip* in the sea. All

nations speak in phraseology that imports this. We have some beautiful examples in Virgil.

The same author applies the word, just in our manner, to the setting sun. "If the sun *dips* himself, without a cloud, into the western sea."

Again he says,—“If the crow dips, εβαψατο, his head into the river.” Can any one need a commentary to point out the mode imported by the word here?

“Constantine,” says “Dr. Gale, observes from an epigram of Hermolaus, ες υδατι κρωσσόν εβαψε, *He dipped his pitcher in the water.* The mysterious Lycophron affords us an instance parallel to this, in Callimachus; *dipping*, βαψαντες, with strange and foreign buckets.” And again, to this may be added, what Aristotle says in his Mechanical Questions; “*The bucket must be first let down, or dipped, βαψαι, and then be drawn up again, viz. when it is full.*” Can any thing be supposed more specifically to express *dipping*, than βαπτω in these instances?

Homer employs the word in the Odyssey, in a situation where the meaning cannot be doubted. He compares the hissing of the eye of Polyphemus, when bored by a red-hot stake, to the hissing of the water when a smith dips his iron in order to temper it.

Ως δ' οτ' ανης χαλκευς πελεκυν μεγαν, ης σκεπαρνον,  
Ειν υδατι ψυχρω βαπτει μεγαλα ιαχοντα.

“As when the smith an hatchet or large axe,  
Temp'ring with skill, *plunges* the hissing blade  
Deep in cold water. (Whence the strength of steel.)”

COWPER.

No one who has seen a horse shod, will be at a loss to know the mode of the application of water in this instance. The *immersion* of the newly formed shoe in water, in order to harden the metal, is expressed by the word βαπτειν. An instance of the same kind we have in the Apocryphal Book of Ecclesiasticus, where iron heated in the furnace, is said to be tempered, ενβαφει, by immersion in water. The note of Didymus on the place is: το βαψαι ψυχρω τον πετυρωμενον

σιδηρον ισχυρον γαρ αυτον ποιει. "The dipping of red-hot iron in cold water hardens it."

Anacreon, in his Ode on the Arrows of Cupid, represents them as forged by Vulcan, and *dipped* by Venus in honey, into which Cupid put a mixture of gall.

Αχιδας δ' εβαπτε Κυπρις,  
Μελι το γλυκυ λαβουσα.  
Ο δ' Ερωε χολην εμισγε.

The manner of poisoning arrows by dipping their points in the poisonous matter, sufficiently explains this. Here we see, also, that this word applies to honey, and even to gall, to poisoning as well as to washing.

Herodotus, speaking of a custom of the Egyptians, employs this word in a sense entirely analogous to the use of βαπτίζειν, in the ordinance of baptism. He applies it to a ceremonial or religious purification of the person and garments, by immersion in a river after defilement. Τν δ' Αιγυπτιοι μιαρν ηγηνται θηριον ειναι και τουτο μιν, ην τις ψαυση αυτων παριων νοε, αυτοισι τοισι ματιοις ακιων εβαψε αυτον, βαε εε τον ποταμον. "The Egyptians consider the swine so polluted a beast, that if any one in passing touch a swine, he will go away and *dip* himself with his very garments, going into the river." Here is a religious baptism, for the purpose of cleansing from defilement; and it is by immersion, expressed by βαπτειν. Can any one require a more definite example? The person dips himself; therefore it is βαπτω, not βαπτίζω. All the occurrences of the word in the Septuagint, are confirmatory of this view of its meaning.

Αηψεσθε δε δεσμην υσσωπου, και βαφαντες απο του αιματος του παρα την θυραν. Ex. xii. 22. "And ye shall take a bunch of hyssop, and dipping it in the blood which is at the door," &c. This surely is not *washing*: it is *smearing*. It is not pouring or sprinkling, but dipping.

Lev. iv. 6. Και βαψει ο ιερευε τον δακτυλον ειε το αιμα,

και προσρανει απο του αιματος. "And the priest shall *dip* his finger in the blood, and *sprinkle* of the blood," &c. Here we have the action both of *dipping* and *sprinkling*; and βαπτω applies to the former, while ρανω applies to the latter. Can any thing be more decisive than this?

Lev. iv. 17. Και βαψει ο ιερευσ τον δακτυλον απο του αιματος του μοσχου, και ρανει. "And the priest shall *dip* his finger in the blood of the bullock, and *sprinkle* it," &c.

Lev. ix. 9. Και εβαψε τον δακτυλον εις το αιμα. "And he dipped his finger into the blood." He could not sprinkle or pour his finger *into* the blood.

Lev. xi. 32. Εις υδωρ βαφησεται. "It must be put into water." Literally, "It shall be dipped into water." This cannot admit even of plausible evasion.

Lev. xiv. 6. Και βαψει αυτα και το ορνιθιον το ζων εις το αιμα. "And shall dip them and the living bird in the blood," &c.

Dr. Wall has asserted that the word βαψει here, cannot be understood dipping all over: *for the blood of the bird in the bason could not be enough to receive the living bird, and the cedar wood, and the scarlet, and the hyssop, all into it.* To this the answer of Dr. Gale is perfectly satisfactory. The blood of the slain bird was received in a vessel of running water, in which mixture, as appears from verse 51, the things were to be dipped. It may be added, that this makes the figure have a beautiful allusion to the double efficacy of the blood of Jesus Christ. It washes as well as atones; and though this might be exhibited by separate dippings, yet the union is seen more clearly in the combination of blood and water. But that the word βαπτειν is employed when only a part of an object is dipped, is most freely admitted; and the same thing may be said of the very word *dip* itself. Thus we speak of dipping a pen in ink, when only the point of the pen is dipped. What would we say

of the foreigner who should allege that the English word *dip*, when applied in the expression, *They dipped the man in the river*, does not necessarily imply that they dipped him all over; because he finds from the expression, *dip a pen in ink*, it is applied sometimes when only a part is dipped? Every person at all accustomed to philosophize on language, knows that such a figure is quite common; but that it never alters or affects the proper meaning of the word. The figure, in fact, is not in the verb, but in its regimen. In all such expressions, both βαπτω and *dip* have their proper and entire significations, and express mode, as fully as when there is no figure. The expression, *dip a pen*, determines mode as clearly as when the object is sunk to the bottom of the sea, never to arise. A writer must be perverse indeed, who indulges himself in such quibbles; yet some of the gravest and most learned writers have urged this objection. It must be observed, that Dr. Wall, though he is a friend to infant baptism, is decidedly in favour of immersion. With respect to all such elliptical phrases, I observe, that they are used only about common operations, when the part to be dipped is so well known as to prevent obscurity. But granting to the authors of this objection all their demands, I hope we shall find them dipping at least a part of the body of the person baptized. It is strange to find Christians arguing that the word, though it signifies to immerse, may be applied when only a part is dipped; yet in their own practice, *dipping* neither in whole nor in part, but substituting *pouring* or *sprinkling* in its place.

Lev. xiv. 16. Καὶ βαψῇ τὸν δακτυλὸν τὸν δεξιὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐλαίου. "That the priest shall dip his right finger in the oil that is in his left hand, and shall sprinkle of the oil with his finger seven times before the Lord." Here, also, we see the characteristic distinction between *dipping* and *sprinkling*. The action of putting

the oil on the finger, is expressed by βαπτω; that of applying it to the object, by ραινω. The word occurs again in the 51st verse, with reference to the same process as that described in verse 6.

Numb. xix. 18. Και ληψεται υσσωπον, και βαψει εις το υδωρ ανηρ καθαρος, και περιρρανει επι τον οικον. "And a clean person shall take hyssop, and *dip* it in the water, and sprinkle it upon the house."

Deut. xxxiii. 24. Βαψει εν ελαιω τον ποδα αυτου. "Let him *dip* his foot in oil." Here the great abundance of oil is expressed, by representing the possessor as *dipping* his foot in it. The unlearned reader may perceive, that in all these instances the meaning of the word in question is so clear and definite, that even our translators, who were no practical immersers, render it as we do. Can it then admit a doubt, that this is the proper rendering?

Josh. iii. 15. "And as they that bore the ark were come unto Jordan, and the feet of the priests that bare the ark, εβαφησαν εις μερος του υδατος του Ιορδανου were *dipped* in the brim of the water."

Ruth ii. 14. Βαψεις τον ψωμον εν τω οξει. "*Dip* thy morsel in the vinegar."

1 Sam. xiv. 27. "And Jonathan heard not when his father charged the people with the oath; wherefore he put forth the end of the rod that was in his hand, and εβαλεν αυτο εις το κηριον του μελιτος, dipped it in a honey-comb." Here the mode is most determinately fixed. He stretched forth his rod, and *dipping* the point of it, ate the honey off the rod.

2 Kings viii. 15. "And it came to pass, that on the morrow he took a thick cloth, and *dipped it in water*," εβαλεν εν τω υδατι.

Job. ix. 31. What our translators render, "yet shalt thou plunge me in the ditch," &c. in the Greek is, Ικανως εν ρυτω με εβαψας, *Thou hast dipped me deeply in filth*. Here we not only have the mode signified by this word, but evidence that the word is as

applicable when the object of *dipping* is to *defile*, as when the object is to *wash*. It denotes the mode only, without any reference to the intention with which it is used.

Psalm lxxviii. 23. Οπως αν βαφη ο πους σου εν αιματι, η γλωσσα των κυων σου εξ εχθρων παρ' αυτου. "That thy feet may be *dipped* in the blood of thine enemies, and the tongue of thy dogs in the same." Here the person is supposed to wade through blood, to denote the greatest slaughter.

In 2 Mac. i. 21, the word is used to signify the drawing of water from a deep pit, (compare verse 19.) "He ordered them to draw," literally, *dip*.

The use of the word in the New Testament, is exactly the same as in the examples which have been quoted from other writers. Matt. xxiv. 23, has already been referred to. The same transaction is related Mark xiv. 20. "It is one of the twelve that *dippeth* with me in the dish," ο εμβαπτομενος μετ' εμου εις το τρυβλιον. John xiii. 26, relates the fact, omitting the circumstance that the betrayer was dipping with him in the dish, and giving a circumstance omitted by Matthew and Mark, namely, that Jesus pointed out the betrayer by giving him a sop, after he had dipped it. Βαψας το ψωμιον επιδωσω. Και εμβαψας το ψωμιον. The word here refers to the dipping of the bread in the bitter sauce. Neither pouring nor sprinkling could have any place here.

Luke xvi. 24. "And he cried and said, Father Abraham, have mercy on me, and send Lazarus, that he may *dip the tip of his finger in water*, and cool my tongue," ινα βαφη το ακρον του δακτυλου αυτου υδατος.

Rev. xix. 13. "And he was clothed with a vesture dipped in blood," βεβαμμενον αιματι.

The glorious Redeemer is here represented as going forth to the destruction of his enemies, and as an emblem of his work, he is figured as clothed with a vesture *dipped in blood*. This gives the most awful

image of the approaching slaughter. Dr. Gale, indeed, has alleged some reasons, to prove that we have not here the genuine reading. "The authority of Origen," says he, "whose writings are older than any copies of the Old Testament we can boast of, and therefore that he described from more ancient copies, must be more considerable than any we have. Now he, in his commentary on St. John's Gospel, cites these words from ver. 11, to ver. 16, inclusively, almost verbatim as they are in our edition; but reads *εργαστισμενον*, *sprinkled*, instead of *βεβαμμενον*; which makes this passage nothing to our purpose. However, I should not think this single authority of Origen sufficient to justify my altering the word; but I have likewise observed that the Syriac and Æthiopic versions, which, for their antiquity, must be thought almost as valuable and authentic as the original itself, being made from primitive copies, in or very near the times of the Apostles, and rendering the passage by words which signify to sprinkle, must greatly confirm Origen's reading of the place, and very strongly argue, that he has preserved the very same word which was in the autograph." These reasons, however, do not in the least bring the common reading into suspicion in my mind, and I will never adopt a reading to serve a purpose. Misapprehension of the meaning of the passage, it is much more likely, has substituted *εργαστισμενον* for *βεβαμμενον*. The warrior is represented as going out, and not as returning, and the garment as emblematically dyed to represent his work before it was begun. Dr. Cox's reply to Mr. Ewing's observations on this verse is a triumphant refutation of the objection which misconception has founded on this passage, and must silence it for ever. "The following reference," says Dr. Cox, "is very triumphantly adduced: 'And he was clothed in a vesture *dipped* in blood,'—properly, it is alleged, 'a vesture *bespattered, sprinkled, spotted, or stained* with blood.' 'In this case, evidently, the vesture was



not *popped* into the blood, but the blood was *popped* upon the garment, and thus it was *bespattered* with blood,' &c.\*

"If any thing is *evident* here, it is that Mr. Ewing has mistaken the sense, and unwillingly produced a quotation most unequivocally in our favour. The illustrious person described is the WORD, or SON of God, under the image of a conqueror seated upon a white horse, *going forth* to a mighty conflict, followed by the armies of heaven! It is not the representation of a conqueror *returned* from battle, with his garments supposed to be *bespattered* or *stained* with the blood of his vanquished foes; but of one *going forth* to the war. A sharp sword issues out of his mouth, that with it he should smite the nations; *ἵνα ἐν αὐτῇ παραδῶν τα εὐνη*. But it may be demanded, is it not incongruous to represent his vesture as *stained* or *bespattered*, as dyed in the blood of his enemies before he has engaged in the conflict? The answer is, it does not in reality, though it is so commonly understood, refer to the blood of foes *splashed* in mortal strife upon the garment of the conqueror; it simply contains an emblematical representation of Christ, under the figure of a general, commencing some great expedition, clothed in the splendid vestment which was usual on such occasions. The name given to it by the Roman writers, is *Paludamentum*. It was the distinguishing robe of the general, and was usually of a purple, or scarlet colour. As the *prætexta*, or white robe, worn by the chief magistrate, constituted the usual domestic badge of honour; so the *Paludamentum* distinguished the hero when he marched to battle 'Quibus erat,' says Pliny, 'moris paludamento mutare prætextam.' A vesture dyed in blood, was, therefore, a vesture of a red or purple colour, to express the military character of the expedition; as, even to the present day, a peculiar dress, of a vivid and sanguinary hue, is worn

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\* See chapter on the Examination of Mr. Ewing's System in this work.

by those who are devoted to war. What then becomes of our author's *bepopped* or *besprinkled* vesture? It is found only in his own imagination."

Before I proceed farther, I shall advert to some examples in which βαπτω has been supposed to signify to *wash*; but in all of which it retains its own peculiar meaning.

Aristophanes applies the word to the cleansing of wool in warm water; must not *wash* or *cleanse*, then, be one of its meanings? By no means. Let us examine his words: *πρωτα μιν γαρ τ' εριτα βαπτουσι θερμω κατα τον αρχαιον νομον*. "First they dip the wool in warm water, according to ancient custom." What is asserted, is that they *dip*, or *immerse*, or *plunge* the wool into warm water. *Washing* is the consequence of the operation, but is not the thing expressed by the verb. It might be rendered by *wash* in a free translation; but this would be to give the sense, not an exact version of the words. Had he used the word *πλυνω*, then the *washing* would have been expressed, and the *dipping* would have been necessarily supposed. Both these words might be used for the same thing in many situations; still each of them would have its peculiar meaning. Accordingly Suidas and Phavorinus interpret βαπτουσι here by *πλυνουσι*. It argues very shallow philosophy, however, to suppose, that on this account the words are perfectly synonymous. We could, even in our own language, say indifferently, that *sheep are dipped in the river before they are shorn*, or *sheep are washed in the river before they are shorn*, yet this does not make *dip* and *wash* synonymous in our language. Words may be so far equivalent, as in certain situations, to be equally fitted to fill the same place, when each continues even in such situations to have its characteristic meaning. Ignorance of this important principle in the application of words, has led writers into the greatest absurdities, in determining the meaning of terms in a dead language. Whenever they find one word used in explanation of another, or where another would serve the purpose, they think the words

are synonymous. This is a false first principle, and all reasonings founded on it must be unsound. Yet this is the most plausible argument that Dr. Wall and others can find to prove that βαπτω signifies to *wash*. Suidas and Phavorinus explain it by πλυνω, therefore it must signify to *wash*. To convince the unlearned reader of the fallacy of this principle, let him open an English dictionary, and try if all the words given in explanation are strictly synonymous with those which they are used to explain. Yet on this principle, it is supposed to be irresistibly evident, that βαπτω signifies to *wash*, because baptism is referred to in the expression, "having your bodies washed with pure water," Heb. x. 22. When a person is *dipped* in pure water, he is *washed*, still *dipping* and *washing* are two different things. Baptism is a *washing*, not from the meaning of the word itself, for as far as that is concerned, it might be a defilement; but because it is an *immersion in pure water*.

The passage from Herodotus, in which he represents swine as an abomination to the Egyptians, coincides entirely with this doctrine. If an Egyptian touches a swine, he runs immediately to the river and dips himself. That he dips himself, is the thing expressed; but as the purpose of the dipping is cleansing, or religious washing, the same fact might be substantially reported by saying that *he washed, or cleansed, or purified, or bathed himself in the river*. Yet βαπτω no more signifies to *wash* or *purify* here, than it does in the translation of the LXX. with respect to Job, when applied to plunging in filth. The word has here its own peculiar meaning, and makes not the smallest intrusion into the province of λουω. Mr. Ewing's remark on this passage is truly surprising. The Egyptian, it seems, performed this operation on himself, but the Christian is baptized by another. And can Mr. Ewing really think that this is any thing to the purpose? Was it ever supposed that it is from the verb βαπτω that we are to learn whether a believer is to dip him-

self, or to be dipped by another in the ordinance of baptism? It is enough that the word informs of the mode: other things must be learned from their proper sources. From Herodotus, in the story of the Egyptian, we may learn the meaning of the word; but from Scripture, we must learn whether the operation is to be performed to the believer by himself, or by another. Was ever any thing so unreasonable, as to expect a perfect coincidence between an ordinance of Christ, and a superstitious custom of heathens? The meaning of the word is quite unaffected, whether the person dips himself or is dipped by another. Does Mr. Ewing doubt whether βαπτω can apply when the operation respects a thing different from the agent? This cannot be his meaning, for almost all the examples of its use refer to such cases. Does he mean, that among the innumerable things which are said to be dipped, as expressed by βαπτω, a human being is not to be found, except in the case of one performing the operation for himself? If this is his meaning, it is not to the purpose; for though an example could not be found in which one person is said to dip another, the command of Christ warrants the practice, and the word βαπτω will apply to one thing as well as another. But, as Dr. Cox has observed, there is an example in the case of the drowning of Aristobulus, which we shall afterwards consider. And we have already seen an example in the Scythian custom of immersing their new-born infants. But I will never consent that any such example is necessary. The demand is founded on a false principle of criticism. A passage from the Hymns of Callimachus, in which this word is misunderstood by some, is set in its proper light by Dr. Gale: "My opinion," says he, "is confirmed also by Callimachus, in his hymns, when he says: 'Ye Grecian watermen, (they furnished private houses with water, as some do among us) dip not your vessels in the river Inachus to-day.' The hymn was made on the solemnizing the festival of washing the

statue of Pallas ; which ceremony was performed by persons set apart for that purpose, in the river Inachus, a little before day ; from this river the inhabitants were usually supplied with water, which makes the poet, in veneration to the goddess, charge the watermen here not to dip their pitchers in the river on that day."

This, however, is of importance, rather for the understanding of the poet, than for ascertaining the meaning of the word in question. For whether the purpose of the watermen was to wash their pitchers by *dipping* them, or to fill them by *dipping* them, *dipping* is the only thing expressed by the word βαπτω.

In Dan. iv. 30, and v. 21, this word is rendered by *wet* in our version, which may seem an insuperable objection to the uniformity of its signification of mode. This instance is thought to support their opinion, who assert that βαπτω is a generic word, denoting the bringing of any thing into a state of wetness. But there is here no exception to the peculiar meaning of the word. The term *wet* gives the general sense of the passage well enough, but is by no means a translation of the word in the original, nor of that employed by the Septuagint. It ought to have been rendered according to the usual modal meaning, which, instead of being harsh, would have found corresponding expressions in all languages. By employing a general word, our translators in this instance have lost the peculiar beauty of the original, without in the least adding to the perspicuity. The words of the Septuagint are, ἀπὸ τῆς ὀφούρου τοῦ οὐρανοῦ τὸ σῶμα αὐτοῦ ἐβαπν. "His body was *immersed* in the dew." In the translation, "His body was *wet* with the dew," the general effect is the same, but the eloquence of expression has evaporated. But a soul-less critic will reply, "there was here no literal immersion ; the word cannot then be used in that sense." Were we to pass through the poets, conforming their

language to this observation, what havoc should we make of their beauties! How dull and lifeless would become their animated expressions! I have seen no explication of this passage that appears to develop the principle of this application, though the general sense of the passage is well enough understood. As the theory of generic meaning in *Barrow*, including every application of water without reference to mode, has no other plausible foundation but the common version of this passage, it will be of importance to settle the question, though it should occupy some pages.

Dr. Gale affords us many materials to prove, that the word has here its ordinary sense; but I think he fails in his attempt to analyse the expression. His observations on the copiousness of the eastern dews are much to the purpose; a part of which I shall transcribe. "Philosophically speaking," says he, "the hottest climates and clearest skies naturally abound most with dew, which is also confirmed by constant experience. It is commonly known to be so in her Majesty's Leeward Islands in America,—where one season of the year, when they have no rains for a considerable time together, the fruits of the earth would be burned up, were it not for the dews that fall plentifully in the night. That incomparable mathematician, Captain Halley, observed, when making some experiments in St. Helena, that the dews fell in such abundance as to make his paper too wet to write on, and his glasses unfit for use without frequent wiping. And as to Africa, in particular, where part of Nebuchadnezzar's dominions lay, Pliny tells us, the nights were very dewy. Egypt has little or no rain; but is fed by the overflowing of the Nile, and by constant nocturnal dews; and Nebuchadnezzar kept his court in a country of near the same latitude, and consequently of the like temperament."

This is very useful as a ground-work for the analysis of the expression; but it does not in the least

give a reason why a *wetting* with a copious fall of dew is called an *immersion*. Had this monarch been wet even by a shower-bath, why is his *wetting* called a *dipping*? If all the water in the ocean had fallen on him, it would not have been a literal *immersion*. The words would still be wanting. Our opponents, if they know their business, may admit this, and still deny the consequence which this writer draws from it. Nor does this gentleman succeed better in analysing the expression. "Hence it appears very clear," says he, "that both Daniel and his translators designed to express the great dew Nebuchadnezzar should be exposed to, more emphatically, by saying, he should lie in dew, and be covered with it all over, as if he had been dipped: for that is so much like being dipped, as at most to differ no more than being in, and being put in, so that the metaphor is easy, and not at all strained." But Daniel does not say that Nebuchadnezzar *should lie in dew, and be covered with it all over*. Had this been his expression, it would have been quite literal. Dr. Gale absurdly supposes that *Βαπτω* means to cover with water without reference to mode, and at the same time metaphorically alludes to *dipping*. Neither Daniel nor his translators say that Nebuchadnezzar should be as wet as if he were dipped; for if that had been the expression, there could have been no dispute about it.

Dr. Cox's reply to Mr. Ewing, with respect to the analysis of this expression, appears to me not quite satisfactory. "It was," says Mr. Ewing, "*popped upon*, not even by *effusion*, but by the gentlest *distillation* that is known in nature." "To this it has been generally replied," says Dr. Cox, "and I think satisfactorily, that a body exposed to eastern dews, would be as wet as if plunged into water." Now, this is valid, as proving that the body ought to be completely *wetted* in Baptism; but it leaves the mode unaccounted for. Mr. Ewing might grant this, yet still insist from this passage, that mode is not contained in the word.

Many persons do plead for a copious effusion of water in Baptism; and they might yield to the above reasoning, still contending that the mode is not essential or that it is not *immersion*. The most complete wetting by dew or rain is not *dipping* literally. If we will fairly meet this passage, we must show, not merely that Nebuchadnezzar was completely wetted, but that a wetting in one mode may be figuratively designated by the words that properly denote a wetting in another mode. I will not hide one particle of the strength of our opponent's cause, nor an apparent weakness in our own. Let Christianity itself sink, rather than use one insufficient argument.

Dr. Cox continues: "The passage, however, merits a little more detailed explanation. The verb is used in the passive voice, in the second aorist, and the indicative mood, implying consequently that the action was past, and indefinite as to time." It does not seem to me, that the voice, tense, and mood of the verb, have any concern in this debate. In all voices, tenses, and moods, a verb must have its characteristic meaning. "It does not," continues Dr. Cox, "imply the *manner* in which the effect was produced, but *the effect itself*: not the mode by which the body of the king was wetted, but its *condition*, as resulting from exposure to the dew of heaven." Without doubt, the verb expresses mode here as well as any where else. To suppose the contrary gives up the point at issue, as far as mode is concerned. This in fact makes βαπτω signify simply *to wet*, without reference to mode.

Dr. Cox gives an illustration, but unfortunately it can give no relief, as it fails in an essential point of similarity. "Suppose," says he, "by way of illustration, we select another word, and put it into the same voice and tense; as σπλασθῇ ὑπο σου, "he was hurt by you." It is obvious that this representation might refer to an injury done long ago, and would predicate nothing of the *manner* in which it was in-



flected," &c. Very true. Nothing of *manner* is here expressed, and for an obvious reason, *nothing of manner* is expressed by the verb βαπτω. But will Dr. Cox grant that this is the case with the verb βαπτω? If he does, about what is he contending? Βαπτω not only necessarily implies mode, but literally expresses nothing but mode. Instead of literally denoting *wetting* in any manner, it does not literally include *wetting* at all. This is as true in this passage, as it is in any other. Mode is as much expressed here, as it is in the commission of our Lord to the Apostles. The difference is, that the thing that is here called an immersion, was so only figuratively. I claim this passage as much as I do the plainest example in the New Testament.

That the word in question ought here, as in all other places, to be rendered *immerse*, is necessary from the following reasons :

1. It is utterly unwarrantable to give a meaning to the word which it cannot be shown to have in some unquestionable examples. To assign a meaning not so justified, is to reason without first principles—to build without a foundation. This suits the visionary, but can never be the resource of true criticism. Now, the whole history of the word does not afford a single example in which it must signify to *wet*. Whatever, then, may be the principle on which this *wetting* of Nebuchadnezzar is called *immersion*, *immersion* it is called.

2. This is confirmed, as Dr. Cox has observed, by the original. The word in the original signifies to *dip*; if so, why should not the Greek word by which it is translated have its own peculiar meaning? How can mode be excluded, if it is in both the original and the translation?

On this point Dr. Gale is quite satisfactory. "The word here used in the original," says he, "is טָבַע, which in the Chaldee necessarily implies *dipping*, witness Buxtorf, Castell, &c. and above all, the constant

use of the word. It is by this word the Jerusalem Targum renders the Hebrew טבל, Levit. iv. 6,—the only place where that imperfect version translates the Hebrew word, but had it been complete, we should probably have had more examples.

“In other places where the word is used, though not to translate טבל, it is always in the same sense, signifying to *immerse* or *drown*; as Exod. xv. 4, in which place the Jerusalem Targum, Jonathan’s Paraphrase, and that called Onkelos, the Syriac version, and the original of Moses, do all use טבע or טבע, to signify, *immerse*, *plunge*, or *drown*, as our version renders it; but I suppose it will not be questioned, otherwise I would attempt more largely to prove, this word does always signify to *dip*.” Let the philosophy of the application, then, be what it may, the word βαπτω in this passage, must have its own peculiar meaning.

3. The Syriac version, as Dr. Gale remarks, renders the original in the same manner as the LXX. “The authors of the ancient and valuable Syriac version,” says he, “who were of the neighbourhood of Babylon, and well enough acquainted with the large dews in these parts, and endeavoured to give an exact literal translation, have shunned this error.” If, then, the Syriac translators have rendered the original by a term that signifies to *dip*, why should not βαπτω in the translation of the LXX. have the same meaning? To me the reasoning of Dr. Gale is entirely satisfactory.

4. The expression is intelligible and beautiful in our own language, and, I have no doubt, might be exemplified in all languages. Alluding to the flood, we might say, that God *immersed the world in water*; or of a rock when covered by the tide, that it is *immersed in the sea*. Do we not every day hear similar phraseology? The man who has been exposed to a summer-plump, will say that he has got a complete *dipping*. This is the very expression of Daniel. One mode of

wetting is figured as another mode of wetting, by the liveliness of the imagination. The same figure meets us almost in every page of the poets. Virgil will supply us with instances in abundance :

“ Postquam collapsi cineres, et flamma quievit ;  
Reliquias vino et bibulam lavere favillam.”

They washed the relics, and the warm spark, in wine.

Who *washes* ashes, and bones, and embers ? On the principle of Mr. Ewing's criticism, we might, from this passage of Virgil, deny that *lavo* properly signifies to *wash*, and assert that it denotes to *drench*, to *quench*, to *wet*, to *moisten*, &c. What avails it then, to tell us that Nebuchadnezzar was *wet* with the gentlest distillation in nature ? The effect of that gentle operation may be so like that of another more violent operation, that the language of the imagination may designate the more gentle by the characteristic denomination of the more violent. A *wetting* by dew, may, in the language of animation, be called a *dipping*. Language violates the laws of natural philosophy, as well as of logic, without scruple ; or rather it does not at all own subjection to them. It owes allegiance only to the laws of mind. Things most absurd, if explained according to the laws of natural philosophy, and most untrue, according to the laws of logic, are true and beautiful when tried by their proper standard. Why did Virgil make such an application of the word *lavo* here ? Was it for lack of proper terms to express his ideas ? Of these he had abundance. Was it to deceive or puzzle ? Neither ; for his meaning appears at a glance. He uses *lavo* for the same reason that the Holy Spirit, by Daniel, used the word signifying to immerse, when speaking of the wetting of Nebuchadnezzar by the dew, to enliven the style. Every reader must observe that much of the beauty of this passage in Virgil is owing to the use of the word *lavo* in this figurative catachrestic sense. Literal accuracy

would have been comparatively tame. And had not the word βαπτω been a term whose meaning affects religious practice, the above expression of Daniel and the Septuagint, instead of tormenting commentators and controversialists, would have been admired as a beauty in composition. "Wetting by the gentlest distillation in nature," would the critic say, "is here in the most lively and imaginative language, figured as an *immersion*." But what is an elegance in the classics, is a ground of never-ending quibble to theologians, who, instead of seeking the laws of language in the human mind, subject the words of the Spirit to the laws of logical truth. No doubt, were Virgil of authority in religion, and were rites and ceremonies to be determined by his writings, the above expression would have been as variously interpreted as that in Daniel. Many a time we would hear, that *lavo*, from this example, does not signify to wash, but to *wet*, to *moisten*, to *drench*.

Virgil affords us another example in the same word:

Illi alternantes multa vi prælia miscent  
Vulneribus crebris: *lavit* ater corpora sanguis.

In the encounter of the two bulls, *the black blood washes their bodies*. Here it might be said, in the spirit of Mr. Ewing's criticism, the black blood could not wash; nay, it would defile the bodies of the contending animals. *Lavo*, then, cannot signify to *wash*, but to *smear*. But every one must see that the word *lavo* has here its peculiar signification, and that the whole beauty of the expression depends on this circumstance. Every man who has a soul at all, knows well that *lavo* is here much more beautiful, than if the poet had chosen a term literally signifying to smear. That which was a real *defilement* is called a *washing*, to express figuratively the copiousness of the blood that flowed from the mutual wounds of the contending bulls. This gives a feast to the imagination, where literal expression would afford no food. *Audire habenas*, to hear the reins, signifying to *obey the bridle*,

is an expression of the same kind. Indeed, it is impossible to open the poets without being presented with examples of this phraseology.

Having examined those examples in which this word has been supposed to signify to *wash* or to *wet*, but in each of which it is to be explained according to its characteristic meaning, I shall now proceed with other examples. The word occurs, as might be expected, very frequently in the writings of Hippocrates. And as, in medical use, there is occasion to refer repeatedly to every mode of the application of liquids, in the voluminous writings of this great physician, there can be no doubt but we shall find the characteristic meaning of βαπτω. Accordingly, we do find it in numerous instances; and in all these, I do not recollect any but one, in which it has not the sense of *dip*. In that one, it signifies to *dye*, according to its secondary import.

The first occurrence of it which I have observed in this author, is in his treatise De Superfœt. p. 50. edit. Basil. Βαπτειν δε τας μηλας, εν ενι των μαλακταγηριων διειμενω. "Dip the probes in some emollient."

At the bottom of the next page, we have another example. Βαψασα δε το ρακος εν μυρω λευκω αιγυπτιω ευωδει. "Dipping the rag in white sweet-smelling Egyptian ointment."

In the treatise De Victus Ratione, p. 104, the following example occurs: εγχρυφαι, θερμοι ες οινον αυσηρον εμβαπτομενοι. "Let the food be cakes dipped hot in sour wine."

In the treatise De Usu Humidorum, we have the following example:

Εγια δε οσα μεν ψυξις ειδικα, η καταχειται, η ενισται, η εμβαπτηται εις υδωρ ψυχρωτατον. "But for the sake of cooling the wound, wool is either sprinkled with the sour wine, or put into it, or it may be dipped into the coldest water."

In continuation from the last words, the following immediately succeed: οσα δε ψυξις, μελας οινος και ειγια

παταξῆναι, ιον. και φυλλα τευτλων, η οβονια βαπτεται εις τα πλειςα. p. 113. "As a cooler, black wine is sprinkled on wool, whereas beet-leaves and linen are for the most part *dipped*."

In the treatise De Morbis, we have the following examples: και προς την κεφαλην σπογγους εν υδατι βαπτων θερμω, προστιθεναι, Lib. xi. p. 145. "Dipping sponges in warm water, apply them to the head."

In the next page, at top, we have the following example: εξωθεν δε σπογγους βαπτων ες υδωρ θερμον, προστιθεσθαι προς τας γναθους και τα σιαγονια. "As an external application, dipping sponges into warm water, let them be applied to the cheeks and jaws." A similar example occurs near the top of the next page; σπογγον ες υδωρ θερμον εμβαπτων, προστιθεναι. "Dipping a sponge into warm water, apply it." Page 149. σκεροδα διδου, ες μελι βαπτων. "Give garlic, *dipping* it into honey."

In page 151, we have the following example: ζωμον δε μη ροφειτω, μηδε βαπτεσθαι. "Let him not sup soup, nor even dip his bread into it." In the Appendix to Mr. Ewing's Essay on Baptism, written by a friend, we find a very odd view of this passage. I shall quote his observations at large. "Hippocrates (de Morb. lib. ii.) uses βαπτεσθαι to denote the application of a liquid to the skin. Ζωμος δε μη ροφειτω μηδε βαπτεσθαι, "neither sip, nor *pour* (or sprinkle) broth;" using βαπτεσθαι in this sense, I suppose, from the idea that the application of the liquid would strongly affect the place to which the application was made; at all events, it would require no small ingenuity to discover in this passage the idea of immersion." In this criticism there is a complication of errors and false principles. 1. Why does the author translate βαπτεσθαι by *pour* or *sprinkle*? Is there one instance in which it confessedly must have this meaning in the whole compass of Greek literature? If not, to apply such a meaning in any particular emergency is to reason without first principles. 2. If the author read the whole of the works of Hippocrates, as I am convinced he did, must he not have

found a multitude of examples in which the word *βαρυνω* unquestionably has the meaning *dip*? He would reply, no doubt, such a meaning could not apply here? But even if he could not find any view in which the usual meaning of the verb could apply in this instance, would it not have been more candid to grant the usual signification of the word, and confess a difficulty, than to assign a meaning altogether at random, without a shadow of authority either from the word or the context? 3. How does he bring the *skin* of the patient into requisition in this place? Where does he find this? Neither in the expression, nor in any usual ellipsis. He might as well have supposed the feet or the head. 4. Is it a fact that broth or soup would have such a mischievous effect on the skin? The solution of this surpasses my medical knowledge. 5. It requires no ingenuity to find here the proper meaning of the word *βαρυνω*, as importing to *dip*. It is well known that at table the ancients dipped their bread into the soup, or other liquid which they used as a seasoning. What then can be so natural as to fill up the ellipsis with the bread which was dipped? An ellipsis of the regimen in things so common was quite usual. The evangelist uses the same ellipsis, where he says, "he that dippeth with me in the dish," that is, he that dippeth *his hand* with me in the dish, as another evangelist expresses it; or "he that dippeth *his bread* with me," might, with equal propriety, be supplied as the supplemental matter. 6. The elliptical matter must be supplied by the connexion. In an ellipsis we are never left to wander abroad to look for the thing that is wanting. It is always omitted, because it is so obvious that it cannot be missed. This is the principle on which ellipsis is used, and on no other is it justifiable. Were it otherwise, all language would consist of riddles. This is the reason why ellipsis is so common in conversation, and about the most common things. What is omitted, is omitted, because every hearer will instantly supply it. We say of a

man, that he is a great *drinker*—drinker of what? Drinker of water? No. Drinker of milk? No. But without the smallest hesitation, we understand it to be *drinker of ardent spirits*. Just so in the present passage. The elliptical matter must be supplied from the connexion, and this leaves no doubt what it is. The writer was giving direction about the food of his patient. In the words immediately preceding, he prescribed boiled mutton, fowl, gourd, and beet. In the passage quoted, he forbids him to eat broth, or even to *dip*—dip what? *Dip* his bread in the broth. What else could he mean? In this view, the passage has a natural and a rational meaning. In some cases, a patient might be forbidden to partake freely of broth, when he might be permitted to season his morsel by dipping it in the savoury liquid. But in this case, it seems, even this indulgence was not permitted. But upon what principle could the skin of the patient be supplied as the supplemental matter? It is not in the connexion, and is as arbitrary as if we should supply the *coat* of the patient. It may be added, that in the immediately succeeding connexion, the patient is permitted to eat fish. The whole passage speaks of diet.

7. Whatever is forbidden in a medical prescription, must be a thing that is likely to be done, if not forbidden. No physician would act so absurdly as to prohibit what there is no probability his patient would do. Now, there was no probability that the patient here would sprinkle broth on his skin, had the physician been silent on the subject. I never heard of any such custom, and against even accidental sprinkling he was sufficiently guarded, by the circumstance that he was not permitted to use the fluid as food. There was surely no danger of sprinkling his skin with broth, if he was not permitted to eat broth. This gloss is one of the wildest that I ever met.

The word occurs again in the same book, p. 153.  
*Βαντίζω ἐς ὕδωρ, καὶ τὰ ἀρτῆα καὶ τοὺς κρέατα βαντίζονται.* “*Dip*—



*ping* linen rags (ρακια ημισυβίου) into water, apply them to the breast and back."

Lib. iii. p. 163. πομφολυγος γαρ υποπελιδόνου γινομένης επι της γλωσσης, οια σιδήριου βαφέντος εις ελαιον. "A livid blister rising on the tongue, as of iron *dipped* into oil.

P. 164. εις την ερετριδα γην υγρην, και λιην τετρημμενον και χλιαρην, επιβαφασθοιον λεπτον περικαλυψαι κυκλω τον θωρηκα. "Having *dipped* a piece of fine linen into moist Eretrian earth, well pounded, and warm, cover the breast round with it."

In the treatise De Internarum Partium Affectibus, we have the following examples from the same author:—

P. 193. εν υδατι ψυχρώ βαπτων σευτλα και τω σωματι επιτιθεις, μαλιστα προς πονον νεον, η ρακια βαπτων εν ψυχρω υδατι και εκθλιβων προστιθεναι. "*Dipping* beet in cold water, apply it to the body; especially to a new pain; or *dipping* rags in cold water, after wringing out the water, apply them."

In the same page we have another example: τρωγετω δε και της οριγανου της απαλης, ως πλεισιν εις μελι αποβαπτων. "Let him eat green marjoram, for the most part *dipping* it into honey."

P. 199. Having prescribed a variety of things to be eaten by his patient, he adds: ως ξηροτατοι μεν ουτοι μαλιστα εισι. και εις τον ζωμον μη εμβαπτεσθω. "These are of a very dry nature; and let him not *dip* them into the broth." This passage is a decisive commentary on the ellipsis which Mr. Ewing's friend has so strangely misunderstood. The different kinds of food here mentioned, are prescribed on account of the quality of dryness, and the patient is expressly forbidden to *dip* them in the soup or broth, as was usual. He is not forbidden to *sprinkle* his skin with broth, which no man ever thought of doing; but he is forbidden, in the eating of the things prescribed, to *dip* them in the soup, which he was likely to do, had he not been forbidden,

P. 202. Καυσαι δε εν πυξινοισιν ατρακτοισι, βαπτων ες ελαιον ζεον. “Burn it with spindles of box-wood, dipping them into boiling oil.”

P. 203. ραφανιδι χρεσθω. και σελινω, ες οξος βαπτων. “Let him use radish and parsley, dipping them into vinegar.”

In the treatise De Natura Muliebri, p. 119. ροδινον μυρον εμβαπτουσα, “Dipping (the flies) into the oil of roses.”

P. 226. εν χυτρηδιω, ειριον ως μαλθακωτατον εμβαπτων. “Dipping the softest wool in a pipkin.”

P. 228. αποδαπτων ες οπον συκης. “Dipping the balls (βαλανους) into the juice of the fig-tree.”

P. 231. εμβαλει ες αλειφαρ λευκον αιγυπτιον. “Dipping (the plaster) into white Egyptian oil.”

In the treatise De. Morb. Mul. the following examples occur :

P. 249 λαβων σπογγον, η ειριον μαλθακον βαπτων ες θερμον υδωρ. “Taking a sponge, or dipping soft wool into warm water.” And in the next line : ειτα ες οινον ακρητον εμβαπτων παλιν τον σπογγον η το ειριον. “Then dipping again the sponge, or the wool, into pure wine.”

P. 250. Speaking of a number of things boiled together, he says : ειτα ειριον εις τουτο βαπτων. “Then dipping wool into this.”

P. 254. Speaking of a certain mixture, he says : επειτα βαφας ες αλειφαρ ροδινον, η αιγυπτιον, προσθεσθω την ημερην. “After this, having dipped it into the oil of roses, or Egyptian oil, let it be applied during the day.” In the same page, we have another example : μετα δε το δειπνον, φαγουσα κρομμυα εμβαπτουσα ες μελι. “After supper, let her eat onions, dipping them into honey.”

P. 257. When a blister is too painful to the patient, he orders it to be taken away ; and ες ροδινον ειριαν αποδαπτουσα προσθεσθω, “dipping wool into the oil of roses, let her apply it.”

P. 258. Νιτρον εψησας ξυν ρητινη και κοιησας βαλανον βαπτων ες ορνιθος εσαρ προστιθει. “Having boiled nitre

with rosin, and forming them into a ball, *dipping* it into the fat of a fowl, apply it."

P. 261. εμβαψας ες αλειφαρ λευκον αιγυπτιον. "*Dipping* the ball (βαλανον) into white Egyptian oil."

Κικιδά εν μελιτι. η χολην ταυρου, ες αιγυπτιον ελαιον βαψασα προστιθεςθω. "Having *dipped* nut gall into honey, or the gall of a bull into Egyptian oil, let it be applied." Ib.

βαλανον ποιειν ευμηχεα, και βαπτων ες ελαιον λευκον. "Make an oval ball, and *dip* it into white oil." Ib.

P. 262. επειτα ρακος περιθειναι λεπτον εν ειριω βαψασα αλειφαρ αιγυπτιον. "Then put a fine rag about it in wool, *dipping* it into Egyptian oil." ες λευκον αλειφαρ αιγυπτιον βαπτων. "*Dipping* (the thing prescribed) into white Egyptian oil." Ib.

P. 263. χαλδανης οσον ελαιην ενελιξας ες οθονιον κεδρινον εμβαψασα. "Having rolled a bit of galbanum the size of an olive into a piece of linen, and having *dipped* it into cedar-oil,"

P. 264. Having prescribed different kinds of flesh to his patient, he directs, μηδενι πεπερι πεποιημενον ες οξος εμβαπτων. "Cooked without pepper, *dipping* it into vinegar."

P. 269. Speaking of wool rolled round a quill : βαψαι, η λευκω, &c. "*Dip* it either in white oil, or," &c. And within a few lines : η πτερον οξει βαψαι. "*Dip* the feather in vinegar."

P. 273. το μολυβδιον αποβαψαι ες υδωρ ψυχρον. "*Dip* the leaden instrument into cold water."

P. 279. ελαφου δε στεαρ προστιθεςθω τηκτον εμβαπτων μαλθακον ειριον. "Apply the fat of the deer, melted, *dipping* soft wool into it."

P. 279. ειριον ες μωρον αποδακτουςα. "*Dipping* wool into ointment."

P. 280. τουτο εμπλασαι εις ειριον μαλακον καθαρον, και εμβαψατω εν λευκω ελαιω αιγυπτιω. "Put this mixture into clean soft wool, and let her *dip* it in white Egyptian oil."

P. 284. βαπτουσα δε το πινωδες ειριον εν μελι. “*Dipping* the unscored wool in honey.”

P. 288. βαλανον ποιειν, και εμβαπτειν ες τι των υγρων. “Form it into a ball, and *dip* it into some liquid.”

χολην ταυρου τριπτην περι πλασσειν πετω και ες αλειφαρ εμβαψας αιγυπτιον, προστιθεναι. “Roll around a quill, the gall of a bull, rubbed; and *dipping* it into Egyptian oil, apply it.”

η κυκλαμινον οσον αστραγαλον συν χαλκου ανθει, η ανεμωνης κεφαλην, τριψας συν αλητω, πετω περιπλασσειν ες λευκον ειριον εμβαπτεσθαι. “Or cyclaminus, the size of a die, with the flower of brass; or a head of anemone, bruising it with meal, and putting the mixture into white wool, around a quill, *dip* it,” as directed above. For ειριον, some read ελαιον; *dip it into white oil: oleo albo intingito.*

P. 289. λινου το σχιστον αυτη τη καλαμη οσον δραχμην κοψας λεπτα, καταβρεξαι εν οινω λευκω ως ηδιστω την νυκτα, επεिता απηθησας διαχλαινας τε εν ειριω ως μαλθακωτατω εμβαπτειν. “Having pounded finely a drachm of the fibres of flax with the stalks, steep them thoroughly for the night in the sweetest white wine; then, having strained and warmed it, *dip* the softest wool in it.” Literally, *dip in it with the softest wool*; just as we might say, *dip the liquor with the wool*, instead of dip the wool in the liquor.

P. 290. σμυρνην και ρητινην ομου μιξας, και διεις εν οινω, οδονιον εμβαπτων, προστιθεναι: “Mixing myrrh and rosin together, and putting them in wine, dip a piece of linen in the mixture, and apply it.”

De Steril. p. 292. βαπτειν δε και την μηλην εν τω μαλθακτηριω: “*Dip* the probe in the unguent.”

P. 293. φυρησαντα βαλανιον ειριω κατειλιξαι πλην του ακρου επεिता εις αλειφαρ βαψαντα ως ηδιστον, προσθειναι: “Working them into a little ball, roll it in wool, except the top: then having *dipped* it in the sweetest oil, apply it.”

P. 297. Speaking of a mixture the size of a nut-gall, he says: ες ιρινον μυρον βαψασα: “*Dipping* it in the ointment of fleur-de-luce.”

P. 299. Μαλυδον και λιθον τον σιδηρον αρπαζει, ταυτα τριψας λεια, ες ρακος αποδησον, και ες γαλα γυναικος εμβαψας, προσθετω χρησθω : "Taking lead and the magnetic stone, rub them smooth, and tie them in a rag ; then having dipped them in breast milk, apply them."

Ειριον απλυτον ες μελι βαψας : ib. "Dipping unwashed wool into honey."

De Morb. Pass. Grass. p. 339. Speaking of a shoemaker who was killed by the prick of his awl in the thigh, he says, εβαψεν ως δακτυλον, "The instrument dipped about a finger's length."

P. 362. σπογγους βαπτοντα : "Dipping sponges."

De Ratione Victus Acutorum, p. 383. Ξεσμους αρτους εξοινου μελανος και ελαιου αποβαπτων. "*Dipping* hot cakes in black wine and oil."

Coacæ Præcognitiones, p. 435. Πομφολογος δε υποπελίου γινομενης επι της γλωσσης εν αρχα, οια σιδηριου βαφεντος ες ελαιον, χαλεπωτερη η απολυσις γινεται : "If a livid blister rise on the tongue at the beginning, as of iron *dipped* in oil, the cure becomes the more difficult."

De Ulceribus, p. 514. Τα μεν αλλα, τα αυτα. αντι δε του οινου, οξος οξυτατον εσω λευκον. εμβαψαι δε ες αυτο, ειρια ως ασυπωδεα. "The other things being the same ; but in place of the wine, take the strongest vinegar of white wine. *Dip* into this the most greasy wool." τα ειρια βαψαι ως εν ολογισω υδατι. επειτα οινον ξυγχρας μερος τριτον, εψειν εως αν καλως εχη το παχος : ib. "*Dip* the wool in the smallest quantity of water possible ; then *pouring* into it of wine a third part, boil it to a good thickness."

P. 522. εν μελιτι βαπτων ηπαρ βοος ωμων : "Dipping the raw liver of an ox in honey."

Thus we have seen in what a vast multitude of examples Hippocrates uses this word to signify *to dip* ; and that quite irrespectively of the nature of the fluid. Indeed, he not only uses it so frequently in this signification, but he uses it in no other signification, except once in the sense of *to dye* ; and it is the only word which he employsa to denote the mode

in question. For I have intentionally omitted no instance in which the word occurs in all his works. Besides, we have in this writer the words which signify every application of water, and other fluids, from the gentle distillation from the nipple, to the bathing of the whole body. He uses *rain*ω, *αιονα*ω, &c. for *sprinkle*; and for *pour* he uses *χε*ω, with its compounds, which occurs times innumerable. For *wet*, *moisten*, *soak*, *steep*, he uses *δε*ω, *βρε*χω, *τεγγ*ω, &c. The first of which meets us in almost every page; the second is often used; and of the last there are several examples. For bathing the whole body, he constantly uses *λου*ω, and he makes a very free use of the bath, both hot and cold: for washing a part of the body, he uses *νιπτ*ω, with its compounds; and occasionally the compounds of *πλυν*ω. If it is possible to settle the meaning of a common word, surely this is sufficient to fix the meaning of *βαπτ*ω beyond all reasonable controversy. In the words of the father of medicine, in which he has occasion to treat of every mode of the application of liquids, and which consist of no less than five hundred and forty-three closely printed folio pages, all the words of mode are applied, and *βαπτ*ω invariably is used when he designates immersion.

Having established the meaning of this word, as significant of mode, I shall now show that it signifies also *to dye*. That it has this signification, I believe, is not doubted by any. But while one party contends that this is its primary signification, the other errs as far on the opposite side; contending that this meaning is only by consequence, and that the word, when it relates to *dyeing*, always denotes *dyeing* by dipping, as the mode. Now, while I contend that *dyeing* is the secondary meaning of this word, I contend also that this is a real literal meaning, independent of consequence. Although this meaning arose from the mode of *dyeing* by *dipping*, yet the word has come by appropriation to denote *dyeing*, without reference

to mode. Were this a point of mere philological accuracy, I would pursue it no farther; but as it is of material importance in this controversy, I shall establish it by a number of examples, that will put the fact beyond question. One truth can never injure another; and if it has the appearance of doing so, we may depend that there is something about the matter which we do not understand. The advocates of truth often labour in the proof of what cannot be proved, the proof of which their cause does not require, and which sometimes would be injurious rather than profitable. That βαπτω signifies *to dye in any manner*, is a truth which, instead of being against us, serves to solve difficulties that have been very clumsily got over by some of the ablest writers on this side of the question. Indeed one of the most plausible objections is by this fact removed to a demonstration.

Nothing in the history of words, is more common than to enlarge or diminish their signification. Ideas not originally included in them, are often affixed to some words; while others drop ideas originally asserted in their application. In this way βαπτω, from signifying mere mode, came to be applied to a certain operation usually performed in that mode. From signifying to *dip*, it came to signify to *dye by dipping*, because this was the way in which things were usually *died*. And afterwards from *dyeing by dipping*, it came to denote *dyeing in any manner*. A like process might be shown in the history of a thousand other words. Candlestick originally denoted a *stick* to hold a candle, but now the utensil employed to hold a candle, is called a candlestick, even when it is of gold.

The only instance in which I have observed the word βαπτω in this signification, in the works of Hippocrates, employs it to denote dyeing by *dropping* the dyeing liquid on the thing *died*; ἐπειδὴν ἐπιστάξῃ ἐπὶ τὰ ἱμάτια βαπτέται: “When it *drops* upon the garments, they are *died*.” This surely is not *dyeing* by dipping.

There is a similar instance in Arrian's Expedition of Alexander the Great, the only one in which I have found the word at all in that work *τους δε πωγωνας λεγει Νεαρχος οτι βαπτονται Ινδοι*: "Nearchus relates that the Indians *dye* their beards." It will not be contended that they *dyed* their beards by immersion.

We meet this word, or its derivatives, several times in Ælian, in the sense of *dyeing*, and sometimes when the process was not by dipping. Speaking of an old coxcomb, who endeavoured to conceal his age by dyeing his hair, he says, *δια τουτο την τριχα πολιν ουσαν σπειρατο βαφη αφανιζειν*: "He endeavoured to conceal the hoariness of his hair by *dyeing* it." *βαφη* here denotes *dyeing* in general; for hair on the head is not dyed by dipping. In the title of this anecdote, the old man is styled *την τριχα βαψαμενου*: "The old man with the *died* hair," lib. vii. c. xx.

Speaking of a lady whose yellow locks were not coloured by art, but by nature, he uses the word *βαφαις*. Lib. xiii. c. 1.

Nicolas of Damascus, speaking of parasites as obliged to flatter their patrons, says, *Απο των ετων κλεπτει τις, η και βαπτεται*: "Does a patron affect to be younger than he is? or does he even *dye* his hair?"

Æschylus, in the Choephoræ, p. 85, uses the word in the same way :

———— μαρτυς ειδε μοι  
*Φαρος τοδε ως εβαψεν Αιγισθου ξιφος :*

"This garment, *died* by the sword of Ægisthus, is a witness to me." The garment must have been *died* by the blood running down over it.

These examples are sufficient to prove, that the word *βαπτω* signifies to dye in general, though originally and still usually applied to *dyeing* by *dipping*. Having such evidence before my eyes, I could not deny this to my opponents, even were it a difficulty as to the subject of the mode of Baptism. In a controversialist nothing can compensate for candour ;



and facts ought to be admitted, even when they appear unfavourable. It is an unhallowed ingenuity that strains to give a deceitful colouring to what cannot be denied, and cannot ultimately serve a good cause. Truth will be sooner made to appear, and will sooner be received, if on all sides there is openness and honest dealing, without any attempt to conceal, or to colour. To force through difficulties, employ insufficient evidence, refuse admissions that integrity cannot deny, and by rhetorical artifice cut down whatever opposes, is the part of a religious gladiator, not of a Christian contending earnestly for divine institutions.

On the subject of this application of the word βαπτω, I cannot but blame some of the most distinguished writers on both sides of the question. On the one side, supposing it to be necessary, or at least serviceable, to prove that, when the word relates to *dyeing*, it is always dyeing by *dipping*, they have evidently strained, and have employed false criticism. With respect to the other side, to say nothing of the straining to squeeze out of the word the several significations of *sprinkling*, *pouring*, *washing*, *wetting*, &c. for which there is not any even plausible ground, the obvious fact that it signifies *dyeing* by any process, has been uncritically pressed to prove, that when it relates to the application of pure water, it denotes all modes equally. There is neither candour nor philosophy in such attempts. It manifests little acquaintance with the history and philosophy of the signification of words. In reality this admitted fact is nothing in their favour, as it is perfectly agreeable to the history of the meanings of a numerous class of words. Use is always superior to etymology as a witness on this subject. A word may come to enlarge its meaning, so as to lose sight of its origin. This fact must be obvious to every smatterer in philology. Had it been attended to, Baptists would have found no necessity to prove that βαπτω, when it signifies to *dye*, always pro-

perly signifies to dye by *dipping* ; and their opponents would have seen no advantage from proving, that it signifies *dyeing in any manner*. The word candlestick applies now as well when the material is gold, as when it is timber. He would not, however, be worth reasoning with, who should from this circumstance deny that the name points out the materials of which candlesticks among the Saxons were originally made.

The observations of Dr. Gale on this subject, fall in some degree under the above censure. "The Grecians," says he, "very frequently apply the word in all its various forms, to the dyer's art, sometimes perhaps not very properly, but always so as to imply and refer only to its true natural signification *to dip*."

What does this learned writer mean when he expresses a doubt of the propriety of this usage ? Does he mean that such an extension of the meaning of words is in some degree a trespass against the laws of language ? But such a usage is in strict accordance with the laws of language ; and the history of a thousand words sanctions this example. Language has not logical truth for its standard ; and therefore against this it cannot trespass. Use is the sole arbiter of language ; and whatever is agreeable to this authority, stands justified beyond impeachment. *Candlestick* is as properly applied to gold as to timber ; *Barrow* signifies *to dye by sprinkling*, as properly as by *dipping*, though originally it was confined to the latter.

Nor is he well founded when he asserts, that the word in such applications always implies and refers to its primary signification only. On the contrary ; I have produced some examples, and he himself has produced others, in which candour cannot say that there is any such implication or reference. From such examples it could not be known even that *Barrow* has the meaning of *dip*. They relate to *dyeing* wholly without reference to *dipping* ; nay, some of them with an expressed reference to another mode,

This is a fact, and were it even against me, I could not but admit it.

Nor are such applications of the word to be accounted for by metaphor, as Dr. Gale asserts. They are as literal as the primary meaning. It is by extension of literal meaning, and not by figure of any kind, that words come to depart so far from their original signification. The examples of this kind which Dr. Gale produces, cannot be accounted for by his philosophy. *Και λυδίζων, και ψηνίζων, και βαπτομενος βατραχειοις.* "Magnes, an old comic poet of Athens, used the Lydian music, *shaved his face, and smeared it over with tawny washes.*" Now, surely *βαπτομενος* here has no reference to its primary meaning. Nor is it used figuratively. The face of the person was rubbed with the wash. By any thing implied or referred to in this example, it could not be known that *βαπτω* ever signifies to *dip*.

*Ορνις Βαπτος, a coloured bird.* This expression is indeed figurative. But the figure has no reference to *dipping*, the primary meaning of the word, but to *dyeing*. The bird is said to be *dyled*, though its colours were natural. By the same figure we would say a *painted bird*, though its colours were not conferred by the pencil. This example strongly confirms my view of the word in Daniel. Here even in the verbal of the very word *βαπτω*, we have the same figure which I have pointed out in the use of the word in the above contested passage. The colours of a bird are said to be *dyled*, by a beautiful figure founded on likeness; just as in Daniel, Nebuchadnezzar was said to be *immersed in dew*, though literally the dew fell on him. What a Goth should we reckon the critic, who would philosophise on such expressions as *painted bird*, on the principle of the objection to *dipping* as the meaning of the word in the expression used by Daniel! "The plumage of the bird," says the philologist, "is natural, and not conferred by either painter or dyer."

The word *painted*, therefore, and the word *dyed*, when applied to birds, designate properly natural colours. *Βαρρος*, therefore, in the expression used by Aristophanes, does not signify *dyed*, but denotes colour, whether artificial or natural." A foreigner, on the same principle, might show the depth of his philosophy on the phrase *painted bird*. "Here," says he, "a bird is said to be *painted*. Now, we know that the colours of a bird are not given by the pencil, but by the Creator. The proper sense then of the English word *painted*, is not *coloured by the pencil*, but coloured in any way." This might appear to have great depth and justness, to people as little acquainted with the language as himself; and who should not venture to dip into the philosophy of the criticism. But a mere child who speaks English would laugh at it. Yet it is the very criticism employed by celebrated scholars, on the passage in Daniel. If theologians had as much taste as they have ingenuity and learning, it would save themselves and their readers an immensity of useless labour.

The *pictæ volucres* of Virgil, is a perfectly similar example in the Latin language. Aristophanes speaks of *dyed birds*, Virgil of *painted birds*. Let the criticism on the passage in Daniel, be applied to the phrase of Virgil. "Here," says the critic, "instead of colours laid on by the pencil of the painters, the colour is given by the invisible hand of nature. *Pictæ* then cannot signify *painted*, or have any allusion to *painting*, but must denote properly *natural colouring*. This is the very essence of the criticism on the passage in Daniel. Nebuchadnezzar was not *immersed* in dew, —therefore the word *Βαρρος* must here signify the *distillation of dew*.

Our own Milton uses the same figure, when, speaking of the wings of the angel Raphael, he says, *colours dipped in heaven*, though he does not mean that they were either *dipped* or *dyed*. The foreigner

who, from his authority, should argue that the English word *dip* does not signify the mode which we understand by it, would find his justification in the criticism on the above passage in the book of Daniel.

Dr. Gale gives us another passage from Aristotle, which is as little to his purpose, namely, to prove that the word, when it signifies *to dye*, has always a reference to dipping, and implies it. *Θαλομενος δε βαπτει και ανθιζει την χειρα.* "If it is pressed, it dyes and colours the hand." Surely there is no reference to dipping here; the hand is dyed by pressing the thing that dyes. Here also the critical eye will see a confirmation of my view of the principle that operates in the application of the word *βαπτω* in the passage of the book of Daniel. Things are said to be *died* by nature, on the same principle that Nebuchadnezzar was said to be immersed in dew.

Having found beyond reasonable doubt, that *βαπτω* in its secondary sense, is employed *literally and properly* to denote *dyeing*, even when there is no *dipping*; we are now prepared to examine the occurrence of the word in the Battle of the Frogs and Mice, which has been so obstinately contested; and which hitherto has been the most plausible resource of those who have laboured to prove that at least one of the meanings of the word is to pour. The blood was poured into the lake, therefore it is thought *βαπτω* must signify *to pour*. But in reality, the passage favours neither the one party nor the other. It expresses neither *pouring* nor *dipping*, but *dyeing* without reference to mode. If *βαπτω*, as we have proved, signifies *to dye in any mode*, there is no occasion for the advocates of immersion in Baptism, to find immersion in the word as it signifies *to dye*. This simple fact settles the controversy about this passage for ever.

Καππεσε δ' ουδ' ανεπνευσεν· εξαπτετο δ' αιματι λιμνη  
Πορφυρεω.

"He fell, and breathed no more, and the lake was

tinged with blood ;” or, according to the translation of Cowper,

“ So fell Crombophagus, and from that fall  
Never arose, but *reddening* with his blood,  
The wave,” &c.

To suppose that there is here any extravagant allusion to the literal *immersion* or *dipping* of a lake, is a monstrous perversion of taste. The lake is said to be *dyed*, not to be *dipped*, nor *poured*, nor *sprinkled*. There is in the word no reference to mode. Had Baptists entrenched themselves here, they would have saved themselves much useless toil, and much false criticism, without straining to the impeachment of their candour or their taste. What a monstrous paradox in rhetoric, is the figuring of the dipping of a lake in the blood of a mouse ! Yet Dr. Gale supposes the lake dipped by hyperbole. “The literal sense,” he says, “is, the lake was *dipped in blood*.” Never was there such a figure. The lake is not said to be *dipped* in blood, but to be *dyed* with blood.

They might have found a better commentary to this passage, in the battles of Homer’s heroes in the Iliad. The expression evidently alludes to one in the beginning of the twenty-first book of the Iliad, with respect to the slaughter of the Trojans by Achilles in the river Xanthus: *ερυθραίνετο δ’ αἵματι ὕδαρ*: “The waters as they ran *reddened* with blood.”—COWPER. In allusion to this, in the burlesque poem, from which the disputed passage is taken, the whole lake is said to be *dyed* with the blood of a mouse, which fell in battle on its edge.

The Monthly Reviewers, as quoted by Mr. Booth, understood the expression in this paradoxical sense. “In a poem attributed to Homer,” they say, “called the Battle of the Frogs and Mice, it is said a lake was baptized with the blood of a wounded combatant—a question hath arisen in what sense the word *baptize* can be used in this passage.” This should never have been a question ; for this lake is not said to be *bap-*

tized. The word βαπτω not βαπτίζω is used. Again, the lake was not dipped, as these friends of dipping, or at least of profuse pouring, assert. The expression is literal, and has not the smallest difficulty.

The derivatives of this word, both in the primary and secondary meaning, prove that it denotes immersion. Βαμμα, *sauce* or *soup* into which bread or other food is dipped in eating; also *a dye* into which the thing to be dyed is dipped, as distinguished from χρωμα.

Βαφη, *immersion*: κἀγω γὰρ ὡς τὰ δειν' ἐκαρτερον τοτὲ βαφη σιδήρου ὡς, &c. Soph. in Ajace: "I who endured horrible things, as iron dipped in water." Βαφη σιδήρου is also used for the edge of iron; because the edge, or sharpness, is given in the tempering by immersion in water.

Βαψις, *the art of dipping*: as βαψις χαλκου καὶ σιδήρου, *the tempering of brass and iron*; quoted by Scapula from Pol. ex Antiphonte. Now metal is tempered in water by immersion.

Βαπτισίς, *a laver, or bathing place*, used by Lucian.

Διβαφος, *dyed* by being twice dipped; just as dyers with us speak of giving their cloth one dip, or two or three dips.

Οξυβαφος, οξυβαφον, and οξυβαφιον, quoted by Scapula from Athen. lib. 2. *The small vessel which was used to hold the vinegar with which they seasoned their food.* This the ancients did by dipping. To this doubtless our word *saucer* owes its origin, however differently it is used at present. This is an instance of the process by which words extend their signification beyond the ideas originally contained in them. The word *saucer*, from signifying a small vessel for holding *sauce*, now signifies one for cooling tea. This is a fine illustration of the process by which βαπτω, from signifying to dip, came to signify to dye by dipping; and at last dropping the mode, to dye in any manner. The foreigner who should allege that the English word *saucer*, cannot signify a small

vessel for tea, but must always denote one for *sauce*, would reason as correctly as those who attempt to force βαρυν, when signifying to dye, always to look back to its origin.

This compound mentioned above, is also used as the name of a measure, doubtless because this vessel was at first used as the measure of the quantity so designated. At last, however, it would come by a natural process to denote the measure, without any reference to the vessel.

In medical language, this compound was also applied to the deep cavities or *cups* in which bones turn in the joints—doubtless taking the name from the shape. Here the *socket of a joint* is called a *vinegar cup*.

Οψοβαρον, taken also by Scapula from Poll. lib. vii. denotes the small vessel in which these things were served up; which were eaten with bread, and which were always used by dipping. Xenophon represents the hands of the king of Media, as smeared in this operation.

The verbal βαρυν, *to be dipped*, or *that it may be dipped*, we have already seen in the passage quoted from Euripides in justification of the translation of a passage in Hippocrates. The negative Αβαρυν may also be alleged as confirmatory of the application of the root in the sense of dipping. Αβαρυν σιδηρος is untempered iron, literally *undipped iron*, for iron is tempered by *dipping*.

Αβαρυντος also signifies that *cannot be immersed*, and is applied by Pindar, as Scapula observes, to cork. This fact is perfectly decisive. There can be no doubt that the property of cork not to sink in water, is referred to by Pindar.

Αβαρυντρον, a *trepán*, a surgical instrument, so called because it was so formed as not *to sink too deeply*, lest it should injure the membrane of the brain. This shows that the word from which it is derived signifies *to dip*.



In ascertaining the meaning of βαπτω, it may be of assistance to us to examine also some of its compounds, and also the prepositions with which it is construed. In composition, we find it sometimes joined with prepositions that point to the meaning, for which we contend, and which will not suit the meaning attached to it by our opponents. Besides, it admits no preposition in composition or construction with it, which cannot be accounted for on the supposition of this meaning. If this position can be made good, it will afford the strongest confirmation to our doctrines.

We have seen, in the numerous examples quoted, that it admits both the prepositions *εις* and *εν* to be compounded with it, as well as to construe with it in regimen. A mere glance at the examples may convince any one that this would not suit either *pour* or *sprinkle*, from the consideration of the things which are the subjects of the operation of the verb. We could not, for instance, say, *pour or sprinkle wool in or into the river*. If then the word signified *pour* or *sprinkle*, it could not admit these prepositions either in composition or in regimen, with respect to many things that are the subject of the operation of the verb.

Both the prepositions *εις* and *εν* in composition with this word, have the same form. Εμβαπτω is the compound word with respect to both. The regimen, however, is different. If *εμ* is put for *εις*, the verb is construed with the accusative of the thing in which the operation of the verb is performed, either without, or more generally with the preposition itself repeated before it. Εμβαπτω *εις* το υδωρ. When *εμ* is put for *εν* the verb is construed with the dative of the thing in which the operation of the verb is performed, either with the same preposition repeated before it, or without it.—Εμβαπτω *εν* τω ελαιω.

When *εις* is used either in the compound or before the substantive, there can be no question that all idea of *pouring* or *sprinkling* is excluded. And though *εν* may sometimes be translated *with*, it never has this

acceptation in composition. Indeed, this form is so decisive, that the celebrated Dr. Owen asserts, that it is this that makes the verb signify to *dip*. “βαπτίζω,” says he, “does not signify properly to *dip* or *plunge*, for that in Greek is *μβαντω* and *μβαντιζω*.” This observation is not worthy of the learning of that great and good man. If the verb *βαντω* did not of itself signify to dip, the preposition in question could not give it that meaning. Dr. Owen’s criticism is well exposed by the cool good sense of Mr. Booth. “Besides,” says he, “I appeal to the learned whether Dr. Owen might not as well have asserted, that *mergo* does not properly signify to *dip* or *plunge*, for that, in Latin, is *immergo*? Nay, does not the Doctor himself, in the same discourse, acknowledge, that ‘the original and natural signification of the word, imports to *dip*, to *plunge*, to *dye*, to *wash*, to *cleanse*.’”

*Εμβαμμα* signifies sauce, or any liquid into which food is *dipped* in order to be eaten—*something to be dipped into*. This compound could not suit either *pouring* or *sprinkling*. *Εμβασιον*, a *saucer*, or vessel to hold the liquid for seasoning food, which was used by *dipping*. It came also to denote a certain measure,—no doubt from the circumstance that this vessel was employed as a measure. In this sense, Hippocrates uses it several times.

*Καταβαντω* signifies, literally, to dip *down*, that is, to dip deeply, or thoroughly. The preposition is designed to increase the action of the verb. Accordingly, *καταβαντων*, signifies a *dyer*.

*Επιβαντω*, to dip *upon*. We find this compound once used by Hippocrates, and although it affords us no evidence it takes none from us.

The use of *Απο* with this word, may appear more strange, but it is explicable. It is used both in composition and following the verb; and sometimes it is used in composition when *σις* follows the verb. *Αποβαντω* appears to designate to *dip*, as proceeding *from* the *dipping* power—I dip *from*, intimating that the

thing dipped is at some distance from the dipper ; or, rather it marks the departure of the thing dipped, from the thing in which it is dipped. When *Απο* follows *βαπτω*, it respects the point from which the finished dipping has proceeded. *βαπτω απο του αιματος*. *I dip it from the blood*. The blood is the point from which the dipping proceeded.

The preposition *ex* is also construed with *αποβαπτω*, in one of the examples taken from Hippocrates. This makes it still more evident, that *απο*, in construction with this verb, denotes the point *from* which the dipping was effected. *Ex*, views the thing dipped, as proceeding *out of* the thing in which it was dipped.

Scapula seems to think that *απο* in composition with this word is designed to intimate the gentleness of the operation, as he translates it, *immergo leniter*, *I dip gently* ; and refers to Dioscorides, lib. 5. *αποβαψαι εις υδωρ*.

But though it may be used with respect to the gentlest dipping, it cannot intimate this. But whatever may be the peculiar effect of this preposition in composition with *βαπτω*, and on whatever principle its use is to be accounted for, the fact that the compounded word is sometimes used in construction with *εις*, removes all appearance of objection to our view of the meaning of the verb.

Let us now take a glance at a few passages in which *βαπτω* is used figuratively, as this also may cast some light back upon its literal meaning. Aristophanes says : *Ινα μη βαψω βαμμα σαρδινιαχον*. "*Lest I dip you into a Sardinian dye*." The figure is but low, and is just the same as if a pugilist with us should say, *I will dip you in vermillion*. It is an allusion to the dyer's art, and means, *I will beat you, till you shall be covered all over with your own blood*. It would be to no purpose to allege, that, when a man is beaten, he is not literally dipped in his blood, but the blood runs over him. This would indicate a total misconception of the figure. The likeness does not consist

in the *manner*, but in the *effects*. As the reference is to the art of *dyeing*, so the expression must be suited to the usual mode of dyeing. *I will dip you in vermilion*, is exactly the expression of the poet in English. He would be a sorry critic, who, from this, should allege that the English word *dip*, signifies to *run over*, as blood from the wounded body. In fact, *pour* and *sprinkle* are as little applicable here, in a literal sense, as *dip* itself. When a man is beaten, there is no *pouring* or *sprinkling*, more than *dipping*. The blood is not put on the beaten person by the beater, in *any manner*.

Marcus Antoninus Pius speaks of the man of virtue as βαπτυσθων, *dipped* or *dyed* in justice. I would not explain this with Dr. Gale, "dipped as it were in, or swallowed up with justice." *Justice* is here represented as a colouring liquid, which imbues the person who is dipped in it. It communicates its qualities as in the operation of dyeing. The figure can receive no illustration from the circumstance that "persons given up to their pleasures and vices, are said to be immersed or swallowed up with pleasures." The last figure has a reference to the primary meaning of the word βαπτω, and points to the *drowning* effects of liquids; the former refers to the secondary meaning of the word, and has its resemblance in the colouring effects of a liquid dye. The virtuous man is dipped to be *dyed* more deeply with justice; the vicious man is drowned or ruined by his immersion. Perfectly similar is the figure in an observation of the same writer, where he asserts that the thoughts, βαπτεται, are *tinctured* by the mind. We use the word *imbue* in the same way. He uses the same word also when the *dye* injures what it colours. He cautions against bad example, lest (βαψης) you be infected.

We see, then, that the use of this word in a figurative sense, is not only always consistent with my view of the meanings of this word, but that it frequently illustrates its primary import.

That βαπτω signifies *to dip* is strongly confirmed by the circumstance, that *dyeing*, which it also imports, was usually performed, both among the Greeks and Romans, by immersion. If the word originally denoted *to dip*, it might by a natural process come to signify *to dye*, which was performed by dipping. But if the word originally signified *to pour* or *to sprinkle*, no process can be supposed by which it would come to denote *to dye*. Upon our view, there is a connecting link which joins these two meanings together, notwithstanding their great diversity. They are seen by our doctrine as parent and child. On the view of our opponents there is no relation. The two meanings cannot have any consanguinity. Now, that *dyeing* anciently was commonly performed by dipping, and that it still is so, admits no reasonable doubt. Dr. Gale has well observed this, and has given evidence of the fact, should any be so perverse as to deny it. After producing some passages, he observes, "I will only observe, you will please to consider *dipping* as the only probable and convenient way; and in every respect perfectly agreeable to the nature of the thing, as well as to that sense of the word, which is very considerable. We see it is the only way with us; and which carries the parallel still farther between the ancient Greeks and us, as they used βαπτω, we use the word *dip*, both among the workmen in the shop, and in ordinary conversation; for what is more common than to talk of such or such a thing *dipped*, meaning in the dyer's copper, or in some colours." "Besides it is observable, that the Grecians made a difference between *dye*, and other colouring matter. Thus Plutarch distinguishes between χρωματα and βαμματα; and Pollux does the same; βαμματα signifying only that sort of colouring-matter into which any thing is dipped, according to the sense of the word, as I see Stephens also has remarked. And there is a passage in Seneca very clear to this purpose. Interest quamdiu ma-

cerata est, crassius medicamentum an aquatius traxerit, sæpius mersa est, et excoccta, an semel tincta. *There is a difference also, how long it lies infused; whether the dye be thick and gross, or waterish and faint; and whether it be dipped very often and boiled thoroughly, or only once tinctured.* And Phavorinus and Pollux use καταβαπτων, which on all hands is allowed most emphatically to signify dipping, plunging, immersing, as a synonymous word for βαπτων and χρωνυς, in English a dyer.

“This makes it necessary to suppose they dyed by dipping; as well as another word used by them in these cases, viz. εβλεν, to boil; *they boiled it in kettles*, says Aristotle; *and when the flowers are boiled long enough together, at length all becomes of a purple.* Εβλεσιν εν ταις χυταις—και τοτε τελευταιον απαντα γινεται πορφυροειδη των ανθεων ικανως συνεβλεστων.”

A most decisive passage to the same purpose, he thus translates from Plato de Republica, lib. iv. p. 636. “*The dyers, when they are about to dip a quantity of wool, to make it of a purple colour, cull out the whitest of the fleece, and prepare and wash it with a world of trouble, that it may the better take the grain; and then they dip it, βαπτουσι. The dye of things thus dipped is lasting and unchangeable, and cannot be fetched out or tarnished, either by fair water, or any preparations for the discharging of colours. But things which are not dyed after this manner, you know what they are; no matter what dye they are dipped in, βαπτη, they never look well; without this preparation they take but a nasty colour, and that is easily washed out too. And thus in like manner our choosing soldiers, and instructing them in music, and those exercises which consist in agility of body, you must imagine our design is only to make them the better receive the laws, which are a kind of dye,—that their temper being formed by a proper discipline, may be fixed and unalterable by terror, &c. and (βαπτη) their tincture may not be washed out by any medicaments of the most powerfully expelling nature; as pleasure, which is stronger to this ef-*

*fect than any dye, as is likewise grief, fear, or desire, and the like."*

Here is the most complete evidence, that both among the Greeks and Romans *dyeing* was usually performed by *dipping*. Indeed, nothing but perverseness can make a question of this, though there was no evidence of the fact from history. There is no other way in which fluids can be extensively applied in dyeing, but by dipping.

The truth of this fact is not in the least affected by the observation of Mr. Ewing, that *dyeing*, *staining*, and *painting*, were originally similar operations, having been first suggested by the accidental bruising of fruits, &c. Though this were a fact recorded, instead of a conjecture, it could be of no service on this subject. Arts are not necessarily conducted in the way in which they were originally suggested. Whatever was the origin of *dyeing*, *dipping* was the common way of performing it as an art. It is the usual mode of performance, and not the accidental mode of discovery, that could give its name to the art. Dr. Cox's answer to this objection is quite satisfactory. "In reply to this," says he, "it might be sufficient to say, that in whatever manner the process was primarily discovered, the correct meaning of the term which expresses it, involves the idea of immersion, and did so at the very period when the contested words were in colloquial use. Pliny states, 'the Egyptians began by *painting* on white cloths, with certain drugs, which in themselves possessed no colour, but had the property of abstracting or absorbing colouring matters; but these cloths were afterwards *immersed in a diluted dyeing liquor*, of an uniform colour, and yet when removed from it soon after, that they were found to be *stained* with indelible colours, differing from one another, according to the nature of the drugs which had been previously applied to different parts of the stuff.' In this passage we are favoured with an intelligible distinction between *painting*, *immersion*, (or the art of

dyeing,) and *staining*; yet we are required to admit that they were *one*."

Agreeably to the above view of the connexion between the secondary meaning of this word and the primary, we have a great number of the branches which have the same double import, from the same connexion. *Βαμμα*, sauce into which food is *dipped*,—and a *dye* into which things are to be dipped. *βαψν*, *dipping*, and dyeing stuff, or the tincture received from dyeing. *βαπνς*, both *dipping* and *dyeing*,—and *βαπν*, the dyer's art. *βαπς*, to be *dipped*, and to be *dyed*, &c. &c. In all these, there is no other common idea but mode: this is the link that connects these two things that are altogether different. If the same word has the same double meaning in so many of its branches, there must surely be at the bottom some natural relation between these meanings.

This view of the primary meaning of *βαπς*, and the secondary, is greatly confirmed by the analogy of other languages. The same primary and secondary meanings are found in the corresponding word, in many other languages. The Septuagint translation gives *παβαπα*, in Ezek. xxiii. 15. The Hebrew, to which this corresponds, is *טביל*, signifying *dyed raiment*. Here we see that *טביל*, which, as Dr. Gale observes every one must own, signifies to *dip*, is used also for *dye*. This analogy is complete, and must arise from the same cause, namely, that among the Hebrews, as well as the Greeks and Romans, *dyeing* was commonly performed by *dipping*. The same word, in the Chaldee also, as Dr. Cox has observed, signifies both to *dip* and to *dye*.

In the Latin also, the same word, *tingo*, signifies to *dip* and to *dye*. To this Mr. Ewing replies, that "Tingo is the Greek *τρυγω*, which is very properly translated in the Lexicons, *mafacio*, *humido*, *mollio*; I *moisten*, *wet*, *soften*, or *mollify*." That *tingo*, is derived from *τρυγω* is undoubted; but to assert that it has all the significations of its parent, and that it has no



other, would be as unphilological in theory as it is inconsistent with fact. *ἑγγυω* does not signify to *dye*; *tingo*, its derivative, has this signification. Where did it find it? *ἑγγυω* signifies to moisten, &c.; *tingo* has not this signification. I am aware that *wash* is given as one of its meanings in the dictionaries, but I have seen as yet no authority for this from the classical use of the word. Besides, *wash* is not the same as *moisten*, *wet*, &c. I grant, indeed, that the word may be used when *washing*, *wetting*, *moistening*, *softening*, &c. is the consequence of the *dipping*. Still, however, this is not literally contained in the expression. Though any of these words might be given in certain situations as a translation, yet such a translation would not be literal. *Tingo* expresses appropriately *dipping* and *dyeing*, and these only.

Indeed, the meaning of *tingo* is to be learned from its use in the Latin language, and not from the use of its root in the Greek. When this is ascertained, then the philologist may look into its origin, to discover a correspondence. It may be expected that the root will contain some idea which has been a foundation to its use in the derived language. But a correspondence in all their meanings would often be looked for in vain. The derived word often drops every meaning of the root but one, and takes others that the root never possessed.

Does Mr. Ewing deny that *tingo* signifies to *dip*? If he does, the classical use of that word will contradict him. The *dipping* of the sun, moon, and stars in the ocean, as we would express it, is in the language of the Latin poets expressed by *tingo*. If he does not deny this, his assertion in the above extract is nothing to his purpose.

If there was any need of authority with respect to the meaning of *tingo*, we have it in Tertullian. He understood the Latin language, and he uses *tingo* for *dip*. It is well known that he believed that proper baptism consisted in three immersions; and he translated the Greek verb by *tingo*.

The same analogy is recognized by our own language ; and though I would not say with some, that *dip* has *dye* as a secondary signification, yet in certain circumstances it may have this import by consequence,—“*colours dipped in heaven.*” Since, then, the analogy of so many languages connects *dipping* and *dyeing* by expressing them by the same word, why should not the same thing be supposed in the Greek ? and βαπτω, as it has the secondary meaning of *dye*, have also the primary meaning of *dip* ? It may be added, that we have the authority of the Latin poets, to translate βαπτω by *tingo*, in the sense of *dipping*. As the Greek poets apply βαπτω to the setting of a constellation, or its *dipping* in the ocean, the Latin poets express the same thing by *mergo* and *tingo*.

Having viewed βαπτω in every light in which it can assist us on this subject, I shall now proceed to exhibit the examples of the occurrence of βαπτίζω itself, which, to the utter exclusion of the root, is applied to the Christian rite. Βαπτω, the root, I have shown to possess two meanings, and two only, to *dip* and to *dye*. Βαπτίζω, I have asserted, has but one signification. It has been formed on the idea of the primary meaning of the root, and has never admitted the secondary. Now, both these things have been mistaken by writers on both sides of this controversy. It has been generally taken for granted, that the two words are equally applicable to baptism ; and that they both equally signify to *dye*. Both of them are supposed, in a secondary sense, to signify to *wash*, or *moisten*. I do not admit this with respect to either. I have already proved this with respect to βαπτω ; the proof is equally strong with respect to βαπτίζω. My position is, THAT IT ALWAYS SIGNIFIES TO DIP ; NEVER EXPRESSING ANY THING BUT MODE. Now, as I have all the lexicographers and commentators against me in this opinion, it will be necessary to say a word or two with respect to the authority of lexicons. Many

may be startled at the idea of refusing to submit to the unanimous authority of lexicons, as an instance of the boldest skepticism. Are lexicons, it may be said, of no authority? Now, I admit that lexicons are an authority, but they are not *an ultimate authority*. Lexicographers have been guided by their own judgment in examining the various passages in which a word occurs: and it is still competent for every man to have recourse to the same sources. The meaning of a word must ultimately be determined by an actual inspection of the passages in which it occurs, as often as any one chooses to dispute the judgment of the lexicographer. The use of a word, as it occurs in the writers of authority in the English language, is an appeal that any man is entitled to make against the decision of Dr. Johnson himself. The practice of a language is the House of Lords, which is competent to revise the decisions of all dictionaries.

But though it is always lawful to appeal from lexicons to the language itself, it is seldom that there can be any necessity for this, with respect to the primary meaning of words. Indeed, with respect to the primary meaning of common words, I can think of no instance in which lexicons are to be suspected. This is a feature so marked, that any painter can catch, and faithfully represent. Indeed, I would consider it the most unreasonable skepticism, to deny that a word has a meaning, which all lexicons give as its primary meaning. On this point, I have no quarrel with the lexicons. There is the most complete harmony among them, in representing *dip* as the primary meaning of βαπτίζω and βαπτω. Except they had a turn to serve, it is impossible to mistake the primary meaning of a word commonly used. Accordingly, Baptist writers have always appealed, with the greatest confidence, to the lexicons even of Pædo-Baptist writers. On the contrary, their opponents often taken refuge in a supposed sacred or Scriptural use, that they may be screened from the fire of the lexicons.

It is in giving secondary meanings, in which the lines are not so easily discovered, that the vision of the lexicographers is to be suspected. Nor is it with respect to real secondary meanings that they are likely to be mistaken. Their peculiar error is in giving as secondary meanings, what are not properly meanings at all. The same objection that I have to lexicons, with respect to this word, I have not with respect to it alone, but with respect to almost all words to which they assign a great variety of meanings. I do not exclude Dr. Johnson himself from this censure.

It may appear strange to some, that the most learned men can be imposed upon in this matter ; and with respect to words which they find in use in what they read, think that they have meanings which they have not. But a little consideration of the nature of the mistake will explain this matter. I admit that the meaning which they take out of the word, is always implied in the passage where the word occurs. But I deny that this meaning is expressed by the word. It is always made out by implication, or in some other way.

To explain this point more clearly, I shall lay down a canon, and by this I mean a first principle in criticism. That which does not contain its own evidence is not entitled to the name of a critical canon. I do not request my readers to admit my canon. I insist on their submission—let them deny it if they can. My canon is, that in certain situations two words, OR EVEN SEVERAL WORDS MAY WITH EQUAL PROPRIETY FILL THE SAME PLACE, THOUGH THEY ARE ALL ESSENTIALLY DIFFERENT IN THEIR SIGNIFICATIONS. The physician, for instance, may, with equal propriety and perspicuity, say either “dip the bread in the wine,” or, “moisten the bread in the wine.” Yet this does not import that *dip* signifies to *moisten*, or that *moisten* signifies to *dip*. Each of these words has its own peculiar meaning, which the other does not possess. *Dip the bread* does not say *moisten the bread*, yet it is

known that the object of the dipping is to *moisten*. Now it is from ignorance of this principle that lexicographers have given meanings to words which they do not possess ; and have thereby laid a foundation for evasive criticism on controverted subjects, with respect to almost all questions. In Greek it might be said with equal propriety *δευσαι εν οινω*, or *βαψαι εν οινω*, “*moisten in wine*, or *dip in wine* ;” and from this circumstance it is rashly and unphilosophically concluded that one of the meanings of *βαπτω* is to *moisten*.

Let it be remembered that my censure lies against the critical exactness of lexicographers, and not against their integrity, or even their general learning and ability. I go farther,—I acquit them of misleading their readers with respect to the general meaning of the passages, on the authority of which they have falsely assigned such secondary meanings. The ideas which they affix to such words, are implied in the passage, though not the meaning of the words out of which they take them. But this, which is harmless with respect to most cases, is hurtful in all points of controversy, as it gives a foundation for the evasive ingenuity of sophistry in the defence of error. It may be of no importance to correct the lexicographer, who, from finding the expressions *δευσαι εν οινω* and *βαψαι εν οινω* employed for the same thing, asserts that here *βαψαι* signifies to *moisten*. But it is of great importance when the error is brought to apply to an ordinance of Christ. Besides, it introduces confusion into language, and makes the acquisition of it much more difficult to learners. The mind must be stored with a number of different meanings in which there is no real difference. What an insurmountable task would it be to master a language, if, in reality, words had as many different meanings as lexicons represent them! Parkhurst gives six meanings to *βαπτίζω*. I undertake to prove that it has but one : yet he and I do not differ about the primary meaning of this word.

I blame him as giving different meanings, when there is no real difference in the meaning of this word. He assigns to it figurative meanings. I maintain, that in figures there is no different meaning of the word. It is only a figurative application. The meaning of the word is always the same. Nor does any one need to have a figurative application explained in any other way, than by giving the proper meaning of the word. When this is known, it must be a bad figure that does not contain its own light. It is useless to load lexicons with figurative applications, except as a concordance.

Polybius, vol. iii. p. 311. ult. applies the word to soldiers passing through water, *immersed* (βαπτίζομενοι) *up to the breast*. Here surely the word cannot mean *pouring or sprinkling*. The soldiers in passing through the water were *dipped* as far as the breast. Strabo also applies the word to Alexander's soldiers marching a whole day through the tide, between the mountain Climax and the sea, (Lib. xiv. p. 982.) βαπτίζομενων, *baptized up to the middle*. Surely this baptism was *immersion*.

Plutarch, speaking of a Roman general, dying of his wounds, says, that having *dipped* (βαπτίσας) his hand in blood, he wrote the inscription for a trophy. Here the mode of the action cannot be questioned. The instrument of writing is *dipped* in the colouring fluid.

Diodorus Siculus, speaking of the sinking of animals in water, says, that when the water overflows, "many of the land animals, βαπτίζομενα, *immersed* in the river, perish." This baptism also is *immersion*. The whole land was overwhelmed with water. This itself, upon a principle before explained, might be called a baptism or immersion, in perfect consistency with the modal meaning of the word. However, it is not the land, but the land animals, that are here said to be *baptized*. These would at first swim, but they would soon *sink*, and be entirely *immersed*. There

is here then no catachrestic extension of the word, as in the cases which I have illustrated in another place. The *sinking* of animals in water is here called *baptism*. What then is *baptism* but *immersion*? Upon the principle of giving secondary meanings to words, which has been resisted by me, *drown* might be given as an additional meaning to βαπτίζω, from the authority of this passage. As the animals were *drowned* by immersion, this immersion might be called *drowning*.

Lucian uses the word in a like case, and with circumstances that explain the former example. Towards the end of the dialogue, he makes Timon, the man-hater, say, that if he saw a man carried down the stream, and crying for help, he would *baptize* him, και ην τινα του χειμῶνος ο ποταμος παραφερη, ο δε, τας χειρας ορεγων, αντιλαβessθαι δεηται, ωθειν και τουτον επι κεφαλην βαπτιζοντα, ως μηδε ανακυψαι δυνηθειη. “*If in winter, the river should carry away any one with its stream, and the person with outstretched hands should beg to be taken out, that he would drive him from the bank, and plunge him headlong, so that he would not be able again to lift up his head above water.*” Here is a *baptism*, the mode of which cannot be mistaken. Timon’s *baptism* was certainly *immersion*. To resist such evidence, requires a hardihood which I do not envy. Having such examples before my eyes, I cannot resist God, to please men. To attempt to throw doubt on the meaning of the word βαπτίζω, is as vain as to question the signification of the word *dip*. The latter is not more definitely expressive of mode in the English, than the former is in Greek. The only circumstance that has enabled men to raise a cloud about βαπτίζω is, that it belongs to a dead language. There never was a word in any language, the meaning of which is more definite, or which is capable of being more clearly ascertained.

The sinner is represented by Porphyry, (p. 282.)

as *baptized* up to his head, (*βαπτίζεται μέχρι κεφαλῆς*) in Styx, a celebrated river in hell. Is there any question about the mode of this *baptism*?

Dr. Gale gives some striking examples from Strabo. "Strabo," says he, "is very plain in several instances: Speaking of the lake near Agrigentum, a town on the south shore of Sicily, now called Gergenti, he says, *things which otherwise will not swim, do not sink* (*βαπτίζεσθαι*) *in the water of the lake, but float like wood*. And there is a rivulet in the south parts of Cappadocia, he tells us, *whose waters are so buoyant, that if an arrow is thrown in, it will hardly sink or be dipped*, *βαπτίζεσθαι*, into them." "In another place, ascribing the fabulous properties of the lake Asphaltites to the lake Sirbon, he says, *the bitumen floats atop, because of the nature of the water, which admits no diving; for if a man goes into it, he cannot sink, or be dipped*, *βαπτίζεσθαι*, *but is forcibly kept above*. Now, in these several passages, the modal meaning of the word is confirmed in so clear, express, and decisive a manner, that obstinacy itself cannot find a plausible objection. Things that sink in other water, will not sink or be baptized in the lake near Agrigentum. This is mode, and nothing but mode. It is immersion, and nothing but immersion. *Sprinkling*, and *pouring*, and *popping*, and *dropping*, and *wetting*, and *washing*, and *imbuing*, and *dedicating*, and *devoting*, and *consecrating*, with all the various meanings that have ever been forced on this word, are meanings invented merely to serve a purpose. And if the sinking of an arrow in water is called its baptism, what can baptism mean but immersion? If, when the buoyancy of water will not suffer a person to sink, the idea is expressed by *βαπτίζω*, what can baptism be but an operation of the same nature with *sinking* or *diving*, which are used here as nearly synonymous terms with that which signifies to baptize? It may as well be said that



*sprinkling or pouring, is sinking or diving, as that it is baptism.*

Two Greek critics are quoted by Dr. Gale, as applying the word in exhibiting the beauty of Homer's representation of the death of one of his heroes : "*He struck him across the neck with his heavy sword, and the whole sword became warm with blood.*" On this, Pseudo Didymus says, that the sword is represented as *dipped* in blood, *εβαπτισθη*. And Dionysius says, "*In that phrase, Homer expresses himself with the greatest energy, signifying that the sword was so dipped, βαπτισθαις, in blood, that it was even heated by it.*"

"Heraclides Ponticus," says Dr. Gale, "a disciple of Aristotle, may help us, also in fixing the sense of the word ; for, moralizing the fable of Mars being taken by Vulcan, he says, *Neptune is ingeniously supposed to deliver Mars from Vulcan, to signify, that when a piece of iron is taken red hot out of the fire, and put into water, βαπτίζουσι, the heat is repelled and extinguished, by the contrary nature of water.*" Here we see that the immersion of hot iron in water, for the purpose of cooling it, is denominated a *baptism*.

Themistius, Orat. IV. p. 133, as quoted by Dr. Gale, says, "The pilot cannot tell but he may save one in the voyage that had better be drowned, *βαπτισται*, sunk into the sea." Such a baptism, surely, would be immersion.

The word occurs in the Greek translation of the Old Testament, and is faithfully rendered *dip* in our version. 2 Kings v. 14. *Και κατέβη Ναμαν καὶ εβαπτισατο ἐν τῷ Ἰορδάνῃ ἑπτάκις. Naaman went down, and dipped himself seven times in Jordan.* Here bathing in a river is called *baptism*. What more do we want, then, to teach us the mode of this ordinance of Christ ? If there was not another passage of Scripture to throw light on the institution, as far as respects mode, is not this, to every teachable mind, perfectly

sufficient? But, it seems, we are crying victory before the field is won. This passage, which we think so decisive, has a far different aspect to others. On the contrary, it is made to afford evidence against us. Well, this is strange indeed; but ingenuity has many shifts. Let us see how artifice can involve the passage in a cloud. Nothing is more easy. Does not the prophet command Naaman to *wash*; if, then, he obeyed this command by *baptizing* himself, *baptizing* must signify *washing*. For the sake of argument, I will grant this reasoning, for a moment. If, then, this is so, go, my brethren, and wash the person to be baptized, as you think Naaman washed himself from head to foot. This will show that you respect the example. In what manner soever the water was applied to Naaman, he was bathed all over. If the word signifies to wash the whole body, who but the Pope himself, would take on him to substitute the sprinkling of a few drops in the place of this universal washing?

But I do not admit the reasoning, that, from this passage, concludes that βαπτίζω signifies to wash, although no instance can be produced more plausible in favour of that opinion. This passage is a complete illustration of my canon. The two words, λουω and βαπτίζω are here used interchangeably, yet they are not of the same signification. Not of the same signification! it may be asked, with surprise. Elisha commands him to *wash*; he obeys by *baptizing* himself; must not *baptizing*, then, be *washing*? I think none of my opponents will wish a stronger statement of their objection than I have made for them. But my doctrine remains uninjured by the assault. The true philologist will not find the smallest difficulty in reconciling this passage to it. The words λουω and βαπτίζω have their own peculiar meanings even here, as well as every where else, without the smallest confusion. To *baptize* is not to *wash*; but to baptize *in a river or in any pure water*, implies

washing, and may be used for it in certain situations. If Naaman *dipped* himself in Jordan he was *washed*. It comes to the same thing, whether a physician says, *bathe yourself every morning in the sea*, or, *dip yourself every morning in the sea*, yet the words *bathe* and *dip* do not signify the same thing. We see, then, that we can make the very same use of our modal word *dip*, that the Greeks made of their βαπτίζω. No man who understands English, will say that the word *dip* and the word *bathe* signify the same thing, yet, in certain situations, they may be used indifferently. Persons at a bath may ask each other, did you *dip* this morning? or did you *bathe* this morning? *To dip* may apply to the *defiling* of any thing, as well as to *washing*. It expresses no more than the mode. It is the situation in which it stands, and the word with which it is construed, that determine the object of the application of the mode. *To dip* in pure water, is to wash; to dip in colouring matter, is to dye; to dip into mire, is to defile. None of these ideas, however, are in the word *dip* itself. No word could determine mode, according to the principles of criticism employed by writers on this subject.

The error in this criticism is that which I have before exposed. It supposes that, if in any circumstances two words can be used interchangeably, they must signify the same thing; and that controversialists are at liberty to reciprocate their meanings, as often as the necessity of their cause demands it. This is a source of error more fruitful in false criticism, than any other of its numerous resources. There is a speciousness in it that has imposed on lexicographers, critics, and commentators. They have universally, so far as I know, taken as a first principle, that which is a mere figment.

The Sibylline verse concerning the city of Athens, quoted by Plutarch in his life of Theseus, most exactly determines the meaning of βαπτίζω.

Ασχος βαπτίζη, δυναι δὲ ται οὐ θςμης εἶναι.

“Thou mayest be dipped, O bladder ! but thou art not fated to sink.”

The remark of Vossius and Turretine upon this is : “Hence it appears that βαπτίζεις is more than σκιολαζεις, which is to swim lightly *on the surface*, and less than δυνεις, which is to *go down to the bottom*, so as to be destroyed.” In the latter part of this distinction, they are certainly mistaken, as to both verbs. βαπτίζεις may be applied to what goes to the bottom and perishes ; and δυνεις very frequently applies to things that sink without destruction. It is the usual word applied to the setting of the sun or its apparent sinking in the ocean ; and it is the word which Homer applies to the sinking of the marine deities who live in the bottom of the sea. Indeed the word has no more destruction in it than βαπτίζω itself, which is occasionally applied to the sinking of ships. The matter of fact is, that whether the sinking object is destroyed or not, is learned from neither word, but from the circumstances in which it is used. If βαπτίζεις is applied to a ship going to the bottom, its destruction is known without being expressed by this word : if δυνεις is applied to Neptune, Thetis, or a sea nymph, it is in the same way known that there is no destruction. The obvious and characteristic distinction between the word is, that δυνεις is a neuter verb, signifying to *sink*, not to cause something else to sink. But a thing that sinks of itself, will doubtless *sink to the bottom*, if not prevented ; and if it is subject to destruction by such sinking, it will perish. It is therefore characteristically applied to things that *sink to the bottom*. But βαπτίζεις signifies merely to dip, without respect to depth or consequence, and is as proper to the immersion of an insect on the surface of the deepest part of the ocean, as to the sinking of a ship or a whale in the same. Both words might in many cases be applied to the same thing indifferently, but in their characteristic meaning, as in the above verse, they are opposed. The expression in this verse is allegorical,

literally referring to a bladder or leathern bottle, which, when empty, swims on the surface : if sufficiently filled, will dip, but will not sink. In this view, it asserts that the Athenian state, though it might be occasionally overwhelmed with calamities, yet would never perish. There is another sense which the expression might have, which is very suitable to the ambiguity of an oracle. "You may yourselves destroy the state, otherwise it is imperishable." A leathern bottle might be so filled, as to force it to the bottom, though it would never sink of itself. Nothing can more decisively determine the exact characteristic import of βαπτίζω than this verse. It is *dip*, and nothing but *dip*.

Mr. Ewing's learned friend, in remarking on this word, falls into an error opposite to that of Vossius and Turretine. They make the word denote to *dip*, without going to the bottom : he makes it to *dip*, so as to continue under water. "Our Anti-pædo-baptist friends," says he, "when they contend, that from the examples adduced by them, *immersion* is the only sense in which βαπτίζω, in its literal acceptation, was employed, do not seem aware that almost all of these examples imply, not a mere *dipping*, or immersion immediately followed by an emersion, but a continued and permanent immersion, a continuance under water." Now upon this I remark, first, that if there is one example in which it applies to an immersion, followed by an emersion, it is as good as a thousand to determine that it may apply to such immersions. I observe in the second place, that not one of the examples imply a continuance under water. When the word is applied to a drowning man or a sinking ship, it no more implies the permanence of the immersion than when Plutarch uses it to signify the dipping of the hand in blood. The word has no reference to what follows the immersion ; and whether the thing immersed lies at the bottom, or is taken up, cannot be learned from the word, but from the connexion

and circumstances. It is a childish error to suppose, that we must have a model for Christian Baptism in the meaning of the word that designates it. But if this argument had any foundation, what does the gentleman mean by it? Does he think that baptized persons ought to be drowned? This is surely very perverse. When it cannot be denied that the word denotes to *dip*, they endeavour to make it more than dipping. Then by all means let them have Baptism in their own way. When we have brought them under the water, perhaps they will not make conscience of lying at the bottom.

The example referred to by Hammond is also irresistible: It is said of Eupolis, that being thrown into the sea, *βαπτίζετο*, he was *baptized*. This baptism surely was immersion. This example shows us also that the word may be applied when the object is destroyed, as well as when it is raised again out of the water, though in general things dipped are taken immediately up after the dipping. The baptism spoken of by Plutarch, must also be immersion, *βαπτίσον σε εις θαλάσσαν*: *Baptize yourself into the sea*.

The expression quoted by Hedericus from Heliod. b. v. is equally decisive. *βαπτίζειν εις την λιμνην*, *to baptize into the lake*. And that from Æsop, *της νεως κινδυνουσουσης βαπτιζεσθαι*, *the ship being in danger of sinking*. If a ship sinking in the ocean is baptized, baptism must be immersion.

But the language of no writer can have more authority on this subject than that of Josephus. A Jew who wrote in the Greek language in the apostolic age, must be the best judge of the meaning of Greek words employed by Jews in his own time. Now this author uses the word frequently, and always in the sense of immersion. He uses it also sometimes figuratively with the same literal reference. Speaking of the purification from defilement by a dead body, he says, *βαπτισαντες τε και της σφραγος ταυτης εις πηλην ερραινον*: "and having *dipped* some of the ashes into spring

water, they sprinkled," &c. Here we see the characteristic distinction between βαπτίζω and γαύω. The one is to *dip*, the other to *sprinkle*. Antiq. l. iv. c. 4. p. 96.

On this example, Mr. Ewing's friend remarks:—"Now, upon looking into the Levitical law upon this particular point, (Numb. xix. 17,) we find the direction was, 'They shall take of the ashes, *and running water shall be put thereto.*' Here, then, the *putting running water to ashes*, is expressly termed βαπτισαντες της νεφθας." Let the gentleman look a little more closely, and he will see that his observation is not correct. It is true that Numb. xix. 17, and the above passage from Josephus, refer to the same thing; but they do not relate it in the same manner. The Septuagint directs, that water shall be poured upon the ashes into a vessel; Josephus relates the fact as if the ashes were thrown into the water. Now, this might make no difference as to the water of purification, but it was a difference as to the mode of preparing it. Nothing, then, can be farther from truth, than that the putting of the water on the ashes, according to Numb. xix. 17, is called by Josephus, *the baptizing of the ashes*. If Josephus speaks of the *baptizing* of the ashes, he represents the ashes as being put into the water, and not the water as being poured on the ashes. He uses the verb εβημι as well as βαπτίζω. According to Josephus, then, the ashes were dipped or put into the water; though, according to the Septuagint, the water was poured out into a vessel on the ashes.

Speaking of the storm that threatened destruction to the ship that carried Jonah, he says, και οτου ουπω μελλοντος βαπτισθαι του σκαφους, "when the ship was on the point of *sinking*, or just about to be *baptized*." What was the mode of this baptism? l. ix. c. 10. p. 285.

In the history of his own life, Josephus gives an account of a remarkable escape which he had in a voyage to Rome, when the ship itself foundered in the

midst of the sea : βαπτισθέντος γὰρ ἡμῶν τοῦ πλοίου κατὰ μέσον τὸν Ἀδριαν. "For our ship having been baptized or immersed in the midst of the Adriatic sea," &c. Is there any doubt about the mode of this baptism? p. 626.

Speaking of the murder of Aristobulus, by command of Herod, he says, "The boy was sent to Jericho by night, ἔκει δὲ κατ' ἐντολὴν ὑπὸ τῶν Γαλατῶν βαπτίζομενος ἐν κολυμβηθρᾷ τέλειτα, and there by command having been immersed in a pond by the Galatians he perished." Jewish War, Book I. p. 696. The same transaction is related in the Antiquities in these words ; βαρυντες αὖτις καὶ βαπτίζοντες, ὡς ἐν παιδία νηχομενον οὐκ ἀνηκάν εἰς καὶ πανταπασίιν ἀποπνίξαι. "Pressing him down always, as he was swimming, and baptizing him as in sport, they did not give over, till they entirely drowned him." Can any thing be more express and exact than this? Here the baptizers drowned the baptized person in the pool, where they were bathing, p. 458.

Describing the death of one Simon by his own hand, after he had killed his father, mother, wife, and children, lest they should fall into the hands of the enemy, he says, ὅλον εἰς τὴν αὐτοῦ σφαγὴν ἐβαπτίσε τὸ ξίφος. "He baptized or plunged his sword up to the hilt into his own bowels." The mode here is not doubtful; the sword was dipped in his body. We have previously seen βαπτω used in like circumstances, and ἐβαψε would have been equally proper here, according to the observation already made, that words which have a characteristic distinction, may, in certain situations, be interchangeable. Εἰς βαπτίσε, *he caused it to dip*, may denote a greater effort than ἐβαψε, *dipped it*. Jos. Bell. Jud. l. ii. p. 752.

A little afterwards, he applies the word to the sinking of a ship : μετὰ δὲ τὴν Κεστίου συμφορὰν πολλοὶ τῶν ἐπιφανῶν Ἰουδαίων, ὡς περ βαπτίζομενης νέως ἀπενήχοντο τῆς πόλεως. "After this misfortune of Cestius, many of the Jews of distinction left the city, as people swim away from a sinking ship." Here a sinking ship is supposed to be baptized by sinking, p. 757.



He applies the word to the immersion of the ships which carried the people of Joppa, after being driven out of the city by the Romans : μετρωρος υπεραρθεις ο κλυδων εβαπτισεν. "The wave high raised, *baptized* or *sunk* them." Here is a sublime baptism. The surge, rising like mountains over the ships, immersed and sunk them to the bottom. The surge is the baptizer, the ships are baptized, and this baptism is the sinking of them to the bottom. Joseph. Jewish War, Book iii. p. 737.

Towards the end of the same book, he thus speaks of those who perished in the lake of Gennesareth, having fled from the city of Tarichæa : συν αυτοις εβαπτιζοντο σκαφες. "They were *baptized* or *sunk* with the ships themselves," p. 792. Here the Roman soldiers were the baptizers ; and in executing this duty, they sunk both ships and men.

Hippocrates uses this word sometimes, and always in the sense for which I contend. We have seen that he uses βαπτω very often : I have not found βαπτίζω more than four times. This circumstance sufficiently proves, that though the words are so nearly related, they are not perfectly identical in signification. The first occurrence of it is in p. 254. βαπτίζειν πάλιν ες γαλα γυναικος και μυρον αιγυπτιον. "Dip it again in breast milk and Egyptian ointment." He is speaking of a blister which was first to be dipped in the oil of roses, and if when thus applied, it should be too painful, it was to be dipped again in the manner above stated. The first dipping, as we have seen from a preceding quotation, is expressed by βαψας. This shows that, in the radical signification of dipping, these words are perfectly of the same import : and that though they have their characteristic distinction, there are situations in which they are interchangeable, where the characteristic difference may be expressed, but is not necessary.

The same writer gives us the clearest insight into the meaning of this word, by twice comparing a pe-

culiar kind of breathing in patients, to the breathing of a person after being immersed : *ανεπνεον ως εκ του βεβαπτισθαι αναπνεουσι*. "He breathed as persons breathe after being baptized," p. 340. The same comparison occurs again, p. 357, in the following words : *ανεπνει, οιον εκ του βεβαπτισθαι αναπνεουσι*. Surely unbelief must be obstinate, if this does not remove it. The breathing of persons under the disease referred to, is like the breathing of a person after baptism. Can any thing, then, be more obvious, than that baptism is an immersion in water, even an immersion over head, so as to stop the breath till it is over ?

Hippocrates applies the word also to a ship sinking, by being overburthened : *μη γελασω τον την νηα πολλοις φορτιοις βαπτισοντα, ειτα μεμφομενον τη θαλασση οτι κατεβυθισεν αυτην πληρη*. "Shall I not laugh at the man who baptizes or immerses his ship, by overlading it ; then complains of the sea, that it ingulfs it with its cargo ?" p. 532. What sort of baptism was this ? Is it possible that a mind really thirsting for the knowledge of God's laws, can resist such evidence ? Here we see *βαπτίζω* not only most definitely signifying to immerse, but contrasted with another word, which signifies this with additional circumstances. *Βαπτίζω* is used to denote that immersion that takes place when a ship is weighed down by its burthen, so as to be completely under water : *καταβυθίζω* signifies to make to go down into the abyss. Yet we have more than once met with instances in which *βαπτίζω* itself is applied to a ship going to the bottom. But as I observed in such cases, it is not from the word itself that it is known that the ship goes to the bottom, but from the circumstances. It does not, by virtue of its own intrinsic meaning, denote going to the bottom, but to dip or immerse, without reference to depth. It may, then, be applied when the operation is extended to the bottom, as well as when it is confined to the surface. But when it is so applied, it does not definitely distinguish the idea of depth. When this

is intended to be expressed, another word, as in the present case, is employed : καταβυθίζω definitely expresses *going down into the abyss*.

This word is found in Polybius, in circumstances that leave no doubt of its signification. He applies it to soldiers wading through deep water, and expressly limits its application to that part of the body which was covered with water : μολὸς ἑως τῶν μαζῶν οἱ πεζοὶ βαπτίζομενοι διέβαινον. "The foot soldiers passed with difficulty, baptized or *immersed* up to the breast." Polyb. iii. c. 72. Does not this decisively determine the meaning of βαπτίζω? They were not, indeed, plunged over head; but for this reason, a limitation is introduced, confining the application of the word to that part of the body which was under water. That only was baptized which was buried.

The same author gives us another example equally decisive : Αὐτοὶ ὑπ' αὐτῶν βαπτίζομενοι καὶ καταδυνοντες ἐν τοῖς τεύμασιν. "They are of themselves baptized or immersed, and sunk in the marshes," v. c. 47. Here βαπτίζομαι is coupled with καταδυνω, as a word of similar import, though not exactly synonymous: the former denoting simple immersion; the latter, the sinking of the immersed object to the bottom.

Dio also affords evidence decisive of the same meaning : παντελῶς βαπτίζονται. "They are entirely baptized, sunk, overwhelmed, or immersed," xxxviii. p. 84.

He applies it, as we have seen it employed by others, to the sinking of ships : χειμῶν τοιοῦτος ἔξαιφνης τὴν χώραν ἀπᾶσαν κατέσχευεν ὥστε—τὰ πλοῖα τὰ ἐν τῷ Τιβερὶδι—βαπτισθῆναι. "So great a storm suddenly arose through the whole country, that the boats were *baptized* or *sunk* in the Tiber," xxxvii. What then is baptism but immersion?

He applies it in the same way, L. 492 : πῶς μὲν ἀν' οὐχ' ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ πληθὺος τῶν κωπῶν βαπτισθῆσι. "How could it escape *sinking*, from the very multitude of rowers." We see, then, that the classical writers in the

Greek language, without exception, know nothing of this word in any other signification than that of *immersing*. They never apply it to any other mode. They no more apply it to *pouring* or *sprinkling*, &c. than to *warming* or *cooling*. Such significations have been conjured up by profane ingenuity, endeavouring to force the words of the Spirit of God into agreement with the long established practices of men, in perverting the ordinances of God.

Porphyry applies the word to the heathen opinion of the baptism of the wicked in Styx, the famous river of hell : *οταν δε κατηγορουμενος επιβη, αναμαρτητος μεν ων αδεως διερχεται, αχει των γονατων εχων το υδωρ, αμαρτωνδε, ολογον προδας βαπτιζεται μεχρι κεφαλης.* “When the accused person enters the river, if he is innocent, he passes boldly through, having the water up to his knees ; but if guilty, having advanced a little, he is *plunged* or baptized up to the head.” De Styge, p. 282. The baptism of Styx, then, is an immersion of the body up to the head. The part not dipped, is expressly excepted.

Diodorus Siculus applies the word to the sinking of beasts carried away by a river : *Των δε χερσαιων θηριων τα πολλα μεν υπο του ποταμου περιληφθεντα διαφθειρεται βαπτιζομενα, τινα δε εις τους μετσωρους εκφευγοντα τοπους διασωζεται.* “The most of the land animals being caught by the river, *sinking* or *being baptized*, perish ; but some escaping to the higher grounds, are saved.” I. p. 33. Here, to be *baptized*, is to sink in water. This example, also, confirms my observation, that though when *sinking to the bottom*, or *sinking in the great deep*, is designed to be distinguished from simple immersion, *βαπτίζω* could not suit the situation ; but another word, such as *καταδυνω*, *καταβυθίζω*, *καταποντιζω*, &c. is used ; yet *βαπτίζω* will apply to the deepest immersion, and to destruction by immersion, when there is no contrast, and when the depth and destruction are known from other words or circumstances in the connexion. *Βαπτίζω* denotes simple immersion, yet it

may be used in circumstances when that immersion is certainly known to *be going to the bottom, and being destroyed.*

There are instances in which the word is by some translated *wash*, and in which the general meaning may be thus well enough expressed in a free version. Still, however, the word, even in such situations, does not express the idea of washing, but has its own peculiar meaning of *mode*, the idea of *washing* being only a consequence from the *dipping*. There are some cases in which it is pretended that it must apply to purification by sprinkling, &c. Now, as I am pledged to show, that the word does not signify to *wash in any manner*, I am still more bound to show that it does not denote purification by *sprinkling*. I shall therefore now attend to this part of the subject.

In Ecclesiast. xxxiv. 30, it is said, "He that washeth himself because of a dead body, and toucheth it again, what availeth his washing?" Now, as βαπτίζω is the word here used, and as from Numb. xix. 18, we learn that such a person was to be purified by sprinkling, does it follow that βαπτίζω must signify to sprinkle, or to purify by sprinkling? He that wishes to see this objection honestly stated in all its strength, and refuted in the most triumphant manner, may consult Dr. Gale's Reflections on Dr. Wall's History of Infant Baptism. But the answer must be obvious to every person who consults Numb. xix. 19. which shows that sprinkling was but a part of that purification, and that the unclean person was also *bathed in water*. It is this *bathing* that is effected by *baptism*. The passage in question ought to be translated,—“He that *dippeth* or *baptizeth* himself because of a dead body, and toucheth it again, what availeth his *dipping* or *baptism*?” The word βαπτίζω has here its appropriate meaning, without the smallest deviation.

Besides, had there been no immersion or bathing of the whole body enjoined in Numbers, I would utterly despise this objection. Though God had not made

bathing of the body a part of this purification, might not the traditions of the elders have made the addition? And would not this have been sufficient authority for the author of this Apocryphal book to make a ground of his reasoning? When I have proved the meaning of a Greek word, by the authority of the whole consent of Greek literature, I will not surrender it to the supposition of the strict adherence of the Jewish nation, in the time of the writing of the Apocrypha, to the Mosaic ritual. We know that they made many additions, and that these were esteemed as of equal authority with the rites of Moses.

For a very full and interesting discussion of Luke xi. 38, and Mark vii. 4, let the reader consult Dr. Gale, p. 125. Here he will find a triumphant answer to every quibble from Dr. Wall. But as the text itself is perfectly sufficient for my purpose, I shall not swell my volume with quotations from that learned writer. In our version, Luke xi. 38, *ἐβαπτίσθη* is translated wash. "And when the Pharisee saw it, he marvelled that he had not first washed before dinner." The objection is, does not *βαπτίζω*, then, sometimes denote to wash? Nay, farther, as the Jews washed the hands by having water poured on them, and as this passage respects the washing of the hands, is there not here evidence that the word in question sometimes signifies to wash by pouring? This, surely, is as strong a statement of their objection as our opponents can wish. Yet in all its plausibility, I despise it. Even here, the word signifies to dip, and not to wash. *Dipping* is the thing expressed: *washing* is the consequence, known by inference. It is dipping, whether it relates to the hands or the whole body. But many examples from the Jews, and also from the Greeks, it is said, prove that the hands were washed by pouring water on them by a servant, and I care not that ten thousand such examples were brought forward. Though this might be the usual mode of washing the hands, it might not be the only mode, which is abun-

dantly sufficient for my purpose. The possibility of this is enough for me ; but Dr. Gale has proved from Dr. Pococke, that the Jews sometimes washed their hands by *dipping*. People of distinction might have water poured on their hands by servants, but it is not likely that this was the common practice of the body of the people in any nation. The examples from Homer cannot inform us with respect to the practice of the common people.

But I say this without any view to my argument in this place, for it is evident that the word does not here refer to the washing of the hands. It may apply to any part, as well as to the whole ; but whenever it is used without its regimen expressed, it applies to the whole body. When a part only is dipped the part is mentioned, or some part is excepted, as is the case with λουω. The passage, then, ought to have been translated,—“ And when the Pharisee saw it, he marvelled that he was not baptized, or dipped before dinner.” The Pharisees themselves on some occasions, would not eat till they had used the bath, and this Pharisee might expect still more eminent devotion from Jesus. Indeed, to use the bath before dinner, was a very common practice in eastern countries ; and the practice would still be more in vogue with those who considered it a religious purification. But there is no need to refer to the practice of the time, nor to ransack the writings of the Rabbins, for the practice of the Jews. We have here the authority of the Holy Spirit for the Jewish custom. He uses the word βαπτίζω, and that word signifies *to dip*, and only *to dip*. If I have established the acceptation of this word by the consent of use, even an inexplicable difficulty in this case would not affect the certainty of my conclusions. But the difficulty is not inexplicable. What should hinder the word to have here its usual import ?

Mark vii. 4. our translators render, “except they wash, they eat not.” Now, my opponents may say, does not βαπτίζω here signify to wash ? I answer no.

*Dipping* is the thing expressed; but it is used in such circumstances as to imply *washing*. The *washing* is a consequence from the dipping. It ought to have been translated, "except they dip themselves, they eat not." In the preceding context, we are told that in ordinary they do not eat without washing their hands. Here we are told that when they come from market, they eat not till they are *dipped or baptized*. Dr. Campbell's notion, that *νιττω* and *βαπτίζω* here both refer to the hands, the one to washing by having water poured on them, and the other by dipping them, I do not approve. For, though *βαπτίζω* will apply to the dipping of the hands, as well as to the dipping of the whole body, yet when no part is mentioned or excepted, the whole body is always meant. His view of the matter I consider nothing but an ingenious conceit, without any authority from the practice of the language. *Νιττω* cannot denote a peculiar mode of washing, in distinction from another mode. Besides, to wash any thing by mere dipping, is not so thorough a washing as may be expressed by *νιττω*. Now, if the words both refer to the washing of the hands, the first will be the best washing, which is contrary to Dr. Campbell's supposition. Dr. Campbell, indeed, with Pearce and Wetstein, understands *πυγμῇ* of a handful of water. But they produce no example in which *πυγμῇ* has this signification, and therefore the opinion has no authority. Indeed, there is a self-contradiction in the opinion of these learned writers on this point. *Πυγμῇ*, they properly consider as signifying the fist, or shut hand; and from this, suppose that the word here denotes as much water as may be held in the hollow of the hand, with the fingers closed. But a fist will hold no water; and the hand with the fingers closed so as to hold water, is no fist. With as little reason can it be supposed to signify, as Dr. Campbell suggests, that *πυγμῇ* denotes the manner of washing, with reference to the form of the hands when they wash each other. In such circumstances, nei-



that of them is a fist, but still less the washing hand. In this operation the hands infold one another, and if there is any thing like a fist, it is the two hands united. Dr. Campbell quotes, with approbation, the remark of Wetstein: βαπτίζεσθαι est manus aquæ immergere, νίπτεσθαι manibus affundere." But the former does not signify to dip *the hands*, except the regimen is expressed; and though the latter applies to pouring water on the hands, it will equally apply to washing out of a bason. Parkhurst, indeed, translates the phrase, "*to wash the hands with the fist*, that is, by rubbing water on the palm of one hand, with the doubled fist of the other." This distinguishes the infolded hand as the rubbing hand, but, as a matter of fact, I believe that, though both hands may be said to rub on each other, yet the infolding hand is distinguished as the rubbing hand. *To wash the hand with the fist*, is not an expression which would be likely to be chosen to express the operation of washing the hands. The palm of one hand is applied to the palm of the other; and when the palm of one hand is applied to the back of the other, the intention is to cleanse the latter, and not by the latter to cleanse the former. Besides, the inside hand is seldom closed into a fist. I prefer, therefore, the explanation of Lightfoot, which is both most agreeable to the meaning of πύγμα, and to the Jewish traditions. He understands it as denoting *the hand as far as the fist extended*. This is agreeable to the definition of the word by Pollux: "If you shut your hand, the outside is called πύγμα;" and it is agreeable to the Jewish traditions, one of which he shows, enjoins such a washing. The contrast, then, here, is between the washing of the hands up to the wrist, and the immersion of the whole body. Dr. Campbell, indeed, remarks, that "it ought to be observed, that βαπτίζωνται is not in the passive voice, but the middle, and is contrasted with νίψονται, also in the middle, so that, by every rule, the latter must be understood actively as well as the former." But,

though I understand βαπτίζωμαι in the middle voice, I do not acknowledge that this is necessarily required from a contrast with νίπτωμαι. Let the meaning of this passage be what it will, the active, passive, and middle voices, might be so associated. I know no rule that requires such a conformity as Dr. Campbell here demands. It might be said of Christians, κυριακὸν δεῖπνον φαγούσι, καὶ βαπτίζονται. *They eat the Lord's Supper, and they are baptized.* The contrast between νίπτωμαι and βαπτίζωμαι in the passage referred to, does not require the same voice. Νίπτωμι, the active itself, might have been used, and βαπτίζωμαι in the passive. I understand it in the middle, not because νίπτωμαι is middle, but because in the baptism referred to, every one baptized himself. Had it been as in Christian baptism, I would understand it in the passive.

Mr. Ewing translates the passage thus: "For the Pharisees and all the Jews, except they wash their hands oft, eat not, holding the tradition of the elders. And *even when they have come* from a market, unless they baptize, they eat not," &c. But the word *oft*, as a translation of πρῶτον, is liable to the objections of Dr. Campbell, which I need not here repeat. Mr. Ewing surely should have obviated them. Besides, neither Mr. Ewing, nor any other, so far as I know, has produced one example, in which πρῶτον confessedly signifies *oft*. Without this the translation has no authority. Mr. Ewing translates καὶ *and even*, for which there is no authority. That particle often signifies *even*, but never *and even*. Mr. Ewing's translation makes their baptism after the market, inferior to the washing before mentioned. But this certainly reverses the true meaning. Defilement certainly was understood to be increased by the market. Mr. Ewing indeed endeavours to give a turn to this, but it is a complete failure. "And in order to show how strictly they hold this tradition," he says, "they observed it, not merely on their more solemn occasions,

but even when they had just come from places of public resort, and from the ordinary intercourse of life." But where did Mr. Ewing find *their more solemn occasions*? This is apocryphal, and like the Apocrypha, it contradicts the genuine Scriptures. The Evangelist declares, that *except they wash their hands, they eat not*. This implies, that they never sat down to table, even at their ordinary meals, without washing. The baptism after market, then, must have been a greater or more extensive purification. Mr. Ewing supposes that the word *baptize* is used here to show that the washing was not for cleanliness, but was a religious custom. But this is shown sufficiently, if *baptize* were not used. It is directly stated, that this washing was obedience to the tradition of the elders. I observe farther, that if the washing was not by other circumstances known to be a religious custom, this would not have been known by the word βαπτίζω more than by νίπτω. Besides βαπτισματα does not here explain or limit νίπτω. If the latter could not, with the words construed with it, be known to designate a religious observance, it can receive no assistance from the former. Mr. Ewing understands both words as referring to the same thing, washing the hands by water poured on them. Why then is νίπτω changed for βαπτίζω? Surely the change of the word intimates a change of the meaning in such circumstances. "They eat not, except they wash their hands. And after market, they eat not, except they baptize." Surely no person, who has not a purpose to serve, would suppose that baptize here meant the very same thing with wash the hands. But if it is insisted that baptize here is distinguished from νίπτω as a religious washing, then how will it determine that νίπτω here refers to a religious washing? If it is here so distinguished from νίπτω, then the washing denoted by νίπτω cannot be a religious washing. This would import, that the washing of the hands first spoken of by νίπτω was not a religious

washing ; and that the latter washing was distinguished from the former by this. The meaning then would be : " Except they wash their hands, they eat not ; and when they have come from the market, they eat not, until they have washed their hands religiously."

But as respects my argument, I care not whether βαπτίζωμαι here refers to the hands or the whole body ; it is perfectly sufficient for me, if it here admits its usual meaning. Let it be here observed, and never let it be forgotten, that with respect to the meaning of a word in any passage, the proof that it has such a meaning always lies upon him who uses it in that meaning as an argument or objection ; for this obvious reason, that if it is not proved, it is neither argument nor objection. Now if I choose to bring this passage as an argument, or as additional evidence, I must prove its meaning. In this way I have viewed it as having weight. But if I choose to give up its evidence, and stand on the defence, my antagonist is bound to prove his view of it as a ground of his objection, and my cause requires no more of me than to show that the word in such a situation is capable of the meaning for which I contend. For it is evident, that if it may have such a meaning, it cannot be certain that it has not that signification. Many a passage may contain the disputed word in such circumstances as to afford no definite evidence. It cannot, in such a passage, be used as proof ; it is enough, if it admits the meaning contended for. This is a grand law of controversy, attention to which will save the advocates of truth much useless toil ; and keep them from attempting to prove what it may not be possible to prove, and what they are not required to prove. It will also assist the inquirer to arrive at truth. Now in the present case, except Mr. Ewing proves that βαπτίζωμαι must here signify the *pouring of water* upon the hands, or that it cannot refer to the dipping of the hands or the body, he has done nothing.

I bring passages without number, to prove that the word *must* have the meaning for which I contend. No objection then could be valid against my conclusion, except a passage in which it *cannot have* that signification. These observations I state as self-evident truths. The man who does not perceive their justness cannot be worth reasoning with.

But why should it be thought incredible, that the Pharisees immersed themselves after market? If an Egyptian, on touching a swine, would run to the river and plunge in with his clothes, is it strange that the superstitious Pharisees should *immerse* themselves after the pollution of the market?

Dr. Gale, however, on the authority of the Syriac, Arabic, Ethiopic, and Persic versions, is inclined to understand the passage as relating to the dipping of the things bought in the market. But as I decidedly prefer the other sense, I will not avail myself of this resource. I abhor the practice of catching at any forced meaning that serves a temporary purpose, at the expense of setting loose the meaning of God's word. I do not wish to force a favourite mode of baptism on the Scriptures, but I will implicitly submit my mind to the mode that God has appointed. I have not a wish on the subject, but to know the will of Christ.

What our version, Mark vii. 4. calls the *washing*, &c. the original calls βαπτισμοῦς, *the baptisms* of cups, pots, &c. It may then be asked, does not this imply that this word signifies washing? But I answer as before, that though these things were *dipped* for *washing*, yet *dipping* and *washing* are not the same thing. The *washing* is not expressed, but is a mere consequence of the *dipping*. The passage, then, ought to be translated *dippings*, or *immersions*, or *baptisms*, if the last term is adopted as an English word. The purification of all the things specified, except the last, was appointed by the law, Levit. xi. 32. to be affected by being put under water. But with respect to the

κλῆται, or beds, Mr. Ewing asserts that the translation *dippings* would be manifestly absurd. Now what is manifestly absurd cannot be true. If this assertion then is well founded, Mr. Ewing has opposed a barrier which the boldest cannot pass. But why is this absurd? Let us hear his own words. "The articles specified in ver. 4. are all utensils and accommodations of the Jewish mode of eating, about which the Evangelist was speaking; from the 'cups, pots, and brazen vessels' of the cook and the butler, to the 'beds' of the *triclinium*, or dining room, for the use of the family and their guests. There were three only of these beds in one room. Each was commonly occupied by three persons, and sometimes by five, or even more. Three such beds probably accommodated our Lord and his disciples at the last supper. They must have been of such a size, therefore, as to preclude the idea of their being immersed, especially being frequently immersed, as a religious ordinance." Now I will admit this account in every tittle, yet still contend that there is nothing like *an absurdity* in the supposition, that the *couches* were immersed. The thing is quite possible, and who will say that the superstitious Pharisees might not practise it? It would indeed be a very inconvenient thing, but what obstacles will not superstition overcome? It would be a foolish thing; but who would expect any thing but folly in will-worship? Such religious practice was indeed absurd, but it is an abuse of language to assert that it is *an absurdity* to say that the Pharisees immersed their couches. Let Mr. Ewing beware of using such language. If the Holy Spirit has asserted that the Pharisees *baptized* their couches, and if this word signifies *to immerse*, Mr. Ewing has asserted that the Holy Spirit has asserted an absurdity. This is no light matter. It is an awful charge on the Spirit of Inspiration.

Dr. Wardlaw is equally rash on this point. He supposes that it is incredible that they *immersed* their

beds. How is it incredible? Is the thing impossible? If not its credibility depends on the testimony. But whether or not the Holy Spirit gives the testimony, depends on the meaning of the word. If from other passages we learn that it has this meaning, this passage cannot teach the contrary, if the thing is possible. Upon the principle of interpretation here recognized by Mr. Ewing and Dr. Wardlaw, we might reject every thing in history not suited to our own conceptions; or explain them away by paring down the meaning of words. This is the very principle of the Neological explanation of the Scripture miracles. The things are thought absurd in the obvious meaning of the words; and therefore the language must submit to accept a meaning suitable to the conceptions of the critics. Mr. Robinson thinks the common view of the exploit of Samson in killing such a multitude with the jaw-bone of an ass incredible, and he takes away the incredibility of the Scriptural account, by explaining it of the tooth of a rock which Samson pulled down on his enemies. Dr. Wardlaw says, with respect to the immersion of beds, "he who can receive it, let him receive it." I say, he who dare reject it, rejects the testimony of God. This is a most improper way to speak on the subject. If *immersion* is the meaning of the word, it is not optional to receive or reject it. Whether or not this is its meaning, must be learned from its history, not from the abstract probability or improbability of the immersion of beds. If the history of the word declares its meaning to be immersion, *the mere difficulty of immersing beds, in conformity to a religious tradition, cannot imply that it has another meaning here.* The principle, then, of this objection, and the language in which these writers state it, cannot be too strongly reprobated. If adopted on other questions respecting the will of God, it tends to set us loose from the authority of his word.

I will here reduce my observations on this point to the form of a canon. *When a thing is proved by suffi-*

*cient evidence, no objection from difficulties can be admitted as decisive, except they involve an impossibility.* This is self-evident, for otherwise nothing could ever be proved. If every man's view of abstract probability were allowed to outweigh evidence, no truth would stand the test. The existence of God could not be proved. The Scriptures themselves could not abide such a trial. If my canon is not self-evident, let no man receive it. But if it is just, it overturns not only this objection, but almost all the objections that have been alleged against immersion in Baptism. Besides, there is hardly any point of theological controversy in which it may not be useful. Many who are willing to admit it on the subject of Baptism, may act contrary to it on other subjects. Indeed, there are few who do not in things of small moment overlook this principle.

In tracing the history of Jesus, we will see how much of the opposition to his claims were founded on the principle which my canon reprobates. When he said that he was the bread that came down from heaven, the Jews murmured, and replied, "Is not this Jesus, the son of Joseph, whose father and mother we know? How is it then that he saith, I came down from heaven?" John vi. 42. Here was a difficulty that they thought insuperable. "We are sure he was born among us—he could not therefore have come from heaven." But there was a solution to this difficulty, had their prejudices permitted them to find it. It was possible, that though born on earth, as a man, he might come from heaven, as he was God. But they were glad to catch at the apparent inconsistency; and their prejudices would not allow them to attempt to undeceive themselves. This in fact is the very substance of one common objection to the Deity of Christ. The Arians still collect all the passages that assert the human nature of Christ, and take it for granted that this is a proof that he is not God. Let our brethren take care that it is not on the



same principle they allege this objection to immersion in baptism. Were there no wish to find evidence on one side only, would it be supposed that it is *absurd* or *incredible* that the superstitious Pharisees *immersed* even their couches?—Another striking instance of objecting on this principle we have, John vii. 41, 42. “Shall Christ come out of Galilee? Hath not the Scripture said, that Christ cometh of the seed of David, and out of the town of Bethlehem, where David was?” This would appear to them a noose from which he could not extricate himself—a difficulty that he could not solve. *The Scriptures assert, that the Christ will come out of Bethlehem, but this man has come out of Galilee.* Had they been as willing to see evidence in his favour, as evidence against him, they might have perceived that the agreement of these apparent contradictions was not impossible. The knowledge of his real history would have given the solution. But it was not a solution they wanted. In reading the history of Jesus also, it is not uninteresting to remark, that many things which appeared to his enemies decisive evidence against him, had no weight at all with his friends. This discrepancy shows how much our sentiments are under the influence of our feelings, and consequently the guilt of unbelief, with respect to any part of the divine counsel which we reject. Though we have no right to judge one another, we have a right, when God has given a revelation, to ascribe all ignorance of it to sin. I make this observation not merely with respect to the point now in debate, or to criminate my opponents. The observation applies to every error, and as no man has attained in every thing to truth, it applies to us all. I make the observation to incite my brethren on both sides of this subject, to search without prejudice—to inquire under the influence of an impression of great accountableness.

I will state farther, that in proving that a thing is not impossible, there is no obligation to prove, that

any of the possible ways of solution did actually exist. The bare possibility of existence is enough. This also is self-evident, and may be stated as a canon. Yet from inattention to this, the opponents of immersion are constantly calling on us to prove, that there were in such and such places things necessary for dipping. Mr. Ewing guages the reservoirs and wells of Jerusalem, to show their insufficiency for immersion. He may then call on me to find a place sufficient to immerse a couch. But I will go on no such errand. If I have proved the meaning of the word, I will believe the Spirit of God, who tells me that the Pharisees baptized their beds, and leave the superstition and industry of the devotees to find or make such a place. Let the demand which our opponents in this instance make on us, be conceded to the infidel, the Bible must be given up. In replying to difficulties started by the deist, the defender of Christianity thinks he has amply done his duty, when he shows that the solution is possible, without proving that the possible way of solution did actually exist. Indeed, many of the defenders of Christianity undertake too much, and lay too much stress on actual proof, with respect to the way in which difficulties may be removed. When such proof can be got, it is always right to produce it, more clearly to confound the infidel. But it is extremely injudicious to lay such a stress on these solutions, as if they were actually necessary. It ought always to be strongly stated, that such proof is more than the defence of truth requires. When writers think themselves remarkably successful in this way, they are not disinclined to magnify the importance of their discoveries, and are willing to rest a part of the evidence on their own success. This discovers more vanity than judgment, and more desire for the glory of discovery, than for the interests of the truths defended. When this happens, it is not strange that infidels are emboldened to make the unreasonable demand, which their opponents have voluntarily ren-

dered themselves liable to answer. If I could prove that there was at Jerusalem a pond that could immerse the High Church of Glasgow, I would certainly bring forward my proof; but I would as certainly disclaim the necessity. To give an example. In opposition to Dr. Campbell's opinion, that in Mark vii. 4. βαπτίζονται refers to the dipping of the hands, Mr. Ewing, as his proof, alleges, that "as far as he has observed, there is only one way of washing either the hands or the feet in Scripture, and that is by pouring water upon them, and rubbing them as the water flows." Now, were I of Dr. Campbell's opinion on this passage, I would grant Mr. Ewing all this, yet abide by my position. It is very possible that all the other instances of washing the hands that are mentioned in Scripture may be such, yet a different way have been in existence on some occasions. And if the expression were βαπτίζωσι τὰς χεῖρας, this I would suppose not only possible, but undoubtedly true. No number of examples of one mode of washing the hands, can prove that no other mode was ever practised, when the thing does not respect a divine ordinance, but either the ordinary washing, or the superstitious washing enjoined by the commandments of men. It is of vast importance in every controversy to know what we are obliged to prove, and what is not necessary to our argument. From inattention to this, Mr. Ewing thinks he has defeated Dr. Campbell, when he has never touched him. His weapons fall quite on this side of the mark. Now, on this last point I differ from Dr. Campbell, I do not think that βαπτίζονται refers to the dipping of the hands. Yet I would not use Mr. Ewing's arguments to disprove this. Indeed, were Dr. Campbell alive, he would not be so easily defeated. Mr. Ewing discredits his authority on the subject of *immersion* as the Scriptural mode of Baptism, by representing him as resting his opinion on Tertullian among the ancients, and Wetstein among the moderns. Nothing can be more unfair. He merely

refers to Tertullian, to show the sense in which the word βαπτίζω was understood by the Latin fathers, and quotes the opinion of Wetstein, with a general approbation of him as a critic, certainly beyond his deserts, and with respect to a criticism which I believe to be false. But Dr. Campbell was not a man to found his views on such authority. When he says, "I have heard a disputant of this stamp, in defiance of *etymology* and *use*, maintain that the word rendered in the New Testament *baptize*, means more properly to sprinkle than to plunge; and in defiance of all *antiquity*, that the former method was the earliest, and for many centuries the most general practice in *baptizing*," does he not found on his own knowledge of *etymology* and *use*—on his own knowledge of *antiquity*? Will Mr. Ewing venture to say that Dr. Campbell was not well acquainted with the *etymology* and use of the word in question? From what modern must he receive instruction with respect to the antiquities of church history? It may be true, indeed, that Dr. Campbell has not done all for this subject that he might have done. But did he fail in what he attempted? Who would expect that in his situation he could have done more? Nor is his candour in confessing a mode of baptism primitive, which he did not adopt, to be ascribed to a vanity of patronizing what he did not practise. Like many others, he may have thought that the mode was not essential to the ordinance. And I have no hesitation in affirming, that such an opinion is far less injurious to the Scriptures, than the attempt of those who will force their favourite mode out of the Scriptures, while even on the rack they will not make the confession. Such persons are obliged to give a false turn to a great part of Scripture, totally unconcerned in the controversy. Nay, they are obliged to do violence even to the classics. Popery itself is not obliged, on this point, to make such havoc of the word of God. It has a happy power of changing Scripture ordinances, and, there-

fore, on this point can confess the truth without injury to its system.

I am led to the defence of Dr. Campbell, not from a wish to have the authority of his name on my side on this question. In that point of view, I do not need him. I consider myself as having produced such a body of evidence on this subject, that I am entitled to disregard the mere authority of names. I have appealed to a tribunal higher than the authority of all critics—to use itself. I do not hold up Dr. Campbell as universally successful in his criticisms. Many of them I am convinced are wrong; and those who have in all things made our version of the Gospels conform to his, have done no service to the cause of Christ. His judgment is always to be respected, but often to be rejected. On some points of Christian doctrine, he was evidently but partially enlightened, and against some he has made his translation and criticisms to bear. But as a man of integrity—as a candid adversary—as a philosophic critic, he has few equals. With respect to the philosophy of language, he is immeasurably before all our Scripture critics. I bow to the authority of no man in the things of God, yet I cannot but reverence Dr. Campbell. I respect him almost as much when I differ from him, as when we are agreed. He looks into language with the eye of a philosopher, and in controversy manifests a candour unknown to most theologians. Mr. Ewing's censure of Dr. Campbell involves the great body of learned men: It is too notorious to need proof, that the most learned men in Europe, while they practised sprinkling or pouring, have confessed immersion to be the primitive mode.

But with respect to Mark vii. 4, though it were proved that the couches could not be immersed, I would not yield an inch of the ground I have occupied. There is no absolute necessity to suppose that the *κλιναι*, or beds, were the couches at table. The word, indeed, both in Scripture and in Greek writers,

has this signification : But in both, it also signifies the beds on which they slept. Now, if it were such beds that the Pharisees *baptized*, there is nothing to prevent their immersion. They were such that a man could take up from the street, and carry to his house, Matt. ix. 6.

Besides, as it is not said how often they purified in this manner, we are at liberty to suppose that it was only for particular kinds of uncleanness, and on occasions that did not often occur. Mr. Ewing, indeed, says, "there was, no doubt, a complete observance of the 'baptisms,' of cups, and pots, and brazen vessels, and beds, at the feast of the marriage in Cana in Galilee." There is no doubt that at that feast there was a purification of all things, according to the custom of a wedding : But where did Mr. Ewing learn that it was *during the feast* that the couches were purified ? The water-pots were, no doubt, for the purification usual at a wedding : But this does not indicate all Jewish purifications. The hands and the feet of the guests were washed, and very likely also the vessels used at the feast : but that the couches were purified, is not said, and is not likely. It is not necessary even that all things purified at a feast, should have been purified out of these water-pots. It is enough that they were suitable for the purification of some things. If there was any thing to be purified, which could not be purified in them, it may have been purified elsewhere. It is not said that all things were purified in these water-pots. Besides, it is not said that these water-pots were but once filled during the wedding feast. We may therefore fill them as often as we find necessary. I do not, therefore, find it at all necessary, with Mr. Ewing, to guage these water-pots, in order to settle this question.

Mr. Bruce informs us, that in Abyssinia, the sect called Kemmont, "wash themselves *from head to foot*, after coming from the market, or any public place, where they may have touched any one of a different

sect from their own, esteeming all such unclean." Is it strange, then, to find the Pharisees, the superstitious Pharisees, immersing their couches for purification, or themselves after market? I may add, that the couches might have been so constructed, that they might be conveniently taken to pieces, for the purpose of purification. This I say only for the sake of those who will not believe God without a voucher. For myself, it is perfectly sufficient that the Holy Spirit testifies that the Pharisees baptized themselves before eating, after market; and that they baptized their couches. It is an axiom in science, that no difficulty can avail against demonstration; and with me it is an axiom, that no difficulty entitles us to give the lie to the Spirit of inspiration.

In Heb. ix. 10, the word βαπτισμοις is translated *washings*. Is not this proof that the word signifies to wash? The reply to this has already been given, in showing the difference between *dip* and *wash*. The translation ought to be "different baptisms," not "different washings." *Dipping* is the thing expressed, *washing* is a consequence. But Dr. Wardlaw observes, "that amongst the 'divers washings' (βαπτισματα, baptisms) of the old dispensation referred to, Heb. ix. 10, must surely be included all the various modes of Jewish purification; and consequently the *παντισματα*, or *sprinklings*, which were the most numerous," p. 172. But how is this certain? Why should it be supposed that the *baptisms* under the law contained all the purifications required by the law? This is not said here, nor any where else in the Scriptures. There is no necessity to suppose that every thing enjoined in the law must be included in the things here mentioned. The apostle designs to illustrate merely by specification, not to give a logical abstract. But even were the *sprinklings* to be included in one or other of the things mentioned, it may be in the *carnal ordinances*. It is a very convenient way of proving any thing, to take it for granted. Dr. Wardlaw here

takes for granted the thing to be proved. The phrase, "divers baptisms" must indicate the *sprinklings*; therefore baptism must signify sprinkling, as one of its meanings. But we deny that the "divers baptisms" include the *sprinklings*. The phrase alludes to the *immersion* of the different things that by the law were to be *immersed*. The greatest part of false reasoning depends on false first principles. Dr. Wardlaw's first principle here, is like that of Nathaniel with respect to Christ: "Can any good thing come out of Nazareth?" If it is granted that no good thing could come out of Nazareth, the proof was undoubted, that Jesus was not the Christ. To refute such reasoning, we have only to demand the proof of the premises.

Judith xii. 7. is another passage which may be alleged to prove that βαπτίζω sometimes signifies to wash; but from what has frequently been observed on the like use of the word, with how little reason, will appear in a moment: and she went out in the night, and baptized herself in the camp at a fountain," και εβαπτιστο εν τη παρεμβολη επι της πηγης του υδατος. Εβαπτιστο ought here to have been translated *she dipped herself*. Washing was the consequence of dipping in pure water. Homer speaks of *stars washed in the sea*, (Il. E. 6.); and Virgil expressing the same thing, speaks of the constellation of the bear, as fearing to be *dipped* in the ocean, (Georg. I. 245.) Now, though exactly the same thing is referred to, the expressions are not exactly equivalent. By the word *washing*, Homer fixes our attention, not on the mere dipping, but on the effect of it,—the washing of the stars by being dipped. Virgil fixes our attention, not on the washing of the stars, but on their dipping, with reference to the danger or disagreeableness of the operation. We may say either *fill the pitcher*, or *dip the pitcher*; but this does not imply that *dip* signifies to *fill*. In like manner, the word βαπτίζω is used when persons sink in water, and perish. Whiston, in his version of Josephus, sometimes translates it *drown*. But does this



imply that βαπτίζω signifies to *drown*, or to *perish*? The *perishing* or the *drowning*, is the consequence of dipping in certain circumstances. The person, then, who so perishes, may be said to be drowned. But this is not a translation; it is a commentary. I have already pointed out the fallacy of that position, which is a first principle with most critics; namely the supposition, that words are equivalent, which in any circumstances are interchangeable. It is an error plausible, but mischievous. Yet, on no better foundation does Dr. Wall, and innumerable others after him, argue that βαπτίζω must signify to wash in general. The verb λουω is applied to baptism, therefore βαπτίζω, it is thought, must signify to wash as well as λουω.

Mr. Ewing, indeed, says, "In this case, the washing could not have been by immersion, being done at a spring or fountain of water." But what sort of impossibility is this? Was it utterly impossible to have a conveniency for bathing near a fountain? On the contrary, is it not very probable that stone troughs, or other vessels, were usually provided at fountains, for bathing, and washing clothes? We find such a provision at two fountains near Troy, mentioned by Homer, lib. xxii. 153.

Ενθα δ' ἐπ' αὐτῶν πλῦνοι εὐρεσς ἑγγυς εἶσι  
Καλοὶ, λαινεοὶ, οὗσι σιματα, &c.

"Two fountains, tepid one, from which a smoke  
Issues voluminous, as from a fire;  
The other, ev'n in summer's heats, like hail  
For cold, or snow, or crystal stream frost-bound.  
Beside them may be seen the broad canals  
Of marble scoop'd, in which the wives of Troy,  
And all her daughters fair, were wont to lave  
Their costly raiment, while the land had rest," &c.

COWPER.

We find also a like provision at a river in Phæacia, in the Odyssey, lib. vi. 86.

Ενθ' ἦτοι πλῦνοι ἦσαν ἐπηστᾶνοι, πολὺ δ' ὕδωρ  
Καλὸν ὑπὲρ προρρεῖ, &c.

" At the delightful rivulet arrived,  
Where those perennial cisterns were prepared,  
With purest crystal of the fountain fed  
Profuse," &c.

COWPER.

Why, then, may not such a provision have been at the fountain referred to, especially as it was in a camp? Is it likely, that in such a place there would be no convenience for bathing? Indeed, nothing is more common in our own country, than where there is no river, to have a vessel, or contrivance of some kind, for bathing, near a well. But I produce this evidence as a mere work of supererogation. Nothing more can be required of me, than to show that the thing is not impossible. Even were it certain, that at this fountain there was no such provision, might not some person have supplied her with a vessel? To argue as Mr. Ewing does here, is to reason without first principles. He takes it for granted, that a thing is impossible, which is so far from being impossible, that it is not improbable. Were this a lawful mode of reasoning, it would be an easy thing to disprove every thing.

I shall now try what evidence can be found to determine the literal meaning of the word βαπτίζω, from its figurative applications. When a word is used figuratively, the figure is founded on the literal meaning; and therefore, by examining the figure, we may discover additional evidence with respect to the literal meaning. And here I would first observe, that some instances of figurative use may not be decisive, as well as some instances of literal use. It is enough that every instance of both literal and figurative use will explain fairly on the supposition of the meaning for which we contend, when other instances irresistibly and confessedly imply it. Our opponents contend, that in some of its figurative occurrences, the allusion is to *pouring*. "In this sense of *pouring upon*, and *pouring into*," says Mr. Ewing, "till mind and body are *overwhelmed*, *impregnated*, *intoxicated*, and the circum-

stances are oppressive, or even destructive, the word is very frequently used in profane writers." In opposition to this, I assert that not one of all Mr. Ewing's examples necessarily refer to *pouring upon*, or *pouring into*. In many of them, the translation may be *overwhelm*; but in this term, the reference is not to water *poured upon* or *poured into*, but to water coming over in a current, like the tide overwhelming the beach. This is strictly, and characteristically expressed by  $\kappa\omega\zeta\omega$ . To this, some of the figurative occurrences of  $\beta\alpha\pi\tau\iota\zeta\omega$  have a reference; and here there is a real immersion. The *overwhelming* water baptizes or *sinks* the person or thing baptized. Some of the instances in which the word is translated *overwhelm*, may well enough be so rendered, as a free translation; yet as there is no allusion to water *coming over*, but to sinking in water, the translation is not literal. I observe again, that whether the water is supposed to come over the object, or the object is supposed to sink in the water, there is not a single figurative occurrence of the word, which does not imply that the object was completely covered with the water. Now, this kind of baptism would be little relief to Mr. Ewing. The man who is covered by the tide, while he lies on the shore, by the edge of the sea, is overwhelmed; and he is as completely covered, as if he had gone into the sea, and dipped himself. Even were Mr. Ewing to *pour* or *sprinkle* the water in baptism, till the person baptized should be entirely *drenched*, it would afford no relief from immersion. Not one, then, of the examples of figurative use adduced by Mr. Ewing, countenances his own favourite mode of baptism.

Let us now take a look at Mr. Ewing's examples, in which the word is used figuratively:  $\beta\epsilon\beta\alpha\pi\tau\iota\zeta\theta\eta\iota\varsigma\tau\epsilon\tau\omega\alpha\chi\alpha\rho\omega$ . "To have been *drenched* with wine." I have no objection to the translation *drench*, as it may imply that the object is *steeped* or *dipped*, so as to be *soaked* in the fluid. But as a thing may be drenched

by *pouring* or *sprinkling*, the translation is not definitely exact. Literally, it is *immersed in wine*.

In order to determine whether *pouring* or *immersing* is the ground of the figure, let us examine what is the point of likeness. It must be a bad figure, if the point of resemblance in the objects is not obvious. Now, let it be observed, that there is no likeness between the *action* of drinking, and either the *pouring* of fluids, or *immersion* in them. Were this the point of resemblance, the drinking of one small glass might be designated a *baptism*, as well as the drinking of a cask; for the *mode* is as perfect on the lowest point in the scale, as on the highest. Every act of drinking, whether *wine* or *water*, would be a *baptism*. Mr. Ewing, indeed, supposes that there is an *excessive pouring*, but as this cannot be included in mere *mode*, it cannot be included in the word that designates this, but must be expressed by some additional word. Besides, if the word βαπτίζω signifies *excessive pouring*, it must do so in baptism, which condemns Mr. Ewing's *popping* a little water on the face. If it is supposed that there is *pouring* in the drinking of a drunkard, which there is not in drinking moderately; and that the design of this application of the word βαπτίζω is to designate this; I reply, that the *mode* of drinking a small glass is as much *pouring*, as the drinking of the cup of Hercules. Indeed, there may be something of *pouring* in the action of putting a small quantity of liquid into the mouth, which there is not in drinking a large goblet. But if the word βαπτίζω, in expressing drunkenness, refers to the *mode* of drinking, there is then no figure at all in the expression, for between *pouring* and *pouring* there is no resemblance. This is identity. Indeed, Mr. Ewing does not treat these expressions as figurative. He speaks as if he considered that the word βαπτίζω was taken in them literally. He supposes that there is a "*pouring upon* or a *pouring into*, till mind and body are overwhelmed," &c. The wine then is poured into the person till he is intoxicated.

This might be true, if the wine was put into him as men administer a drench to a horse. But the drunkard administers the wine to himself. What is the sense of the expression *he is poured with wine*, which on this supposition is the literal meaning?

But when βαπτίζω is applied to drunkenness it is taken figuratively; and the point of resemblance is between a man so completely under the influence of wine, and an object completely subjected to a liquid in which it is wholly immersed. This is not only obvious from the figure itself, but from the circumstances with which the figure is sometimes conjoined. Clemens Alexandrinus employing the same figure, says, βαπτίζομενοι εἰς ὕπνον, *baptized into sleep*, through drunkenness. Now, *baptized into sleep*, is exactly our figure *buried in sleep*, which is an immersion; and burial is the thing represented by Christian baptism. Is there any likeness between *pouring* and *sleeping*? Is not the likeness between complete subjection to the influence of sleep, and the complete subjection of an object to the influence of a liquid when immersed in it? The same Father applies the word βαπτίζουσι to those who give themselves up to fornication. This is just our own figure when we speak of *plunging* headlong into debauchery.

This view is fully confirmed by the same figure in other languages. All figures that are founded on nature, and obvious to the observation of all nations, will be in all languages the same. Figurative language is a universal language. Now, when we examine this figure in the Latin language, our view of it is put beyond all doubt. Virgil says of the Greeks taking Troy,

Invadunt urbem somno vinoque sepultam.

“They invade the city *buried* in sleep and wine.”

Here *burial* is applied both to sleep and wine. *Baptized* therefore into sleep and wine, as used in the Greek language, must be the same as *buried* in sleep and wine in the Latin. Surely if the expression in

the Greek needed a commentary, this must be an authoritative one. There can be no pretence for taking *pouring* out of *burial*. This must be immersion.

Lactantius, as Gale remarks, employs the phrase *vitiis immersi*, *immersed* or *plunged in vice*; and Origen, in his commentary on John, uses the same figure. The expression of the former, therefore, must be the best commentary on that of the latter. Vices are not supposed to be *poured upon* the vicious person, but he *sinks in them*. We ourselves speak in this manner. We speak of a man who *sinks in vice*. Martial's figure—*Lana sanguine conchæ ebria*—"wool drunk with the blood of the shell-fish"—also affords a commentary on the Greek figure. Here wool *dipped* in a liquid, is said to be drunk with that liquid from being completely soaked with it. Schwarzius, indeed, supposes, that Shakspeare's figure,—"*then let the earth be drunken with our blood*," countenances the supposition that βαπτίζω, though it primarily signifies to dip, sometimes signifies *pouring* or *sprinkling*. But what is the ground of this opinion? Why, it is this. βαπτίζω sometimes is figuratively applied to *drunkenness*, and *drunkenness* is sometimes figuratively applied to the earth *drenched with blood*. Therefore since the earth is drenched with blood by *pouring* or *sprinkling*, βαπτίζω must sometimes signify *pouring* or *sprinkling*. This states the evidence as fairly as any can desire. But there is a multitude of errors here. If one word may figuratively be applied to an object literally denoted by another word, does it follow that they mark the same mode? Is there any likeness between the mode of drinking, and that of the falling of blood on the earth? The earth is here said to be drunk with blood, not because there is a likeness between the manner of drinking wine, and that of the falling of blood, but from being completely drenched with blood, without any reference to the manner in which it received the blood. Indeed, as there is no likeness between the falling of blood on the earth,

and the mode of drinking, the above expression is the clearest proof that the expression *baptized with wine* does not refer to the same mode. It might as well be said, that the expression, Deut. xxxii. 42. "I will make mine arrows drunk with blood," implies a proof that βαπτίζω signifies to dip; because arrows are besmeared with blood by being dipped in the body. But this would be false criticism. God's arrows are supposed to be drunk with blood—not from the manner in which arrows are usually covered with blood, but from the abundance of the blood shed by them.

These observations will apply to all the examples in which this word is applied to drunkenness. I need not, therefore, examine them particularly. But I must refer to one or two, to show how ill Mr. Ewing's explication will apply to them. Οἶνω δὲ πολλῷ Ἀλέξανδρον βαπτίσασα, "having made Alexander drunk with much wine." This, according to Mr. Ewing's explication, would be, "having poured Alexander with much wine,"—not "having poured much wine into Alexander." This would be pouring the man into the wine, instead of pouring the wine into the man. Βεβαπτισμενον εἰς ἀναισθησίαν καὶ ὑπνον ὑπὸ τῆς μεθης, literally "baptized into insensibility, and sleep under drunkenness." Now, a *baptism into sleep*, we have already seen, is an *immersion*. *Immersed* or *buried* in sleep is a phrase that is warrantable; but what is the meaning of being *poured* into sleep and insensibility? Here it is not supposed that sleep is poured out on the person, but if βεβαπτισμενον signifies pouring, the person must have been *poured out into sleep*.

The words δύναμις βεβαπτισμενη ἐν τῷ βάθει τοῦ σώματος, Mr. Ewing translates, "a force *infused into*, (or *diffused in*,) the inward parts of the body." This translation, however, is not only unwarranted by the original, but is as unsuitable to the supposition that βαπτίζω signifies *to pour*, as that it signifies *to immerse*. To *infuse into* would not be βαπτίζειν ἐν, but βαπτίζειν εἰς. Does Mr. Ewing mean to say, that the paren-

thetical words are explanatory, and that *diffused in*, is equivalent to *infused into*? or does he mean that they are two different meanings, of which the text is equally susceptible? A strange thing, indeed, if the same phrase can equally signify *infused into*, and *diffused in*! In English these things are very different. Greek, it seems, has a wonderful fertility of meaning. When a controversialist indulges himself in a license of this kind, he may indeed very easily prove or disprove any thing. He has nothing to do but make the text speak what he wants. This gives βαπτίζω a new meaning, *to diffuse*. This is the most wonderful word that was ever found in any language. It can with equal facility in the very same phrase denote *opposite* things. To *diffuse* is surely the opposite of *infuse*. It is very true, that the same word compounded with different prepositions, may do so, as is the case with *infuse* and *diffuse*. But let it be observed, that it is the very same phrase that Mr. Ewing makes equally susceptible of these opposite meanings. This surely is philological legerdemain. Let it be observed also, that Mr. Ewing supposes that the word βαπτίζω itself in these examples signifies *to pour upon*, or *to pour into*. Now, where does he find the force of these prepositions in the Greek word? If it signifies *to pour*, it does not signify *to pour into*, or *to pour upon*. The additional idea which varies the word so materially, must be obtained by a preposition prefixed or following: The literal translation of the above example is, "a force or power immersed in the depth of the body. *To immerse in the depth* is a congruous expression, but *to pour in the depth* is altogether incongruous.

The example from Plutarch will suit my purpose well enough in Mr. Ewing's translation; "for as plants are nourished by moderate, but choked by excessive watering, (literally *waters*,) in like manner, the mind is enlarged by labours suited to its strength, but is *overwhelmed* (Gr. *baptized*) by such as exceed its



power." Mr. Ewing says, "The reference here to the nourishment of plants, indicates *pouring* only to be the species of watering alluded to in the term *βαρριζῆσαι*." But in this figure there is no reference at all to the mode of watering plants. The reference is to the quantity of water. The mode is not mentioned; but even were it mentioned, it would be merely a circumstance to which nothing corresponds in the thing illustrated. What critic would ever think of hunting after such likenesses in figurative language? There is actually no likeness between the mode of watering plants, and the proportioning of labour to the mind of a pupil; and Plutarch is not guilty of such absurdity. To Plutarch's figure it would be quite the same thing, if a pot of plants was dipped in water, instead of having the water poured into it. The pot itself might be dipped in water without any injury to the plants. The plants are injured when water is suffered to lie about them in too great abundance, in whatever way it has been applied. The *choking* of the plant corresponds to the suffocation in baptism, or immersion. The *choking* of the powers of the mind is elegantly illustrated by the *choking* of the vegetative powers when a plant is covered in water. There is a beautiful allusion to the suffocation of an animal under water. Were Plutarch to rise from the dead, with what indignation would he remonstrate against the criticism that makes him refer to the *mode* of watering plants, in a figure intended to illustrate the bad effects of too much study! How loudly would he disclaim the cold, unnatural thought! Is it not possible figuratively to illustrate something by a reference to the mountains buried under snow, without referring to the *manner* of its falling, and pursuing the resemblance to the *flakes of feathered snow*? So far from this, I assert, that this manner of explaining figures is *universally improper*. No instance could be more beautifully decisive in our favour than the above figure of Plutarch. Mr. Ewing makes him compare

the *choking* of one thing to the *overwhelming* of another. But the author himself compares the *choking of a plant*, or the extinction of vegetable life, to the *choking or the extinction of the mental powers*; and in both there is an elegant allusion to the choking of an animal under water.

But even on Mr. Ewing's own system, his explanation of this example is most fatal to his *popping*. βαπτίζω here, he makes to signify death by too much water, as opposed to the moderate application of water. If this is the distinctive meaning of βαπτίζω, it cannot also denote *the smallest application of water*. It cannot surely designate the opposite extremes.

The word is frequently applied to overwhelming debt, or oppressive taxation, τοὺς δὲ ἰδιώτας, διὰ τὴν ἐκ τούτων εὐπορίαν, οὐ βαπτίζουσι ταῖς εἰσφογαῖς. This Mr. Ewing very well translates, "on account of the abundant supply from these sources, they do not oppress (or overload, Gr. baptize) the common people with taxes." But neither the original nor the translation will bear to be explained by the assertion that they are brought to support, namely, that βαπτίζω sometimes signifies to *pour upon*, or *pour into*. Taxes are not supposed in this figure to be *poured upon*, or *poured into*, the people who pay them; and overwhelming taxes are not supposed to be *poured*, while small taxes are dropped on the people. The people might rather be said to *pour* their taxes into the treasury. If βαπτίζουσι here signifies to *pour upon*, or *pour into*, as Mr. Ewing supposes, the translation, when literal, will be, "They do not *pour* the common people with taxes," or rather, "they do not *pour into*, or *pour upon* the common people with taxes." If any man can take sense out of this, he will deserve the praise of invention. But in this figure, the rulers are supposed to immerse the people, through the instrumentality of the oppressive taxes. The literal translation is, "They do not *immerse* the common people with taxes." The people, in the case of op-

pressive taxation, are not in such figures supposed either to have the taxes *poured upon them*, nor themselves to be *immersed in the taxes*, but to sink by being weighed down with taxes. The taxes are not the element in which they sink, but are the instrumental *baptizers*. They cause the people to *sink* by their weight. This suits the words: this suits the figure: this suits the sense: this suits every example which refers to debt: this suits the analogy of all other languages. We say ourselves *dipped in debt*, *drowned in debt*, *sunk by debt*, or *sunk in debt*. *To sink in debt*, figures the debt as that in which we sink. It is a deep water in which we sink. *To sink by debt*, figures the debt as a load on our shoulders while we are in deep water. In this view, it is not the drowning element, but the *baptizer* or *drowner*. To be dipped in debt, supposes that we owe something considerable in proportion to our means. But we may be *dipped* without being *drowned*. The last cannot be adequately represented by βαπτίζω, except when circumstances render the meaning definite. The Latin language recognizes the same analogy. Were we at any loss with respect to the meaning of the figure in Greek, the *Ære alieno demersus* of Livy is a commentary. This supposes that the debtor is *plunged* or *sunk* in debt. A man struggling for his life in the midst of deep water, and at last sinking by exhaustion, is a true picture of an insolvent debtor. When βαπτίζω occurs in such a situation, the meaning is substantially given in English by the word *oppress*, or *overload*; but neither of them is a translation. They convey the meaning under the figure of a load; the other gives the idea under the figure of immersion.

The same observation applies to the next example, which Mr. Ewing quotes from Josephus, p. 302. οἱ δὲ καὶ ὀρχα τῆς σταθεως ὑστερον εὐαπτισαν τὴν πόλιν, translated by Mr. Ewing, "those, indeed, even without (engaging in) faction, afterwards *overburthened* or *oppressed* (Gr. baptized) the city." The original is

stronger than the translation. It asserts that the robbers ruined, or *sunk* the city. The passage is translated by Whiston, "although these very men, besides the seditions they raised, were otherwise the direct cause of the city's destruction also." The reference is to a ship sinking from being overburdened, and ill managed in the storm, from the dissensions of the crew. In this view the figure is striking and beautiful. But how can Mr. Ewing accommodate even his own translation to his definition of the meaning of the word βαπτίζω in such examples? In them, he says, it is used in the sense of *pouring upon* and *pouring into*. What did the robbers pour *upon* or *into* the city? Besides, there is neither *upon* nor *into* here. If the word βαπτίζω signifies *to pour*, the translation literally will be, "they poured the city." This will not accommodate to Mr. Ewing's own definition of the meaning of the word more than to ours. Again, even according to Mr. Ewing's own translation of this passage, the word βαπτίζω here denotes *something in excess*. What aspect has this towards the popping system? A few drops of water is not an oppressive load.

Josephus uses the same figure on another occasion. Speaking of Herod's sons, he says, τοῦτο ὡς περ τελευταία θυελλα χειμαζομενους τους νεανισκους επεβαπτισεν, p. 704. This is a commentary on the preceding example, and limits the figure to a ship sinking. In the former case, the ship was overburthened, and there was a mutiny among the sailors. Here the ship is attacked by repeated storms, and at last is sunk by a hurricane. The word χειμαζομενους imports, that the young men had a winter voyage, in which they were attacked by many storms, and at last were plunged into the abyss by an overwhelming blast. Whiston, who has no purpose to serve, translates it thus: "and this it was that came as the last storm, and entirely sunk the young men, when they were in great danger before." Where is *popping* now? What has *pouring* to say here? It may be observed, that in the last example, the word

is compounded with *επι*. This must be designed to render the failure more graphic, and represents the storm as pressing *on* them, while they sink under it.

The very next example which Mr. Ewing quotes in the sense of *overwhelming* by being *overburthened*, definitely refers to *sinking* in water: *αυτος επι των βεβαπτισμενων υπο του μεγαλου κυματος εκσινου*. "I am one of those who have been overwhelmed by that great wave of calamity." Now what allusion is there here to *pouring upon*, *pouring into*, or *pouring* of any kind? Yet this is one of the examples brought by Mr. Ewing, to prove that the word *βαπτίζω* sometimes signifies to *pour upon*, and *pour into* till mind and body are overwhelmed. What was *poured upon* or *poured into* this person? Is it supposed that the wave gradually poured on him till it sunk him? Nay, verily. He is said to be baptized *under* the wave. Indeed, a wave does not cover by *pouring*, but by *flowing*, *dashing*, or *sweeping* horizontally. In the overwhelming by a wave, there is no likeness to pouring or popping, and the object is as completely covered by the wave, as when it is dipped. Besides, the person is here supposed to be forced down into the water below, by the weight of the superincumbent wave. The wave is the baptizer, not the thing in which he is baptized. He is baptized *under* the wave. And can there be a stronger proof that baptism is immersion. Let Mr. Ewing perform baptism according to his own translation of this passage, and he will act as differently from his own mode as from ours. Let the baptized person be overwhelmed with water, and he will be buried in water.

Another example of this figure from the same author, is entirely decisive in our favour. *Ο δε μολις α νυ φερει φερων υπο μικρας αν βαπτισθει προσθηκης*. Liban. Ep. 310. "He who bears with difficulty the burden he already has, would be entirely overwhelmed (or crushed) by a small addition." Is it possible to squeeze the idea of *pouring* out of the word in this

occurrence? A burden is not *poured* on the shoulders. Besides, it is not the putting of the burden on the man, that is here called baptism. The baptism is effected by the burden, after it is put on. The burden causes the man to *sink*.

The example which Mr. Ewing quotes from Plutarch, is already decided, by the evidence produced with respect to the allusion when the figure respects debt: πεντακισχιλιων μυριαδων οφλημασι βεβαπτισμενοι. "Oppressed by a debt of 5000 myriads." This debt was not *poured upon* him, nor *poured* into him; but, oppressed by it as a load, he *sunk* or became insolvent. The figure does not represent the mode of putting the debt on him, for in this there is no likeness. It represents the debt *when on him*, as *causing him to sink*.

The example from Heliod. Æthiop. lib. 4, can, by no ingenuity, be reconciled to the assertion which Mr. Ewing brings it to support: και τη συμφορα βεβαπτισμενον. "And overwhelmed with the calamity." If βαπτίζω is supposed to signify to *pour*, this passage must be translated, "and *poured* by or with the calamity." The calamity is not poured upon him, but the calamity *pours* him. But to be *immersed*, or to *sink*, by calamity, is good sense, and a common form of speech. This also is baptism by immersion, and can be nothing else. What is more common than to speak of *sinking* under misfortunes?

In like manner, Gregory Thaumaturgus, p. 72. speaks of persons as delivered from the difficulties in which they were βαπτίζομενους, *immersed*. But the observation of Schelhornius, renders the reference in this figure entirely definite. After quoting a number of examples in which the word is applied figuratively to calamities, he observes, with great sagacity, that the same sentiment is expressed in the same author by the word βυθίζεσθαι, which determines his meaning when he uses the word βαπτίζω to express the same thing. πλειονι κλυδωνι κακων βεβυθισμενοι. Literally, "Sunk into the deep by a greater wave or tide of mis-

fortunes." Now, that βυθίζω denotes *to cover, to sink in the abyss*, there can be no doubt. It is a verb formed from the appropriate name of the great abyss. βαπτίζω, then, as expressing the same thing, must agree with it in the general idea, though it characteristically differs from it in strength of expression. In some circumstances, they may both refer to the same thing, while in others they have a characteristic difference. No evidence can be more satisfactory in determining the meaning of a word, than this. It is indirect, and would be hid from the ordinary reader; but when sagacity points it out, no candid mind can reject it. This also confirms an observation which I have made on another example, namely, that to be *baptized by a wave*, does not import that the baptism was *in the wave*, but *under it*; and that the wave is the baptizer, or power that sinks the baptized person under it. Here the great κλυδων not only covered the person itself, but sunk him *below itself* into the deep.

The Septuagint renders Isaiah xxi. 4, ἡ ἀνομία μου βαπτίζει, translated by Mr. Ewing, "*iniquity overwhelms me.*" "Here," says Mr. Ewing, "the idea of *plunging into* is excluded. The subject of baptism is viewed as having something *poured or brought upon* him. He is not *popped into* the baptizing substance, but it *pops upon* him." And pray, Mr. Ewing, who *pops* this iniquity upon the baptized person? Is iniquity itself the popper? Is not iniquity the thing with which he is *popped*? Is it both *popper* and *popped*? But if iniquity *pops* him with itself, does not this represent sin as coming on the sinner of itself? But Mr. Ewing most manifestly mistakes the meaning of this phrase. The expression, "*iniquity baptizeth me,*" does not mean that iniquity comes on him either by *popping* or *dipping*, either by *pouring* or *sprinkling*; but that his sin, which originated in himself, and never was *put on him in any mode*, sunk him in misery. Our iniquities cause us to *sink* in deep waters. This example is, with all others in which the word occurs, either in its literal or figu-

rative use, completely in our favour. Iniquity is the baptizer, and instead of *popping* the subjects of its baptism, would *sink* them eternally in the lake that burneth with fire and brimstone, were they not delivered by that which is represented in the baptism of Christians. Upon the whole, there is not one of all the examples of the figurative use of this word, which cannot fairly be explained in perfect accordance with the literal meaning which we attach to it, while many of them can bear no other meaning. So far from all being explicable with an allusion to *pouring*, there is not one of them, which taking all circumstances together, can fairly be explained in that meaning. There is not one instance in which Mr. Ewing can show, that the reference must necessarily be to pouring. All languages employ corresponding words in the same figurative meaning for which we contend in the above examples. No evidence can be more entirely satisfactory.

The figurative baptism of our Lord, is quite in accordance with those examples in which the word is used for afflictions. Mat. xx. 22, Mark. x. 37. In accordance with this view, also, he is represented in the prophetic parts of the Old Testament, as *immersed* in deep waters. "Save me, O God, for the waters are come in unto my soul. I sink in deep mire, where is no standing; I am come into deep waters, where the floods overflow me." Ps. lxxix. 1, 2, 14. In like manner, the afflictions of the church are represented by this figure. "Then the waters had overwhelmed us, the stream had gone over our soul: then the proud waters had gone over our soul," Ps. cxxxiv. 4, 5, &c. The enemies of the Lord, also, and of his people, are represented as destroyed by immersion in deep waters. "Then will I make their waters deep, and cause their rivers to run like oil, saith the Lord God." Ezek. xxxii. 14.

The baptism of the Spirit, is a figure that has its foundation in immersion, by which the abundance of his gifts and influences, and the sanctification of the



whole body and soul, are represented. That which is immersed in a fluid, is completely subjected to its influence, as wool is said to be drunk with the blood of the shell-fish. So the sanctification of the believer by the Holy Spirit, through faith in the atoning blood of Christ, is figuratively called an *immersion* or a *baptism*. But this and the preceding figure I will meet again, in the examination of the theory of Mr. Ewing.

#### EXAMINATION OF MR. EWING'S SYSTEM.

Having considered the evidence for the meaning of this word from its occurrences in Greek writers, I shall now examine the new theory proposed by Mr. Ewing. This writer pretends to have discovered the signification of βαπτω, by reducing it to its radical letters; and by interchanging labials and vowels, he forms the word *pop*, from the sound. For an admirable exposure of this fancy, I refer the reader to Dr. Cox. But the very attempt is absurd and ludicrous. It could not succeed on any subject, or with respect to any word. It is entitled to no more consideration, than an attempt to decide by an appeal to the cry of birds. The thought of settling a religious controversy about the meaning of a word in a particular language, by speculations with respect to its radical letters, as applying to all languages, is certainly one of the wildest conceits that has been broached in criticism since the birth of that art. Upon this theory, I shall do no more than make a few observations.

1. It applies etymology utterly beyond its province. Etymology, as a foundation for argument, can never proceed beyond *the root existing as a word in the language*, whose meaning can be learned from its use. To trace a word to a more remote ancestry, is to relate fable for history.

2. When etymologists go farther, they do not pretend to give a meaning to a word which it is not found to have by use, nor to reject any meaning which use

has assigned. They do not pretend to regulate language by assigning meanings from origin, but from a comparison of actually ascertained meanings, to assign a probable root. The value of their discoveries is not from their authority in settling controversies about the meanings that use has actually assigned to the words which they analyze, but from the light which they reflect on the philosophy of language, and the science of mind. So far from having authority in theological controversy, their researches have no authority in criticism, with respect to the use of words in classical writers. Classical writers are an authority to the etymologist, but the etymologist cannot give law to the classics. The etymologist must collect, and from use ascertain the various meanings of a word,—on the authority of which he may venture a conjecture of an origin higher than that of any word now in the language. By a comparison of these meanings, he may discover a common idea, and thereby be enabled to determine the primary meaning. But without this authority, the primary meaning can never be ascertained by the mere sound of radical letters. It may be true that particular radical letters are found in words that designate a common idea, but that this is the case, and how far it is the case, depends on ascertaining from use the actual meaning of the words. If the meaning of words may lawfully be ascertained from the radical letters which they contain, instead of the tedious process of reading the classics, and acquiring the meaning of words from their use, we may at once proceed to reduce them to their radical sounds, and determine their import by this philological chemistry. Mr. Ewing not only fails in this instance of analysis, but utterly mistakes the true object of etymological researches. His attempt is not calculated to throw light on the philosophy of language, nor illustrate the processes and relations of human thought, but converts etymology into a sort of philological alchemy.

3. Were the origin of βαπτω to be traced, even with the utmost certainty, to some other word or words in the language, its meaning in the language must be determined by its use in the language, and not by its origin. Words often depart widely in their use from the meaning of their root. They may drop some idea that was at first essential, or they may embrace ideas not originally implied.

4. In analyzing any word, the etymologist must be guided not merely by the consideration that the letters that compose it have the appearance of indicating a certain origin, but, especially as a groundwork, that such an origin corresponds to its known and acknowledged meaning. And when we have found such an origin to a word, it is of no authority in argument, as it takes the meaning of the word for granted. If *pop* were the ascertained and acknowledged meaning of βαπτω, the etymologist might employ his art to reduce the one word to the other. But even then, the evidence that the one was the parent of the other, would depend on the fact that the meaning was ascertained by use, and could not rest on the coincidence of sounds. That *rain* comes from γαίνω, to sprinkle, and plunge from πλύνω, &c. depends on the fact that the meaning of the one word is known by use to correspond to the meaning of the other. Were there no such correspondence in known signification, the correspondence in sound would be no foundation for derivation. Many words correspond as nearly in sound, which have no relation. In deriving a word, therefore, by reducing it to its radical letters, the etymologist, if he acts agreeably to the sound principles of his art, must have all the meanings of the derived word previously ascertained, as a groundwork for his conclusions. They are data which in his process must be taken for granted. But if the meanings of a word are taken for granted in this process, the object of the process cannot be to ascertain a doubtful meaning. If the word βαπτω has not from use all the meanings

which Mr. Ewing assigns to it, no etymological process can give any of these meanings to it, for they must be all taken for granted as a foundation for his deductions.

5. This theory assigns to *βαπτω* as its primary meaning, a signification which use has not given it in a single instance. Indeed, though the author endeavours to conform the examples to this primary acceptance, he does not pretend to have derived it from the examples. He concludes that the primary meaning of this word is *pop*, from the sound, and from its correspondence to the other meanings. That *βαπτω* has such a primary meaning, there is no evidence. If *pop* really embraced all the significations assigned by Mr. Ewing to *βαπτω*, he might allege, that it is probable that the word once signified to *pop*; but this would not be proof that it had any such signification during the period to which the writings now extant in the Greek language belong. This could be proved only by examples from these authors. Whatever is the origin of the word *βαπτω*, it never signifies *pop*.

6. To prove that any meaning is sanctioned by use, it is not sufficient that there are examples of its occurrence, which will explain on this meaning. There is no word of frequent occurrence, which in some situations might not bear a false translation, or explain in a sense which it really never has, without making nonsense. Nay, a false translation of a word may, in many situations, make good sense, and even express a Scriptural truth, though not the truth of the passage. Before the authority of use therefore can be pleaded for a meaning, a passage must be produced in which the word *must* have the meaning assigned. This is self-evident. I state it therefore as a canon, or first principle of criticism, *that in controversy a word occurring frequently in the language is never to be taken arbitrarily in a sense which it cannot be shown incontestably to have in some other passage.* An acknowledged sense is necessary as a foundation on which to rest the supposi-

tion, that in the contested passage it may have the signification assigned. There is no ground to allege that the word has a signification in the contested passage, which it is not proved to have in some other place. It may have this authority, and fail ; but without this it cannot succeed. A meaning not so proved has no right to be heard in controversy. I have limited the canon to controversy, but, in fact, it extends in some measure to matters in which men do not find an inducement to dispute. Many of the beasts and fishes and fowls and plants mentioned in the Old Testament, cannot be now exactly and confidently ascertained by us, for want of this criterion ; and although there is no warm controversy about these things, it is because there is no temptation from the subject. If a word occurs so seldom in what remains of any language, and in such circumstances as cannot definitely determine its meaning, nothing can be legitimately rested on it in controversy. Now this canon sweeps away not only Mr. Ewing's theory, but all other systems that give a meaning to βαπτίζω, different from that for which we contend. There is not one instance in all the Greek language in which it necessarily signifies to pour, sprinkle, &c. Our opponents have not an acknowledged foundation on which to rest the opinion, that with respect to the ordinance of baptism, the word βαπτίζω may have the meaning for which they contend ; for in no instance can it be proved to have such a meaning. On the contrary, even Mr. Ewing himself, the boldest of all the critics on that side of the question, does not deny that this word sometimes signifies to dip ; nay, he himself gives many examples in which it must have this signification.

7. I will state another canon equally self-evident, and equally fatal to the doctrine of Mr. Ewing, and all our opponents. *A word that applies to two modes, can designate neither.* The same word cannot express different modes, though a word not significant of

mode may apply to all modes. *Wash*, for instance, may refer to the action designated by it, in whatever mode it may be performed. Whether it is done by dipping, or by pouring, the word *wash* does not assert. It is indifferent as to mode, although even here one mode is more common than another. *Stain*, in like manner, asserts nothing of mode, but applies to all modes. A thing may be stained by sprinkling, by pouring, or by dipping. *Wet* also applies to all modes. A thing may be wetted by *dipping*, by *pouring*, by *sprinkling*, by the insensible distillation of the *dew*, by *damp*. The word expresses the effect only, and says nothing of the mode. But it would be both false and absurd to say that these words signify all these modes. They express nothing of mode. Modes are essentially different from one another, and have nothing in common. One word then cannot possibly distinguish them. The name of a mode is the word which expresses it as distinguished from other modes. But it is impossible for the same word to express the distinction of two modes. It might more reasonably be supposed, that the word *black* may also be employed to signify the idea denoted by *white*, as well as the idea which it is employed to designate, because black and white admit of degrees; but there are no degrees in mode. Without reference then to the practice of the language, on the authority of self-evident truth, I assert that βαπτω cannot signify both *dip*, and *pour* or *sprinkle*. I assert, that *in no language under heaven can one word designate two modes*. Now we have the confession of our opponents themselves, that βαπτω signifies to *dip*. If so, it cannot signify also to *pour* or *sprinkle*.

8. The various meanings that Mr. Ewing assigns to this word, will not derive from *pop*. His theory, then, has not the merit even of consistency, which a false theory may have. He asserts, indeed, that all the meanings which he admits, may easily be reduced to this word; and that each holds of it, inde-

pendently of all the rest. But how does he make out this assertion? By making as many compounds of *pop*, as βαπτω is supposed to have meanings. In each of these meanings, it becomes, in fact, a different word. *Pop in, pop out; pop up, pop down; pop backward, pop forward, &c.* are different compound words, as much as diffuse is different from infuse. Now if the word βαπτω signifies merely to *pop*, it cannot signify to *pop up*, to *pop down*, &c, by its own power. It must have something added to give it such a meaning. It is false then to say that βαπτω has all these significations. But if βαπτω signifies to *pour*, it does so without the aid of any other word: if it signifies to *sprinkle*, it must do so by itself. It signifies to *dip*, without the aid of any other word. It is true, indeed, that βαπτίζω admits composition with prepositions, but this is not to enable it to signify to *dip*; for if this were the case, it could never have that signification without the preposition in composition. But it has this signification where there is no such composition. Indeed, there are but few of its occurrences in which it admits the composition. It was indeed a conceit of the great Dr. Owen, that βαπτίζω cannot denote to dip, except in composition with *sv* or *sig*. But this is contradicted by use, and by the analogy of other words, as is well remarked by Mr. Booth. Besides, if βαπτω signifies to *pop*, and if *pop* can apply to none of the meanings which βαπτω is said to have, without the aid of a preposition, then it cannot be said that βαπτω signifies to *pour* or *sprinkle*. It only signifies a part of that idea.

Again, when the compound is formed, it will not produce the meanings contended for. To *pop upon* does not signify to *sprinkle*, for there may be a *popping upon*, when there is no sprinkling, though *sprinkling* may be performed by *popping upon*. In the very example alleged by Mr. Ewing, there is *popping upon* without *sprinkling*.

“A fellow finding somewhat prick him, popped his

finger *upon* the place." Did he sprinkle his finger upon the place? But if there is *popping upon* without *sprinkling*, then *popping upon* will not signify sprinkling without something to limit it still farther. Granting then that *βαπτω* signifies to *pop*, for this very reason it cannot signify to *sprinkle*.

In the same manner it may be proved, that if *βαπτω* signifies to *pop in or into*, it does not signify to *pour*. For there may be *popping in or into* without *pouring*. Mr. Ewing's own example proves this.

"He that killed my king.

*Popt* in between the election and my hopes."

There was no pouring here. But a word that does not necessarily imply *pouring*, cannot signify *pouring*.

Even with the addition of the word *water* itself, the idea is not made out. If we substitute *water* for finger in the above example, we will fail in the attempt to express *sprinkling*. The fellow might pop *water* upon the place without *sprinkling*. In like manner, there may even be *popping* into water, without immersion. When a boy *pops* a duck into the water, she does not sink. Mr. Ewing then has failed in every point of view. Even the expression, "he popped water into his turned up face," Mr. Ewing's favourite expression for *baptizing*, does not express either *pouring* or *sprinkling*. So far from necessarily implying that the water was *poured* or *sprinkled*, it naturally implies that the water was cast by a *jerk* or *slight dash*, and not by *drops*, or by a *stream*. Instead then of accounting for all the meanings attached by Mr. Ewing to the word *βαπτω*, it does not account for any one of these meanings.

Still less will this derivation account for *dyeing* as a meaning of *βαπτω*. How is it possible, that if *βαπτω* primarily signifies to *pop*, it could also receive the signification to *dye*? Mr. Ewing answers this, by supposing that a thing may be dyed, by having the colouring liquor popped upon it, and by the supposition,



that the art of *dyeing* was suggested by the accidental staining of things by the juice of fruits. But this account is totally unphilosophical. All this may be true, yet be insufficient to account for the fact. Accidental and infrequent union cannot originate a meaning founded on such union. It is not priority of the mode of doing any thing, but the frequency of doing in a mode, that will confer the name of the mode on the thing effected in such mode. This is the voice both of philosophy and of fact.\* I have already exemplified the thing in many instances. *Βαρρω*, to *dip*, comes naturally to signify to *dye*, from the frequency of *dyeing* by dipping. But there never was such a frequency of *dyeing* by *sprinkling*, as would, on philosophical principles, give the name of the mode to the thing effected in that mode. Besides, if *Βαρρω* primarily signifies to *pop*, and if it came to signify to *dye*, because *dyeing* was usually performed by *popping*, then *dyeing* must have been performed neither by pouring nor sprinkling, for *popping*, as I have shown, is different from both. It is impossible philosophically to account for *dyeing* as a meaning of *Βαρρω* on any other principle, than that this word primarily signifies to *dip*.

Again, if *Βαρρω* came to signify to *dye*, because that the art of dyeing was suggested by the accidental stains from the bruising of fruits, why did not *pop* accompany its relative in this signification? Why did not Milton say, "colours *popped* in heaven," instead of "colours *dipped* in heaven?" There is no end to the absurdity of this fantastic theory: It is a mine of inconsistency that never could be exhausted. This is the necessary condition of all false theories. However plausible they may be made by the ingenuity of their inventors, they must contain inconsistency, that will sometimes *pop* out its head, and show itself even

\* Thus *cano*, to sing, came to signify to foretell, because prophets uttered their predictions in song. This principle operates very extensively in language.

to the most indolent readers. But truth is consistent ; and although many apparent difficulties may at first sight occur, they will gradually disappear, as light is cast on the subject by inquiry. Even when its defenders, by inadvertency, couple it with something extrinsic, that tends to obscure and mar its evidence, the ingenuity of opponents will only have the good effect of separating the chaff from the wheat.

But no absurdity can vie with that of supposing that a word of so peculiar and restricted a meaning as *pop* is represented to be, should be accounted so generic, that it becomes the liege lord of innumerable different significations, that do not arise the one out of the other, but hold immediately of itself. Nay, according to Mr. Ewing's philosophy, it might become the liege lord of half the language. Instead of originally representing a very generic idea, it is supposed primarily to signify a particular sound,—a small smart quick sound. It is said to be a word "formed from the sound." All its applications agree to this ; and *pop* itself never came to have the acceptations that Mr. Ewing supposes *Barrow* to have. We never find this word applied to any things, but such as are of a trifling or playful nature. We never hear of a shipwreck as a popping of the ship into the deep. This would be ludicrous. *Pop*, instead of being a generic word, is as specific a word as can be imagined ; and never was actually extended to serious or important things, except to burlesque them. Indeed, instead of being a liege lord, conferring ample and separate territories on many great vassals, it is so very confined in its own territory, that it has a domain hardly sufficient for a walk, to give it an airing. To enable it to go a little into the world, it is obliged to take assistance from the prepositions. Mr. Ewing himself cannot send it abroad, without escorting it with *up* or *down*, *backwards* or *forwards*, *in* or *into*, *off* or *upon*, &c. A word so limited in its own territories, is ill fitted to become, as liege lord, proprietor of a great part of the

language,—nay, of every language ; for Mr. Ewing's chemistry must extract the same thought from all languages. The author, indeed, while he declares that each of the vassals is independent of all the rest, and holds immediately of the liege lord, inconsistently gives it a process from the particular sound originally denoted by it, to “the noise caused by the *agency of body in motion upon body*, and that *in any direction whatever*.” Here we have a process, that by gradually dropping particularities, and encroaching on territories not originally included in its kingdom, gives it a generic meaning. Here every step in the process is connected with that which precedes and depends on it. But let us look at the generic meaning which we have found by this process. It is so generic, as to disclaim all kindred with *pop*, according to the use of that word in the English language. Mr. Ewing's definition assigns this word to express “the noise caused by the agency of body in motion upon body.” Now, has *pop* actually so generic a meaning? If so, we may speak of the *popping of a cart*, when we mean to express the *creaking* of its wheels ; for this is “noise caused by the agency of body in motion upon body.” In short, every noise from motion may be called *popping*. But with all the impudence of this little playful word, it has never had the boldness to *pop* itself into such a province.

Again, if *βάρω* signifies primarily to *pop*, and if *pop* signifies primarily to make “a small smart quick sound,” and if all the various meanings of *βάρω* hold of it in this signification, then they must all be reducible to the primary signification, namely, “a small smart quick sound,” without any relation to one another. The signification *to dye* must be referred immediately to this particular sound, and not to the accidental bruising of fruits. Mr. Ewing inconsistently makes the various meanings hold of *pop* in its generic meaning, acquired by process, instead of its primary particular motion. Nay, he absurdly makes

the various meanings of *βαπτω* hold of the English *pop*, and that in a meaning far removed from its primary meaning. No matter that it was as true that *pop* had the generic meaning acquired by process from a particular one, as it is manifestly false, this would say nothing to the processes of *βαπτω*. Instead of tracing the progress of *pop* from "a small smart quick sound," to a "sound caused by the motion of body in motion on body," let Mr. Ewing trace the progress of *βαπτω* itself. It is with this the controversy is concerned, and not with the mutations in the meaning of an English word. Let him show such a primary meaning in *βαπτω*, and then let him trace it through all the rivulets derived from the fountain. Can any thing be more obvious, than that if *βαπτω* primarily signifies *to pop*, and if *pop* primarily signifies *to make a small smart quick sound*, *βαπτω* cannot be admitted as proprietor of any other territory, till it is proved by use to possess it? Is the harmony between *βαπτω* and *pop* like that of the monads of the soul and body, according to the system of Leibnitz, that the one must necessarily accompany the other in all its most fantastic movements? Can any thing be more absurd, than to squeeze *pop* out of *βαπτω*, on the authority of sound and primary acception, yet in the theory founded on this, to reason not from the primary meaning of *pop*, but from a meaning acquired by process? Can any thing be more absurd than to pretend to determine the different meanings of a Greek word, by the mutations of meaning in the English word derived from it?

9. If *pop* originally denoted "a small smart quick sound," as is very likely, then there is no reason to extract *pop* out of *βαπτω*, for *βαπτω* never denotes such a sound,—nor any sound. Mr. Ewing himself, does not pretend to allege one example in which *βαπτω* has the meaning which *pop* originally implied. On the authority, then, of the coincidence of primary meaning, no relation can be found between them.

10. The construction of the words in connexion with βαπτω, in many of its occurrences, contradicts this theory. Mr. Ewing says, "a person or thing may be either *popped into* water, or may have water *popped upon or into him*." Very true, but the same syntax will not *pop him* into water, that will *pop water upon or into him*. According to Mr. Ewing, to *pop into* water, is to dip. If so, the examples of *dipping*, as denoted by this phrase, are innumerable. Let any person examine the number which I have produced. But can Mr. Ewing produce out of all Greek literature, a single example of the phrase *popping water upon a person or thing*, when the verb is βαπτω? *Baptizing water upon* a person or thing, is a phrase that never occurs. This would be the baptism of the water, not of the person. *To pop water upon a man*, in Greek would be βαπτειν υδωρ ἐπ' ἀνθρώπου, if βαπτειν is the Greek word for *pop*: But such phraseology is not to be found in all the Greek language.

11. The many examples in which βαπτίζω is applied to great, serious, and terrific objects, contradicts this theory. Mr. Ewing, indeed, has foreseen this *storm*; and to prevent his theory from being *overwhelmed* by it, has invented a groundless distinction between what he calls the *proper* and *lax* sense of the word. "It is a word," he says, "which properly denotes operations on a small scale, and of a gentle nature: it is in a secondary sense that it comes to be applied to the vast and the terrible." But can it apply to the vast and the terrible, if it does not either include the vast and the terrible in its primary meaning; or by forsaking its primary meaning, has, by philosophical procedure, advanced to new territories? Words often advance to meanings very distant from their roots; but when they do so, they give up their first acceptation, and take the new meaning as their proper acceptation. *Candlestick*, for instance, at first denoted a utensil of wood; it now denotes the utensil, without respect to the material of which it is com-

posed : But it has forsaken its ancient meaning altogether. It cannot be said that it properly signifies an implement made of wood, for holding a candle ; and in a secondary sense, the same utensil of any materials. It now as properly signifies the utensil when it is made of metal, as when it is made of wood ; of gold, as when it is made of an osier.

In this every thing is natural, and the philosophy of the progress is intelligible to the child : But let Mr. Ewing point out any philosophical principle that would lead *βαπτίζω* from such a primary sense as he contends for, to the secondary sense which he here assigns. Is there any principle to conduct the operation in extending the word pop-gun to signify a cannon ? He does not pretend that this process has been verified in the term *pop*. To employ *pop* in this way, would be ludicrous. The same must be the case with *βαπτίζω*, if it signifies to *pop*.

But if there were any principle to lead to this process, when it had taken place, the first meaning must be given up ; for they are utterly irreconcilable. Let Mr. Ewing point out any principle in the human mind that would naturally conduct this process. Let him point out any example in any language, in which a word at the same period of its history has such primary and secondary meanings. Can any thing be more extravagant than the supposition, that this word properly denotes operations on a small scale, and as a secondary meaning things of a vast and terrific nature ? If it has the one meaning, it cannot have the other. There is no philosophy in this distinction. What a wild thought, that the noise of a pop-gun, and destruction by the overwhelming torrents of boiling lava from the crater of a burning mountain, may be expressed by the same word. Mr. Ewing, indeed, acknowledges that it is not usual in English to say, "he popped upon me with an overwhelming flood." But he might have added, that this could not be said in any language, employing a word corres-

ponding to *pop*. This word cannot apply to such things, from the inconsistency between them and the ideas which it denotes. And there must be the same inconsistency with respect to the words that correspond to *pop* in all languages.

Mr. Ewing calls this *secondary* sense, “a *figurative*, an *exaggerated*, rather than a proper and natural sense.” But if it is a *secondary* sense, it is not a *figurative* sense, for a *secondary* sense is a *proper* sense; and a *figurative* acceptance of a word is no sense of the word at all. When a word is used hyperbolically, it still retains its proper sense, and from this circumstance the figure has its beauty. When the Psalmist represents the mountains as *leaping*, the word *leaping* still retains its proper meaning, but the motion of a mountain in an earthquake is elegantly figured as *leaping*. The word *leap* does not here come by exaggeration to denote the motion of a mountain in an earthquake. In like manner, when a wild Irishman says, that he was *killed* when he had received a severe beating, the word *kill* is not diminished in its meaning, but what is not *killing* is by a lively imagination so called for the sake of energy. It is absurd to speak of the *exaggerated* or diminished meaning of a word. The *exaggeration* or the *diminution* is not in the words at all.

I have already pointed out the true distinction between βαπτω and βαπτίζω. The former signifies to *dip*, the latter to *cause to dip*. Now, these significations equally apply to small objects, and to great. But while the latter may be applied to the smallest object, it is peculiarly fitted to denote the immersion of objects greater than can be lifted in the hand. Accordingly we find that βαπτίζω, while it is sometimes applied to the smallest objects, is much more usually than βαπτω applied to large objects. It more exactly applies to the immersion in baptism, because the baptized person is not taken up by the baptizer, but caused to sink into the water by the force impressed. It is βαπτίζω also, as any one

may see by a look at the examples which I have quoted, that is applied to the sinking of ships, and the destruction of things not lifted out of the water. This is a distinction philosophical, intelligible, useful, and agreeable to fact. Mr. Ewing's distinction has nothing to recommend it but the necessity of his theory. Josephus speaks as literally when he designates the sinking of a ship by the word βαπτίζω, as when he speaks of the *immersion* of the smallest object.

12. Mr. Ewing mistakes the effect that prepositions have in composition with the verbs. He seems to suppose, that they always modify or give direction to the action of the verb as simply as the English prepositions. But a slight examination of this subject will convince any one that they have a variety of power unknown to our language. Let us take one or two examples: εἰτα θερμοὺς ἀγροὺς ἐξ οἴνου μέλανος καὶ ἐλαίου ἀποβαπτῶν. Here it is obvious ἀπο does not direct its force in conjunction with the verb, upon the object of the verb; but either marks the distance of the agent from the object in the performance of the action, or rather the departure of the object from the thing in which the action was produced. The latter is without doubt the effect of the preposition after the verb, ἐξ οἴνου, *out of wine*. It is not "dip the loaves into the wine," but "dip them *out of the wine*." The point to which our attention is here called by the expression, is the departure of the object out of the thing in which the action of the verb was produced. This implies that it was in the wine, but does not express it. Now, the preposition in composition may unite with the preposition after the verb, as is frequently the case, when the same preposition that is used in composition is also used after the verb, as Εμβαπτίζω εἰς θάλασσαν, and our own phrases, *the tyrant was expelled out of the kingdom*,—*he infused courage INTO the soldiers*, &c. &c.

Whatever is the meaning of the participle in the above example, the preposition in composition with it



cannot exert its influence on the object of the verb. We could not say *popping from the loaves out of the wine*. The expression is on the same principle that operates in the phrase βαψει τον δακτυλον απο τον ελαιου, "shall dip his finger *from* the oil," Lev. xiv. 16. and απο του αιματος, "from the blood," Lev. iv. 17.

Εἰς and ἐν occur very frequently in composition with this verb ; but their effect is quite obvious ; απο is less frequent, because it is only on the above principles that it applies. Επὶ is still less frequent, and as Κατα denotes a *deep dipping*, so Επὶ denotes great exertion in producing the effect of the verb. It does not mean that the action of the verb is produced *upon* the object, but that the force of the agent is exerted in producing the action of the verb. It does not direct the action of the verb to the object, but directs the energy of the agent to the production of the action. Ες την Ερετριδα γην υγρην, και λιην τστριμμενην και χλιαρην, επιβαψας οδονιον λεκτον, "dipping a piece of fine linen into moist Eretrian earth," &c. Here the effect of επι is to show the force necessary to press the object into the moist earth.

Now this is Mr. Ewing's favourite compound for denoting *baptism*. To *pop upon* must mean to pop the water on the person. But let the verb be translated as he will, it cannot comport in this example with this view. The Eretrian earth was not to be *popped upon* the linen, for it was a mass of moist earth ; and it is not said that the linen was to be *baptized upon* with the earth, but *into the earth*. Now Mr. Ewing supposes that when the verb is compounded with επι, the baptizing substance is preceded by *with*. "He popped upon me with an overwhelming flood." But this is not the syntax in any of the examples in which this compound word occurs. It is not *baptize with*, but baptize *in* or *into*. This is a capital mistake, and the detection of it leaves him without aid from his favourite compound. To *baptize upon*, in the construction in which it always stands, is as inconsistent with *popping*, as *into* would have been. Indeed, *into* is in

this example expressly used before the baptizing substance. If the linen was to be baptized *upon* moist earth, it was also to be baptized *into* the earth.

The expression in Josephus in which this compound is used, to which Mr. Ewing seems to refer, is as little in unison with his doctrine : τουτο ωσπερ τελευταια θυελλα χειμαζομενους τους νεανισκους επεβαπτισεν. "This, as the last storm, immersed the young men," &c. Here the storm is not the *baptizing substance*, but the *baptizer*; and it did not *pop itself upon them*, for the verb is in the active voice. If then it signifies to *pop*, the *popper must pop* something on them. What is it then that the storm *pops on them different from itself*? To express Mr. Ewing's meaning, the syntax must be quite different. Some *popper* must "pop the young men with a storm," &c. or it must be, "the young men were popped upon *with* a storm." but instead of this the storm itself is the *baptizer*, and as their *baptism* was their destruction, it must have been *immersion*. *Επ* then cannot here import, as Mr. Ewing's doctrine supposes, that the baptizing substance was *popped upon* the baptized; for the baptizing substance was the sea in which they perished, and the storm was the baptizer that sunk them. Mr. Ewing's own translation of the passage cannot give him relief. "This, as the last storm, *epibaptized or overwhelmed* the young men, already weather-beaten." Now, what did the storm baptize *upon* them? With what did it *overwhelm* them? With itself, Mr. Ewing may say. I answer no. The verb is in the active voice, but to express this meaning would require the middle. If the storm *popped* them, it must have popped them with something different from itself. Besides, the allusion is evidently to a ship *sinking* in the sea by a storm. The sea is the baptizing substance, the storm is the baptizer, and the effect of such a baptism is destruction. *Επ* then is evidently intended to mark the violence of the pressure of the storm on the ship,

as the force of the agent in effecting the action of the verb.

Again, if *epibaptize* signifies to *pop upon*, how is it that it here imports to overwhelm? Can any two ideas be more inconsistent than that of *popping upon*, and that of overwhelming? Can two extremes meet? How does *overwhelm* hold of *pop*? I have already shown that no process can account for two meanings so discordant, and that no figure will justify it. This is contrary to a canon as clear as any in language,—*That which designates one extreme, cannot at the same time designate the other.* As I have observed in another place, many words may apply to both extremes, but this can never happen except when they designate neither. *To dip*, for instance, applies to an *immersed world*, and it applies to an immersed insect. But it designates neither. How ludicrous is the expression, the storm *popped upon* the young men! Even were we to grant for a moment, that *pop* should enlarge its signification so as to apply to the most violent storm, still it would express only the force of the storm, and not its effect. The translation would then be, “The storm rushed on them with tremendous violence;” but this would not import the effect of the storm, as issuing in their destruction. In many ways they might escape from the greatest storm ever known. Jonah was even cast into the sea, and yet escaped. Even when the *whistle* becomes a *tempest*, it will not serve Mr. Ewing.

The same observations will apply to the other example from Josephus: *Επιβαπτισεν γαρ αυτον την πολιν*, “That he would *baptize* or *sink* the city.” How is it that Mr. Ewing has translated this as if the verb was in the passive voice, and as if Josephus himself was not supposed the *baptizer*? “for the city.” says Mr. Ewing, “must be *epibaptized* or *overwhelmed*.” Do not the people, in their expostulations with Josephus, in order to dissuade him from leaving them, tell him that

if he should depart, he would himself *sink* or epibaptize the city? His desertion of the city would be the means of its ruin. He is then represented as doing the thing that would be the consequence of his departure.

But how is this, as Mr. Ewing says, an overwhelming by *rushing or pouring upon*? Did Josephus by *popping off from* the city, *pop upon it* with such violence as to overwhelm it? This surely implies the mysteries of transubstantiation. Josephus *popped* nothing on the city by leaving it, nor did he rush or pour on it with violence by flying from it. *Επι*, then, in this compound, can afford no countenance to the supposition, that in baptism the water is popped or poured upon the baptized person. To suit the example to this purpose, Josephus must have been represented as pouring the baptizing substance on the city.

Upon the whole, Mr. Ewing labours under a capital mistake when he supposes, that the prepositions prefixed to this verb, necessarily relate to the direction of the action of the verb. The Greek prepositions have a much more extensive and varied power in composition than ours have, in such compounds as *pop in, pop out, &c.* *Epibaptize*, which he supposes expressly to imply that the water is poured on the baptized, does not in one instance occur in syntax suitable to his interpretation, even although the meaning of the verb were doubtful.

13. In this theory of Mr. Ewing, we have the strongest evidence that our opponents are not themselves satisfied with any mode of defence hitherto devised. We have Mr. Ewing's own virtual acknowledgment, that the ground on which pouring has till his time been held for baptism, is not firm. Can there be a more certain sign that he himself was dissatisfied with the usual view of the subject, than his having recourse to so extravagant a theory? If he has taken to sea in this bark of bulrushes, must he not have con-

sidered the ship which he left as being in the very act of sinking? I call on the unlearned Christian to consider this circumstance. What must be the necessities of a cause, that requires such a method of defence? This theory is not only unsound, and unsupported by the Greek language, but it is ludicrous in the extreme. Since the heavens were stretched over the earth, there has not been such a chimerical scheme embodied under the name of criticism. The thought that the ordinances of Christ could be squeezed out of the radical sounds contained in words, or that the actual meaning of words may be authoritatively determined by such a species of etymology, is frightfully fanatical. Sober criticism can lend no ear to such dreams. What, then, must be the desperate situation of that cause, that takes aid from such a theory as that of Mr. Ewing!

The passages which Mr. Ewing brings forward in support of his theory, are already mostly considered. I shall, therefore, only touch on a few of his observations on them. There is one rule of interpretation which Mr. Ewing prescribes to us, at which I am beyond measure astonished. Though he does not formally state it as a canon, yet he reasons on the supposition that we are obliged to find an exact parallel for immersion, with all its circumstances, in the purifications of the heathens or of the Jews. Having quoted the passage from Herodotus, which is so decisive in our favour, he endeavours to lessen its value in the following words. "After all," says he, "there is one very manifest point of difference. The person who adopts this summary method of purification, performs the operation for himself. The immersion of one person by another, for any purpose except that of medical treatment, or that of murder, I can discover in no writings whatever, sacred or profane." And does Mr. Ewing really think that any such authority is necessary to determine the meaning of this word? Must we seek for a model for Christian baptism, either

among Jewish or heathen rites? I care not if there never had been a human being immersed in water since the creation, if the word denotes *immersion*, and if Christ enjoins it, I will contend for it as confidently as if all nations, in all ages, had been daily in the practice of baptizing each other. Whether I am to immerse myself in baptism, or be immersed by another, I am to learn from the Scripture accounts of the ordinance, not either from the meaning of the word or the practice of nations. The demand of Mr. Ewing is unreasonable beyond any thing that I recollect to have found in controversy. If it could not be accounted for by the strength of prejudice, it would indicate a want of discernment that no man will impute to Mr. Ewing. The man who demands, in order to the proof of immersion in baptism, that a complete model of the ordinance be found in Jewish or heathen purifications, must either labour under the influence of the strongest bias, or be strangely deficient in the powers of discrimination. “*For any purpose except that of medical treatment, or that of murder*”!!! And is not any of these cases as authoritative as an *immersion for purification*? Is not the immersion of a man for medical purposes, as much an *immersion*, and as authoritative to show the meaning of the word, as an *immersion* for superstitious purposes. Examples are useful to settle the meaning of the word, not as a model for the ordinance. The dipping of the flea’s foot in Aristophanes, is as authoritative as the immersion of a Pharisee for purification. But what heightens the extravagance of this demand is, that while Mr. Ewing calls for a complete model for Christian immersion in the purifications of Jews and heathens, he is so easily satisfied with evidence on his own side of the question, that he has found *popping water on the turned up face* to be the baptism of the New Testament. Here he has the eyes of a lynx, for he has seen what I believe no other man ever pretended to see in the Scriptures.

But it seems, that even a complete model in hea-

then purifications would not serve us. Nay, if we have been condemned for want of a heathen pattern for baptism, we are also condemned for having it. "There is also," says Mr. Ewing, "a point, not of difference, but of resemblance, between this example and an Anti-pædo-baptist's baptism, which seems to have very much astonished the historian, namely, the person's plunging himself, *αὐτοῖς ἡμαρτοῖσι*, 'with his very clothes on.' It was evidently regarded as a singular and monstrous sort of purification by this heathen writer; and we shall meet with abundant evidence that it was never so seen in Israel." Here we are condemned for observing baptism according to the model, as we were before condemned for coming short of the model. Surely I may answer such reasoning in the language of Christ: "We have piped unto you, and ye have not danced; we have mourned unto you, and ye have not lamented." As long as the mind is in a state to make such objections, it would not yield though one should rise from the dead. A heathen thought purification with the clothes on singular and monstrous. Must Christ's ordinance conform to heathen notions of purification? But, Mr. Ewing, how can you assert that Herodotus regarded this as monstrous? There is no such thing said, nor implied. The historian does not mention the circumstance as monstrous, or in any degree improper, but as an evidence of the abhorrence that the Egyptians have for swine, and the deep pollution contracted by their touch. The thing that was singular and strange is, that the person touching the swine, supposed the pollution to affect his very garments, or that it was as necessary to baptize them as himself. The polluted Egyptian baptized himself, with his very clothes, that he might purify his clothes, which he considered to be defiled as well as himself. The Christian is baptized with his clothes on, not indeed to imitate the example of the Egyptian, but for the sake of decency. Had Christian baptism been like Egyptian baptism, an or-

dinance in which every believer was to baptize himself, there would have been no need to baptize with the clothes on. The thing then that is strange and singular in the Egyptian baptism, is not strange in Christian baptism. It would be strange if persons bathing alone in a retired place should encumber themselves with a bathing dress ; but it would not be strange to find them using a bathing dress on a crowded strand. A little discrimination under the influence of candour would have taken away all monstrosity from this example. There is nothing in the historian that in the remotest degree gives ground for Mr. Ewing's assertion. Is this a candid or a Christian way of representing evidence ? If men will indulge themselves in such liberties with the documents on which they found their report of antiquity, no credit could be given to history. Mr. Ewing here represents Herodotus as regarding this circumstance as *monstrous*, without the smallest authority from his words. Is not this bearing false witness ? The intention, I am convinced, is not to misrepresent evidence. Yet evidence is misrepresented, where nothing but bias could discover the supposed meaning. Well may a Roman Catholic see all the doctrines of popery in the Scriptures, when Mr. Ewing can find the circumstance of bathing with the *clothes on* designated as monstrous in the language of Herodotus. If, in all the passages which I have considered, I have made one such misrepresentation, let me be put to shame. I may mistake the meaning of my author, but a mistake that indicates a bias, I hope no man will be able to find in my criticism. I would let Baptism and the Bible itself sink, rather than force evidence. What I demand from my antagonist, I will grant him in return. I will not lay down one law for him, and walk by another myself. I will do all in my power to save the Israelitish spies, but if this cannot be done without a falsehood let them perish.

The same uncandid and unreasonable mode of rea-



soning is again resorted to in the following language. Formerly he had complained that the examples implying immersion, do not respect cases in which one person baptized another, but each baptized himself. "Here," he says, "it must be confessed, that, in some of the cases, there are *dippers* as well as *dipped*." Now, if there is, in any instance, the model he requires, why does he complain, that in some instances it is not to be found? Does he suppose that every instance must contain the full model, or that one instance is not sufficient for the purpose, even were it necessary to produce such a model from heathenism? If, in one case, he finds a *dipper*, is it not enough to show that the word may be applied to the ordinance of Christian immersion? But whether a person *dips* himself, or is *dipped* by another, has no more to do with the meaning of this word, than the name of the baptized person has. Nor can an example from heathen or Jewish purification, that would coincide in every particular with the external form of the ordinance, be of more authority as a model, than an example of plunging a pick-pocket in the mire. To speak in the above way, then, is totally to misconceive the nature of the evidence on which a just conclusion can be founded.

Mr. Ewing complains, that, "the other cases also, are not those of voluntary plunging, but of fatal sinking." But is not immersion *immersion*, whether the immersed person rises or sinks? We want no aid from these examples but what they can give, what they cannot refuse to give, and what our opponents admit that they give. The examples in which the word applies to sinking, prove that the word implies *dipping*. This is all we want from them. That the baptized person is not to lie at the bottom, but to rise up out of the waters, we learn not from the word, but from the accounts of the ordinance. We wish no model in heathenism as an authority for the ordinance of baptism. This we have in the Scriptures. We are in-

debted to the heathen writers only for the meaning of the word. It is altogether astonishing that a man like Mr. Ewing can indulge in such trifling. If all his requirements were necessary, no ordinance of Christ could be proved. But happily his requirements are only for his opponents. They do not regulate his own conduct. He relaxes from his rigour wherever his *popping* scheme comes to the trial. If one instance could be brought, in which this disputed word necessarily signifies to pour or sprinkle, though it related to a person sprinkling himself, what would he say, should I object that this was no authority for one person to sprinkle another! Very true, he would doubtless say, but it proves that the word signifies to sprinkle. I have other ways of learning whether baptism is a sprinkling of one's self, or a sprinkling of one by another. In like manner, the examples of involuntary immersion prove to me the meaning of the word. From Christ and his apostles I learn that Christian immersion is neither involuntary nor fatal. It is a grievous thing to be obliged to notice such reasoning.

Mr. Ewing exclaims, "Is this the pattern of *baptizers* and *baptized*?" No indeed, Mr. Ewing, this is not the pattern, and I never heard of any who made this a model. But these examples are authority to show the meaning of the word. Had Mr. Ewing produced one instance in which the disputed word signifies to *sprinkle* or *pour*, and that instance referred to bespattering with filth, what would he say were we to exclaim, "Is this the pattern of baptism by sprinkling?" Would he not pounce upon us with the reply: "This determines the meaning of the word, which is all any examples from heathen writers can do. That pure water is to be used in baptism, we learn from the Scriptures." And why does he not use common sense in his objections?

"Shall we illustrate the office of John the Baptist, and of the apostles and evangelists of Christ," says

Mr. Ewing, "by the work of providential destruction, or that of murderers?" We shall determine the meaning of the word by such examples. Nothing more can be done by any examples from antiquity. Nothing more do we want. I put it to every candid reader,—I put it to Mr. Ewing himself, whether he would make such an objection, if the examples were in his favour. Nay, we have the answer virtually expressed in the authority which he gives to the example of heathen and Jewish purifications. While he complains of us for establishing the meaning of the word by documents that apply the word to involuntary and fatal immersion, his mode of reasoning in other places gives an authority to heathen models of purification that they do not possess.

"These examples imply," says Mr. Ewing, "not a mere *dipping*, and *up* again, an *immersion* immediately followed by an *emersion*; but a continued and permanent immersion, a remaining under water." Now, is not this mode of reasoning perverse and unjust? If some examples are found, in which this word is applied to the dipping of things taken immediately up, is not this sufficient to establish the propriety of its application to the ordinance of baptism? Can it be necessary that all the examples refer to things taken up? Will Mr. Ewing never learn that we are seeking from these examples, not an authoritative model for baptism, but the meaning of a word? If the disputed word, in some instances, applies to things taken immediately up, and in others to things never taken up, a true critic, nay common sense, will learn that the word itself can designate neither *taking up* nor *lying at the bottom*. One instance in which the word applies when the thing is taken up after dipping, is as good as ten thousand.

But though some examples of the occurrence of this word imply a permanent immersion or destruction, the word *Baptizo* never expresses this. Whether the thing is taken up, or is allowed to remain is not

expressed by the word, but is implied by the circumstances. The word, without one exception, signifies simply to *dip*.

In the following extract, the reasoning is more plausible. The author seems to think that it is demonstration. However, when it is dissected, it has no muscles. "Some may think," says Mr. Ewing, "it was not necessary to use a word directly to express the *emersion*, because if *immersion* really was enjoined, the *emersion* must be understood to follow of course, from the necessity of the case. This is a perfectly natural thought, but it cannot help the cause of Antipædo-baptists. According to their views, baptism is a *two-fold* symbol, representing *two* things of distinct and equal importance. The *immersion* and the *emersion* are both of them parts of this symbol; the first representing the *death*, and the second the *resurrection* of Christ. Now, if this be the case, the word βαπτίζω is a name for the *one half only* of their ordinance of baptism. It entirely fails them as to the *other half*. A word may have various meanings, but it cannot have two of them at the same time. If, therefore, this word, *pops them down*, it certainly cannot give any warrant or suggest any literal or figurative meaning, for *their popping up again*." Now, how can we deliver ourselves out of this tremendous gulf? Nothing can be more easy. Distinguish the things that are different, and place every thing on its proper evidence, and all difficulty vanishes. The word βαπτίζω, even applied to baptism, expresses *immersion* only. Yet I contend, that in baptism there is a *two-fold* symbol. How is this? I learn the meaning of the word from its use; and I learn the meaning of the ordinance, not from the word, but from the Scripture explanation of the import of the ordinance. If there was nothing said in Scripture about the import of baptism, I would learn nothing on the subject from the word that designates it. I would learn as little of its being a symbol of the death of Christ, as of his resurrection. I learn neither

from the word ; for it is possible that this word might have been used, without teaching any thing on the subject. I learn both from the Scripture explanations of Christ's institution.

But it may be said, if the word signifies immersion, it may be a symbol of Christ's burial ; but it is not fitted to be such a symbol, unless it also signifies to *emerge*.—Now, as far as depends on what is actually expressed by the word, I grant that this is the case. But as in the ordinance of baptism, the *emersion* is as necessary as the *immersion*, there is nothing to prevent the institutor to make the *emersion* symbolical as well as the immersion. If the institutor had not made it symbolical, if it was not explained as pointing to Christ's resurrection and ours, I would as soon anoint with oil and spittle, as deduce it from the meaning of the word, even though the word had expressed both *immersion* and *emersion*. The ordinance is as fit to represent *emersion* as *immersion*, though the word baptism expresses the latter only. The symbol consists in the thing, not in the name. There is no necessity that the name should designate every thing contained in the ordinance. But even granting that this is necessary, what would follow ? Not that baptism is not *immersion*, but that baptism is an emblem of burial only. This would do Mr. Ewing little service. If we can once persuade him to have himself *popped into the water*, it is not likely that he will be so obstinate as to reject the half of the edification of the ordinance.

Mr. Ewing says, "Now, if this be the case, the word βαπτισμα is a name for *the one half only* of their ordinance of baptism." But why should the name of any ordinance designate every thing that the ordinance is explained by the institutor as containing ? This is not necessary ; nor do Scripture ordinances at all recognize the authority of such a principle. Is it not strange that Mr. Ewing should have forgotten one of the names of the Lord's supper which is liable to the like objection ? It is called *the breaking of*

*bread*; yet it includes the drinking of wine. Such are the effects of intemperate zeal. It requires, in one instance, what it overlooks in another. Now, Mr. Ewing, is not this battery silenced for ever?

### ON THE BAPTISM OF THE SPIRIT.

THE baptism of the Spirit is a figurative expression, explicable on the principle of a reference to immersion. This represents the abundance of the gifts and influences of the Spirit of God in the enlightening and sanctification of believers. That which is immersed in a liquid, is completely subjected to its influence, and imbued with its virtues; so *to be immersed in the Spirit*, represents the subjection of soul, body, and spirit, to his influence. The whole man is sanctified. It is objected that the Holy Spirit is said to be *poured out*, and therefore to represent the pouring of the Spirit, baptism must be by *pouring*. This is the grand resource of our opponents, and is more specious to the illiterate, than any thing that has been said. A very considerable part of the language of Scripture, in the representation of the gifts of the Spirit, is founded on the figure of *pouring*; and readers who have no discrimination, or who are under the influence of bias, at once conclude that this *pouring* is the baptism of the Spirit. This argument is drawn out in formidable array by Mr. Ewing; and is relied on with the utmost confidence by Dr. Wardlaw. But it is nothing but a careless confusion of things entirely distinct, and is founded on an egregious blunder, as will appear by the following considerations.

*First*, The word, in its literal sense, must guide all its figurative applications. The explanation of the figure must conform to the literal meaning, but the literal meaning can never bend to the figurative. The latter, indeed, may assist us in ascertaining the former; but when the former is ascertained, the latter must be explained in accordance with it. But the

literal meaning of this word is ascertained to be that of *immersion*, by a strength of evidence, and a multitude of examples, that cannot be exceeded with respect to any word of the same frequency of occurrence. This is a fixed point ; and in the examination of the reference in the baptism of the Spirit, nothing can be admitted inconsistent with this. *The baptism of the Spirit* must have a reference to *immersion*, because baptism is *immersion*, and in its literal sense never signifies any thing else. When we come to the examination of this figure, or any other of the same word, we must ground on this ascertained fact. As there is not one instance in the literal use of the word, in which it must signify *pouring*, or any thing but *dipping*, the pretensions of *pouring*, as the figurative baptism, do not deserve even a hearing. They cannot legitimately even go before a jury, because true bills are not found. There is no ground of trial, because there is nothing in the allegations that can at all excite a doubt. *Pouring cannot be the figurative baptism, because baptism never literally denotes pouring.*

*Secondly*, This opinion is founded on the egregious error which teaches that God is material, and that there is a literal pouring out of his Spirit, which may be represented by the pouring of water. Our opponents understand the baptism of the Spirit to be a literal baptism, and the pouring out of the Spirit to be a literal pouring out of Him who is immaterial. But though there is a real communication of the Spirit, there is no real or literal baptism of the Spirit. Let the reference in the baptism of the Spirit be what it may, it cannot be a literal baptism, because God is not material. We cannot be literally either *dipped* into God, or have him *poured* on us. *Pouring*, then, in baptism, even if *baptism* were *pouring*, could not represent the *pouring* of the Spirit, because the Spirit is not literally *poured*. Baptism, whatever be the mode, cannot represent either the manner of conveying the Spirit, or his operations in the soul. These

things cannot be represented by natural things. There is no likeness to a Spirit, nor to the mode of his operations. It would be as easy to make a likeness of God creating the world, and attempt to represent by a picture the divine operations in the formation of matter, as to represent by symbols the manner of the communication of the Holy Spirit, and his operations on the soul. If Christians were not infatuated with the desire of establishing a favourite system, so gross conceptions of God could not have so long escaped detection. This error is as dishonourable to God, as that of the Anthropomorphites. It degrades the Godhead, by representing it as a *material* substance.

When the Spirit is said to *be poured*, it is a figurative expression, to which there is nothing resemblant in the manner of the divine operations. What, then, it may be asked, is the resemblance? Why is the Spirit said to be *poured*, if the *pouring* of water does not resemble it? The foundation of the figure is the very reverse of what is supposed. The Spirit is said to be *poured out*, not because there is any actual *pouring*, which is represented by *pouring out* water in baptism, but from the *resemblance between the effects of the influences of the Spirit and those of water*. Between the Spirit itself and water there is no resemblance, more than between an eye or a circle and the divine nature. Nor is there any resemblance between the mode of the operations of the Spirit, and that of the influences of water. The Holy Spirit is said to be *poured*, because his influences or effects are like those of water, and because he is supposed to *dwell above*. The Holy Spirit is represented as poured out, on the same principle on which God is said to have come down from heaven, or to look down from heaven, or to have hands and arms. It is in accommodation to our ways of thinking and speaking, not as expressive of reality. The Holy Spirit is figured as water, not to represent any likeness in him to water, just as God is figured as a man. The Holy Spirit is said also to be as *dew*. Does



this imply that there is a likeness to the falling of dew and the manner of the communication of the Holy Ghost? Our Lord represents the Spirit as a *well*, the waters of which spring up, John iv. 14. Is there also a likeness in the manner of the communication of the Spirit to water *rising up* out of the ground, as well as to water *poured out* from above? The Holy Spirit is also represented as a river whose streams make glad the city of God. Is there also a likeness between his operations and the *running* of water? In all these figures, the Spirit is represented in accommodation to natural things, and natural things are not accommodated to it. The effects of the one resemble the effects of the other, but as to *manner*, there is no likeness. A particular *manner* is given to the operations of the Spirit, to suit the *manner* of the communication of the natural object. Therefore it is that the Spirit has ascribed to it all the various modes mentioned above. The Spirit, in every figure, takes the *manner* of the resembling object; but the resembling object never takes the *manner* of the Spirit, because nothing is known of his manner. Of this there must not be—cannot be any likeness. If the manner of the communication of the Spirit could be represented, one only of these modes must be employed. If his manner is *pouring*, it cannot be like *dew*, nor like *rain*, nor like a *river*, nor like a spring-well. But if the likeness be merely between the effects of the Spirit and the effects of water, then the Spirit may be represented as *dew*, or *rain*, or a *river*, or a *spring-well*, just as the water is supposed to be applied. It is absurd to suppose an ordinance to be appointed to represent the mode of the Spirit's communication; and as it is spoken of under all these modes, each of them might claim an ordinance as well as pouring. Baptism might as well represent water *rising out of the earth*, *distilling in dew*, *running in a stream*, or *falling in rain*, as *pouring out of a cup*. Each of these represents the blessings of the Spirit, by conforming the language about the opera-

tions of the Spirit to a particular state of the water ; none of them represents the mode of these operations. The Holy Spirit is said to fall ; why then should not baptism represent falling ? The Holy Spirit is represented as wind ; why then is there no *blowing* in baptism ? The Holy Spirit is represented by *fire* ; why is there no fire used in this ordinance ? The gift of the Spirit was represented by the *breathing* of Jesus on the Apostles ; why is there no *breathing* in baptism ? The influences of the Spirit are represented by *oil* ; why is not *oil* used in baptism ? The reception of the Holy Spirit is represented by *drinking water* ; why is there no *drinking* in this ordinance ?

In like manner, curses are represented as *poured out* by God on his enemies, or put into their hands as a cup to be drunk. Drinking is equally an emblem of blessings and curses, because it is the one or the other according to the qualities of the liquid. In the judgments of God on the wicked, there is no likeness to the manner of the divine operations. Why, then, should such a likeness be supposed when pouring respects blessings ? Baptism, then, cannot be either *pouring* or *dipping*, for the sake of representing the manner of the conveyance of the Holy Spirit ; for there is no such likeness. *Pouring of the Spirit* is a phrase which is itself a figure not a reality to be represented by a figure. Baptism is a figure, not of the mode of any divine operation, to which there can be no likeness, but *of the burial and resurrection of Christ*, which may be represented by natural things, because it respects the objects of sense. In this reference it has a real application, a true likeness, and the most important use. Of the *immersion of the Spirit*, I will say the same as of the *pouring of the Spirit*, that it cannot represent the operations of the Spirit, or the mode of his conveyance. Believers are said to be *immersed* into the Spirit, not because there is any thing like *immersion* in the manner of the reception of the Spirit, but from the resemblance between an object

soaked in a fluid, and the sanctification of all the members of the body, and faculties of the soul. The common way in which the *pouring* of the Spirit has been explained, is inconsistent both with sound taste and with sound theology. It mistakes the nature of figurative language, and converts the Godhead into matter.

But though the baptism of the Holy Spirit is a figurative Baptism, to which there cannot be a likeness in literal Baptism; yet as respects the transactions on the day of Pentecost, there was a real Baptism *in the emblems of the Spirit*. The disciples were immersed into the Holy Spirit by the abundance of his gifts; and they were literally covered with wind and fire. The place where they met was filled with *a rushing mighty wind*, and *cloven tongues as of fire* sat over them. They were then completely covered by the emblems of the Spirit. Now, though there was no dipping of them, yet as they were completely surrounded by the wind and fire, by the catachrestic mode of speech which I before explained, they are said to be *immersed*. This is a process exemplified with respect to innumerable words, and the principle is quite obvious, as well as of daily application. The shepherd, when his sheep are covered with snow in a glen, says that they are *buried* in the snow. When a house falls upon the inhabitants, we say that they are *buried* in its ruins. A general will threaten to *bury* the inhabitants in the ruins of their city. The word *bury* with us strictly conveys the notion of digging into the earth, as well as of covering over the dead. Yet here it is extended to a case in which the former does not take place. Burial usually is performed by both operations, but here the thing is performed by one; and therefore the word that designates both is elegantly assigned to that which serves the purpose of both. Just so with respect to being covered with a fluid. *Immersion* denotes that the thing *immersed* is put into the *immersing* substance; yet when the same effect is produced

without the manner of the operation, the usual name of the operation is catachrestically given to the result. Virgil's expression, *Pocula sunt fontes liquidi*, Georg. III. p. 529, is an exact parallel. "The liquid fountains are their cups," &c. Now, *fountains* are not *cups*, more than the thing referred to is *immersion*, yet they are called cups, because in the instance referred to they serve the purpose of *cups*. This poet supplies innumerable examples of the operation of the principle here illustrated.

Let it not be supposed that the principle which I have now illustrated is at all akin to that unfounded fancy of Mr. Ewing, with respect to the supposed *exaggerated* meaning of βαπτίζω. Mr. Ewing in this gives two meanings to a word, at variance with each other, and while he calls it figurative, he makes it literal; and agreeably to his doctrine it must, in the hyperbolical meaning, hold directly, and immediately, and independently, of the primary meaning. The principle which I have explained is not of this paradoxical kind. I give but the one meaning to the word, and even when there is no literal *immersion*, I maintain that the word never drops its characteristic meaning. Indeed, the beauty of the figure is that the word suggests its own peculiar meaning, even when it does not literally apply. It professedly calls a thing by a name which literally does not in all respects belong to it, to gratify the imagination. Why does Virgil call *fountains* by the name of *cups*? Not because they were really *cups*, nor because *cup* signifies *fountain* literally, but because the human mind by its constitution is delighted in certain circumstances by viewing a thing as being what it is not, but which in some respects it resembles. The process for which I contend, I can vindicate by the soundest philosophy,—I can trace to its origin in the human mind,—I can illustrate by parallels without number. Mr. Ewing has not attempted to illustrate his figure, nor is it in his power to show its foundation in the human mind, or to sanction it by corresponding examples.

Mr. Booth, with a truly critical judgment and correct taste, illustrates this mode of speech by alluding to the electrical bath, "so called," says the writer whom he quotes, "because it surrounds the patient with an atmosphere of electrical fluid, in which he is *plunged*." Here the writer to whom he refers, scruples not to say that the patient is *plunged* into the fluid which is brought around him. Indeed, the very term electrical bath is an exemplification of the operation of the same principle. *Bath* properly refers to a vessel of water in which persons are *bathed*. But by a catechresis this term is given to a vessel filled with a fluid, which is not for the purpose of bathing.

*Thirdly*, There is another grand fallacy in this argument. *It confounds things that are different*. Water is *poured* out into a vessel in order to have things put into it. But the *pouring* out of the water, and the application of the water so poured out, are different things. Water is poured into a bath in order to immerse the feet or the body, but the *immersion* is not the *pouring*. Now, our opponents confound these two things. Because the Spirit is said to be poured out in order to the Baptism of the Spirit, they groundlessly conclude, that the *pouring* is the Baptism. A foreigner might as well contend that, when it is said in the English language, "Water was *poured into* a bath, and they *immeraed* themselves," it is implied that *pouring* and *immersing* are the same thing.

———"Then taking the resplendent vase  
Allotted always to that use, she first,  
Infused cold water largely, then the warm.

She, then, approaching, ministered the bath  
To her own king." COWPER, *Odys. xix.*

The *pouring* out of the Spirit is as different a figure from the *baptism* of the Spirit, as the *infusion* of the water into the bath, is different from the application of the water to the object in the bath.

Now, let us apply these observations to Mr. Ewing's

reasoning. Dissection is not a pleasant work, either to the operator or the spectators ; but it is impossible to make an anatomist without it. General observations must be applied to the subject in detail, that all may thoroughly understand their application, and perceive their justness. It is tedious, but the business cannot be effectually done without the knife.

Speaking of water, air, and fire, Mr. Ewing says, "which are all considered in Scripture as elements of Baptism." Air and fire were elements of the baptism that took place on the day of Pentecost, but they are not elements in the standing ordinance of Christ. In the baptism of the day of Pentecost there was no water at all. They who were baptized on that day in wind and fire had been baptized before. This was not the ordinance of Christian Baptism, nor an ordinance at all. Christ himself was the administrator, and it is called baptism only in an allusive sense. If it was baptism as an ordinance, it would prove that after the baptism of water, there ought to be another baptism into wind and fire.

"And in this connexion," continues Mr. Ewing, "these elements are uniformly represented as *poured, inspired, and made to fall from above.*" Very true, but is this *pouring, inspiring, falling from above*, called Baptism? Never—never.

Mr. Ewing asserts, that these emblems of the work of the Spirit, are an allusion to the creation of man. But how does he find the fire in that work? Why, was there not "*the fire of life*?" But the *fire of life* is no element. This is only a figurative expression. It is mere fanaticism to take such mysteries out of the Scriptures. Is it not strange that Mr. Ewing will allow himself to indulge so wild a fancy in deriving emblematical instruction from his own creations, and that he so obstinately refuses to take that edification from the import of Baptism, which is obviously contained in the apostolical explanations of the ordinance?

He says that baptism "consists in a representation

of all the elements employed in our first creation." I have remarked that there was no fire employed in our first creation ; and Christian baptism has no representation either of fire or air. Nor has the water of baptism any allusion to the water that moistened the clay in the creation of man. These mysteries are akin to those that the Romish church so piously finds in the oil and spittle used in baptism.

He says that the promise of the baptism with the Holy Spirit and with fire "was given to all the disciples." Then the promise has not been fulfilled. Wind and fire are not used in the baptism of all disciples. This baptism was peculiar to the day of Pentecost. This promise cannot be supposed as literally applying to all disciples. He says, "it belongs to them, both as it regards gracious influence, and as it regards miraculous inspiration." But the baptism of the day of Pentecost could not respect the spiritual birth, else there would be two baptisms representing the same thing. The persons baptized on the day of Pentecost, were previously baptized into water as being born again. It could not respect their progressive sanctification, else it might be repeated as often as the Lord's Supper, and every disciple would equally need the *wind and fire* literally. Nor have all disciples the promise of miraculous gifts. This interpretation might suit Miss Mary Campbell : but I have not heard that Mr. Ewing has adopted the Row heresy. Mr. Ewing, however, is contented with a diminished sense of the promise. *Miraculous inspiration* he understands as applying to all believers only in the sense of their being "built on the foundation of [the apostles and prophets, that is, their faith is founded on the authority and energy of that Spirit by which the apostles and prophets were inspired." What an abuse of words is this! A man is miraculously inspired because he believes the doctrine of an inspired person!!! It would be charitable in Mr. Ewing to send this canon to his neighbour Mr. Campbell ; it might help to screen

him, if ever he comes to trial before the General Assembly. The Row heresy would turn out a very innocent thing, if the claim of miraculous gifts imports no more than faith in the doctrine of Christ. Now, were I to propagate in Ireland that Mr. Ewing believes that every Christian has a promise of miraculous inspiration, would he not allege that I had injured him? And why does he misrepresent the language of the Holy Spirit, in a manner that he would judge calumny with respect to himself?

Mr. Ewing derives another argument for pouring, from the expression, "*born from above*," John iii. But *from above*, merely designates that God is the author of this birth, without respect to any emblem appointed to represent it, though baptism is, in ver. 5, referred to as its emblem. *Born from above*, is perfectly synonymous with *born of God*.

As little can be built on the emblem, John xx. 22. The *breathing* on the disciples was not a *baptism*, nor is it called a *baptism*.

Mr. Ewing says, that "the mode of the baptism, Acts i. 5, is explained, v. 8." But ver. 8. says nothing of the mode of that baptism: "But ye shall receive power, after that the Holy Ghost is *come upon you*." The *coming* is not the *baptism*. The influence of the Spirit when *come*, not the *coming* of the Spirit, is the baptism.

The author observes, with respect to Acts ii. 3, "that 'the sound' of the wind was heard *descending* from heaven, and filling the house," Yes—but the *descending* is not the *baptism*. The wind *descended* to fill the house, that when the house was filled with the wind, the disciples might be baptized in it. Their baptism consisted in being totally surrounded with the wind, not in the manner in which the wind came. The water must be brought from the river or fountain, to fill the vessel for immersion. Does this say that the conveyance of the water is baptism?

Mr. Ewing says, that "distributed flames of fire



appeared like tongues, and *sat down* upon every one of them." Though this translation is warranted by the learned Bishop Pearce, it is by no means justifiable. The common version is perfectly exact. It is not fire cloven, or distributed into tongues, but cloven tongues. There were not only many tongues, to denote many languages; but the tongues were cloven, to denote that the same individual could speak different languages. The fire *sat down* upon each of them. The baptism did not consist, as Mr. Ewing supposes, in the *sitting down*, or the mode of the *coming of the flame*, but in their being *under it*. They were surrounded by the wind, and covered by the fire above. They were therefore buried in wind and fire.

It is quite obvious, indeed, that even the mode in which the house is said to have been filled with the wind on the day of Pentecost, is no more *pouring* than it is *dipping*. The wind is not said to be *poured into* the house, but to come *rushing* with a mighty noise; or the sound that filled the house, was like the sound of a *rushing* mighty wind. If literal baptism has any allusion to this, the mode ought to be that of a *rushing wind*. If the manner of the coming of the emblem is the *baptism*, then baptism is neither *pouring* nor *immersion*, but *rushing*.

But even if the Pentecost baptism were, for argument's sake, allowed to be *pouring*, this would not relieve Mr. Ewing. The whole house was filled with the sound of the wind—the emblem of the Spirit. This was not *poping* a little water with the hand on the turned up face. When Mr. Ewing pours water on the baptized person, till the latter is covered completely with it, he will give as much trouble as if he were to immerse at once. In whatever way the water in baptism is to be applied, this passage teaches us that the baptized person must be totally covered.

Speaking of our Lord's baptism, Mr. Ewing asserts, "the meaning of the ordinance, and the very mode of its administration, confirmed the truth that the Holy

Spirit was about to be given." But how did the meaning and mode of Christ's baptism confirm this truth? Does not this take for granted that Mr. Ewing's meaning of the mode and import of this ordinance is just? If the very thing in debate is granted to Mr. Ewing, no doubt he will prove it. He refers to John vii. 39, and Acts xix. 2, 3. But neither of these passages asserts what he teaches. He speaks also of the influences of the Holy Spirit, "*visibly descending from on high, and abiding upon him.*" The influence of the Holy Spirit did not *visibly* descend. It was the emblem of the Spirit that descended *visibly*. The appearance of a dove *descended visibly, and abode upon him.* But was this Christ's baptism? The baptism was over before the emblem descended. Besides, the *descending* of the Spirit, could not be the baptism of the Spirit. Jesus is not here said to be baptized with the Spirit. This baptism was literal baptism. This extraordinary communication might indeed have been called a baptism, just as in the case of the disciples, but it is not so called here. And if it were so called, it would not be the *descent* of the Spirit that is the baptism, but the communication of it after its descent. If the baptism consisted in the *descent*, the baptism was over when the dove reached Jesus. Is it possible that there is any one who has so little of the powers of discrimination, as not to be able to distinguish between bringing water from a fountain, and the use of that water when it is brought—between pouring water into a bath, and bathing in the bath? Yet every one who concludes from the *pouring* of the Spirit that baptism must be *pouring*, either wants this discrimination, or is unwilling to use it.

Another passage alleged by Mr. Ewing on this subject, is Psal. xlv. 2, "*Grace is poured into thy lips,*" &c. What has this to do with baptism? The Spirit, indeed, is here said to be poured, but did any man ever deny this? But let it never be forgotten, that such language does not imply the strange notion, that

there is any literal pouring in the giving of the Spirit, or that an ordinance is appointed to represent this pouring. It is quite useless, then, to refer to each of the passages which Mr. Ewing alleges to prove a descent. The *descent* is not the *baptism*, and cannot represent any real movement in the Spirit. The same answer will serve for all. But Mr. Ewing says, that "John supposed Jesus to receive the symbol of the Holy Spirit's descent, and presently he was seen, by miracle, to receive the reality." And is it possible that Mr. Ewing can say, that what was seen after the baptism of Christ was the reality!!! The appearance of a dove seen to light on the head of Christ, the reality of the communication of the Spirit!!! Surely, surely, the dove itself was but the emblem, not the reality represented by an emblem of baptism.

But was the dove *poured out* of heaven? Is not the Spirit said to *descend* from heaven, in conformity to the dove, the emblem? This shows that the descent of the Spirit is spoken of in language always suited to the emblem under which he is represented. When water is the emblem, his descent is spoken of as pouring, or as falling like dew, &c. When the dove is the emblem, the descent is spoken of, not as pouring, but as the descent of a bird. Such varied language is suited to the various emblems, and not to any reality in the manner of the communication of the Spirit. Let any Christian attend to this observation, and he will be ashamed of the childish explanation of this language, that implies that the Godhead is matter. Pouring is most frequently used for the sending of the gifts of the Spirit; but I have shown that the same thing is spoken of with reference to a fountain springing up,—a running stream,—the rain that is said to fall,—or the dew that distils. And here the same thing is exhibited as the descent of a bird, in conformity to the dove, which is the emblem employed. Let us hear no more then of baptism as *pouring*, in order to represent the *pouring* of the Spirit. We

may as well make baptism a *flying*, to represent the descent of the dove ; or a *blowing* and a *blazing*, to represent the wind and fire on the day of Pentecost ; or a stream, to represent the river that supplies the city of God ; or a jet, to represent the springing of a fountain ; or a distillation, to represent the gentle falling of the dew ; or a shower-bath, to represent the falling of the rain.

But if we are so obstinate as to resist the passages which Mr. Ewing has alleged above, the most incredulous will doubtless surrender to the "view expressly given (Acts ii. 16-21, 33, 38, 39.) of baptism with water, in consequence of the performance of the promise of baptism with the Spirit." "I will *pour out* of my Spirit," &c. "He hath *poured out* this, which ye now see and hear." "For as yet he was *fallen upon* none of them." "The Holy Ghost *fell upon* them all." The reply I have given will equally apply to this. The *pouring* is not the *baptism*, though the Spirit was *poured out*, that they might be *baptized* in it. The *descent* and the *pouring* are over, before the baptism takes place. But it may be alleged, Is it not said (Acts xi. 15, 16, 17.) that the Spirit's falling on them brought to remembrance the promise of the baptism of the Spirit ? Does not this import that the baptism of the Spirit is the same thing with the falling of the Spirit ?—It implies, indeed, that the baptism of the Spirit fulfilled the promise : but it does not imply that the baptism was the *falling*. The *falling* preceded the *baptism*. Rain *falls* to *moisten* the earth. The *moistening* of the earth is not the *falling* of the rain, the falling is a previous process. Suppose that in a drought, a man skilled in the signs of the weather should foretell that *on to-morrow the earth will be moistened with water*, would we not consider the prophecy fulfilled when we saw rain falling ? Yet *falling* is not expressed by the word *moistening*. Just so with the *pouring* and the *baptism of the Spirit*. Let my opponents bring to the subject a small portion of dis-

crimination, and they will instantly discern that the *falling* of the Spirit on the disciples fulfilled the promise of the baptism of the Spirit, though *falling* and baptism are two very different things. Is not *falling* itself different from *pouring*? They are modes as different as *pouring* and *dipping*. But every thing will serve Mr. Ewing that *pops down*. Yet strange, though he argues with equal confidence from every mode of *descent*, he comes at last to the confident conclusion, that no mode of descent will answer, but that of *pouring*. Though *falling* and *flying* will serve him in opposing immersion, yet he unceremoniously dismisses them all, when through their means he has gained the victory. Even decent and innocent *sprinkling*, that has held joint and unquestioned possession with its sister *pour* for so long a period, he turns out of doors with every mark of indignity.

But with respect to the *falling* of the Spirit on the disciples in the house of Cornelius, how did Peter and the rest perceive the descent? Was there any thing visible? No; they knew that the Holy Spirit fell on them, because they saw the effect of his influences, Acts x. 46. The influences, then, of the Spirit, and not the *falling*, was the baptism of the Spirit.

Mr. Ewing concludes with all the confidence of demonstration. "Is it credible," says he, "that a word which signifies the motion of body upon body, in any direction, should, when applied to represent both the figure and the reality of a DESCENT FROM ABOVE, be meant to be understood of motion in an OPPOSITE DIRECTION," &c. Stop a little, Mr. Ewing. You have said that the disputed word signifies the motion of body upon body, but you have not proved this. Nor is this word employed to represent the *descent from above* in any instance which you have brought forward. Why does Mr. Ewing substitute the word *baptize* here for the word *descend*? In his premises, the words are *pour*, *descend*, *fall*, &c.; in his conclusion, they become *baptized*. This is a trick in slight of hand

which we will not admit. It is utterly unlawful to reason from words that denote descent, and then draw the conclusion from βαπτίζω. So far from its being fact that βαπτίζω, in the passages referred to, is applied to represent both the figure and the reality of a descent, the words that are applied for this purpose, do not represent the baptism, but a process previous to the baptism. Whether the water, or the wind, or the fire, descends from above, or ascends from below, is nothing to the baptism. The baptism is the same, in whatever manner the baptizing substance is conveyed to the place of baptizing.

The authority of Milton is utterly valueless on this subject. I notice it merely to show the boldness and the rashness of Mr. Ewing's criticism. "Because Milton speaks of baptism as dispensed in a river," says Mr. Ewing, "it has been supposed that he favoured the mode of immersion; but I am inclined to think this is a mistake. He says, indeed, of our Saviour's commission to his disciples,

————— 'To them shall leave in charge  
To teach all nations what of him they learn'd  
And his salvation; them who shall believe  
Baptizing in the profluent stream, the sign  
Of washing them from guilt of sin to life  
Pure; and in mind prepar'd, if so befall,  
For death, like that which the Redeemer died.' "

Well, reader, what do you think of this? What was Milton's view of the mode of baptism? If our Saviour commanded them to baptize disciples in the *profluent stream*, must not baptism be immersion? What hardihood must that man possess, who will dare to criticise in this manner! But, says Mr. Ewing, "According to this account, baptism is the sign of, not *immersing*, but *washing* in a river." What egregious trifling! *Baptism* is not the sign of *immersing*! That is, *immersing* is not the sign of *immersing*. Very true; for how could a thing be the sign of itself? Well, of what is baptism a sign, according to Milton?—Of

*washing in a river!* So then Milton makes baptism a sign of washing in a river! Then the sign and the thing signified are the same. *Washing in a river* is the sign of *washing in a river!* Alas! poor Milton; here thou hast a fool's cap. Illustrious bard! thou wast a heretic, but thou wast not a fool. Immersion in a river, thou hast said, is the sign of washing from guilt. Oh, that thou hadst known the reality as well as thou didst know the figure! Hadst thou known the Saviour as well as thou hast known the mode of this his ordinance, thou wouldst have been great indeed.

Speaking of the baptism of the Spirit, Milton indeed uses the phrase "on all baptized." But this may be accounted for by his using the word baptize as it is generally used in English. Using the word in its most common acceptation, I would not scruple to say, *baptized with the Spirit*, when there was no need for accuracy of distinction. Milton, also, from not closely considering the phraseology, might fall into the vulgar error, that the baptism of the Spirit was pouring, because the Spirit is said to be *poured out*, though water baptism was by immersion. This way of explaining the apparent inconsistency, I believe, is not uncommon. I hope I have made it unnecessary to have recourse to this resource.

Mr. Ewing quotes a passage from which it has been concluded that Milton was opposed to infant baptism, but from which Mr. Ewing himself concludes that the poet was a friend both to pouring and the baptism of infants. I need not quote the whole passage; the marrow of it is found in the expression, "When ye had laid the purifying element upon his forehead." Now, both this and the whole passage may agree with either of the opinions, and consequently can neither prove nor refute either. Mr. Ewing is well founded in supposing that the disparagement may not respect the sprinkling; but he has no authority to conclude that Milton approved either of sprinkling as the mode,

or of infants as the subjects of baptism, because he calls the water laid on the foreheads of infants, *a purifying element*. Water is a *purifying element*, even when applied in the holy water of the Church of Rome. The nature of the water is the same, whether it is used superstitiously, or according to the appointment of God. But Milton might have gone much farther, without giving ground for Mr. Ewing's inference. Many Protestants would speak of the baptism of the Church of Rome, with all its trumpery, as true baptism. I am not sure that Mr. Ewing himself would re-baptize a convert from Popery. I refer to this note with respect to Milton,—not from any desire to have him on my side, but to manifest the utter unreasonableness of Mr. Ewing's criticism. No evidence could withstand the torture of such an inquisitor. I doubt not but Mr. Ewing could make Milton as orthodox on the subject of the Trinity as on baptism, if he would as zealously set about the work.

We have a delicious morsel of criticism in Mr. Ewing's explanation of the figurative baptism that was fulfilled in the suffering's of Christ. Mr. Ewing is at no loss to find edification in his mode of this ordinance. He does not need the apostles as commissaries to find provision for the house of God. He gives us much edification in his explanation of this ordinance, not to be found in the Scriptures. "We are led to conceive of baptism," says Mr. Ewing, "as the pouring out of water from a cup on the turned up face of the baptized; and whether he be adult or in infancy, it may thus not only wet the surface as a figure of washing, but be drunk into the mouth, as the emblem of a principle of new life, and of continual support and refreshment,—of a source of spiritual and heavenly consolation, and of a willingness given, or to be given, to the baptized, to receive whatever may be assigned them as their portion." Here surely is a discovery. Here is edification unknown to all former ages. Had the ancients perceived this in the import



of *sprinkling* or *pouring*, there would have been no need of the honey and milk at baptism. Mr. Ewing can obtain the same thing from the manner of putting the water on the face. Mr. Ewing considers the *drinking* of part of the water poured on the turned up face, as an emblem. If so, then this drinking is essential to true baptism; and if any baptized person happen not to receive a part of the water into the mouth, he is not properly baptized. He wants something that belongs to the ordinance. If this is the case, a very great number are not truly baptized. Nay, it is not only essential to receive some of the baptismal water into the mouth, but it is necessary to drink it. If the child by suffocation makes an involuntary effort to throw out the water, it is unbaptized. I think the probability is, that not one of a thousand actually drink any part of the water. I am convinced also, that very many who baptize by pouring water on the face, so far from being aware of the virtue of drinking a part of the element, endeavour to avoid giving pain to the child by pouring the water into the mouth. If this is a part of the emblem of baptism, the nature of the ordinance is yet unknown to the great body of those who practise infant baptism, and the bulk of those called Christians are unbaptized.

But this *drinking* is not only an emblem, it is an emblem pregnant with mysteries. An emblem of a principle of new life—of continual support and refreshment—of a source of spiritual and heavenly consolation—of a willingness given—aye, and of a willingness to be given, &c. What a striking emblem of this willingness, is a child screaming and coughing to eject the water that falls into its mouth? With what a keen appetite does its thirsty soul drink down this agreeable beverage! What pity that the apostles were ignorant of all these mysteries in baptism! What pity that Mr. Ewing's book was not written till the nineteenth century!—Ah, shame! Can it be possible that the minister of an independent Church, should indulge his fancy in finding myste-

ries in an ordinance of Christ, which are no where explained by the apostles as included in it ! Where is the passage of Scripture that explains baptism as containing these mysteries ? Where is this drinking found ? The very foundation of these mysteries is not once mentioned in the word of God. Where is the turned up face ? For any thing that the Scriptures contain on the subject, it might as well be the turned up foot. Another might find mysteries in the foot, as well as Mr. Ewing has found them in the face.

Mr. Ewing, however, says, "We are led to this conception of baptism, by various passages of Scripture which it will be found to explain." But to justify such an explanation, it is not enough that it will illustrate various passages of Scripture. Some passage of Scripture must explain the ordinance in this sense. There is no rite of superstition that might not, by a wild imagination, be alleged to illustrate some passage of Scripture.

We are not yet at the end of the mysteries in the mode of baptism. "The cup," says Mr. Ewing, "which I refer to, is the כּ, the cup of nature, that is, the hollow of the human hand." Though the word of God says nothing at all about the hand in the administration of this ordinance, Mr. Ewing finds it under the designation of a cup. He gives us the full process in the following words : "From this cup, the baptizer so pours it out on the baptized, that it shall run down his face, as the ointment did from the head of Aaron, and even to the skirts, rather to the upper border or collar, of his garment, Ps. cxxxiii. 2." Not only, then, must some of the water be received into the mouth, some of it must also run down on the garments. What nice adjustment is necessary, in the position of the person to be baptized, that all these mysteries may be accomplished ? Would it not be an improvement if a little oil was added to the ceremony ?

Mr. Ewing next proceeds to caution against taking offence at the simplicity of oriental manners, and to just-

ify, by examples, this drinking out of the cup of nature. But all this is unnecessary. Could Mr. Ewing show from Scripture that we are to drink water out of the hollow of the baptizer's hand, we would submit without a murmur. He himself might have a lesson from his own admonition. It is very applicable to his objections to immersion. But because it was customary to drink out of the hollow of the hand, does it follow that baptism must be such a drinking? There is no connexion between the premises and the conclusion.

Let us not, however, be too rash in asserting that Mr. Ewing has no Scripture for his mysteries. He alleges several passages. Was ever the Church of Rome at a loss for Scripture allusions to countenance its rites and mysteries? In no instance is it less successful than Mr. Ewing. He alleges 1 Cor. xii. 13, "baptized into one body;" and "made to drink into one Spirit." But does this imply that *baptizing* and *drinking* are the same emblem? Does it imply that these two figures are taken from a process in baptism? What reason is there to suppose that the last respects that ordinance? The two figures are totally unconnected,—as unconnected as any two figures that in conjunction are applied to the same object. That the last has a reference to drinking in baptism, is as arbitrary a conceit as any thing in the mysteries of popery.

Mr. Ewing adds, "There is perhaps a more intimate connexion between a 'cup' and a 'baptism,' as belonging to *one* allusion, than some readers of Scripture have as yet remarked. Mat. xx. 22," &c. These figures both respect *one* object, but they have not, as Mr. Ewing asserts, *one allusion*. They are figures as independent and as distinct, as if one of them was found in Genesis, and the other in Revelations. One of them represents the sufferings of Christ as a cup of bitterness or poison, which he must drink; the other represents the same sufferings as an immersion in water. When the Psalmist says, "the Lord God is a

*sun and shield,*" is there one allusion in the two figures? Both the figures represent the same object, but they have a separate and altogether independent allusion. The *sun* is one emblem, a *shield* is another. In like manner, when the Psalmist says, "we went through *fire* and through *water*," have the *fire* and the *water* one allusion? This criticism is founded on a total misconception of the nature of figurative language.

Again, if the *drinking of the cup* and the *baptism* have one allusion, that is, if they both allude to the ordinance of baptism, why are both expressions used? Is not this the same as to say, *are you able to suffer as I suffer, and to be baptized with my baptism?* It gives not two illustrations of the same thing, but merely two names. If drinking the cup is baptism, then there are not two figures. We might as well say, the *son of Philip king of Macedon, and Alexander the Great*. But if the *drinking of the cup* and the *baptism*, conjointly, represent the same object, each exhibiting a part, then it follows that the *baptism* is not *baptism*, but is part of baptism, which is completed by the drinking. Besides, this view places the last part of the figure first; the *drinking* is before the *pouring out of the cup*.

It may be remarked, also, that if sufferings are represented as the drinking of a cup, in allusion to the cup of nature in baptism, then the ordinance of baptism represents *sufferings* as well as *blessings*. The drinking in baptism represents not only the reception of the Spirit, but the suffering of afflictions. The figure of drinking a cup, is equally calculated to represent either. But both cannot be contained in the same cup. Afflictions might be represented by the drinking of a cup, but not by the cup of Christian baptism, which represents the blessings of the gospel.

The expression, "I have a *baptism* to be baptized with; and how am I straitened till it be finished," Luke xii. 50, Mr. Ewing explains thus: "I have a

cup to drink of, and how am I straitened until it be finished." But it is utterly without authority to say, that *baptism* is a *cup*. This is a new meaning given to the word, with as little foundation as to say that *baptism* is a *sword*. Mr. Ewing refers to Matth. xxvi. 39, for support to this explanation. But this gives him not a shadow of countenance. The cup there spoken of, refers indeed to the sufferings of Christ, but the cup is not called a baptism. These figures respect the same thing, but they do not respect the same likeness. What a wild idea, to suppose that two independent metaphors cannot in conjunction illustrate the same object! A hero is a *lion*, is a *tower*, is a *rock*, is a thousand things; without supposing any identity or relation between the lion, and the tower, and the rock, and the thousand things that represent him. It is really sickening to dissect such criticism. Proofs and illustrations are brought forward and exhibited with an importance that intimates them quite decisive, which have not the most distant bearing on the point in hand. The passages in which the sufferings of Christ are spoken of, under the figure of *drinking a cup*, are all mustered and paraded, as if the fact that this phrase refers to the same thing with the figurative baptism of Christ, is proof that they are the same figure, or must both refer to baptism. What would we think of the critic who should argue that the phrase *sun* and *shield*, in the eighty-fourth Psalm, is one allusion, because they both refer to God? This is the very criticism of Mr. Ewing.

Mr. Ewing very justly observes, that in the Old Testament, the punishment of the wicked by God is represented by their being *compelled* to drink a cup. But, surely, there can be nothing corresponding to this in *baptism*. We are not compelled to drink a cup of poison, when we drink of the influences of the Holy Spirit.

"This simplicity, and this littleness of the sign," says Mr. Ewing, "mark its resemblance to all the

other symbolical ordinances of God, and distinguish it from those clumsy and unseemly additions, which a superstitious dependence on means, or rather on the show of wisdom in will-worship, has rendered men so prone to adopt." If any man adopts immersion from a dependence on means, or as an invention of will-worship, I will give him up to Mr. Ewing's most indignant reprobation. It is the commandment of God I am searching after; and if I find this, I will never use any reasoning to make the sign either less or greater than it is. "I have as little faith," continues Mr. Ewing, "in the compromise of *copious* pouring, as in the enormity of immersion baptism." But according to some of the precedents alleged by the author himself, he is not at liberty to have little faith in copious pouring. Even granting that the Pentecost baptism was pouring, it was an immensely, it was an *enormously copious* pouring. It was a pouring that filled the whole house. It is Mr. Ewing's business to reconcile this precedent with his *popping*. But Mr. Ewing gives us reasons—Scripture reasons, for his having little faith in *copious* pouring. "A small quantity of blood sprinkled once a year," says he, "by the high priest, with one of his fingers, on a little gold plated seat, was, for ages, the sign to Israël, of the acceptance in heaven of the sacrifice of Christ for the whole church." Very true, because a small quantity was sufficient to perfect the figure. A small quantity of water cannot suffice for the exhibition of the likeness of a burial and resurrection, which are declared by God to be the import of baptism. Had God commanded to sprinkle with a few drops of water, or to pour a little water on the turned up face, for a purpose that such an emblem is calculated to serve, it would have been impious to change this into another ordinance to represent a burial and resurrection. A little blood served the priest for sprinkling; but a little water did not serve him for his bathing. A "little gold plated seat" served

to receive the sprinkling of the blood ; but a little water did not serve to fill the brazen sea. "A small morsel of bread, and a sip of wine," &c. No doubt of it ; but this small quantity is as fit to represent the thing figured, as a baker's shop and a wine cellar would be. "The handful of water," says Mr. Ewing, "on the face of the polluted sinner, confirms the good news of the washing of regeneration," &c. If *washing only* were intended to be represented, this would be true ; but the Spirit of Inspiration has declared, that this ordinance represents the burial and resurrection of Christ, and our fellowship with him in these, by faith in which we are washed. Had not God instituted immersion, and explained its meaning, man could not do either. I disclaim all ordinances of will-worship, and all human explanations of Scripture ordinances. God only can institute. God only can interpret. If Mr. Ewing claims the right of inventing mysteries in the signification of baptism, I believe he will not find a fellow among those on the other side of the question.

The passage of the children of Israel through the Red Sea is figuratively called a baptism, from its external resemblance to that ordinance, and from being appointed to serve a like purpose, as well as to figure the same thing. "Moreover, brethren, I would not that ye should be ignorant, how that all our fathers were under the cloud, and all passed through the sea ; and were all baptized unto Moses in the cloud and in the sea," 1 Cor. x. 1. Here they are said to have been baptized. There can be no doubt, therefore, that there is in their passage through the sea, something that resembles both the external form, and the purpose of Christian Baptism. It was a real *immersion*—the sea stood on each side, and the cloud covered them. But it was not a literal *immersion in water*, in the same way as Christian baptism. It is, therefore, figuratively called by the name of the Christian ordinance, because of external similarity, and because of

serving the like purpose, as well as figuring the same event. The going down of the Israelites into the sea, their being covered by the cloud, and their issuing out on the other side, resembles the baptism of believers, served a like purpose as attesting their faith in Moses as a temporal saviour, and figured the burial and resurrection of Christ and Christians, as well as Christian baptism. If Christian baptism is a representation of burial and resurrection,—and if the passage of the Israelites is called a baptism, we are warranted in supposing that both have the same figurative meaning. It has been argued by some, that the Israelites were baptized by the rain from the cloud, and the spray from the sea. But this is quite arbitrary: for there is nothing said about rain from the cloud, or spray from the sea. It is not in evidence that any such things existed. On the contrary, as they would have been an annoyance, there is reason to believe that they did not exist. The baptism of the Israelites in ver. 2, is evidently referred to their having been under the cloud, and having passed through the sea, as stated in the first verse.

Dr. Wardlaw asks in astonishment, “Are our brethren not sensible of the straining that is necessary to make out immersion baptism here?” Not in the least sensible of any straining, I can assure Dr. Wardlaw. But we do not strain to make out a literal baptism, as respects an ordinance to be performed as an appointment of God. Surely there is no straining, to see in this fact something that may darkly shadow a burial. There is no straining to find in it something corresponding to Christian baptism, though in all things it does not identify with it. However ridiculous<sup>1</sup> this *conceit* may appear to Dr. Wardlaw, it is the very thing asserted by the Holy Ghost. The Israelites by being *under* the cloud, and passing through the sea, were baptized into Moses. By venturing to enter into the sea, they professed and exhibited full confidence in



Moses as sent of God to lead them out of Egypt to Canaan.

"A dry baptism!" exclaims Dr. Wardlaw. Be patient, Dr. Wardlaw, was not the Pentecost baptism a dry baptism? Christian baptism is not a dry baptism, but the baptism of Pentecost, and of the Israelites in the Red Sea, were dry baptisms. Immersion does not necessarily imply wetting: immersion in water implies this. "Would our brethren," says Dr. Wardlaw, "consider a man duly baptized by his being placed between two cisterns of water, with a third over his head?" Certainly not. Nothing is Christian baptism—but the immersion of a believer in water, in obedience to the command of Jesus. Every thing that can be called *immersion* is not *baptism* as an ordinance of Christ. Strange, indeed, that Dr. Wardlaw should suppose that every thing is Christian baptism, which can be denominated an immersion. To be spotted with blood is a *sprinkling*; would Dr. Wardlaw consider this true Christian baptism? In an ordinance of Christ there is something more than mode. Would Dr. Wardlaw consider a man duly baptized, when he is sprinkled with rain, or wet with dew? The Spirit of God calls the passage through the Red Sea a baptism; a likeness then it must have to the Christian ordinance of baptism, to which there is an undoubted reference. Surely it requires less straining to find this likeness from the facts stated, than from fancies supposed. The passage through the sea as much resembles baptism, as the manna does the bread in the Lord's supper. They are figures of the same thing, and therefore, though different, are similar.

Having examined the testimony of the figurative applications of the word βαπτίζω, I shall now try what light can be obtained from its syntax, and the circumstances in which it is found. Matt. iii. 11. βαπτίζω υμᾶς ἐν ὕδατι. "I baptize you in water." It may be

surprising that, after all that has been said on the subject, I should still lay any stress on the preposition *ev*, *in*. I may be asked, Do you deny that it may be translated *with*? I do not deny this, yet I am still disposed to lay stress on it. A word may be used variously, yet be in each of its applications capable of being definitely ascertained. Were not this the case, language would be incapable of conveying definite meaning. To ascertain its meaning here, I shall submit the following observations :

1. *In* is its primary and most usual signification. Even in the instances in which it is translated otherwise, it may generally be reduced to its primary meaning, although it is more usual with our idiom to employ other prepositions. There are instances, indeed, in which we cannot trace the primary idea. This, however, is nothing but what happens with our own preposition *in*, and with all prepositions. If the Greeks say, *ev*  $\chi\epsilon\iota\rho\iota\ \iota\sigma\chi\upsilon\epsilon\alpha$ , we say, *they went out in arms*. *Ev* is so obviously the parent of *in*, that Mr. Ewing says, that "it can hardly be called a translation." He considers it merely a change of alphabet. It may be true, that this was the case in the formation of the derived word, but it certainly is a translation in as full a sense as any one word is a translation of another. It is not like *baptize*, which was not a word of our language. *In* is an English word, as truly as *ev* is a Greek one. It is given as an equivalent to *ev*, not because it was formed from it, but because in meaning it coincides with it. We adopted the word and its meaning also.

2. As the instances in the acceptance of this preposition in which the primary idea cannot be traced are extremely few, so it cannot be admitted in a signification inconsistent with this idea, except when necessity demands it. If the words in connexion admit the primary and usual meaning, it is unwarrantable to look for another. Such a use would render the passage inextricably equivocal. The passages in which it is translated *with*, are without exception of this cast.

They would not make sense in our idiom, if *sv* were translated *in*. Without such a necessity, no translator would ever think of rendering *sv* by *with*. What is more usual than to find, when *sv* is translated *among*, &c. critics explaining it as being "*literally in*." Now, in the instance alluded to, all the words in connexion admit the primary and usual meaning of *sv*. Even the most extravagant of our opponents admit that βαρτιζω signifies to *dip*. If then the word also signifies to *pour*, to use *sv* in connexion with it, would render it altogether equivocal. We could not from the passage determine its meaning. I contend, then, that though *sv* may sometimes be translated *with*, yet it cannot be so used here. For if βαρτιζω is allowed to denote *dip*, and not *pour*, *with* is rejected as incongruous : if βαρτιζω is supposed to signify either *dip* or *pour*, then to use a preposition after it, which usually signifies *in*, but here in the sense of *with*, which is rare, would inevitably be equivocal, or would rather lead to a false meaning. It is absurd to suppose, that such an equivocal expression could be used with respect to the performance of a divine ordinance, which is to be a precedent for all ages.

3. I have produced innumerable examples in which *sv* is construed with this verb incontestably in the sense of *dipping*. If then we have found the disputed phrase in a situation in which our opponents must admit our meaning of it ; if the examples of this meaning of the phrase are numerous ; and if no example can be produced in which the phrase is used in a situation in which we must confess that it refers to *pouring*, or any other thing but *dipping*,—all the laws of language forbid the supposition of *pouring*. What can forbid the phrase to have its usual meaning ? What can authorise a meaning which the phrase has not necessarily in any other passage ?

4. Even Mr. Ewing's translation of βαρτιζω will not construe with *sv* in the sense of *with*. He would not say, *I pop you with water*, but *I pop upon*

*you with water.* Now, there is no *upon* in the verb. Mr. Ewing, indeed, supposes himself at liberty to vary his word *pop* by any preposition he chooses to subjoin to it. But he cannot do so without something in the original to justify the variation. I have shown that *to pop*, *to pop upon*, *to pop into*, &c. are all different words. To consider them all as contained in βαπτίζω and in *pop*, is to say that a *half-penny* is a *guinea*, because in a guinea there is a portion of copper—or that *copper* is *brass*, because brass contains copper as a part of its composition.

5. Any translation that can be given of *σν* is inconsistent with the supposition that βαπτίζω signifies *to pour*. We could not say, “I *pour* you with water.” *Pour* must be immediately followed by the thing *poured*, and not with the person on whom any thing is *poured*. It is not *I pour you with water*, but *I pour water upon you*. The syntax then of the word, as well as its acceptation, forbids *pouring* as the mode of baptism.

What I have further to observe on this passage, will occur in my remarks on Mr. Ewing’s attack on Dr. Campbell’s note.

In admitting that *σν* may sometimes signify *with*, Dr. Campbell appears to ground the fact on a Hebraism. In this sense Mr. Ewing understands him; in which he coincides. “That the phraseology to which the Doctor refers,” says Mr. Ewing, “does not restrict the sense to *in*, but absolutely recommends the sense of *with*, appears from the occasional omission of the preposition, (the use of it in such phrases being entirely a Hebraism, corresponding with the Hebrew *ב*, which, as the Doctor owns, signified *with* as well as *in*.” Now, in opposition both to Dr. Campbell and Mr. Ewing, I maintain that *σν* in this use is not a Hebraism, either in its meaning, or use. It signifies *with* in classical Greek, as well as in the Septuagint or New Testament; and just in the same circumstances. It is also as frequently used with this verb in the hea-

then authors, as in the Scriptures. To convince any one of this, it is necessary only to look over the examples which I have produced, both with respect to *παρ* and *παριζω*, which perfectly coincide in their syntax. Was Hippocrates a Hellenistic Jew?

Indeed, to enlarge the meaning of a Greek preposition, that it may correspond with a Hebrew preposition, is a thing, which, though the conceit has been sanctioned by Dr. Campbell, and many great names, is a pure absurdity. To do so, would not be to speak the Greek language. To do so, would be to mislead all the Greek nations. There is not one instance in which such a thing is done in the word of God. If the apostles used the Greek prepositions, not as the Greeks themselves used them, but as the Hebrews used theirs, they have not given a revelation of the will of God. This view of the Hebraism of the New Testament is one of the worst things in Dr. Campbell's translation; and it is evidently employed to hide or destroy the Sovereignty of God. Whatever may be the extent of the Hebraisms of the New Testament, they cannot, consistently with the honour of revelation, be supposed to affect the sense. This supposition is the resource of those who wish to corrupt the gospel of Christ, or, in some way, to modify a disagreeable doctrine.

Equally groundless, and even equally absurd, is Mr. Ewing's assertion, that the fact that the preposition is sometimes omitted, recommends the sense of *with*. If that preposition is sometimes written, and sometimes left out, it is as clear as an axiom, that the passages in which it is admitted, must agree with the passages in which it is written, and must be translated just as if it were present. The meaning of the passages, then, in which it is omitted, must be determined by those in which it is written. When it is not expressed it must be understood. Such an omission, then, can cast no light on the subject.

Mr. Ewing alleges, that "our English translators,

at least, being friends of immersion, would have been led by their system, to have patronized the Doctor's translation." But this is a fallacious argument. It is true, as Mr. Ewing says, that on this question our translators were "directly opposed" to him. But what sort of friends were they to *immersion*? Just such as Professor Porson, and the thousands of learned men who have the candour to confess the truth, though, as they think the matter of little importance, they practise the contrary. There was then no temptation to induce them to testify for immersion. There was the strongest temptation to induce them to accommodate their translation to the practice of their church, not to their views of the original mode of baptism. Dr. Wall was so far a friend of immersion, that he would have preferred it; yet how has he laboured to prove that it is not necessary! Mr. Ewing's strictures, then, on Dr. R's friend, have no weight, for they view the subject in a false light. The authority of our translators in our favour, is the authority not of friends, but of practical opposers; and, as Dr. Campbell has shown, real opposers, in every case that could, in their judgment, admit pouring or sprinkling.

Dr. Campbell had censured our translators as inconsistent in rendering *ἐν ὕδατι* "with water," while they rendered *ἐν τῷ Ἰορδάνῃ* "in Jordan." How does Mr. Ewing vindicate them from inconsistency? Why? by alleging that the former refers to the ACT and ELEMENTS of Baptism, and the latter to the PLACE. Now, this might vindicate Mr. Ewing, but it does not vindicate our translators. Mr. Ewing forgets that the conceit that *Ἰορδάνη* is not the river, but the district in the neighbourhood of the river, is of his own invention. Our translators evidently understood it of the river itself, as every sober reader must do. Our translators, then, remain under Dr. Campbell's censure, for any thing that Mr. Ewing has done to relieve them.

But let us see if he can justify himself in this business. I admit that "a difference of connexion" will

justify us in "understanding the same word in a different sense." But I see no difference of connexion here. On the contrary the word *Jordan*, in the sixth verse, as evidently means the river *Jordan*, as *water* in the eleventh verse means *water*. The *Jordan* never signifies, as Mr. Ewing supposes, *the plain of Jordan*, the *valley of Jordan*, or *Jordan-dale*. This is a figment formed for a particular purpose. Can Mr. Ewing justify this explanation by a single corresponding example, in which a similar phrase must be so understood? Were we to read in the newspapers, that certain persons in Glasgow were *baptized in the Clyde*, would we understand that it imported merely that they were baptized in Clydesdale? This is a daring perversion of the words of the Holy Spirit. It requires a hardihood that every man does not possess. An Arian or a Socinian does not require more. No Neological gloss is more extravagant. The Spirit of God tells us that our Lord did many miracles; the Neologist forces him to say that there was nothing miraculous in the Saviour's works. The Spirit of God tells us that the people of Israel were baptized by John *in the Jordan*; Mr. Ewing forces him to say that it was not in *Jordan*, but in *Jordan-dale*. What a system is it that compels its abettors to take such liberties with the word of God! I view such conduct, not only with disapprobation, but with horror.

But Mr. Ewing says that an Evangelist explains the thing in his sense. This is high authority indeed. I will ask no better. If this is made good, I will bow with submission. "That it was not the *water* of the river, but the *country* on its banks, is evident from the fuller and more particular account of the apostle John. What Matthew calls *ἐν Ἰορδάνῃ*, *in Jordan*, John calls *ἐν Βεθαβάρᾳ*, and expressly says, it was *πέραν τοῦ Ἰορδάνου*, beyond *Jordan*."

I admit the premises; I deny the conclusion. Let the two Evangelists refer to the same thing, yet what the one calls *Jordan*, the other does not call *Betha-*

bara. Matthew speaks of the *river* in which John was baptizing; John of the *town* in which he was baptizing. John is more particular as to the part of the river in which the Baptist was baptizing; it was in the town of Bethabara. Matthew is more particular with respect to the water in which he was baptizing; it was the Jordan. Corresponding to this, with respect to the same person, one writer might say, "He was baptizing in the Clyde;" another, "he was baptizing in Glasgow." Mr. Ewing himself, in asserting that John's account of this matter is more particular than that of Matthew, virtually admits that it is not necessary that Jordan should be perfectly equivalent to Bethabara; for if one account may be more particular than another, Bethabara may express the place or part of the river, while Jordan expresses the water in which John baptized.

Let it, however, be supposed that the expression of the one Evangelist exactly corresponds to that of the other—what follows? As *Jordan* signifies Jordan-dale, so *Bethabara* must not denote the town, but the whole district supposed to be called Jordan-dale. According to Mr. Ewing himself, these two words do not correspond. He makes the one to denote the whole country, the other, one town situated in the country.

Still it may be said, if the two accounts refer to the same thing, as John is said to be baptizing in Bethabara, and as this town was beyond Jordan, so he could not be baptizing in the river, which was on one side of the town. Mr. Ewing will let us come to the margin of the stream, but the phrase, he says, will not carry us "one jot further." This is hard enough. I will try to advance a little into the river. This I am enabled to do with the sanction of the usual phraseology in similar cases. The limits of a town, in speaking in a general way, are not confined to the ground occupied by the houses. Suppose, for instance, that a man is charged with having commit-



ted a breach of the peace, on a certain day of the month in Glasgow. In proving an *alibi*, he alleges that he was on that day in the town of Belfast. Opposite counsel cries out, "My Lords, and gentlemen of the jury, he is a perjured rascal, for I can prove that he was the whole of that day in a ship in *Belfast harbour*. He never once entered the town that day." What will the judge and jury think of such a mode of proof? Surely he was in Belfast when he was in the port of Belfast. And is it not the same thing with the town and port of Bethabara? When Mr. Ewing changes his views on this subject, and comes over to Belfast to baptize his brethren in that town, it will be asked by some of the people of Glasgow, Where is Mr. Ewing? The reply will be, "He is in Belfast, baptizing the Independent Church of that town." This reply will be made without any reference to the situation of the water. Might it not also be said, that the people of Glasgow go down to Gourock or Helensburgh to bathe? Yet the place of bathing is in the sea. Might it not also be said, that such a person was drowned in Port-Glasgow while he was bathing in the Clyde? In like manner, it might have been added to John's account that the Baptist was baptizing in Jordan. *John was baptizing in Bethabara in the Jordan*. Now, Mr. Ewing, say candidly, am I not now entitled to step a little distance from the margin into the river? Have I not demolished this stronghold?

But I have many other resources, had it been necessary to employ them on this point. A small bend in the river, or hollow in the bed on one side, might have formed a basin, so that houses might actually have been nearer to the centre of the river, than some parts of the basin. A bare possibility is all that is necessary to obviate a difficulty. But sober criticism could never dwell on such things. The common forms of speech utterly condemn such a mode of opposition. Indeed, the houses do not generally extend to the margin of the sea or river. If a town was li-

mitted by the houses, the quay itself would often be no part of it. The harbour has as good a title to be included in the town as the quay.

But there is another awkward situation in which our view, it seems, places John the Baptist, out of which I must endeavour to deliver him. Mr. Ewing asserts, that if John the Baptist baptized in Bethabara, standing in the water of the river, then he must have been in that situation when he bore his testimony to the priests and Levites. Now, it is a hard thing to keep the Baptist in the water during this discourse. I will endeavour, then, to put him on dry ground. The argument is, that in John i. 23, all the things previously mentioned, are said to have been done *in Bethabara, when John was baptizing*. Therefore, if he was standing in the water when he spoke to the priests, all the things are said to be done in the same place. The answer is, all the things were indeed done in the same place, that is, in Bethabara, but this does not imply that they were done in the same part of Bethabara. When Mr. Ewing comes to baptize his brethren in Belfast, it is likely he may have a fierce encounter with the Arians. The Glasgow Newspapers will say, "these things happened in Belfast, when Mr. Ewing was baptizing." Will the people of Glasgow understand that the engagement with the Arians was when Mr. Ewing was actually baptizing? Ah! Mr. Ewing, what shall I call such a mode of opposing immersion? Shall I call it childish? Or shall I call it perverse? Were it in reality asserted, that John gave his testimony to the priests while he was baptizing, I would implicitly believe it. The thing is not impossible. There is not, however, the smallest appearance of such an assertion.

That Jordan denotes the river, and not the country in the neighbourhood of Jordan, is not only obvious from the word of God, it is expressly asserted to be the river by Mark i. 5, where the word river is joined to it. "And there went out unto him all the land of

Judea, and they of Jerusalem, and were all baptized of him in the river of Jordan, confessing their sins" Nothing can limit the word more clearly than this, *ἐν τῷ Ἰορδάνῃ ποταμῷ, in the river Jordan*. As if the Holy Spirit had anticipated Mr. Ewing's perversion of the word Jordan, by converting it, without any authority, into Jordan-dale, the word ποταμῷ is added to it by Mark. Mr. Ewing, indeed, says, that if John i. 28. Matth. iii. 6—13. John x. 40, are considered, they will explain Mark i. 5, in his sense. But I hope I have shown that these passages have no bearing on the point. It would be a strange explanation that would explain the *river Jordan* not to be the *river Jordan*, but something else. This would be a Neological explanation. There is in the passage under consideration, other evidence that baptism was performed by immersion. It is said that Jesus, when he was baptized, went *up* straightway *from* the water. I admit the proper translation of ἀπὸ *is from* and not *out of*; and that the argument from the former is not of the same nature with that which is founded on *ex out of*. I perfectly agree with Mr. Ewing, that ἀπὸ would have its meaning fully verified, if they had only gone down to the edge of the water. I shall not take a jot more from a passage than it contains. The Bible is orthodox enough for me as it is. How then can I deduce *dipping* from the phrases *going down*, and *coming up from*? My argument is this. If baptism had not been by immersion, there can be no adequate cause alleged for going to the river. Can sober judgment, can candour suppose, that if a handful of water would have sufficed for baptism, they would have gone to the river? Many evasions have been alleged to get rid of this argument, but it never will be fairly answered. I have strong suspicions that these evasions are scarcely satisfactory, even to those who make them. I am much mistaken if they are not perplexed with the circumstance of John the Baptist's great predilection for the neighbourhood of Jordan, and other

places, where the water is the very reason assigned for the preference. There is no spot on the earth in which a human being can be found, that without any inconvenience will not afford a handful of water. Even in a besieged town, with a scarcity of water, what would sprinkle the whole inhabitants would not be felt as a sensible loss.

Mr. Ewing attempts to account for the above phraseology, by the fact that fountains and rivers are generally in hollow places. This, indeed, accounts for the phraseology, but does it account for this fact? Whether the river was in a hill or in a valley, why did they go to it, when a handful of water would have sufficed? Mr. Ewing himself says, "I believe, indeed, that John frequented the banks of the Jordan, as the most convenient place of the wilderness, not only for multitudes to attend him, but also for having water at hand with which to baptize them." But was there any place in Judea in which he could not find a supply of water for *popping* or *sprinkling*? The greatest crowd that ever assembled might be *popped* at a small fountain. Besides, however many the persons were who went to his baptism, there is no foundation to suppose that immense crowds were always with him. The account itself does not imply that there ever was at any time an immense crowd. All Judea and Jerusalem are said to be baptized by him; but they are not said to have been with him at once, or even in crowds at any one time. Why should they be supposed to have staid with him any considerable time?

But our argument from this passage is not only that they frequented the banks of Jordan; but that, being there for the performance of baptism, they went down to the water. Now, if an army encamped on Glasgow Green in a time of war, were all to be baptized by *popping*, would they bring the water from the river, or would they all go to the very edge of the water? Why did Jesus go down to the water, when the water

might as well have been brought up to him? Does Mr. Ewing take the infants to the edge of the Clyde when he is *popping* them? This answer, then, is but an evasion. No reason has ever been given, or ever will be given, to account for this fact, on the hypothesis of baptizing with a handful of water.

Mr. Ewing observes that this phraseology is confined to baptisms out of doors. Very true, but in Mr. Ewing's baptism, why were there any baptisms out of doors? If they are *popped upon* with a handful of water, any number might successively be *popped* in the same house with equal convenience as out of doors. When a conveniency for baptism was found within doors, there was no recourse to a river; and then there could be no *going down* nor *coming up*. When a person was baptized in a bath, the baptizer was not in the water at all.

Mr. Ewing says, "Rebekah went down to the well—and came up." "Does this imply that she immersed herself? No. She went down to the well, and filled her pitcher, and came up." Very true. But are the cases parallel? Do they not differ in the very point in which it is essential for Mr. Ewing's argument that they should agree? This illustration favours us, and refutes Mr. Ewing himself. If Rebekah went down to the well, she had a good errand to the well—an errand that is not left to be supplied by conjecture, but is expressly specified, namely, to fill her pitcher. Can Mr. Ewing show such an errand in going to the edge of the river *for popping*? Even the idiot that followed the Armagh coach to Dublin, to see if the great wheels would overtake the little ones, had an errand. But if popping is baptism, there could be no errand to the river for the performance of the ordinance. "Gideon," says Mr. Ewing, "brought down the people unto the water." "Was it to immerse them. No; it was to give them an opportunity of drinking." And could there be a better refutation of Mr. Ewing than what he gives himself? Gideon

did not lead the people to the river for no purpose. The object is expressed. Let us have such a reason for John's baptizing at Jordan, and it will suffice us. Mr. Ewing entirely mistakes the gist of this argument. I observe also, that Mat. iii. 6. Mark i. 5, cannot admit *pouring* as the sense of βαπτίζω. Ἐβαπτίσαντο ἐν τῷ Ἰορδάνῃ cannot be rendered *they were poured in Jordan*, nor *with Jordan*, nor *in Jordan-dale*. The water is poured, not the people. If the clumsy expression *poured upon* could be admitted, it is not to be found. The *upon* is wanting. *The people were poured upon in Jordan-dale*, would be a very awkward expression. Yet shabby as such an auxiliary would be, even that is not to be found.

Let us next examine the baptism of the eunuch, Acts viii. 36. "And as they went on their way, they came to a certain water : and the eunuch said, See, here is water ; what doth hinder me to be baptized ? And Philip said, If thou believest with all thine heart, thou mayest. And he answered and said, I believe that Jesus Christ is the Son of God. And he commanded the chariot to stand still : and they went down both into the water, both Philip and the eunuch ; and he baptized him. And when they were come up out of the water, the Spirit of the Lord caught away Philip," &c. This is as correct and as literal a translation of the words as can possibly be made ; and surely it is so plain that the most illiterate man can be at no loss to discover from it the mind of the Lord on the subject. I have written some hundred pages on the mode of this ordinance, yet to a mind thirsting to know the will of God, and uninfluenced by prejudice, this passage without comment, is in my view amply sufficient. The man who can read it, and not see *immersion* in it, must have something in his mind unfavourable to the investigation of truth. As long as I fear God, I cannot, for all the kingdoms of the world, resist the evidence of this single document. Nay, had I no conscience, I could not as a scholar at-

tempt to expel *immersion* from this account. All the ingenuity of all the critics in Europe could not silence the evidence of this passage. Amidst the most violent perversion that it can sustain [on the rack, it will still cry out, *immersion, immersion!*

Philip, in preaching, had shown that believers were to be baptized immediately, yet the eunuch never speaks of being baptized till he came to water. Now, this implies immersion. Had a handful of water been sufficient, this might have been found in any place. Had it been even a desert without water, there can be no doubt that the eunuch would have a supply of water with him.

When they came to the water, instead of sending down one of the retinue to bring up a little water, they went down to the water. Mr. Ewing supposes that our argument is founded on the mere *going down* and *coming up*. But it is upon the circumstance that no reason can be given for the *going down*, but the *immersion*. What would take them to the water, when the water could be more conveniently brought to them?

But they not only went down to the water; they went *into* the water. What would take them *into* the water, if a handful of water would suffice?

Let it be observed, also, that there is something very peculiar in the account of their going into the water. It is not only said, "*they went into the water;*" our attention is fixed on the fact that they *both* went into the water. This, we might think, would suffice. Yet the Holy Spirit marks the circumstance still more precisely. He adds, *both Philip and the eunuch*. Can any one imagine that such a precision, such an apparent redundancy of expression, is not designed to teach something that the Spirit of Inspiration foresaw would be denied? Had the water been deep enough at the edge, the eunuch only might have been in the water. But in this case, both the baptizer and the baptized went *into* the water. Now, this determines that the preposition *si* must be rendered *into*, and not *unto*, as

Mr. Ewing would have it. Had the account related merely to the going down to the edge of the water, there would be no use in saying that they went both down. Could it be necessary to inform us that Philip, the baptizer, went to the place of baptism as well as the person to be baptized? What would take the one down without the other? There is good reason, however, to inform us that *they both went into* the water; because, in certain circumstances, it would have been necessary only for one of them to be in the water; and the relation of the fact, takes away the ground of perversion.

It is not only said that they went into the water, but their return is called a coming up *out of* the water. They could not come *out of* the water, if they had not been *in* it. This is more precise than the account of our Lord's baptism. There it is said that he came up *from* the water. Here it is *out of* the water.

Let us now see how Mr. Ewing attempts to evade the evidence of this passage. Let my readers put their invention to work, and try what they can think of to darken this evidence. Mr. Ewing, I engage, will go beyond them. His ingenuity is unparalleled. He destroys our doctrine even by demonstration. Demonstration? Aye, demonstration. Jesus is said, Matth. iii. 16. to have gone up *from* the water, not *out of* the water, as our version renders it. "Now," says Mr. Ewing, "it surely will not be said that Philip had any occasion to go farther with the Ethiopian nobleman than John did with our Saviour, in order to the administration of baptism. It is reasonable, then, to understand the *sic* and the *ex* of Acts viii. 38, 39, as signifying precisely what is indicated by the *apo* of Matth. iii. 16." Now, is not this demonstration? I may as well think to pierce the divine shield of Achilles as this argument. But I will strike. Truth is stronger than sophistry. The helmet of Goliath could not resist the pebble from a sling. I deny the first principle on which this argument is founded. It is taken for



granted that *απο* can reach no further than the edge of the water. Now, while I admit that this is all that is necessarily imported in this preposition, I contend that it can apply to the centre of the water, or even the farther edge of the water, as well as the edge on this side. *Απο* signifies the point of departure from an object, but that point may be in any part of the object to which there is access. Whether the point of departure be the edge or the centre, or the nearer or the farther edge, depends not on the word, but on the circumstances, or other information. If the point of departure be an impenetrable object, it must be from the edge; but if the object be penetrable, the departure may be from any part in it. If a fowl on the opposite side of the river, or in the middle of it, takes wing, and, flying across, alights on the hill, we say, *it flew from the river*, just the same as if it had commenced its flight on this side. This is the distinction between *απο* and *εκ*. The former denotes the point of departure, in whatever part of the object that point is found; the latter always supposes that the point of departure is within the object. Of course, *απο* cannot serve us in Matth. iii. 16, but as little can it injure us. It is indefinite as to the situation of the point of departure. In this case, then, it is not necessary to suppose that Philip and the eunuch went farther than John and our Saviour. Though *απο* does not imply that the latter were *in* the water, it is not inconsistent with this, if other evidence demands it. Besides, it might be on some occasions necessary to go farther into the water than on this. At some places, baptism may be performed at the edge; in others, it may be necessary to advance to the centre.

But if *απο* could not reach one inch into the water, I would find no difficulty in refuting Mr. Ewing's argument. If our Lord and John were *in* the water, in returning they must have come from the edge of the water. They would then have come from the edge of the water, and from beyond. Though the account

commences with the edge, it does not deny that there was a previous point of departure. When I say, *this friend has come from Edinburgh*, all I assert is, that the point of his departure was Edinburgh. It might be the very edge; but it might be also from the very centre. On the other hand, when I say, *My friend is out of Edinburgh*, it expresses that he was within the city. We might also fix a point of departure, which will apply only to a certain point, and reach no farther. Yet this will not deny a previous point of commencement of departure. *We started at such an hour from Prince's Street, and at such an hour we arrived in Glasgow.* Now, this point of departure cannot be extended an inch, yet it is quite consistent that we might have had a previous point of departure from Duke Street.

Though I have thus proved, that for any thing to be found in *απο*, our Lord might have been baptized in the middle of Jordan, yet since *απο* necessarily implies no more than the edge as the point of departure; since we are not otherwise informed that John and he went into the water previously to baptizing, as we are informed with respect to Philip and the eunuch, I think there is no reason to believe that John the Baptist usually went into the water in baptizing. The striking difference between the accounts of these two baptisms, leads me to conclude that John chose some place on the edge of the Jordan that admitted the immersion of the person baptized, while the baptizer remained on the margin. The place of baptizing the eunuch did not admit this,—most providentially, indeed, because it affords an example that cannot be plausibly perverted. If the above distinction is well founded, there is no ground for the jest, that John the Baptist was an amphibious animal. There is no necessity at all to suppose that *εἰς* and *ἐκ* are limited in Acts viii. 38, 39, by *απο* in Matth. iii. 16.

“I am far from saying,” says Mr. Ewing, “that *εἰς* does not often signify *into*, and *ἐκ* *out of*.” And I am

as far from denying that *εἰς* sometimes signifies *into*. Its most usual signification, however, is *into*; and in general applies when the thing in motion enters within the object to which it refers. There are instances, however, in which the motion ends at the object. It is therefore not of itself definite. But it is evident that there must be some way of rendering it definite in each of its occurrences, else language would be unintelligible. We are not to suppose that when a word is in itself indefinite, we are at liberty, in every occurrence of it, to understand it as we will. The sound critic is able, on all occasions, to limit it by the connexion, or by circumstances. I observe, then, that as this word usually signifies motion to a place ending within the place, so it is always to be understood in this sense, except circumstances forbid it. I believe the few examples in which the motion does not end within the object towards which the thing in motion is directed, are all of this kind. They are such as cannot cause a moment's hesitation. But if it had such a meaning here, it would evidently be equivocal. It would as readily lead astray as *inform*. Agreeably to this, in the very examples produced by Mr. Ewing, from Gen. xxiv. 16, Judges vii. 5, where the motion ended at the margin of the river, this preposition is not used. It is not *εἰς*, but *εἰς τὴν πηγὴν*; not *εἰς*, but *πρὸς τὸ ὕδωρ*. Let us also compare the passages in which *εἰς* is used with respect to baptism in Jordan, with the immersion of Judith xii. 7. In this latter place, it is not *εἰς τὴν πηγὴν*, but *εἰς τῆς πηγῆς*, denoting that she was not bathed *in* the fountain, but *at it*, in something provided for the purpose. Had *εἰς* been used, it would have denoted that she went *into* the fountain. In the case of the baptism of the eunuch, I have shown a circumstance that fixes the meaning of *εἰς*.

This observation is confirmed by the circumstance that *εἰς* is applied to the river Jordan, when the motion ceases on the banks, in an instance that can create no doubt. 2 Kings vi. 4, "And when they

came to Jordan," is in the Septuagint, ἦλθεν εἰς τὸν Ἰορδάνην. Here the object of the journey determines the extent of the meaning of the preposition.

But I utterly deny such an indefiniteness in the meaning of *ex*. In opposition to Mr. Ewing's assertion, I say that it always signifies *out of*. I say this while my eye is upon all the examples alleged by him and his learned friend.

"Now," says Mr. Ewing, "wherever *εἰς* and *ex* correspond to each other, the extent of the one must measure the extent of the other. The point of departure to return, cannot be different from the point of arrival in going. In other words, if *εἰς* signify *to*, then *ex* must, in the same connexion, signify nothing more than *from*." What can be more mathematical than this? It is as clear as that twelve inches and a foot denote the same measure. The demonstration is perfect, if the axiom on which it is founded be granted. The demonstration is drawn from the hypothetical proposition, "if *εἰς* signify *to*." But I deny that in this instance it signifies *to*. Mr. Ewing himself admits that it often signifies *into*. Why, then, is it taken for granted that it cannot so signify here? To do Mr. Ewing any service, *εἰς* must always signify *to*. It cannot be employed to measure *ex*, if it is itself indefinite. It is very true that the progress *into* the water cannot be less than the progress *out*. All depends on the distance advanced. Now, though *εἰς* might be used, if the advance was only to the margin; yet as it can be used, if the advance were to the centre, it cannot restrain *ex* to its own lowest extent. On the other hand, I will reverse the demonstration, on the principle that *ex* always signifies *out of*, which I will prove. If *ex* always signifies *out of*, as one of these prepositions, when they correspond to each other, must measure the other, then, though *εἰς* is in itself indefinite, *ex* renders it definite in this instance. As *ex* signifies *out of*, *εἰς* must here signify *into*. Now, I defy ingenuity to refute my demonstration.

If an elastic chain is twelve inches at the stretch, but only ten when relaxed ; and if the same measure is called a foot, in the same connexion, then we are to make the *foot* determine the extent of the chain, in the instance referred to, and not the chain to determine the number of inches in the *foot*. The definite must limit the indefinite.

Dr. Wardlaw concurs with Mr. Ewing, in thinking that nothing can be learned from *εν*, and *ἐν*, and *ἐν*, the prepositions usually construed with *βασιζω*. "It is truly surprising," says he, "that so much stress should be laid on the frequently vague import of a Greek preposition." I ask Dr. Wardlaw, what preposition in any language is perfectly univocal? Are there many words of any part of speech, except those expressive of mode, which are perfectly univocal? Are the above prepositions more vague than the prepositions that correspond to them in our language? Does it follow, from a word's having two significations, that no stress can be laid on itself, in determining on the evidence of its meaning in any particular situation? If a word is sometimes used in a sense different from its usual one, are we at liberty to understand it in such unusual signification at random, as often as it may suit our argument? Were this the case, every sentence we utter would be a riddle. Every time we open our lips, we use words which are as vague as any Greek prepositions, yet the most ignorant are not misled by the circumstance. It is only when the observation applies to dead languages, that it imposes on those who do not trace arguments to first principles. *Εν* may sometimes be translated *with*; but there must be laws that regulate this matter, else human language could not be sufficient for testimony. *Εν*, in rare cases, may be translated *at* or *in*; but if this will justify us in assigning these meanings to them when it suits our purpose, nothing could be definitely expressed in human speech. Yet this is the resource of Dr. Wardlaw, in evading the evidence of

immersion ;—a resource which, if used with respect to English, would expose the critic to derision. I have pointed out some of the laws that determine in such cases ; and whether I have been successful or not, such laws must exist, if human language is an adequate evidence of human thought. This I hold as an axiom.

But I will venture to appeal still farther to the common sense of my readers. Admitting all that is demanded for this supposed vagueness, is it not utterly incredible that, with respect to this ordinance, each of these three prepositions should assume, as it were in concert to deceive us, its most unusual signification ? Can we ascribe such a miracle of delusion to the Spirit of truth ? Now, that *in* is the most usual signification of *sv* ; *into*, the most usual signification of *sg* ; and *out of*, the most usual signification of *sx*, I suppose no one will be hardy enough to deny. I could easily prove that the exceptions to this, with respect to the two former, are much fewer than they are generally supposed ; and when I come to Mr. Ewing's appendix, I will show that with respect to *sx*, there is no exception at all. But I am here taking for granted all that our opponents demand ; and allowing the vagueness to be as great as they suppose, is it not absurd to suppose that the Holy Spirit would use the three prepositions all in an unusual sense, when there were other prepositions better suited to the purpose ? The absurdity is still heightened by the consideration that these prepositions are used in connexion with the verb, which the hardiest of our opponents cannot deny as importing, at least in one of its senses, *to immerse*. The usual sense of the whole three prepositions is in our favour : the verb admits our meaning, even according to Mr. Ewing ; but according to the great bulk of the most learned of our opponents, this is its primary meaning : judging, then, even from their own admissions, is it credible that the Holy Spirit would use language so calculated to mislead ? Could there be

any reason to pitch upon such phraseology, except to deceive? If *pouring* or *sprinkling* had been appointed, there were words which univocally denote these meanings. Why then would the Holy Spirit pass by these words, and pitch upon a word that according to our opponents, has perhaps a dozen of significations? If there are prepositions that would, in their usual acceptation, express the meaning our opponents attach to the three prepositions in question, why would the latter be employed in an unusual sense? There never was a greater specimen of Jesuitism, than that which Dr. Wardlaw here charges on the Holy Spirit.

But this mode of reasoning carries its condemnation in its very face. If the controversy was in a language of which we are entirely ignorant, and on a subject to which we are utterly strangers, we may hold it as a self-evident truth, that the man who screens himself under the vagueness of words, and argues at random, on the supposition that on any emergency it is fair to take a word in any signification that in any situation he may find attached to it, has either a bad cause, or does not know how to defend a good one. As no one will charge our opponents with the latter, the cause which they defend must be incapable of a sound defence.

But after we have beaten them down the hill, and pushed them to the very verge of the stream; nay, after we have driven them into Jordan up to the chin, these obstinate enemies of immersion will not *pop down* their heads *into the water*, but will *pop* the water upon the head. Both of these writers declare resolutely that they would not surrender, even in the midst of the river. "Let it be supposed," says Mr. Ewing, "that the baptizer led the person to be baptized, not only to the water, but into it; the question returns, what did he do with him there?" Dr. Wardlaw also expressly refuses to submit, even were it granted "that the parties were in Jordan when the ce-

remony was performed." What shall I do now? Of what service is all my criticism? Can I put them under the water either by the verb or by its syntax? I will try a little common sense; for if I cannot succeed on this point, it is in vain to appeal to the laws of language. I admit that it is possible to sprinkle or pour water upon a person in a river, as well as in a church or parlour. But in the awful presence of the living God, I ask Mr. Ewing and Dr. Wardlaw, if they think it credible that John the Baptist would take into the water the multitudes whom he baptized, for the purpose of pouring a little on their face? If they can answer this in the affirmative, I have no more to say on that point. I must appeal to the common sense of mankind. What other purpose could there be in going *into* the water, but to be *immersed*? Turks, Jews, and infidels, declare your judgment. Every other mode might have been observed, with much greater convenience, out of the water than in it. I know it is possible for Mr. Ewing and Dr. Wardlaw, to take every infant baptized by them, with all the nurses and attendants, *down into* the river Clyde, and pop them there; but verily, if I read in the newspapers, that they did this, I should be convinced that they were deranged. Madness or fanaticism would universally be supposed to be the cause. Upon such evidence, could the Lord Chancellor refuse an act of lunacy against them? And shall they ascribe to John the Baptist and the Saviour, conduct that in Great Britain would prove lunacy? It is useless to reason with persons so obstinate. Neither argument nor criticism can reach such extravagance. As Dr. Campbell, in reference to the class of first principles which he ascribes to common sense, says, that to deny them, does not imply a contradiction,—it implies only lunacy; so to assert, that John the Baptist led the multitudes into the river Jordan, in order to pour a little water into their faces, does not imply an impossibility,—it only implies that they were all mad.



However, as I have now, by their own admission, got them into the water, I will try to force them under it, before I let them out. Dr. Wardlaw asserts that *εις τον Ιορδανην* may be translated *at* or *in* Jordan. To this I reply, 1. *At* and *in* are very unusual senses of *εις*, and never are given to it by any sober critic, except when the usual signification will not apply. When they have such signification, the meaning is so obvious, that it cannot be doubted. It never takes place when it could cause confusion or ambiguity. If the same phrase could optionally be interpreted *at* a river, *in* a river, and *into* a river, human language would be as dark as the enigmas of the Sphinx. 2. There is no reason to bring them to the water, or place them *in* the water, but the intention of immersing them into the water. 3. A multitude of examples might be produced, in which *εις* is construed with *βαπτίζω*, in which the signification is without doubt *immersion*. I appeal to those I have given. No one example can be produced in which *εις*, in construction with the verb, signifies either *at* or *in*. The phrase, then, cannot be supposed to have a signification here different from its usual signification; and which there is no single proof that it ever has. I will force them down, then, by the verb and the preposition separately, and by both united as a phrase. I defy them to produce, out of Greek literature, one instance in which the phrase has the meaning contended for by them.

Dr. Wardlaw partakes with Mr. Ewing in his astonishment, that an argument should be drawn from *going down* and *coming up*. If my astonishment had not been entirely exhausted with the Jordan scene, I should be mightily astonished that both these writers so far mistake the gist of the argument. The *going down* and the *coming up*, is not supposed to refer to the act of immersion. As pouring water into a bath, is necessary in order to immersion in the bath; so going down to the river, is necessary in order to dipping in the river. We do not confound the going into the

water, with the immersion in the water. This would show the same want of discrimination that confounds *pouring* with baptism.

But Mr. Ewing overturns all our arguments and criticisms with a difficulty. "If the *act* of baptizing," says he, "had consisted of immersing the subject in water, there would surely have been some allusion to the lowering of his body in that supine direction, which is, I believe, commonly observed for the purpose of bringing it under the surface: some allusion, also, to that stooping attitude, which is at the same time necessary on the part of the immerser? But there is nothing of this kind to be found in all the Scriptures, either in the accompanying phraseology, or, as we have seen, in the name of the ordinance itself." Now if the *surely* was a real *surely*, the conclusion would be undeniable; for I do not know a single reference of the kind demanded. But what makes this *surely* necessary? Why, it is necessary to keep Mr. Ewing's theory from *sinking*, but this is its only necessity. If no information is given about the way of putting the body under water, then no part of the meaning of the ordinance depends on one way more than another. We are then at liberty to do it in the most convenient way. But this requirement is very strange in one who maintains baptism to be a popping of a handful of water out of the cup of nature, or the hollow of the hand, upon the turned up face of the person baptized. Each of these things is a necessary part of baptism, yet I am so stupid as to be unable to see a glimpse of any of them in the Scriptures.

I shall now examine the example of Mr. Ewing's Appendix, alleged to prove that *ex* sometimes signifies merely *from*, as perfectly synonymous with *pro*. I have admitted that *ex* may, in certain circumstances, be translated *with*, and that *ex* sometimes denotes motion to a place, that ends on this side of the object, without occasioning any confusion or ambiguity. But I have denied that *ex* is ever used when the object de-

*parting* is not supposed to have commenced its departure *within* the object from which it departs. Now, Mr. Ewing's very learned friend, who writes the Appendix, in reply to some observations by Dr. Ryland, steadily abides by his first position ; and by a number of instances alleges, with the utmost confidence, that the use of the Greek language proves the supposed laxity in the use of *ex*. The general acquaintance of this gentleman with Greek literature, entitles his opinion to the the highest respect, and I am willing to allow him to be in all respects what Mr. Ewing represents. I take the utmost liberty in exposing false reasoning and false criticism, even in those whom I respect. God's truth is a paramount object, and whatever tends to pervert it must be cut down. "The extensive reading in Greek writers which this gentleman possesses, is a qualification of indispensable importance to a critic ; and that he is conversant with the philosophy of language is obvious at a glance. I stand upon ground too firm to make me fear the talents of my antagonist, and I would feel ashamed were I conscious of underrating these talents through dread of them. No man unjustly disparages the abilities of his opponent, who is not conscious either of having a bad cause, or of his inability to defend a good one.

The learned writer of the Appendix says: "The truth is, that though *απο* and *ex* were originally distinct, in the progress of the language they came to be used indiscriminately, and while *απο* encroached on the province of *ex*, *ex* in return usurped part of the territories of *απο*." Now, on the very face of this observation, I pronounce it unphilosophical ; and I would confidently do so, had the assertion respected a language of which I do not know the letters. It is contrary to the first principles of language, that prepositions appointed to express different relations, should be used to express the same relation. Were this the case, the prepositions would be two only in sound ; one of them would cumber rather than enrich the language. There is a sense in

which one word may be said to encroach on the territories of another ; that is, it may be used in a situation which another usually fills. But this is not properly an encroachment. So far as it properly goes, the territories are its own. The territory occupied by both, belongs exclusively to neither. It is common, and either may be used at pleasure. But consistently with this joint reign, each may have a peculiar territory, into which it is usurpation in the other to enter. Were it true, according to the learned writer, that *pro* and *ex* at random usurp each other's territories, it would be impossible for criticism to ascertain any thing from their use. Language would be incapable of definite meaning. From my account of them, it is clear that in a vast multitude of instances, they may be used in the same place optionally. But even here, it is not impossible to discriminate them. Each of them has in every instance its own distinctive meaning. I may say in English, this friend is *out* of Glasgow, or *from* Glasgow, yet *out of* and *from* are not the same. The one expression denotes that the point of departure was *in* the city ; the other may have its point of departure either *in* or *at* the city. There are cases also in which the English preposition could not be used in the same situation. In a besieged city, the expression "this soldier has come *out of* the city," is very different from "this soldier has come *from* the city," I assert, then, that the fact that these prepositions may be used often in the same situation, is no evidence that they have not their characteristic meaning ; and far less is it evidence that they are in all things indiscriminate. While they have a common territory, each has a province of its own. Even when *pro* is used where *ex* might be used, there is this difference, that the former is not definite, and does not mark the idea which the use of the other would have marked. I call the attention of critics to this distinction as one of vast importance, and one which has been universally overlooked. It has been hitherto taken for granted, that if two

words are interchangeable in any situation, they may, at the pleasure of the critic, be supposed interchangeable. I maintain that two words with meanings characteristically distinct, may have in other things a common province, while there are laws to ascertain the extent of the common province, and to limit each within its peculiar boundary. I maintain even farther, that in the common province each expresses its own meaning. They reign without interference even over the common territory. Now, if I am well founded in these observations, they will be of vast advantage in ascertaining definitely the import of language.

With respect to the prepositions *απο* and *εκ*, though they may often be used interchangeably, yet the latter always implies *intusposition*; the former the point of departure in general. But the writer of the Appendix has alleged a number of examples to prove, "that *εκ* may be, and often is, made use of to express removal, distance, or separation, merely where previous *intusposition* neither was, nor could be in view." Now, if his examples prove this, let him have it. That none of them do so, I am quite confident.

His first example is from Thucydides. Speaking of a promontory, he says, *ο ην εκ τε θαλασσης αποκρημων και εκ της γης ηκιστα επιμαχον*, "which was steep *from* the sea, and not easily attacked *from* the land." The example has not the colour of opposition to our doctrine. Were I lecturing on the passage to students, I would remark as a beauty, the distinctive import of *εκ*, which this writer's criticism teaches him to overlook. The promontory is supposed to rise *out* of the sea below, as a tree grows *out* of the ground. The imagination views the object *commencing* at the bottom of the sea, and rising a vast height above its surface. Do we not ourselves speak of a rock rising *out* of the ocean? There is nothing here said in Greek, but what we ourselves say in English, yet *out of* with us is never *from*. As to the example alleged, there is no real motion, or point of departure, whether *απο* or *εκ* is used. The point of departure is merely in the view of the imagi-

nation. While examples of this kind still preserve the original distinction, yet examples most decisively to the point must be taken from real motion, and a real point of departure. It is with these that *από* and *ἐκ* are connected on the subject of Baptism. The writer remarks: "The historian surely never meant to convey the idea, that the steep part of the rock had formerly been within the rock." This *surely* is granted, but the observation is *surely* so absurd as to need no answer. When we say that "a rock rises boldly, *out of* the sea," do we mean that the top of it rose from the bottom? But there is here an *intusposition*: the rock commences below the water.

But if we are able to manage the first *ἐκ*, he asks us what we will do with the second. This he thinks altogether refractory. However, it costs me no more trouble than the first. A glance discovers its bearing. "Would Dr. R. maintain," says the writer, "that Thucydides meant that the promontory, if attacked on the land side, must then be understood as having come *out of* the land?" No; indeed, Dr. R. could not make such an assertion,—nor is any such assertion needed. It is not the promontory that comes out of the land; it is the assault that comes out of the land. When attacked on the land side, does not the assault come from the interior of the land? I am surprised at such an observation from such a writer. What is most strange is, that the same question might as well be asked if *από* had been used. In that case, would the writer suppose that the promontory was represented as coming *from* the land? The promontory is not, as this writer absurdly supposes, here represented as the point of departure, whether *από* or *ἐκ* is used. The promontory is the point of arrival. The assailants come out of the country on the land side, and direct their assault, not *from* the promontory, but *upon* it. Never were witnesses farther from serving the cause of the party who summoned them.

The next example is, — *ἐκ τῆς Ἀβύσσου ἡ Ἰερουσαλήμ*.

"The road *from* Abdera to Ister." I say, literally, "the road *out of* Abdera to Ister." The road is supposed to commence *within* Abdera. Does the road *out of* Edinburgh to Leith commence at the extremity of the city? There might be as much of the road within the city as without it. This example is clearly on my side.

But what shall I do with Alexander's mound? Surely I cannot bring it *out of* the continent. Yes, I will bring a machine that will force it *out of* the land. Let us see the words of the author, *χωμα εγγω χωννυσαι εκ της ηπειρου ως επι την πολιν*, "he resolved to carry up a mound *from* the continent to the city." I say literally, "*out of* the continent." But says the writer, "the rampart never had been within the continent, but merely commenced at it." I say the rampart, according to Arrian, commenced *within* the continent. The point of commencement was not without the land, but within it. As the foundation of a house is more secure when it commences underground, so a mound is more secure, when it commences within the land. I was not, it is true, present on the occasion when Alexander commenced this work; but I know where Arrian fixes the commencement. We could say that the mound of Edinburgh runs out of Bank Street into Prince's Street. The point of commencement is *within* the street above, and ends *within* the street below. Now, has not my machine taken Tyre without a mound?\*

The next example is,—“a line is said to be drawn *εκ του πολου*, *from* the pole of a circle.” “It is impossible,” says our author, “for a line to be within a point.” Very true; and did not the writer see that it

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\* Mr. Locke, in one of his Letters to Mr. Molyneux, speaks of his letters written *out of* Holland. The letters were written in Holland. What sort of a critic would he be, who should say that this implies that Mr. Locke was not in Holland when he wrote the letters? Yet this is the principle on which many criticise on dead languages. My opponents are in error in their canons of criticism,

was equally impossible for the whole line to be at a point? And if its point of commencement could be at the edge of a point, might it not also be within the point? This is the thing said. The line is supposed to commence within the pole. The author adds: "in other prepositions of the same book, *απο* is made use of to denote precisely the same idea." Say, is made to fill the same situation. This is quite in accordance with my doctrine. We ourselves do the same thing with *from* and *out of*, yet they do not signify precisely the same idea.

Another example is—

———— " *ἐκ δὲ θυραίων*  
*ἤγαγε* ——— *μυχούς ἐπι.*

"She led him *from* the gate to the inner apartment."  
"Though he came from the gate," says the writer, "he could never be supposed to have come *out of* it." Certainly not *out of the wood or metal* of the gates, but as certainly *out of* the gates. Who is so ignorant as not to know that *gates* denote, not merely the gates strictly, but the place in which they stand, and that whole assemblies are said to meet and sit in the gates? We speak in like manner of a door. *He stood in the door*—he came *out of* the door—he came *from* the door. But *out of* the door is not perfectly the same as *from* the door. There is not the shadow of difficulty in such examples.

Another example brought by this writer is—

Ος ζωοπλαστών ἀνδρας  
Ἐξ ἀκροῦ ποδὸς ἀγαλματώσας.

"Who forming men *from* the extremity of the foot, making a statue." The writer remarks, "forming *out of* the extremity of the foot, would convey either no meaning at all, or a very absurd one; *ἐκ* in this passage is completely synonymous with *απο*." To suppose that the upper parts of the statue proceeded out of the foot, would indeed be absurd. And to



suppose that they proceeded *from* the foot, would be no less absurd. But if the meaning is, as without doubt it is, that the foot was the point of commencement in the making of the statue, it may as well be said that this point was *within* the foot as *at* the foot, and that the work commenced *out of* the foot as *from* the foot. Nay, it seems to be the very intention of the expression to include the foot; for if he made the statue only *from* the foot, he did not make the foot. The expression is not only intelligible on the supposition of the peculiar meaning of *ex*, but is more definite than it would have been, had *apo* been used.

The next example alleged is from the Penegeris of Dionysius, Lin. 109.

Ex δ' ὄρεων Σικελίων Κρητὴς ἀναπέπταται οἶδμα  
Μακρὸν ἐς ἀντολίην.—

"From the Sicilian mountains the sea is extended far to the east." "No one," says the writer, "I think will contend that *ex* here implies any thing but the point of departure,—certainly it was not meant to denote, that the sea was ever *within* the mountains." Nothing, indeed, but the point of departure, or rather the point of commencement. But that point is within the mountains, either really or in the imagination. Is not the sea *within* the mountains in every bay formed by mountains? What is meant by *ποντος ἐὼς Ἀἴθης*. "The sea *within* Lybia,"—an expression used by Dionysius, a few lines above the passage quoted by this writer? But in this place I do not understand the point of commencement, as respecting the place where the sea touches Sicily, but the place of the spectator. When viewed *out of* the Sicilian mountains, the sea of Crete extends far to the east. On no supposition, however, has the expression any appearance of opposition to my doctrine, with respect to the distinctive meaning of *ex*.

Another example is ——— ἀναστὰς' ἐκ θρόνου  
"Rising from her seat." "Not out of it certainly,"

says the writer. *Yes, out of it certainly*, say I. Thrones or chairs of state were of such a construction, that persons, were said to sit down *into* them, and to come *out of* them,—just as we would say that a gentleman comes *out of* his gig. Indeed, we might say ourselves, that the old man rose *out of* his arm chair. This is a most unfortunate example for our author. The phrase *ἐκ δεξιῶν καὶ ἐξ ἐναντιῶν*, Matth. xx. 21, are elliptical, and their explication depends on a knowledge of ancient customs, which may not now be attainable. Literally, it is no more right hand and left, than it is *on* the right hand and *on* the left. The word thrones, or seats, or places may be understood, and from their construction and situation above the assembly, the application of *ἐκ* might have arisen. But of this I am bound to say nothing. What I say is, that in some way the idea of *out of* must have been implied, because *ἐκ* is used. Every professor of Greek, in speaking on these phrases to his pupils, if he was not a disgrace to his chair, would say, “literally, *out of* right hand (seats) and *out of* left hand (seats,)—*on* my right hand, on my left hand, are our phrases, but they are not a translation.” But did not the gentleman perceive that these phrases are as hard to be accounted for, on the supposition that *ἐκ* signifies *from*, as on the supposition that it signifies *out of*? Could we say, “to sit *from*, my right hand, more than to sit *out of* my right hand? If it is said, that the point of the sitting commences *at* the right hand, I reply, that it may also commence *within* the *δεξιῶν τόπων*, *right hand places*. We are at liberty to supply any word we please, for it is evident that the substantive to which *δεξιῶν* is related, is not *hand*. It is possible to sit *within* right hand places, or right hand seats.

The phrase *ἐκ νεότητος*, *from* my youth, has no difficulty. The commencing point is *within* his youth. It did not commence in the outer verge of youth, or at the very edge of youth, but *within* it, far *within* it. Philosophically, then, as well as literally, it is *out of* my

youth. In like manner, ἐξ ἀρχῆς, from the beginning, is literally *out of* the beginning. The commencing point is supposed to be *within* the beginning, not where the beginning ended. He knew it *in* the beginning. The distinctive meaning of *ex* is visible even in these phrases. It is no proof of the contrary, that in some of them we have no idioms to correspond with them. If all languages had corresponding phrases perfectly alike, what would be meant by idiom? There is not one of the phrases alleged by this writer, in explaining which, a Greek Scholar would not say, "*literally out of.*" In some of them our idioms may be *from*; the Greek idiom is not *from* in any of them.

I have followed the writer through all his examples, and have wrested them out of his hands. But this was more than my cause required. There is not one of the examples that corresponds to the subject of our debate. Our contest respects a case in which there is *real motion*, and a change of position from one point to another. It respects departure and arrival. Now there is no example to the purpose in which there is not a change of place. The preposition *ex* might be used with respect to other things in which the primary idea could not be discovered; while, with respect to real change of place, the distinction might be universally preserved. But there is not one of the author's examples that respects cases similar to the case to be illustrated. Not one of them relates to real motion, either *from* or *out of*. These are the examples that must decide the matter. Though I could not analyze one of the examples brought by this writer, I would still contend that *ex*, as signifying point of departure, or motion *from* one point to another, is more definite than *and* since it always implies that the point of departure is *within* the object, and not *without* it. From this there not only is no exception, but there is no colour of exception.

I conclude then with all the authority of demonstration that Philip and the eunuch were *within* the

water, because they came *out of it*. I have already observed, with respect to other examples in which βαπτίζω occurs, that it will not construe with the signification *pour*. I observe the same thing with respect to Acts viii. 38. "What doth hinder me to be baptized, βαπτισθῆναι." It could not be translated, "what doth hinder me to be poured!" It is not the baptized person, but the water, that is *poured* in the observance of this ordinance by pouring.—Philip ἐβαπτίσθη, baptized the eunuch. If the word then signifies to pour, it was the eunuch he poured, and not the water on the eunuch. Now, the same thing may be observed, with respect to all the passages in which this word occurs. Not one of them will construe on the supposition, that it signifies to *pour*. The same thing is true to a certain extent, with respect to *sprinkle*, and every other meaning that has been given to this word. Some of the passages may construe on that supposition; but many of them will not. I need not waste time in going over all the examples, and applying to them all the meanings that have been given to the word in question. This has been done by many, and must, at a glance, be obvious to all. It merely may be stated as a canon, that *whatever this word signifies with respect to the ordinance of Baptism, will translate it in every passage in which it refers to Baptism*. There can be no exception to this, even though it should be supposed to admit a different syntax in other meanings; yet, as referred to the same ordinance, it must, without doubt, have the same meaning. This canon, then, excludes the pretensions of *pour* and *sprinkle*, and every other meaning that invention has given to it. *Immerse* or *dip* is the only word that can stand this ordeal. This I have shown can bear the test, not only with respect to this ordinance, but with respect to every instance in which the word is used. Can there be any rational doubt, then, in determining on the pretensions of the different claimants?

The reason alleged, John iii. 23, for baptizing, in a

particular place, implies, that baptism is immersion. "And John also was baptizing in Ænon near to Sam-  
 lim, because there was much water there; and they came, and were baptized." But when Mr. Ewing, reads this, he "can see nothing concerning immersion." Strange, indeed, that the same object should have an appearance so different to different eyes. Mr. Ewing sees here, with every one else, that the Holy Spirit assigns a reason for John's baptizing in Ænon, and that this reason is, the circumstance of the convenience of water. As to my purpose, I care not whether it is translated "much water," or "many waters." Does not this imply, that the water was for the purpose of baptizing? The people came there, and were baptized, because of the suitableness of the place for baptizing. This is the meaning that undoubtedly will present itself to every candid reader, who has no system in his mind as to the mode of baptism. Let the language be submitted to persons utterly unacquainted with Christianity, and among a thousand there will be but one judgment. Instead of being difficult to be discovered here, I venture to say, that there is scarcely any mind that has not some difficulty in keeping itself from seeing it. This is the labour: this is the difficulty. A person having made up his mind on the mode of Baptism, when he comes to this passage, may succeed in satisfying himself with some view of the matter which has been created by his own fancy; but I am much mistaken, if it is not always with some difficulty. That the water was for the purpose of baptism, is to my mind the very testimony of the Holy Spirit. When I say, that in such a district, there are *many bleach-greens*, or *many grist mills*, because there is there a fine river, would not every person understand that the water was necessary for the bleaching, and for turning the wheels of the mills? What would be thought of the critic who should deny this, and argue that the water was not necessary for the mills, or for the bleaching, but for the accommodation

of the persons who are employed about them? Just such criticism is it, that denies that this passage makes the water here mentioned, necessary for baptism: and finds out some other use for the water.

But if Mr. Ewing will not see what these words so evidently imply, he makes ample amends by his quick-sightedness in seeing here what is not here at all. He sees here "a plain reason why two large companies, which it was not the intention of God ever to unite together, except in the way of gradual transference, should nevertheless have been attracted to the neighbourhood of each other, where they might act without interference, while separately engaged in making the same religious use of water." Here Mr. Ewing can see very clearly, that the water referred to, was not for baptism, but for the Jewish purifications. He sees then what is neither said nor suggested. It is not in evidence at all, that Jewish purification was an object of this water. Mr. Ewing sees two large companies. I cannot see one large company in the passage, nor in all the history of John the Baptist. Mr. Ewing sees two companies not uniting. I can see no such thing among the Jews. Nor can I see such a separation between the disciples of John or of Christ, and other Jews. But that this reason exists only in Mr. Ewing's imagination, is clear from the fact, that Jesus went every where, and every where was attended with crowds immensely great. I care not what were the crowds attending John; much water was not necessary for the purpose of accommodating hearers. This invention of Mr. Ewing is nothing better than that of his predecessors, who employed the water in giving drink to the camels.

Mr. Ewing thinks that the expression refers not to Ænon only, but also to the land of Judah. If there were such a plenty of water in all the land of Judah, it would be no loss to us. But it is as plain as language can be, that the *many waters* spoken of were in Ænon only.

Mr. Ewing informs us that Dr. R. understands the *πολλα υδατα* as not applying to small streams, while he himself contends that in this place it must be small streams. I agree with Mr. Ewing, that the phrase may signify *small streams*, or small collections of water; and that it refers to separate collections, and not to one vast collection. But I maintain that he fails in proving that it here denotes *springs* or *fountains*: *υδωρ* may apply to any collection of water, from a well to a lake, or the greatest river. The phrase *πολλα υδατα*, is not a Hebraism; for it is found, times innumerable, in the Greek writers. The phrase, in the singular, *πολυ υδωρ*, might apply to the sea, if viewed as one collection; while the plural, *πολλα υδατα*, might apply to a number of ponds viewed separately.

Baptist writers, to prove that the phrase signifies one collection of water, have sometimes appealed to passages where it is undoubtedly so applied. But in all such passages, though the waters are really in one collection, they are viewed by the imagination separately. There is no instance in which the phrase, in the plural, should not be translated *many waters*. Even Rev. xvii. 8. is no exception to this. The waters of the Euphrates are here, in some point of view, considered separately, which is evident, not only from the expression, but from the symbolical import of it. The *many waters* were a symbol of the many nations or people. The river ran through Babylon, and the part of it opposite every gate might be viewed separately in this figure, as separately serving the city. The circumstance, also, that the bed of the Euphrates was as high as the countries on the banks, and in many places higher, made it practicable to water all the country of Babylon, by cuts through the banks of the river. In this way, the whole country might be watered, and all around the city might be encompassed with water. The observation is warranted by Arrian's account of the difference between the Tigris and the Euphrates. The bed of the former was low, and

therefore the river was continually enriched by tributary streams ; but the bed of the latter was high, and was constantly supplying the countries through which it passed, so that it became shallow at the mouth. This is the only passage in which the application of the phrase has any difficulty ; for the *sound of many waters*, like the sound of many voices, is composed of separate parts ; and the many waters of the sea, though one collection, are viewed separately by the imagination.

But Mr. Ewing is quite unguarded, when he argues that the phrase here refers to the springs. I agree with him, that the account which he gives of the origin of the name *Ænon* is the most probable. But I say with Dr. Cox, that a small spring may give rise to a large stream. Every one knows that lakes are sometimes formed from springs. The piece of water in which baptism was performed, would not be the spring itself, but formed out of the spring. And indeed there is no spring which would not afford the formation of a conveniency for baptism. Nor is there a Hebraism in the word *Ænon*, more than there is in the name of the city *Wells*. The *many waters* are not the *many springs*, but the *many springs* may feed the *many waters*. There is no reason to think that there were any great rivers or lakes in *Ænon* ; but the Holy Spirit tells us that there were in it many collections of water fit for baptism, which is all we want to learn from it.

I must now justify my observations with respect to the use of *ὑδατα* in classic use. "*These waters* are said to be good for bathing," *Æl.* p. 48. Hippocrates uses this word in the plural, and frequently this very phrase, as signifying *rains*. He uses the phrase *πολυ ὑδωρ*, referring to drinking. The phrase occurs in his writings, both in the singular number, and in the plural, and in every instance with the distinction which I have pointed out. It is needless to transcribe them : But he uses the phrase *πολλα ὑδατα* with respect to the



waters of a city, as distinguished into several separate kinds, p. 75. Arrian also uses the word *ὕδωρ* for a collection of waters, for a river, &c. He uses the plural also very frequently. He uses the phrase *ὕδατα ἀρυσσας* for *digging wells*, p. 137. Here we see the distinction between a spring and a mere receptacle of water. This was a small collection of water, but it was not a spring. A spring is not dug. *Κατεστράτη-πεδουσε προς ου πολλω υδατι*. "He encamped at a small river," p. 138. I shall merely refer to the following pages: 140, 141, 150; 162, 163, 164, 165, 170, 171, 172, 175, 186, 187, 191. In these, and very many other passages of the same writers, the distinction between the use of the singular and plural of this word would be seen. No invention can turn aside the testimony of this passage of scripture, in favour of immersion. It obviously assigns the conveniency of baptizing, as the reason why John resided at this time in Ænon.

Having considered the syntax and connexion of the word *βαπτίζω*, I shall next proceed to ascertain how far any light can be obtained from the Scripture explanations of the ordinance, and the occasional allusions to it. It is a most providential circumstance, that the mode of this ordinance is determined not only by the word that designates it,—by its syntax, and words in construction with it,—but also by direct explanations.

#### . EXAMINATION OF THE EVIDENCE OF ROM. vi. 3.

THE Apostle Paul, having strongly and fully stated salvation to the guiltiest of men, through grace reigning through righteousness unto eternal life by Jesus Christ our Lord, anticipates, in the beginning of the sixth chapter of his epistle to the Romans, the objection that, in every age, has been made to his doctrine: "Shall we continue in sin, that grace may abound?" He refutes this objection by the fact, that from our union with Christ by faith, we have died along with

him. And that we have died along with Christ, he proves from our baptism. "Know ye not, that so many of us as were baptized into Jesus Christ, were baptized into his death?" Something is here supposed to be implied in baptism, of which no Christian should be ignorant; and that thing is, that all who are baptized, are by that ordinance exhibited as dead along with Christ. To be baptized into Christ's death, is not merely to be baptized into the faith of his death, but of our own death with him. For if our death along with him is not implied in being baptized into his death, then this would be no proof at all of our own death. But it is our own death with Christ, that the apostle is proving by our baptism into Christ's death. The third verse would be no proof of what is asserted in the second verse, if our baptism into Christ does not imply our death in his death.

"Therefore we are buried with him, by baptism into death." As in Christ's death, we have died with him; so in baptism, we are figuratively put into the grave along with him. Words cannot more plainly teach any thing, than these words declare, that *in baptism we are buried with Christ*. Baptism, then, must not only contain a likeness to burial, but that likeness is emblematical. There may be resemblance between two objects, and to exhibit that likeness in words, is a beauty in language. But if the likeness is merely accidental, it is only a figure of speech, and can teach nothing. To found an argument on such ground, would be the extravagance of fanaticism. Homer often compares the falling of his heroes head long from their chariots, to the diving of water-fowl. But this resemblance is merely accidental, and the victor had no intention of giving an emblem of *diving*; nor could any argument be grounded on the likeness. When a person *dips* in bathing, he might be said to be *buried* in the water; and there would be as good a likeness in this to Christ's burial, even as in baptism. But the likeness is only accidental, not

emblematical. No argument could be drawn from this, to prove a dying with Christ. This would be a metaphor. But baptism is not a figure of speech; it is an emblematical action. The likeness is intentional, and the action performed is symbolical. Were it not so, the apostle might as legitimately argue from the *bath* as from *baptism*. This distinction is self-evident, and we shall find that it is of decisive importance. From not understanding it, some have said that we have as good a right to find in the meaning of baptism, something corresponding to planting, as to burial. *Planting* is a metaphor; there must then be a likeness, but no emblematical import.

“That like as Christ was raised from the dead by the glory of the Father, even so we also should walk in newness of life.” Here we see that baptism is an emblem also of the new life of the Christian. He dies with Christ to sin, he rises with him to a new life of holiness. There must, then, be something in baptism, that is calculated to be an emblem of a resurrection, as well as of a burial. Immersion is a mode that answers both; and immersion is the only mode that can do so.

“For if we have been planted together in the likeness of his death, we shall also be in the likeness of his resurrection.” In our baptism, then, we are emblematically laid in the grave with Christ, and we also emblematically rise with him. It is designed to point to our own resurrection, as well as the resurrection of Christ. In baptism, we profess our faith in the one as past, and in the other as future. What simplicity, what beauty, what edification, is contained in this ordinance! How have all these been overwhelmed by the traditions of men! How clearly does this ordinance present the truth that saves the soul! How admirably is it calculated to recall the mind to a view of the ground of hope, that is calculated to silence unbelief! How is it that a vile sinner can escape the wrath of God, and obtain eternal life?

How is it that Christ's work is available for him? Why, when Christ paid our debt, we ourselves have paid our debt, for we are one with Christ. We have died with Christ, and have risen with Christ; Christ's death is our death; Christ's burial is our burial; Christ's resurrection is our resurrection; Christ's sitting in heavenly places, is our sitting in heavenly places.

This clear testimony of the Holy Spirit, Mr. Ewing endeavours to set aside, by a mode of criticism certainly the boldest and most violent that I recollect ever to have seen from the pen of a man of God. The grossness of the perversions of those who know not God, is not astonishing. The extravagance even of Neologists, may be accounted for. But that one who knows and fears God, should take such liberties with his word, is more than I was prepared to expect. Indeed, there is nothing more extravagant in Neologism, than in the manner in which Mr. Ewing explains the burial of Christ. Had I been informed merely of the result, without knowing any thing of the author, I would have at once concluded that it was the offspring of Neology. But the character of Mr. Ewing, as well as the document itself, gives full evidence that it is the work of sincerity. Indeed, while I must say that it is one of the most mischievous perversions of Scripture that I have ever met from the hand of a Christian, I am fully convinced that the author considers that he has conferred an important benefit on the world, by his discovery in criticism. His wild conclusions are speciously drawn from premises hastily adopted, and utterly unsound.

He begins by saying, that "the great, and, as it appears to me, the only original reason why baptism has been thought to imply immersion, is the expression which occurs in Rom. vi. 4, and Col. ii. 12." I shall not answer for the dead, but for my own part, the word by which the ordinance is designated, is perfectly sufficient for me, without a particle of evidence

from any other quarter. Yet I am disposed to set as great a value upon the evidence of these passages, as any writer can do. I value the evidence of these passages so highly, that I look on them as perfectly decisive. They contain God's own explanation of his own ordinance. And in this, I call upon my unlearned brethren to admire the divine wisdom. They do not understand the original, and the adoption of the words *baptize* and *baptism* can teach them nothing. Translators by adopting the Greek word, have contrived to hide the meaning from the unlearned. But the evidence of the passages in question, cannot be hid, and it is obvious to the most unlearned. The Spirit of God has, by this explanation, enabled them to judge for themselves in this matter. While the learned are fighting about βαπτίζω, and certain Greek prepositions, let the unlearned turn to Rom. vi. 4, and Col. ii. 12, &c.

Mr. Ewing, speaking of the reasoning of the Apostle in this passage, says: "He then infers, that since baptism has so immediate a reference to the death of Christ, it must, by consequence, be connected also with his resurrection; and that, as in the former view, it teaches the regenerated the abandoning of the old life of sin, so, in the latter, it equally teaches them the habitual, increasing, and permanent pursuit and progress of the new life of righteousness." By no means, Mr. Ewing. This inference is not legitimate. Baptism might have a reference to burial, without being by consequence connected with his resurrection. Has not the Lord's Supper an immediate emblematical reference to Christ's death, without any emblematical reference to his resurrection? These two things are quite distinct; and it is possible for an ordinance to represent the one, without representing the other. The Lord's day is a memorial of Christ's resurrection, but is no emblem of his burial. If there was nothing in baptism that is fitted to be an emblem of resurrection, baptism does not be-

come an emblem of resurrection by consequence from being an emblem of burial. But baptism is here explained as an emblem of resurrection, as well as of burial; there must, therefore, be something in the emblem, that will correspond to resurrection as well as to burial. There is such a thing in *immersion*, but there is no such thing in *pouring*; nor is there any such thing in applying water as an emblem of sepulchral rites. This, then, overturns Mr. Ewing's system altogether. He confesses virtually in this quotation, that the Apostle infers that baptism is connected with the resurrection. If so, as there is nothing in sepulchral rites, that is, in washing and embalming the dead, that corresponds to resurrection, washing and embalming the dead cannot be the burial referred to,—and pouring water as an emblem of washing and embalming the dead, cannot be baptism. Nothing can be more decisive than this. Indeed, so far from arguing that resurrection must be implied in baptism, because that baptism represents Christ as dead, we could not know that either death or resurrection was referred to in that ordinance, had not inspiration given the information. It is possible that an ordinance, performed either by *immersion* or *pouring*, might have had no instruction in mode. The instruction might have been all in the water. That there is any meaning in the mode, we learn merely from the inspired explanation. Here Mr. Ewing takes the half of his edification in this ordinance, from a source that does not contain any thing on the subject. There is nothing in the emblem, according to his view of it, that corresponds to a new life or resurrection. Has washing the dead any likeness to resurrection? Have sepulchral rites, or embalming, any likeness to resurrection? Mr. Ewing was so tender in the conscience, that he scrupled to give the name to this ordinance from *immersion*, if it also denoted *emersion*, though these two things are necessarily connected, and both explained as belonging to the ordi-

nance. He does not scruple to make the emblem of death, an emblem of life by consequence.

"It is a common remark," says Mr. Ewing, "that the Apostle is treating in this passage, not of the form of baptism, but of its object, its design, and its actual effects." Let its form be what it may, this passage treats of its object as known from its form. "On this account," says he, "many are of opinion that no inference can be drawn from his language, concerning the form of baptism at all." No inference is necessary. The Apostle has drawn the inference himself. We could not have drawn the inference which the Apostle has drawn. Had not the Apostle explained this ordinance, we would have had no right to do so. But even if baptism had not here been explained as a symbolical burial,—had it been alluded to as a burial merely in metaphorical language, it would have been equally decisive of form, though not of meaning. If baptism is a burial merely by a figure of speech, there must be a likeness between baptism and burial, to justify that figure.

"Perhaps," says, Mr. Ewing, "it would be more correct to say, that he is here treating of the connexion between the justification and the sanctification of Christians." True—but he is treating of these things as they are implied in baptism. He is treating also of more. He incidentally treats of the resurrection of believers as implied in their baptism. "And that in doing so," says Mr. Ewing, "he makes three distinct allusions, to baptism, to grafting, to crucifixion." He makes no allusion to *grafting* at all; and whatever is the meaning of the phrase *planted together*, it refers to baptism. Crucifixion does not allude to baptism.

We come now to the examination of Mr. Ewing's account of "the Scriptural meaning of 'being buried.'" Here we will find the mysteries of the critical art. By a learned and laborious process, Mr. Ewing endeavours to prove that Christ was not *perfectly* bu-

ried at all ; and that *burial* in Scripture is not burial, but *washing* or *embalming* the dead. Now, on the very face of this allegation it contains its own condemnation. *Burying*, in the Scripture meaning, must be the same as *burying* in the common meaning, otherwise the Scriptures are not a revelation. This is a canon—a canon which is self-evident. If the Scriptures do not use words in the sense in which they will be understood by those who speak the language, they do not instruct, but mislead. I overturn the whole system, then, by taking away the foundation on which it rests. It assumes what is not true in any instance.

“By burying,” says Mr Ewing, “we commonly mean the lowering of the dead body into the grave, covering it with earth, and so leaving it under ground.” This, indeed, is in general our way of burying. But we would apply the term to burying in any way. We would say that a person *was buried in a vault*, where he would lie exactly as Christ lay,—without lowering, without a covering of mould, &c. If a person was deposited in all respects as Christ was deposited in the tomb, we would say that he *was buried*. The difference is merely in circumstances ; the things are essentially the same. Besides, the immersion of a believer, is equally suited to all kinds of burial. No part of the figure depends on any peculiarity in age or nation.

“In Scripture,” says Mr. Ewing, “*to bury*, not only includes all the preparations of the body for interment, but is the expression used in cases where our method of interment was not practised, where no interment followed at the time, and where no final interment followed at all.” Neither in Scripture nor any where else, is the word used for preparatory rites alone, or where the body was not truly and properly interred.

What does Mr. Ewing mean by final interment ? Does he mean that Christ was not finally interred,



because he rose on the third day ? Then none of us shall be finally interred ; for we shall all rise again. Does he mean that the disciples did not consider him as truly interred, and that they designed to bury him better ? They had no such design. They intended to cover him with more spices, but not to take him from the place where he was buried. He was as truly buried as if he had been in the ground till the resurrection. What does Mr. Ewing mean ? Does he deny that Christ was truly buried ? If he was not buried, the Scriptures are false. And if he was truly buried, though he had lain but a moment, our baptism may be an emblem of his burial. We lie in the water, as Dr. Cox has remarked, a still shorter time than he lay in the grave. Was he not in the sepulchre ? Does not prophecy speak of his grave ?

But it seems Mr. Ewing has Scripture proofs for the meaning that he assigns to *burial*. Let us then take a look at these. In Gen. i. 26. where the Hebrew says *they embalmed* Joseph, "the Septuagint," says Mr. Ewing, "has *ἔθαψαν, they buried him.*" Very true. But does this imply, that by *ἔθαψαν* the translators understood embalming ? No such thing. Had they used the word in this sense, they could not have been understood by those who spoke the Greek language. This translation is not a proof either that the Septuagint understood *embalming* to be the meaning of *burial*, or that they did not understand the true meaning of the original. It is only proof of what occurs in this translation a thousand times, and what occasionally occurs in every translation, namely, careless and loose rendering. Their text, said he, was *embalmed* : they content themselves with saying, he was buried.

"The rites of burial were," says Mr. Ewing, "from the very commencement, a proof that the attending friends had ascertained the fact of the decease." Indeed, it is obvious enough, that they would not commence these rites till after the death of the person ; but these rites never were designed as proof of this.

Above all, the Scriptures do not require such a mode of ascertaining the fact of decease. He adds, "and that among all believers of revelation, the zeal and solemnity with which these rites have ever been performed, ought to be considered as the effect, not merely of personal attachment, but of religious principle, and particularly of the hope that God will raise the dead." Whatever may have been the origin of these rites, nothing can be more certain than that they were used by persons who had no notion of resurrection,—nay, by many who denied it. Above all, these rites were not a divine appointment for reminding of the resurrection. Nothing can be built on this.

"It is our happiness to know," says Mr. Ewing, "that our blessed Saviour never was finally interred." By *finally interred* here, Mr. Ewing must mean that he was raised again, and did not lie like the other dead. For, as far as concerns our salvation and comfort, he might as well have been kept in a common grave for the period of three days, as have been buried in a rock. But may he not have been truly buried, though he had risen in a moment after being deposited?

"Preparations of his body for burial were made," says Mr. Ewing, "both by anticipation, and after the event of his death had taken place. In both cases, they are called 'his burial.'" How can Mr. Ewing say so? The preparatory rites are never called *burial*. The passages referred to have not the smallest appearance of confounding *embalming* with *burying*. John xii. 3. represents Mary not as burying our Lord by the act of anointing him, but as having anointed him as preparatory for burial. She *anointed* him by anticipation; but she did not *bury* him by anticipation. Is it said that she buried him? The woman, Mat. xxvi. 12, is represented as doing what she did, not to bury him, but to *embalm* him, or prepare him for burial. She did to him, when alive, what is usually done to persons after death. She embalmed him by antici-

pation. *Ενταφιαζω* is used for embalming, but *ταφω* never.

"After our Lord had given up the Ghost," says Mr. Ewing, "the rites of burial were renewed by Joseph of Arimathea, and Nicodemus." This was strictly and properly the embalming. But is this called a burial? Had they done nothing but this, Jesus would not have been buried; and the Scriptures would not have been fulfilled. He adds, "and were intended to have been finished by the women which came up with our Lord," &c. These rites, then, were not *finished*; and if they are *burial*, Jesus *was not buried*.

Mr. Ewing, then, has utterly failed in his attempt to prove, that in Scripture, preparatory rites are called burial. Not one of his examples have a shadow of proof. I will now make some general remarks on this strange opinion.

*First*, The word *ταφω* signifies to *bury*, and is never applied exclusively to preparatory rites. This is as true, with respect to Scripture use, as it is with respect to the use of the classics. Mr. Ewing gives a meaning to this word, not confirmed by use, but merely to suit his purpose. In like manner *συνταφω*, the word here used, signifies to *bury one thing or person with another*,—never to embalm one thing with another. The opinion, then, does not deserve even a hearing.

*Secondly*, *ταφω* applies to all kinds of burial. No doubt, originally, in all countries, burial was by digging a pit, and covering the dead with the mould. But when repositories were built for the dead, or were scooped out of rocks, the same word was still used. This, in fact, is the case with our own word *bury*. We apply it to the depositing of a body in a vault, as well as the common burial. This process, in enlarging the meaning of words, may be exemplified in a thousand words. The idea that is common to all *burying*, is that of covering the dead, or surrounding them with something to keep them from violation. It is

quite a waste of time, then, for Mr. Ewing to discuss the situation and peculiarities of our Lord's sepulchre. He was buried as many others are buried, and to this burial there is a likeness in our baptism, when we are buried in water.

*Thirdly*, Burial and embalming are often distinguished as quite different things. Josephus, speaking of the magnificent manner in which Herod buried Aristobulus, says, "And as for his funeral, that he took care should be very magnificent, by making great preparation of a sepulchre to lay his body in, and providing a great quantity of spices, and *burying* many ornaments with him," &c. Here the *embalming* and the *burying* are distinguished. It was the laying of him in the sepulchre (θηκας) that was the burial. It may be noted, also, that here is a magnificent sepulchre, built as a house for the dead, in which the corpse lay on a bier or couch, (κλινη;) yet the person is said to be buried. If Christ was not truly buried, Aristobulus was not truly buried. We have here, also, not only συνθαπτω, but συγκαταθαπτω. The ornaments that were *buried together* with Aristobulus, were deposited in the tomb with him,—not washed along with him by preparatory rites. These ornaments were *buried down* with him, although he was laid, like Christ, in a sepulchre above ground. Yet this is as truly burying as the common way of burying; though the sepulchre should have been on the top of the highest mountain in the world, the corpse is buried under a covering, as truly as if it were deposited in the centre of the earth.

Moschus, describing a funeral, represents the burial, καταθαψαν, as taking place after all the rites were finished, Meg. l. 35.

Patroclus, notwithstanding all the embalming he received, appears to his friend Achilles, and calls for *burial*. Θαψτε με, "*bury me.*"

The dead body of Hector was washed regularly by the maids of Achilles, yet it was not *buried* till long after.

The passage produced by Dr. Cox from Herodotus, is most decisive. The *embalming* is designated by *ταριχεύω*, the *burying* by *θάπτω*. But it is useless to be particular in disproving a thing that has not even the colour of plausibility to support it. No two things can be more distinct than *washing* or *embalming* the dead, and *burying* the dead. Indeed, in the burial of Jesus itself, these two things are distinguished. They first rolled him in spices, which was the *embalming*; then they laid him in the sepulchre, which is the *burying*. What is laying in a sepulchre, but *burying*? But Mr. Ewing says, that the body of Christ "was never finally deposited in the tomb; but, after being wound up with about an hundred pounds weight of spices," &c. No matter how short a time it was in the tomb; in the tomb, it was buried like any other dead body. The disciples had no intention of ever removing it from the tomb. The women who came with more spices, had no intention to unbury it, or take it elsewhere. To give more spices, was not to complete the *burying*, but to complete the *embalming*. Were a person in Edinburgh to visit the grave of a friend every day, and even open both grave and coffin, to ascertain whether the body was removed, this would not affect the *burying*. Why should preparatory rites be called the *burying* of Jesus, seeing he was actually laid in the sepulchre? No fancy can be wilder than this.

*Fourthly*, The representations of Scripture suppose Jesus to have been truly buried. "For as Jonas was three days and three nights in the whale's belly; so shall the Son of man be three days and three nights in the heart of the earth," Matt. xii. 40. Mr. Ewing himself allows that this was fulfilled by his being laid in a sepulchre. And what is laying in a sepulchre, but *burying*? Besides, this removes all Mr. Ewing's objections with respect to the situation of the tomb of Jesus. In this sepulchre, Jesus was in the heart of the earth. It is usual for a ridge of rocks to have earth on the top. The Saviour was under the earth

here as well as if he had been buried in a pit at the bottom of a valley. Again, Christ's being buried, is taught as a part of the gospel, 1 Cor. xv. 1. To allege, then, that he was not truly buried, is to call in question the truth of the gospel. "Moreover, brethren, I declare unto you the gospel which I preached unto you, which also ye have received, and wherein ye stand; by which also ye are saved, if ye keep in memory what I preached unto you, unless ye have believed in vain. For I declared unto you first of all, that which I also received, how that Christ died for our sins, according to the Scriptures; and that he was buried, and that he rose again the third day, according to the Scriptures." Here what was in the evangelist called *three days in the heart of the earth*, the apostle calls being *buried*, for he is said to have risen on the *third* day. The third day from what? The third day from his being buried. He is here considered as being three days buried, for he rose on the third day from his being buried. His resurrection here, is also opposed to his being buried; it must then be burying, in the proper sense of the word.

*Fifthly*, The very basis of this doctrine is a mere assumption, namely, that the dead body of Jesus was washed. It is not in evidence that he was washed at all; and nothing can be deduced from a mere supposition. Mr. Ewing, indeed, endeavours to supply what is wanting in the history. He alleges, what no one will deny, that it was usual to wash the dead. But does it follow from this, that Jesus must have been washed? We would not have known that he was embalmed, had not the history given us the information. It is not necessary that the dead body of Jesus should receive all the usual rites, nor any of them, except those that prophecy foretold. The proof, then, that it was usual to wash the dead, is no proof that Jesus was washed. Indeed, I perfectly agree with Dr. Cox, that it is probable Jesus was not washed at all. So far as the history goes,

this is the obvious conclusion. I acknowledge, indeed, that many things might have taken place, that are not mentioned in the history. If any other part of Scripture said, or implied that Jesus was washed, as well as embalmed, I would argue that the omission of the fact in the history, is no evidence to the contrary. But if the washing is not recorded, nothing can be built on it; because it might not have taken place. The washing of Jesus is an apocryphal washing, of no more authority than the story of Tobit and his dog, or of Bel and the Dragon. I admit no argument but what is founded either on Scripture, or self-evident truth. Had Mr. Ewing been obviating a difficulty,—had he been proving that some part of Scripture asserts that the dead body of Jesus was washed, and had any one alleged the silence of the history as evidence of the contrary, I would take part with Mr. Ewing. The silence of history is not to be alleged against proof. To remove a difficulty, it is sufficient that the thing alleged is possible; to be an argument, the thing alleged must be in evidence. This distinction is self-evidently obvious, when it is considered; yet it is a thing that lies hid from most controversial writers.

But Mr. Ewing says, “as far as the preliminary process went, we are told it was conducted, as the manner of the Jews was to bury.” No, Mr. Ewing, we are not told this. Had this been said, it would settle the question; for, undoubtedly, it was the manner of the Jews to wash the dead. But we are not told that, as far as the preliminary process went, all the usual rites were observed. It is the winding in the linen cloth with the spices, that is said to have been, “as the manner of the Jews is to bury.”

Mr. Ewing alleges the state of the body, covered with blood, &c. as making washing necessary. All this, however, is no evidence that it was done. Had it been necessary to fulfil any thing in Scripture, there is no doubt it would have been done. But there is no

necessity to fulfil national customs. The burying of Jesus with his blood unwashed, marred not his sacrifice, nor left any prophecy unfulfilled. It was customary for all friends to escort the body to the grave; it was customary to keep the corpse some time after death, yet Jesus was carried immediately to the grave without any funeral pomp.

*Sixthly.* Is it not above all things absurd to suppose, that an ordinance in the Church of Christ should be instituted as an emblem of a thing that is never once mentioned in his history? If the washing of the dead body of the Saviour was a thing of so much importance, is it credible that it would not have been mentioned? How is it that the spices are mentioned, yet the washing, which in Mr. Ewing's view, was the principal thing, omitted?

*Seventhly,* Mr. Ewing supposes, that the washing, as a part of the embalming, is put for the whole. Why does he make such a supposition? Was there not a word to signify embalming? Why then use a word that denotes only a part of the thing? Can he produce any instance to give authority to such a supposition? Was it usual to denote the whole process of embalming by the word *wash*? If not, why does Mr. Ewing make the arbitrary supposition? Again, the *washing* was no part of the embalming. It was a part of the rites of burying, and as such, when embalming was used, washing of course first took place. But it is evident, that the washing and the embalming were different things. Besides, many were washed who were not embalmed. If so, it was impossible to designate embalming by washing. This would have implied, that all who were washed were embalmed; whereas multitudes were washed who were not embalmed. This theory, then, is not only founded on an arbitrary supposition; but that supposition may be proved to be false. It is an axiom, that washing cannot stand for embalming, if many who were washed were not embalmed.



*Eighthly*, This theory makes baptism an emblem of the embalming of Christ. This is a new view of the import of baptism, that must be as unexpected to those who baptize by pouring, as to the friends of immersion. From the days of John the Baptist to the present hour, was ever such a thing heard of, but from Mr. Ewing? If this is true, there has not been one properly baptized till the time of the author. For this discovery, Mr. Ewing is undoubtedly entitled to a claim of originality. Till his time, the baptized person was never embalmed. This is a new mystery in baptism. But how does this consist with the other mysteries that the author has found in the same ordinance? The baptized person drinks from the cup of nature as emblematical of a host of blessings; and from the same cup he is washed and embalmed for funeral. No popish ordinance can vie with this ordinance of Mr. Ewing, in fertility of mysteries. The mystery of the five wounds has as good a foundation; but it is not so pregnant in multifarious meaning. If all these things are contained in baptism, it is a most heterogeneous ordinance; and I am sure, that of all the millions who practise it, there is not one in every thousand that understands it. The Roman Catholic church has done much better. She has a multitude of mysteries in baptism, but she has a corresponding multitude of emblems. The oil, and the spittle, and the breathing, &c. &c. entitle her to enlarge the meaning of her ordinance. But Mr. Ewing, under the outward form of one handful of water, contrives to couch the most discordant meanings.

But if washing stands for embalming as a part for the whole, then it cannot, in this situation, stand simply for itself, without the other parts of the process of embalming. In baptism, the water must signify not washing only, nor chiefly, but also and especially the spices, &c. The principal part of the mystery must be in the anointing with oil, and the use of the spices, for these were the principal things in the embalming.

Now, Mr. Ewing overlooks all but the washing ; which is only the previous step to the embalming. He first makes the embalming the principal thing, that he may have some plausible foundation for getting rid of true burying, by substituting the embalming in its place. Then, when this is effected, as he has no need of embalming, but finds it rather cumbersome, he contrives to dismiss it, retaining only the part that fits him. *Washing* is brought in only in the right of *embalming*, but whenever it *pops* its head into this situation, it takes care to displace its principal. Accordingly, washing is the only thing that is made emblematical. The oil and spices have no mystery. Is not this unjust to the chief parts of the embalming ? Surely the anointing ought to have a place in baptism, if baptism is an emblem of embalming. Spices also cannot be dispensed with. Even if they are not used, as they are the chief thing in embalming, they must be chiefly considered in baptism, which is an emblem of embalming. The Church of Rome will thank Mr. Ewing for the oil, which he does not seem forward to use, but the spices, by a very little ingenuity, might serve his system effectually. As embalming preserves the body from putrefaction, so baptism may not only be an emblem of the washing of a corpse, but of the resurrection.

*Ninthly*, Mr. Ewing complains of the want of likeness between Christ's funeral and immersion ; yet he makes a handful of water an emblem, not only of washing a corpse, but of the whole rites of embalming. Surely there can be nothing more unlike burial rites, than the *popping* of a handful of water into the face of an infant. But the complaint of want of likeness in immersion to the burial and resurrection of Christ is quite unreasonable. It is as striking as any emblem can be. It ought, however, to be remarked, that the ordinance is merely emblematical—not dramatic. In the former, there is no need of that exact and minute likeness that the latter requires.

The former could not be known to be a likeness of something else, if it were not explained to be such. The latter is, by its very appearance, known to be an emblem. The sacrifices of the Jewish law, could not, from mere external appearance, have been known to represent the death of Christ. But the dramatic burying of Charles V. declared its own object.

Let it be considered also, that in the emblem of a burial, there is no need of a likeness in the laying down of the body of the person baptized. The emblem is in the actual state of the body as being covered with the wafer. The likeness to the resurrection consists not in the very manner of being taken up out of the water, but in the rising itself. Nothing could afford a resemblance of the way of the raising of the dead. There was no likeness between the way of killing the sacrifice and the manner of Christ's death. There was no likeness between the manner in which Jonah was swallowed by the whale, and again thrown out, to the way in which Christ was carried into the tomb, and in which he came out of the tomb: yet Jonah in the whale's belly was an emblem of Christ as being three days in the heart of the earth. Surely Mr. Ewing should have attended more to the nature of an emblem, and have distinguished what is the point of resemblance, before he ventured to question the likeness between the baptism of believers and the burial of Christ, which is asserted by the Holy Spirit. If the Baptists set any value on the manner of putting the body of the baptized person under water, in my opinion they come under the same censure. Mr. Ewing's whole dissertation on the Jewish manner of burying the distinguished dead, has no bearing on the subject. Between immersion and burying in any manner, there is a likeness. It is nothing to our purpose to make that likeness dramatic.

Mr. Ewing is of opinion, that ver. 5. does not refer to baptism. But whatever is the true meaning of the word translated, "planted together," it is evident,

that it must have its reference to baptism. It might be a new figure, but the manner of introducing it, evidently shows that it, equally with *burying*, refers to baptism. "For if we have been planted together in the likeness of his death, we shall be also in the likeness of his resurrection." The conditional statement is here evidently founded on what precedes. "If we have been planted," &c. He does not pass on to a new argument, to show that we are dead with Christ, leaving the subject of baptism. But having shown the burial of the Christian in baptism, he goes on to show that resurrection is equally important. If we have been buried with Christ, so shall we rise with him. Had he left the subject of baptism, and introduced a new argument, which had no reference to baptism, he would not have stated it conditionally. When he says, "For if we have been planted," it is implied that he had been saying something expressing or implying that *they had been planted*. Whatever is the meaning of *συμφυτοί*, it must have a reference to baptism.

Mr. Ewing thinks that *συμφυτοί* here signifies *grafted*, and of course can have no likeness to baptism. On the contrary, for this very reason I say that it cannot signify *grafting*, because it is expressly said, that we have been *συμφυτοί* in the likeness of Christ's death. If, then, there is in *grafting* no likeness to death, the word *συμφυτοί* cannot mean grafting. Whatever is the meaning of *συμφυτοί*, it must suit the supposition of a likeness to death. Even if this word had no reference to baptism, it must refer to a likeness of death. We have been *συμφυτοί* in the likeness of his death.

But independently of the connexion altogether, I maintain that the word *συμφυτοί* does not signify *grafted*. Mr. Ewing produces no authority from use to establish this meaning. When it refers to trees, it does not designate the operation of grafting, or of inserting a part of one into another; but to the planting of trees in the same bed. The trees of a grove are *συμφυτά*.

*Grafting* is, indeed, one of the figures employed to represent the union of Christ and his people, and some excellent observations on this subject are contained in Mr. Ewing's dissertation on this verse. But they have no application to this subject. A house, a temple, the human body, the husband and wife, are all figures of this union. But they are not the figures used here. No more is grafting. It is a fine figure in its own place; but it has no likeness to death, and therefore has nothing to do with baptism. If the allusion is here to planting, as it is expressly said to have a likeness to death, and refers to baptism, the resemblance must be found in the burying of the roots of the plants. The likeness is sufficiently obvious to justify a metaphor. I have no objection to the supposition of this figure in this place, from the weakness of likeness. Yet I am of opinion on other ground, that neither *planting* nor *grafting* are implied here. In grafting there is no likeness, either to burial or resurrection; and though planting has a likeness to the former, it has not to the latter. But it is evident that the passage connects *σύνφυτοι* as well with the resurrection, as with the burial. Now, in classical use the word *σύνφυτοι* signifies the closest union of any kind—*incorporated, growing together, united, joined with, &c.* Hippocrates uses it with respect to the healing of a wound, when the lips of the wound again *coalesce*. He says also, that a nerve when cut, or a bone broken, &c. *οὐ σύνφυσται*, "do not coalesce." Here we see it denotes the most intimate union, so as to be denied to the union that takes place between the different parts of a broken bone. A glutinous plant, also, that causes things to adhere as one body, takes its name from this word. It might, I think, be applied to express the growing together of the graft and the tree, but this would be the effect or consequence of grafting, and not the operation itself. It denotes, in short, the closest union with respect to things indiscriminately. There is no need, then, to bring either

planting or grafting out of the passage ; and as neither of them resembles a resurrection, they should be rejected. When we translate the passage, "For if we have become one *with him*, or have been *joined with him* in the likeness of his death," we not only suit the connexion to both death and resurrection, but we take the word *συνεμψύχοι* in its most common acceptation.

Mr. Ewing's attempt, then, to find in pouring a handful of water on the face, a likeness to the burial of Christ, has utterly failed. It is as forced as any thing that the wildest imagination ever conceived. Nothing but the necessity of a favourite system could send a man on such a perilous expedition. It is most astonishing, that any man who allows that Jesus Christ lay three days in the tomb, should attempt to find his burial in the washing or embalming of his body.

This attempt of Mr. Ewing to force a likeness between baptism and the rites of embalming, and to make the burial of Christ, not his being laid in the sepulchre, but his being washed as a corpse, is of great importance as a document on this subject. It testifies in the strongest manner, that in Mr. Ewing's judgment, the evidence from Rom. vi. 3, and Col. ii. 12, that baptism contains a likeness to burial, is so obvious, that he could see no way to explain these passages otherwise. Had any other explanation seemed to him possible, certainly he would not have had recourse to so strange a thought, as that Christ's burial was not his interment, and that *bury* in the Scriptures relates to rites preparatory to interment. It is self-evident, that no man would have fled to such a refuge, who could have found any other. I appeal to common sense for the truth of this observation. Mr. Ewing not only had no temptation to find a likeness to burial in these passages, but his cause would have been much better served, could he have proved that these passages contain no such likeness. Since, then, in such circumstances he has confessed a likeness, and since to divert this likeness to another object, he was

obliged to have recourse to so violent an expedient, we have a right to say, not only that his judgment is in favour of likeness, but that all his ingenuity could not explain the passages in a manner satisfactory to himself, without the supposition of likeness.

But what Mr. Ewing's intrepidity and ingenuity did not attempt, Dr. Wardlaw has undertaken. He explains the passages on the supposition that baptism has no likeness to burial in any sense. Now, in this we have Dr. Wardlaw's judgment virtually but clearly pronounced, that Mr. Ewing's attempt is a failure. We have a right then to say, that Mr. Ewing's explanation of these passages is unsatisfactory to the most sagacious of his own party. But Dr. Wardlaw's opinion of the insufficiency of Mr. Ewing's explanation has the more value, when it is considered, that by refusing to adopt it, he is obliged to have recourse to an expedient as violent, and as wild, as that of Mr. Ewing's itself. To assert that there is here no likeness implied between baptism and burial, does as great violence to language as can easily be conceived. If, therefore, Dr. Wardlaw is so convinced of the insufficiency of Mr. Ewing's explanation, that he ventures on one so extravagant, his opinion of Mr. Ewing's failure is entitled to the greater weight. It was his interest to coincide with Mr. Ewing's explanation, had he conceived that it was at all tenable. He would not have ventured to come ashore upon a plank, had he not found Mr. Ewing's leaky boat sinking under him. Dr. Wardlaw complains of the mode of controversy that argues from discrepancies between those on the same side. I admit that the argument may be abused. But if he complain of my argument on this point, he does not see its bearing. Persons on the same side of a controversy, may differ with respect to the explanation of many passages, without any detriment to their common cause. But the difference here is about a thing which must in itself be obvious, namely, whether a certain phrase implies the

likeness of one thing to another. About this there cannot in reality be a ground for controversy among those who understand the words.

The difference, also, is of such a nature, that each must look on the other as giving up the common cause. As Mr. Ewing is so fully convinced that it is impossible to deface the likeness, he must look upon those who do not agree with him in finding it in preparatory rites, as giving up the passage to his opponents. As Dr. Wardlaw cannot explain the passages on the supposition of likeness without admitting immersion, he must look upon those who admit likeness, as yielding the doctrine in debate. On the other hand, we may differ about the meaning of *συμμετοί*, without the least danger to our common cause. One may say it is "*planted together*," another that it is "*joined together*," without overturning the common doctrine. My argument is founded, also, on the extravagancies to which each of these writers is obliged to have recourse, in order to defend his opinion. Each of them must have strong reason of dissatisfaction with the opinion of the other, when, rather than embrace it, he has recourse to an opposite point of extravagance. One sees likeness so clearly, that rather than deny it, he endeavours to find it where sobriety of judgment never could look for it. The other sees the extravagance of this attempt so clearly, that, rather than adopt it, he will deny that the passages contain any likeness.

But let us now take a glance at the process of ejection by which Dr. Wardlaw has removed from these passages the idea of likeness. "To be 'baptized into Christ,'" says he, "is to be baptized into the faith of him as the Messiah," &c. And again, "The simple meaning of the expression evidently is, that by being baptized into the faith of his death, as the death of our surety and substitute, we become *partakers with him in it*." Now, what is here said to be evidently the simple meaning of this expression, is evidently



not its meaning at all. We do not become partakers in the death of Christ, by being baptized into the faith of his death. We become partakers in the death of Christ, by faith, before baptism, and without baptism; and would have been equally so, had baptism never been instituted. In baptism, this participation with Christ is exhibited in figure, just as we are said to *wash away our sins* in baptism. Sins are washed away by faith in the blood of Christ, but they are symbolically washed away in baptism. Just so we become partakers in the death of Christ the moment we believe; in baptism, this participation is exhibited by a symbol.

Dr. Wardlaw, by this mode of interpretation, considers *faith in Christ's death*, and *baptism into his death*, as equivalent expressions. But to be "baptized into his death," is more than to "believe in his death." Baptism into his death, not only imports that we believe in him as our substitute, but *marks* our death in his death. To be *baptized into his death*, is the same as to be *buried into death*. In reality we die with Christ the moment we believe; but this is not expressed by the phrase, *faith in Christ's death*. It is learned from other parts of the Scriptures. Now, herein lies the importance of the mode of baptism. It marks, in a figure, the way in which we become partakers in the benefits of Christ's death. This is by our being, by a divine constitution, one with him. His death is a proper atonement for us, because we die with him, so that in reality his death is ours. This is not necessary in all cases of substitution. To have a debt discharged by another, there is no necessity to become one with him. But it is not so in crime. Justice is not satisfied, except the criminal himself suffers. And by the divine constitution, that makes all believers one with Christ, they are all considered as having died with him. The criminals have suffered, since he who suffered was one with them. Baptism, then, marks this circumstance. It shows,

in a figure, that union with Christ in his death, burial, and resurrection, which we have by faith.

According to Dr. Wardlaw's way of explaining these passages, there was no occasion to mention baptism at all. If the Apostle is speaking of the real oneness with Christ, without considering it as exhibited in a figure, he might as well have said, "Know ye not, that as many as have believed in Christ's death, have died along with him?" This would express all that Dr. Wardlaw takes out of the passage; and it would express it definitely. Why, then, does the Apostle bring in baptism at all? Again, if baptism implies burial only as implying faith in Christ's death, then the Lord's Supper, or any thing that implies faith might have been referred to on this occasion, as well as baptism. We might as well say that we are buried by the Lord's Supper as buried by baptism. We might as well say that we are crucified by baptism. But such phraseology is never used in the Scriptures. The only reason, then, that baptism is here brought forward at all, must be that it is a figure of burial.

That baptism has a likeness to death, is put beyond question in this passage, from the phrase, *buried with him through baptism into death*. Here is a burial *by* or *through the means of* baptism. What buries us into death? It is baptism. But the death into which baptism buries us, must be a figurative death. It is faith that buries us truly into Christ's death. But the death and burial here spoken of, are effected, not by faith, but by baptism. This phrase refutes Dr. Wardlaw's assertion, that though a likeness might be fancied between immersion and burial, no likeness to death can be found in it. The phrase, *buried by baptism into death*, imports that we die with Christ in baptism, as well as we are buried with him. Nay, it is by burial we die. We are supposed to be *buried into death*. And the figure is well fitted for this purpose. To immerse a living man, affords an emblem of death as

well as of burial. The baptized person dies under the water, and for a moment lies buried with Christ. Christ's own death was spoken of under the figure of a baptism.

Dr. Wardlaw, indeed, asserts that the phrase, *buried with him by baptism into his death*, merely directs the attention to that into which they were baptized. But the passage says nothing of the doctrine into which they were baptized, in any other way than as it is contained in the figure. As I observed before, it is by baptism, and not by faith, they are here said to be buried; and, therefore, the burial must be a figurative burial. The phrase in Col. ii. 12, is different, but equally express. It is buried with him *in* baptism. This burial, then, takes place, not in believing, but in baptism. We are buried with him when we are baptized, and *by* the act of baptizing. The two expressions, when taken together, make the thing more definite. One of them expresses that it is *in* baptism that we are buried; the other, that it is *by* baptism that we are buried.

Dr. Wardlaw speaks of this passage, as containing "a beautiful illustration of the spiritual connexion of believers with Christ." Now, how is this an illustration, if it is not by containing a likeness to the thing illustrated? Is it not absurd to speak of illustrating by things in which there is no resemblance to the principal object? Dr. Wardlaw cannot consistently look on this as an illustration. He sets out with supposing, that the passage refers merely to the participation that believers have in Christ's death, burial, and resurrection, by faith, without any likeness to these things in baptism. Now, if this is the case, death, burial, and resurrection, are here not an *illustration* of connexion, but an *exemplification* of connexion. By calling these things an illustration, the author gives up his doctrine. Indeed these things are so obviously an illustration—the passage so evidently considers death, burial, and resurrection, as figurative, that it is

not easy even for the most determined enemy of immersion to speak much about the passage, without using language that admits this.

"To be *dead with Christ*," says Dr. Wardlaw, "and to be *buried with Christ*, are the same things." Certainly not. Death is different from burial, though burial includes death. Were they not different, they would not both have been mentioned here. It is a distinct part of the gospel testimony, that Christ was buried. His burial was as distinct from his death, as his resurrection was.

"The latter of the two phrases," says Dr. Wardlaw, "appears to be used in the fourth verse, chiefly for the sake of *completing the Apostle's figure*." This assertion is most injurious to the language of the Holy Spirit, and totally unfounded in the lawful use of figures. I am bold to assert, that there cannot be an instance of what the author asserts, without a serious trespass of the laws of figurative language. It is true, indeed, that in allegory there may be some points in the figure which have nothing to correspond to them in the thing illustrated, because the unity of the resembling object cannot be broken. But to add burial to death, is to add one figure to another without any necessity. If, then, there is no distinct meaning in burial, to add it to death is vicious in taste, and childish in argument. The only reason why burial is mentioned, must be that it has a distinct meaning. To suppose that the Apostle would bring it in merely for the purpose of stringing one figure to another, is not only an affront to the Holy Spirit, but would be an impeachment of the good sense of the Apostle, if he had written without inspiration. Plato indeed goes over the whole human body, and brings out of it a chain of metaphors. He makes the head a citadel, the neck an isthmus, &c. This is sufficiently childish, but it is manly compared with what the apostle is supposed to do. Plato gives some meaning to each of his figures; but the apostle strings one figure to

another, not for the sake of additional illustration, but out of the puerile conceit of completing his series of figures. It would have been an improvement, had he inserted the embalming between death and the burial, and added the funeral procession to the series.

But what shall we say of *the Apostle's figure*? Is there, then, a figure in the Apostle's language? Is this death, burial, and resurrection, figurative? If the death, burial, and resurrection in baptism are figurative, they must have a likeness. Is there any figurative death without a likeness? There is a common proverb, that murder will never lie. The murderer will sometimes discover himself even by talking in his sleep. Dr. Wardlaw has murdered this passage most barbarously, and it is no wonder if he informs against himself. While he has assassinated the likeness in baptism to death, burial, and resurrection, he speaks of *illustration, figure, and resemblance*.

"As it was necessary," says Dr. Wardlaw, in order to Christ's rising, that he should be *laid in the grave*; so in *the figure*, it is necessary that we should be viewed as *buried with him*, in order to our *rising with him* to newness of life. Certainly, it is necessary that we should be viewed in the figure of baptism as *buried with Christ*. But if the author means that we are buried with Christ by faith in him as a substitute merely by a mode of speaking, it is a most serious error. Does the author say that it is in a figurative way of speaking that the believer dies with Christ? If he does, he has a very inadequate view of the believer's union with Christ. The believer is one with Christ, not by a peculiar mode of speaking, or a particular way of viewing the subject, but by a real union. He is one with Christ as truly as he is one with Adam. He dies with Christ as truly as he fell with Adam. By a divine constitution all Christ's people are one with him, and his work is as really theirs, as if they had themselves performed it. When it is said that Christians have died with Christ by faith,

there is no more figure than when it is said that they have died in Adam, or that they shall die themselves.

But this view of the subject overturns the apostle's reasoning altogether. Dr. Wardlaw understands the apostle as speaking of the connexion that believers have with Christ by faith; and that they are here said to be dead with him, buried with him, and to be risen with him, not by a likeness to these things in baptism, but merely by faith. Now, if he ascribes to them this death, burial, and resurrection, as a mode of viewing them, or as a figurative way of speaking, he wrests the apostle's argument out of his hands. If this death is the death by faith, and yet nothing but a figure, then our security against living in sin, according to the Apostle, is nothing but a figure. A figurative death is no security against sin. An actor will die on the stage to-night, and act to-morrow. If it is only in a certain way of speaking that we rise with Christ by faith, then there is from that figurative resurrection no security of a holy life. The spirit of the Apostle's reasoning on this verse would be, "How can they, who are said by a figure to be dead to sin, live any longer therein? Know ye not, that as many of us as have believed on Christ, are figuratively viewed as having died with him?" This figure would be a weak security against living in sin. It must be a real death that will secure against sin. Now, how different is the Apostle's argument, on our view? "How shall we that are dead to sin, live any longer therein?" This must be real death, otherwise there is no argument. How then are we dead? By faith in Christ we are dead. But in baptism this truth is exhibited in figure. "Know ye not that so many of us as were baptized into Jesus Christ, were baptized into his death?" To be *baptized into Jesus Christ* imports the being baptized into the faith of his death as our substitute; but to be baptized into his death imports, that by baptism we are exhibited as dying along with him. The death in baptism is a figurative death, founded on the real death by faith. If *baptized into*

*his death*, does not import our death with Christ, this verse is not proof of what is asserted in the former. And if baptism is no figurative burial, it is no proof of death, and therefore would be only an incumbrance in this place. The Christian has a real death, burial, and resurrection with Christ by faith. He has all these also in baptism by figure. Baptism is a figure of death, because it has no meaning otherwise. Hence it is used as an argument here: and hence the great importance of understanding the import of baptism. It gives, by a striking figure, a conception of the union of believers with Christ in his death, burial, and resurrection, that has escaped, we see, the most sagacious Christians who are ignorant of the ordinance.

"The simple meaning," says Dr. Wardlaw, is this: "Since, in our being baptized into Jesus Christ, we were baptized into his death,—into the faith of his death as the death of a surety: we may be considered, as by faith, partaking with him in his death." I reply, This partaking is a real—not a figurative partaking. If baptism is not a figure of this, there was no occasion to allude to it at all. The author continues: "*as buried with him*; and that with the special end of our rising with him, in a spiritual resemblance of his resurrection, and 'walking in newness of life.'" But does not Dr. Wardlaw see that we are not here said to be *buried with him by faith*, but *buried with him by baptism into death*? This burial is not merely a burial by faith, but a burial by baptism. The language imports, also, that baptism has a reference both to Christ's resurrection, and our new life. "We are buried with him by baptism into death, that like as Christ was raised up from the dead by the glory of the Father, even so we also should walk in newness of life." This is stated as the end of baptism—not as the end of faith. As baptism does not effect these things, it must be viewed as a figure. Baptism makes us die, buries us, raises us, only in figure; therefore as we are said to die, to be buried,

and to rise in baptism, baptism must contain a likeness to these things. It is not said that we are *buried by faith, that we may rise, &c.*; but that we are buried by baptism into death, that we may rise, &c.- All these things are connected with baptism. But except as a likeness or figure, it has no connexion with them at all. Any other ordinance might have been equally mentioned. Rather there was no need for the mention of any ordinance, on the supposition that there is no likeness.

But that baptism contains a likeness to death, is in this passage expressly asserted: For if we have been *συνταφίσθαι*, "joined with him *in the likeness* of his death." Here we see that this death is a symbolical death. It is a *likeness* to death. Now, the participation in Christ's death, that the believer has by faith, is not a likeness to death, but a real death. It is, by the divine constitution of the union that subsists between Christ and his people, his own death. How, then, is there in baptism a likeness to death, if that ordinance is not by immersion? Our future resurrection is also figured in baptism: "we shall be also in the likeness of his resurrection." In Col. ii. 12, also, we are said to be risen with Christ: "Buried with him *in baptism*; wherein, or *in which*, also ye are risen with him." Dr. Wardlaw asks, How is it we are said to be "risen with him?" Undoubtedly through faith. Without this there is no rising to new life, nor will there be to glory. But this resurrection is notwithstanding said here to be *in baptism*. It must then be *in figure*. Dr. Wardlaw supposes that these things are ascribed to baptism; "because it was the first public declaration of the faith of the converts." But baptism is not necessarily a *public* declaration of faith. Nor is it necessarily the first public declaration. There may be many instances in which a public declaration of faith is made, before there is any opportunity of being baptized. Besides, this is an apocryphal reason. The Scriptures do not assign it. And as a mat-



ter of fact, it is no more connected with salvation than the Lord's supper. It is not in baptism, nor by means of baptism, that we die with Christ really, or are made spiritually alive. This death and this life take place before baptism. Baptism, then, can have these things ascribed to it only in figure. "It is on the same principle," says Dr. Wardlaw, "that they are spoken of as in *baptism* 'washing away their sins.'" All these things are doubtless spoken on the same principle. But that principle is, that baptism is a figure. Baptism washes away sins, not because it is the first ordinance, but because it is an emblematical washing of the body with water. Does not Dr. Wardlaw hold, that baptism is an emblem of washing away sin? How then does he explain the phrase, *washing away sin in baptism*, on the principle of baptism being the first ordinance? We wash away sins in baptism, just as we eat the flesh of Jesus in the Lord's supper. "The cup of blessing which we bless, is it not the communion of the blood of Christ? The bread which we break, is it not the communion of the body of Christ?" How is the cup the communion of Christ's blood? How is the bread the communion of his body? In figure. And when the figure is observed in faith, the real communion is effected. Just so baptism washes away sin. Just so in baptism we die, we are buried, and we rise. But the truth of the emblem is effected, not by baptism in any sense, but by faith of the operation of God. It is absurd and ridiculous to suppose, that an ordinance can wash away sin in any other than a figurative sense. Was it not in this way that Jewish rites were said to make an atonement and to cleanse from sin? The first ordinance observed, has no more to do with these things than the last. The death, burial, and resurrection, which are ascribed to baptism, take place *in baptism* and *by means of baptism*. The washing away of sins, ascribed to baptism, is effected by baptism. This washing, this death, this burial, and this

resurrection, then, cannot be the washing, death, burial, and resurrection, which are effected by faith, and which take place before baptism. If the washing away of sins, the death, burial, and resurrection, ascribed to baptism, were effected previously, and by other means, the Scriptures are not true, that speak of them as effected in baptism, and by baptism. The reality has already taken place, but it is represented in figure as taking place in the ordinance, and by means of the ordinance.

"In Rom. vi." says Dr. Wardlaw, "the language of the whole passage is figurative." And what, suppose it were figurative? Would this imply that there is no likeness? When death, burial, and resurrection, are used figuratively, they must of necessity have a likeness. Will Dr. Wardlaw show what kind of figure he supposes to exist here? Will he show any figure that will justify the ascription of the washing away of sin, of death, burial, and resurrection to an ordinance, because it is the first ordinance observed? This figure he will look for in vain, either in the writings of rhetoricians, or the practice of any language. The principle on which I hold that these things are ascribed to baptism, I have verified by example, and justified on principle. But will Dr. Wardlaw recollect, that this death, burial, and resurrection, he has, in setting out, considered as effected by faith? He cannot, then, speak consistently of this language as figurative. But though he talks of the *simple meaning* of the passage, there is evidently a jumble in his own conceptions of this meaning. There never was a paragraph farther from simplicity, than that which he has employed to show the simple meaning of Rom. vi. 1.

The fact, however, is, that in the expression, *wash away sin by baptism, death, burial, and resurrection in baptism*, there is no figure. It is a figurative action, not a figurative expression. A symbol is not a figure of speech. And I have shown, that as Dr. Wardlaw has in the commencement explained death, burial,

and resurrection, as the death, burial, and resurrection which we have by faith in Christ, dying as our surety, to speak of these things now as figurative language, is to overturn the Apostle's argument, and to deny real union with Christ in his work. We are not one with him by a divine constitution, as we are one with Adam, but merely one with him in a figurative way of speaking. Dr. Wardlaw, then, ejects immersion out of Rom. vi. only by virtually overturning the gospel, or denying real oneness with Christ.

"The same principle of interpretation," says Dr. Wardlaw, "according to which the expression '*buried with Christ*' is explained, as referring to the representation of interment by the immersion of the body under water, should lead us also to understand the phrase which immediately follows, '*planted together in the likeness of his death*,' as referring to an emblematic representation of *planting*, which, accordingly, some have stretched their fancy to make out." If the word *συνεφύτετο* is to be translated *planted together*, there must indeed be a likeness between baptism and planting. And it requires no stretch of fancy to discover a likeness between the burying of the roots of plants and immersion in water. But even on this supposition, the word is metaphorical, and while it equally with a symbolical action requires likeness, it does not imply that baptism is an emblem of planting. Let Dr. Wardlaw consider the difference between a figurative word and a figurative action, and he will withdraw this objection. Baptism is here explained as a symbolical action, representing death, burial, and resurrection. The likeness to planting is illustrative, not symbolical. The phrase, *planting together*, proves the mode of baptism; but it does not imply that there is in it any thing emblematic of planting. Dr. Wardlaw continues, "or the phrase, *crucified with him*, to some similar exhibition of crucifixion." But does not Dr. Wardlaw perceive that we are not said to be crucified with Christ in baptism? We are indeed cruci-

fied with him—really and truly crucified with him—not in baptism, but by faith in his cross. We were nailed to the tree, when he was nailed, because by the divine constitution we are one with him. But, according to Dr. Wardlaw's explanation of this passage, We might as well be said to be crucified in baptism as buried in baptism. If there is no allusion to burial in baptism, more than to crucifixion, why are we not said to be crucified in baptism? If we are really crucified with him by faith in his cross, why might we not, on Dr. Wardlaw's principle, be said to be crucified in baptism, and by means of baptism, because it is the first ordinance in which we profess faith in the cross of Christ? But there is no such absurdity of expression in the Scriptures.

After all the labours of Mr. Ewing and Dr. Wardlaw on this passage, I could safely rest my cause on a candid reading of it by the most unlettered good sense. To a reflecting mind, nothing can more strongly prove the impossibility of diverting these words from giving their testimony in favour of immersion, than that one of these learned and ingenious writers could find no other way to effect his purpose, but by forcing burial to denote embalming or washing the dead; and the other by denying that the passage implies any likeness between baptism and burial. These extravagances are so enormous, that every sober mind may see that the cause that requires them is desperate. I ask any man who fears God and trembles at his word, is Christ's burial merely the washing of his corpse, and not his being laid in the sepulchre? I ask, does the phrase "*buried with baptism by death*" import no likeness between baptism and burial?

Dr. Wardlaw observes, "according to our Baptist brethren, *washing* or *cleansing*, so far from being the exclusive, is not even the principal, but only a secondary meaning of the rite." In this he is mistaken. Death, burial, and resurrection, we do not consider as the primary meaning of baptism; and

washing away sin, as a secondary meaning. It takes both together to make one meaning. The ordinance has one meaning only. It not only signifies washing away sin through faith in the blood of Christ, but denotes that such sins are washed away by our fellowship with him in his death. Washing away of sin is the thing which it always signifies ; but this is not the whole of its meaning. It is then to no purpose that Dr. Wardlaw insists that *sprinkling* and *pouring* may be an emblem of cleansing. They are no emblem of death, burial, and resurrection which are figured in baptism.

Another passage that favours our view of the mode and import of baptism is, 1 Cor. xv. 29. "Else what shall they do which are baptized for the dead, if the dead rise not at all? Why are they then baptized for the dead?" There must be an argument here, and this object of baptism must be a scriptural object, otherwise it could not be an argument. Indeed, though to us the passage may be difficult from difference of circumstances with respect to those immediately addressed, yet it is evident that the apostle considers the argument as very obvious and convincing. Now, to consider the expression to be a reference to the mode and import of baptism, as implying an emblem of the resurrection of believers, will afford a natural meaning to the words, and an important argument to the apostle. Baptism is an ordinance that represents our burial and resurrection with Christ. We are baptized, in the hope that our dead bodies shall rise from the grave. Now, if there is no resurrection, why are we baptized? On that supposition, there is no meaning in baptism. It is absurd for any to be baptized, baptism being a figure of a resurrection, if they do not believe in a resurrection. Heb. x. 22, is on both sides allowed to have a reference to baptism ; and to me it appears evident, that the whole body was covered with the water. "Let us draw near with a true heart, in full assurance of faith, having our hearts sprinkled from an evil

conscience, and our bodies washed with pure water." Here the heart is said to be sprinkled in allusion to the application of the blood of the sacrifices; and the body is said to be washed in pure water, referring to the ordinance of baptism. Now, the pouring of a little water in the face is not a washing of the body. I admit, that sprinkling a little water on any part of the body might be an emblem of purification; but this would not be called a washing of the body. The passage which Mr. Ewing brings to justify his view of this verse, is not parallel. "For, in that she hath poured this ointment on my body, she did it for my burial," Matt. xxvi. 12. "This instance," says Mr. Ewing, "of calling what was poured on the head, a pouring on the body, illustrates what is said of baptism, which is in itself a pouring on the face only, but which, being a figure of washing, is called a washing of the body." Our Lord's expression is quite literal, and has no emblem. The smallest quantity of water poured on any part of the body, is as truly poured on the body as if the whole body was covered. Water is literally poured on the body, if poured on any part of the body. But when the body is said to be washed, it implies that the whole body is washed. Washing a part of the body, is not washing the body. Let us have an example in which the pouring of a little water on a part of an object, is called the washing of the object. The bodies of the priests were washed on entering on their office. Shall we say that this may have been the pouring of a little water on their head? Though I do not agree with Dr. Campbell, that *λουω* cannot be applied to a part, yet it is so generally appropriated to the bathing of the whole body, that in medical use it is employed without a regimen in that sense. If any part is not to be bathed, it must be expressly excepted, as *πλην κεφαλῆς*, *except the head*.

"Except a man be born of water and the Spirit," John iii. 5. is another expression which is admitted to refer to baptism; and has its explanation most intelligibly in emersion out of the water in that ordinance.

To emerge out of the water, is like a birth ; and to be *born of water*, as distinguished from being *born of the Spirit*, is to be born of the truth represented by the water. We are regenerated both by the word and Spirit. We are born into the kingdom of God by the agency of his Spirit, through the belief of the word that testifies the death, burial, and resurrection of Christ, and our death, burial, and resurrection with him. Christ, therefore, is said to have given himself for his church, that he might sanctify and cleanse it with the *washing of water by the word*, Ephes. v. 26. The washing of water is by the word, which is figuratively done in baptism. In like manner, we are said to be saved "by the washing of regeneration and renewing of the Holy Ghost," Tit. iii. 5. We are also said to be "washed and sanctified," 1 Cor. vi. 11, in reference to the cleansing from sin by faith in the blood of Christ, as well as to the renewing of our hearts by the Holy Spirit.

#### BRIEF STRICTURES ON MR. EWING'S MISCELLANEOUS REMARKS ON THE HYPOTHESIS OF IMMERSION.

I HAVE, in a great measure, anticipated any thing that I judge necessary on Mr. Ewing's Miscellaneous Remarks on the Hypothesis of Immersion. I cannot, however, dismiss the subject without more expressly entering my protest against the grounds of his reasoning in this part of his work. They appear to me both false and dangerous. Immersion he considers as indecent and indelicate, and in several cases he attempts to prove its impracticability. "The immersion of one person by another," says Mr. Ewing, "except in cases of necessity or mercy, seems to be contrary to decency, and to the respect which we owe to one another." Mr. Ewing commences very properly, by saying, "I feel it incumbent on me to enforce my conviction on others, by every consideration which the examination of the Scriptures on the subject has suggested to my mind." By all mean

let us have every thing that the Scriptures suggest on this subject. Pray now, Mr. Ewing, was it the Scriptures that suggested this objection? This is an appeal to our pride against the law of Christ,—an appeal, however, that is likely to have more weight with some, than an appeal to the word of God. But is there more dignity and delicacy in pouring water into a person's face, out of the hand, so that some of the water must be swallowed? Had Mr. Ewing, however, established this from the Scriptures, he would have heard no objection from me on this ground. I would not take the responsibility of this argument for all the wealth of the city of Glasgow. Let Mr. Ewing take care that he is not enlisting the corruption of the Christian's heart against the appointment of Jesus. Does not Mr. Ewing see that the respect we owe to one another has no concern in the question? If it suits the wisdom of Christ's appointments, that one person should be immersed by another, even were it a real humiliation, it is to Christ we stoop. That God's institutions cannot foster any of the corruptions of our nature, is self-evident; but that they should consult our sentiments of dignity and delicacy, is a thing that no one acquainted with the Scriptures ought to assert. Has Mr. Ewing never read the Old Testament? Did he never hear of such a thing as circumcision? Has he forgotten the transaction in Abraham's house on the institution of that ordinance? Was there more dignity in that operation, with respect to the Father of the Faithful, and the males of his house, than there is in immersion in water? What shall we say of the transaction at the Hill of Foreskins? What shall we say of many parts of the law of Moses? What shall we say of many parts both of the Old Testament and the New? Try them by Mr. Ewing's test, and they must be expunged from the book of God. Infidelity here may have a plausible handle, though no just ground of objection. But in immersion, with respect both to males and females, there is none. Mr. Ewing's caricature of the immersion of females, is so



much in the spirit of the means by which the Church of Rome keeps the higher ranks from reading the Scriptures, that I have no language strong enough to express my feelings of abhorrence. "Shall you permit your wives and daughters," say the enemies of the Scriptures, "to read the indelicate statements of the Bible?"\* And shall the man of God blow the trumpet of Satan in the camp of Israel? If immersion is an ordinance of Christ, it is a fearful thing to oppose it by such an engine. It is not the first time, however, that Jesus has been rebuked as a sinner. In the estimation of the Pharisees, he broke the Sabbath; he was charged as a wine-bibber and a glutton; and it is not strange that the wisdom of this world should find indelicacy in his ordinances.

Mr. Ewing thinks himself very strong with respect to the argument from the scarcity of water; and no doubt he will appear so to a numerous class of his readers. But the argument, instead of having weight, cannot be admitted to a hearing by any one who understands the nature of evidence. All the information that can be collected at this distance of time, cannot assure us that there were not other resources of water, of which we have no account. Mr. Ewing may say, that the pool of Bethesda may have been sufficient only for one person to go down at a time. Well, if my cause obliged me to prove that it admitted two, I grant that I could not prove it. But I am not bound to proof. I may say that it may have admitted a hundred to go down at once, and the bare possibility is enough to remove the objection. Neither of us can prove the dimensions of it. If, then, there had been no water in Jerusalem but this pool, I am at liberty to suppose that it might have sufficed. The pool of Siloam may have been only sufficient to wash the eyes, but it may have been sufficient to float a ship. This is quite enough for me. If immersion is not im-

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\* It is said that there is no more usual argument to dissuade the higher classes in France from reading the Scriptures, than their indelicacy. They are told that the Bible on this account, is the very worst book that can be put into the hands of youth.

possible in some of the places where baptism was performed, no man who understands reasoning will object on this ground.

Were I engaged with Mr. Ewing, even in an historical controversy, with respect to the supply of water in Jerusalem in the days of the apostles, I could easily show that his conclusions are unwarranted. He depends on the accounts of modern travellers. I would admit their statements, and deny the consequence. Must the supply of water be the same now as it was then? Aqueducts and reservoirs may have then existed, of which there are no remains. Herod, at great expense, brought water to the city by aqueducts, from a considerable distance; and the pools, and fountains, and rivers, cannot now be estimated. The supply of water to the city of God, could not be inadequate to the wants of the inhabitants, and to the use of it in legal purifications, which required abundant resources. Shall we judge of the supply of water in the days of the apostles, by that of the present time, when Jerusalem is suffering under the curse? How much depended at that time upon rain? Is there reason to think that the supply is equal at present? Earthquakes alter the course of rivers, and often seal up fountains. In the year 1182, as Goldsmith relates, most of the cities of Syria, and the kingdom of Jerusalem, were destroyed by an earthquake.\* Must the brook Kedron have been as scanty as it is now? Mr. Ewing tells us that, like other brooks in cities, it was contaminated. Did the filth run up the stream? and could they not baptize where it entered

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\* Mr. Gibbon makes a like objection to the Scripture account of the fertility of Judea. The present barrenness of that country, he considers as proof of the falsehood of the accounts of its ancient fertility. This, which may appear to many very sage, is in reality very shallow. There are many possible ways in which the fertility of a country may differ at different times. The peasants of Switzerland draw walls of stone across their declivities, to keep up the mould which industry has brought to the nourishment of their vines. If these were for a few years neglected, the rains would sweep away all their labours, and there would be nothing in the place of luxuriance, but barrenness and naked rocks.

the city, or upwards? The very attempt to prove, at this distance of time, that there could not be water in or near Jerusalem for immersion, is absurd. I would hold this, were the question merely an historical one. But if the Holy Spirit testifies that the disciples were baptized on believing the gospel, and if I have proved that this word signifies to *immerse*, then, though there were real difficulties on the subject, I am entitled to suppose that there must have been in some place a supply of water.

John the Baptist had enough of water in the Jordan; but if there is enough of water, there are, it seems, other wants. "In the course of his ministry," says Mr. Ewing, "he drew his illustrations, like his Master, who came after him, from the objects surrounding him at the time. But he says nothing of the stream, of its depth, of its rapidity, of its strength, of its overflowings, of its billows, of its qualities of purification." Was ever any thing so childish put upon paper? Can any mind suppose that there is argument in this? Did ever John the Baptist illustrate his subject by allusions to popping? Is the absence of any such allusions, to be received as evidence that there was not immersion in baptism?

"As a teacher," says Mr. Ewing, "you never find him in the river." Does this say that, as a baptizer, he might not have been in the river? Such arguments are not only unsound, but absurd. Whenever they have any weight, there must be an indistinctness of vision, as to the nature of evidence.

I will not go out of my way to look for water to immerse the disciples of Sychar in Samaria. If Mr. Ewing knows that they were baptized, from the usual practice, I know they were immersed, from the meaning of the word. Had I no other resource, I would make Jacob's well supply me. But as it is not said where they were baptized, I will make them conduct Christ and the Apostles on their way, till they come to water. I care not where the water is to be found; if they were baptized, they were immersed.

Mr. Ewing, as well as Dr. Wardlaw, learns from Peter's phraseology, "can any man forbid water?" that the water was to be brought to the place. And if this were certain, it affects not the question. Must the observance of the ordinances of Christ never put us to trouble? But the expression imports no more, than "who can forbid baptism to the persons who have already received the Holy Spirit?" without any respect to mode.

The phraseology of Ananias, it seems, forbids immersion:—"Arise, and be baptized." Where is the proof here? Why, there is no going down to the water, nor coming up from it. Is there any man so frantic as to suppose, that this phraseology must apply to every baptism? Baptism in a bath, is as good as baptism in the Jordan.

But Paul was baptized after a three days' fast, before he had received either meat or strength. "Would this have been done," we are asked, "had his baptism been immersion?" It was done, yet his baptism was immersion. From this, let us learn that baptism is not a thing to be trifled with, but ought to be performed as soon as possible after the belief of the truth. It would give me great pleasure, if Mr. Ewing would make this use of the circumstance. He has certainly delayed his baptism much too long.

But the jailor—How shall we find water to immerse the jailor? "The argument," says Mr. Ewing, "that there was a bath in the jail at Philippi, because there is a very fine tank at Calcutta, and always is one to be found in an eastern jail, may be illustrated in this manner: There was a stove in the jail at Philippi, because there is a very fine one in the jail at St. Petersburg, and always is one to be found in a northern jail." Does Mr. Ewing suppose that his opponents are bound to prove that there must have been a bath in the jail at Philippi? That there may have been one is quite sufficient for our purpose. Even this is not necessary. Any vessel that will hold a sufficient quantity of water; will serve us equally well.

Besides, for any thing in the narrative, the baptism might have taken place in any part of the town. It is madness to suppose that immersion was here impossible ; and if it was not impossible, the objection is not valid. There might have been a thousand ways of obtaining water of which we are ignorant. To suppose that it is necessary to produce, from the history, an actual supply of water, in the case of every baptism, implies a radical error, with respect to the first principles of evidence. The jailor and his household were baptized, therefore they were immersed. What sober mind will go in quest of the water, in a foreign country, at the distance of nearly two thousand years!

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## SUBJECTS OF BAPTISM.

HAVING ascertained the mode and the meaning of this ordinance, I shall now inquire who are the subjects of it. If our minds were uninfluenced by prejudice, this inquiry would not be tedious. We have the answer obviously in the words of the apostolical commission. "Go ye, therefore, and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost ; teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you : and, lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world. Amen." Matth. xxviii. 19.

It is well known that the word corresponding to teach, in the first instance in which it occurs in this passage, signifies to *disciple*, or *make scholars*. To disciple all nations, is to bring them by faith into the school of Christ, in which they are to learn his will. The persons, then, whom this commission warrants to be baptized, are scholars of Christ, having believed in him for salvation. If this needed confirmation, it has it in the record of the commission by Mark. "Go ye into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature. He that believeth and is baptized shall be

saved ; but he that believeth not, shall be damned." Here the persons whom Matthew calls disciples, Mark calls believers. According to this commission, then, none are warranted to be baptized but disciples or believers. But our opponents affect to treat this passage as not at all to the purpose ; alleging, that though it commands believers to be baptized, it does not exclude the infants of believers. They consider this as common ground, and as teaching a doctrine which they do not deny, without opposing the peculiar doctrine which they hold. Accordingly, they run over this commission with the greatest apparent ease, and are amazed at the want of perspicacity in their opponents, who see in it any thing unfavourable to the baptism of infants. Now, this evidence strikes me in so very different a light, that I am willing to hang the whole controversy on this passage. If I had not another passage in the word of God, I will engage to refute my opponents from the words of this commission alone. Dr. Wardlaw thinks he has shown as clear as a sun-beam, that the words of this commission have no bearing on the subject. I will risk the credit of my understanding, on my success in showing that, *according to this commission, believers only are to be baptized.* It is impossible that a command to baptize believers, can be extended to include any but believers. We need not say that this cannot be done by inference ; I say it cannot be done by the most express command or explanation. No command, no explanation, can bring unbelievers into the commission that enjoins the baptism of believers. Even if I found another command, enjoining the baptism of the infants of believers, I would not move an inch from my position. I would still say, this is not included in the apostolical commission. This is another commission, and cannot interfere with the former. This would establish the baptism of infants, indeed, but it would not be according to this commission, nor included in it. It would be another baptism, far more different from the baptism of this commission, than the bap-

tism of John was from that of the Apostles. This command to baptize the infants of believers, would not be according to the command to baptize believers. There would then be two baptisms, on quite different grounds; the one on the ground of faith, the other on the ground of descent. Talk not, then, of the Abrahamic covenant, and of circumcision; if a baptism, or any other New Testament ordinance, must be found to correspond to these, it cannot be forced into the baptism commanded in this commission. This assertion would imply a contradiction. It would imply that the same persons may be, at the same time, both believers and unbelievers. Here, then, I stand entrenched, and I defy the ingenuity of earth and hell to drive me from my position. *This commission to baptize believers, does not indeed imply that it is impossible that another commission might have been given to baptize infants, but, by necessity, it excludes them for ever from being included in this command. If infants are baptized, it is from another commission; and it is another baptism, founded on another principle.*

But not only does this commission exclude infants from the baptism it enjoins: if there were even another commission enjoining the baptism of infants; when these infants, who have been baptized in infancy, according to this supposed second commission, believe the gospel, they must be baptized according to the commission, Mat. xxviii. 19. without any regard to their baptism in infancy. The commission commands all men to be baptized on believing the gospel. Had there been even a divinely appointed baptism for them in infancy, it cannot interfere with this baptism, nor excuse from obedience to the command that enjoins believers to be baptized. The command of Jesus to every believer to be baptized, stands engraven in indelible characters in this commission. Till the trumpet sounds for judgment, it cannot be effaced. I call on all believers, on their allegiance to the Son of God, to submit to this ordinance of his kingdom. He alleged one instance in which the

command of God was made void by the traditions of the Pharisees. God has commanded the children to support their parents if they need it; but the Pharisees, by an invention of their own, eluded this command. Just so with infant baptism. It has usurped the place of believer baptism; and, as far as it is received, sets the ordinance of God aside altogether. So it happens, that this great law of the kingdom, that Jesus has connected so prominently with the truth itself; this ordinance, that in so lively a manner, exhibits that truth in a figure to be observed immediately after its reception, is now generally set aside. Believer baptism is virtually abolished, and expressly explained as fit only for the first reception of Christianity in every country. Why, my brethren, do ye make void the law of God by your traditions?

But Dr. Wardlaw will say, "the reply to this is simple and satisfactory." "Suppose," says he, "the ordinance of *circumcision* had been to continue, and the command had run in these terms:—'Go ye, therefore, and disciple all nations, *circumcising* them in the name of the Father,' &c. Had such language been used, we should have known that children were to be the subjects of the prescribed rite, as well as their parents: the previously existing practice would have ascertained this." I deny it, Dr. Wardlaw. I will not be driven from my position by *circumcision* more than by *baptism*. Had such a commission been given to *circumcise*, it would have excluded infants utterly. Could a command to circumcise believers, include a command to circumcise any but believers? This is impossible. No matter what was the former practice with respect to circumcision. If the apostles are commanded to circumcise believers, they cannot, in virtue of that commission, circumcise any but believers. I will say, also, that if we met in another part of Scripture, a command to circumcise the infants of believers, it would not be included in the apostolical commission. A command to circumcise believers, can extend to none but believers. But Dr.



Wardlaw will say, we know, that the Jews did circumcise infants. We do indeed know this; but are we to do every thing that was enjoined on the Jews? This commission to circumcise believers, would exclude the circumcision of infants; because it extends to none but believers. The Jewish practice as to circumcision, could not show what must be the Christian practice as to this rite, had it been appointed as a Christian ordinance. And no practice could reduce infant circumcision to a commission enjoining believer circumcision. I stand then to my position as well if a Jewish ordinance is adopted, as if a new ordinance is introduced. A command to believers to observe any ordinance whatever, can never imply any but believers. This is as clear as the light of heaven. It is a first truth. The denial of it implies a contradiction. "Would they," (the apostles) says Dr. Wardlaw, "certainly have inferred from it, that, although the *same rite* was to continue, there was to be a change in the *subjects* of it?" There is no need of any *inference* on the subject. That believers, in such a supposed commission, are the only subjects of the rite enjoined on believers, would be self-evident to all who are capable of understanding the terms. What inconsistency would they see in the continuation of the same rite, while the subjects of it were changed? Had the Paschal Lamb been continued instead of the Lord's Supper, would it imply that all who among the Jews eat the passover, should eat it among Christians?

With reference to Mark xvi. 16, Mr. Ewing says, "From this text some infer, that a person must actually believe, else he cannot be baptized. With as much reason they might infer, that a person must actually believe, else he cannot be saved." Certainly; if there were no way of saving children but by the gospel, this conclusion would be inevitable. The gospel saves none but by faith. But the gospel has nothing to do with infants, nor have gospel ordinances any respect to them. The gospel has to do

with those who hear it. It is good news ; but to infants it is not news at all. They know nothing of it. The salvation of the gospel is as much confined to believers, as the baptism of the gospel is. None shall ever be saved by the gospel who do not believe it. Consequently, by the gospel no infant can be saved. It is expressly, with respect to such as hear it, that the gospel is here said to be salvation by faith, and condemnation by unbelief. "Go ye into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature. He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved ; but he that believeth not shall be damned." Here the salvation and condemnation respect those to whom the gospel comes. Infants are saved by the death of Christ, but not by the gospel—not by faith. Adults are saved by faith, not from the virtue of faith, but it is of faith that it might be by grace. Infants who enter heaven must be regenerated, but not by the gospel. Infants must be sanctified for heaven, but not through the truth as revealed to man. We know nothing of the means by which God receives saved infants : nor have we any business with it. The salvation that the gospel proclaims to the world, is a salvation through the belief of the truth, and none have this salvation without faith. The nations who have not heard the gospel, cannot be saved by the gospel, because the gospel is salvation only through faith in it. They are not condemned by the gospel ; for it is condemnation only to those who do not believe it. To them it is neither a benefit, nor an injury. They will be judged, as we are assured in the Scriptures, according to the law written on the heart. I admit, then, that the salvation of the Apostolic commission, is as much confined to believers, as the baptism of that commission is confined to such. The man who would preach infant salvation out of the Apostolic commission, or attempt to prove that the commission may be explained so as to include it, I would gainsay, on the same ground on which I resist the attempts to include in it infant baptism. None can be saved by the gos-

pel, but such as believe the gospel : none can be baptized with the baptism of the gospel, but such as believe the gospel. There is no exception to either.

But that believers only can be baptized by this commission, is clear from that *into* which they are said to be baptized : “ Baptizing them *into* the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.” It is into the faith and subjection of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, that men are to be baptized. Surely none can be baptized into the faith and subjection of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, but adults. Infants cannot believe, nor express subjection. About the glorious doctrine imported in these words, we have no dispute. On this all important point, we have one mind. And I joyfully profess that I embrace as brethren in Christ all who are united with me in that doctrine, and the truths imported in it. While, therefore, I use the surgical knife with an unsparing hand, to remove the morbid parts of the reasoning of my brethren, I love them for their love to that truth ; and I cut only to heal. The agreement, as to the mode and subjects of this ordinance, that I have with the Arian Baptists, I esteem as nothing. My brethren love the thing imported by baptism, while I lament that they spend so much zeal in endeavouring to establish a baptism not instituted by Christ. In doing so, they injure thousands and thousands of their brethren, and cannot but injure themselves. It is impossible to fight against God on any point, without being wounded. I acknowledge I was long in the same transgression. Many infants have I sprinkled ; but if I know my own heart, I would not now pour water into a child’s face in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, for the globe on which I stand. Ah ! my brethren, it is an awful thing to do in the Lord’s name, that which the Lord has not appointed. Who has required this at your hands ? You may explain, and reason and suppose, but, till the trumpet sound, you will never force this commission to include your baptism of in-

fants. You may conjure up difficulties to perplex the weak ; your ingenuity may invent subterfuges that may cover error. But you will never find an inch of solid ground on which to rest the sole of your foot. Your work will never be done. You are rolling the stone of Sisyphus, and the farther you push it up hill, with the greater force will it rebound on your own heads. The labours of Hercules are but an amusement compared with your task. Ingenuity may put a false system plausibly together. But no ingenuity can give it the solidity and life of the truth. It may satisfy as long as persons do not inquire deeply and earnestly into the question. But it will not satisfy when the mind begins to say, "Lord, what wouldst thou have me to do?"

That believers only are included in the baptism of this commission, is clear also from the command to teach the baptized : "Teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you." Here the persons baptized are supposed to be capable of being taught the other ordinances enjoined by Christ. Children then cannot be included.

Never was a commission more definite. Never was a commission violated with less excuse of ambiguity. Yet the arrogance of human wisdom has totally reversed the ordinance here enjoined. It has ordered infants to be baptized, who, by the very terms of this commission, are excluded from this baptism : and it leaves unbaptized, believers whom only Jesus hath commanded to be baptized. Is not this the very spirit of Antichrist ? Christians, how long will ye suffer yourselves to be deluded by the inventions of the mother of harlots ? How long will you observe the inventions of men as the institutions of God ?

The baptism of John was in two points essentially different from the baptism of the Apostolic commission. But in mode and subjects it was perfectly coincident. John did not baptize into the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost : he did not baptize into the faith of Christ as come, but

as about to be made manifest. As far, however, as concerns our subject, the two baptisms corresponded. Let us then examine the evidence to be derived from the baptism of John. "John did baptize in the wilderness, and preach the baptism of repentance for the remission of sins. And there went out unto him all the land of Judea, and they of Jerusalem, and were all baptized of him in the river of Jordan, confessing their sins," Mark i. 4. Here we see John's baptism was a baptism of repentance, in order to remission of sins. It could not, then, include infants who cannot repent, and whose sins, when they die in infancy, are not remitted on repentance, arising from the belief of the truth, but through the blood of Christ, applied in a way of which we can learn nothing from the Scriptures; and with which we have no concern. Some, indeed, reply, that it is not impossible for God to give faith to infants. Dr. Dwight himself says, that John the Baptist had faith from the womb. If John the Baptist was a man when he was a child, Dr. Dwight in this is a child when he is a man. It is astonishing how silly wise men will become, when they attempt to force the word of God. It must be a divine judgment, that when his servants use his word as an instrument to lead his people astray, the Lord gives them up to speak foolishly, so as to put them to shame. Infants have faith! Where does their faith go, when they begin to speak? Can they have faith without knowledge? And did any one ever hear of the knowledge of infants? But this observation is founded on deep ignorance. It proceeds on the supposition, that as faith is necessary to the salvation of adults, it is necessary in infants also. The necessity of faith to salvation, they must consider as a necessity of nature, and not a necessity of divine appointment. They suppose that God himself cannot save infants, without giving them that faith that he requires of all who hear the gospel. Now, there is no such necessity. Faith is necessary to those who hear the gospel, because God has absolutely required it. But it is not

at all necessary to infants, because he hath not required it in infants. The atonement through the blood of Christ is the same to infants as to believers; but it is not applied to them in the same way. John the Baptist is not said to have had faith when an infant. He is said indeed to be sanctified from the womb, but this was not a sanctification through belief of the truth. Adults are sanctified by faith, but infants are not sanctified by faith. If infants believe, we would hear them, as soon as they begin to speak, talking of the things of God, without any teaching from the parents, or the Scriptures. Was ever any such thing heard? Can there be any surer evidence, on the very face of the question, that the Scriptures know nothing of infant baptism, than that the wisest of its defenders should utter absurdities so monstrous in order to prove it? But were we even to grant that John the Baptist had this infant faith, does it follow that all the children of believers have it also? Is it not mentioned as a thing extraordinary, that John was sanctified from the womb? Let them baptize none in infancy, but such as they have reason to believe are sanctified from the womb. I will go farther. Had God made faith necessary to the salvation of infants, and had he appointed to give faith to dying infants, this would not imply that he gives faith to those who live. Were this the case, they would all be believers before they hear the gospel. I am sure Christian parents cannot receive such doctrine. They know that their children are ignorant of God, till, by the hearing of the gospel, he shines into their heart to give them the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ. Can any absurdity exceed that of the opinion that infants are baptized on the supposition that they have faith? If it can be fairly made out that the circumstance of being born of Christian parents is evidence that infants have faith from the womb, I have no objection to baptize them. To defend infant baptism on this ground, is virtually to give it up. It acknowledges the necessity of faith

in order to baptism; but outrages common sense, in order to find it in infants, when they are born. Christians, is the man worthy of a hearing, who tells you that infants have faith as soon as they come into this world; yea, and before they come into the world? Can such nonsense be worthy of refutation? No, were it not that the names under which such absurdities are ushered into the world, have a weight with the public, these arguments would be unworthy even of being mentioned.

The baptism of John was not only a baptism on repentance for remission of sins, it was also a baptism in which sins were confessed. He baptized them in the river of Jordan, confessing their sins. Now infant faith will not do without infant confession. Can infants confess their sins? If not, they were not baptized by John. It was the perception of this difficulty that first appointed sponsors, who believe, and repent, and confess for the infant. Unhappily our Independent brethren have not this resource.

John's baptism, did not serve for Christ's. If so, infant baptism, even if such a thing had been instituted by Christ, would not serve for the baptism in Christ's commission, which is believer baptism. Paul baptized the disciples of John the Baptist, because they had not been baptized into the faith of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; and because they had been baptized only in the faith of the Messiah to come. Surely then, they who are baptized in infancy upon any pretence whatever, must be baptized when they come to the faith of the gospel.

But if John's baptism implied repentance and confession of sin, how could Jesus submit to it? This apparent inconsistency struck John himself so forcibly, that he even presumed to forbid him. "But John forbade him, saying, I have need to be baptized of thee; and comest thou to me?" Jesus did not deny this personally, he had no sins to confess; yet still there was a propriety in his submitting to the baptism of repentance. "And Jesus answering, said unto

him, Suffer it to be so now : for thus it becometh us to fulfil all righteousness." It was necessary for Jesus to observe all the divine institutions incumbent on his people. But if this was necessary, there must be a propriety in the thing itself. It must not be to Christ an unmeaning ceremony. If he submits to the baptism of repentance, there must be a point of view in which it suits him. And what is that point of view ? Evidently that, though he is himself holy, harmless, and undefiled ; yet, as one with us, he is defiled. Just as, by our oneness with him, we can say, "who shall lay any thing to the charge of God's elect ?" by his being one with us, he can confess himself a sinner. The oneness of Christ and his people, then, is not a figurative way of speaking. It is a solid and consoling truth. By it we die in Christ's death, and are acquitted as innocent ; by it Christ is made sin for us, who, in his own person, knew no sin, Christ's baptism, then, is no exception from what is implied in John's baptism. It has the same meaning, as well as the same figure to him as to us. In Christ's being buried in the waters of Jordan, we have a figure of the way in which he was acquitted from the debt he took on him. It represented his death, burial, and resurrection. If we are guilty by being one with Adam, Christ was in like manner guilty by becoming one with us. The object of John's baptism was exhibited in the immersion of Jesus.

It is odd, however, in what a different light the same evidence strikes different people. In the account of the baptism of John, I can see nothing but the immersing of persons professing repentance ; Mr. Ewing sees with equal clearness, that the business was done by pouring water on the turned up face ; and that infants were *popped* as well as their parents. Really it is strange, if the words of the Spirit are like an oracle of Delphi, that can be interpreted in two opposite senses.

Upon what ground can Mr. Ewing conclude, from this account, that John baptized infants ? Here is



the proof, and surely it is demonstration itself. "Consider," says Mr. Ewing, "the very general and comprehensive terms in which the people are said to have come to be baptized, Matt. iii. 5, 6; 'Then went out to him Jerusalem, and all Judea, and all the region round about Jordan, and were baptized of him in Jordan, confessing their sins.' This account," says he, "most naturally admits the supposition, that the inhabitants of those places came, usually at least, with their families." The account does not import even this. If the whole question depended on the presence of a child, the history could not prove it. But what if it could be proved that children accompanied their parents? Would this prove their baptism? "*The general and comprehensive terms.*" How are the terms general and comprehensive? Are they so general and comprehensive, as to include infants? They are not so, Mr. Ewing. However numerous they were, they all confessed their sins. "The disciples," says Mr. Ewing, "there went out to meet John, as the disciples at Tyre did to take farewell of Paul." Who told you so, Mr. Ewing? This is apocryphal. Even this you cannot learn from the history. And if it were expressly stated, it would not serve you. How easily is Mr. Ewing satisfied with proof, when it is on a certain side of the question! The whole Greek language could not produce a phrase that his criticism would admit as conclusive evidence of *immersion*. But that infants were present with their parents at John's baptism, and baptized along with them, he admits without evidence, with the docility of a child. If his obstinacy is invincible on some points, he makes ample amends by his pliancy in others. No man was ever more easily satisfied with proof of his own opinions.

"The same latitude of language," says Mr. Ewing, "is always used respecting the administration of baptism by the disciples of Christ, John iii. 25, 26, 'There arose a question between some of John's disciples and the Jews about purifying. And they came

unto John, and said unto him, Rabbi, he that was with thee beyond Jordan, to whom thou barest witness, behold the same baptizeth, and all come to him.' John iv. 1—3, 'When therefore the Lord knew how the Pharisees had heard that Jesus made and baptized more disciples than John, (though Jesus himself baptized not, but his disciples,) he left Judea, and departed again into Galilee.' " Now, reader, is there any thing here about the subject of infant baptism? Is it not mere dreaming, to quote these passages in proof that Jesus baptized infants? Yet, in Mr. Ewing's estimation, this is proof. "The two foregoing passages," says he, "evidently imply that baptism was dispensed in the same extensive manner, by the disciples of Christ, as it was by John the Baptist." There is no doubt but John's baptism and Christ's were equally extensive. But is this proof that either of them extended to infants! The passages import, that a great multitude came for baptism both to John and to Christ; but that infants were brought for baptism, is not hinted. On the contrary, those baptized by John, are baptized on a confession of sin; and it is said that Jesus made and baptized more disciples than John. The disciples of Jesus, then, baptized while he was with them, *disciples* only.

But not only does Mr. Ewing find infants baptized by John; he also makes provision for them in the apostolical commission itself. Now, really if he can do this, I will not despair of proof for transubstantiation. Well, let us hear him. "We have to add," says Mr. Ewing, "that there is ample room for supposing family baptism to be included in the comprehensive terms of our Saviour's final commission, Matt. xxviii. 18." *Room*, aye, "ample room." I have measured it, and I maintain, that if there is truth in axioms, there is not room for infants in this commission. How is the language of this commission comprehensive? Does Mr. Ewing find a place for the infants in the *all nations*? I cannot persuade myself that this is the refuge which he has provided for them. Does

he deny that it is *disciples* that the commission enjoins to be baptized? Does he make infants *disciples*? Does he deny that the commission, as recorded by Mark, makes the disciples in Matthew xxviii. believers? Why did not Mr. Ewing show how this commission comprehends infants? Why did he pass over this with a mere assertion? If he could do this, he certainly would not have concealed the process by which he has come to the conclusion. That commission commands believers to be baptized; and except both sides of a contradiction may be true, it can never include unbelievers. "When we consider," says Mr. Ewing, "how many things there are which Jesus himself did, which are not written in the gospel histories, (John xx. 30, and xxi. 25,) we cannot wonder at the brevity of the accounts of the subordinate *practice* of the disciples in dispensing baptism to believers and their houses." But does Mr. Ewing suppose that we are so unreasonable, as to look for long histories of all instances of infant baptism, on the supposition that it was practised? We look for no such thing. Were they included in the commission, we would not look for a single example in practice. And if there was an instance of the baptism of but one newly born child, we would esteem it as valid as a million; valid, however, not to prove that infants are included in the commission,—for nothing could prove this,—but valid to prove another baptism, not interfering with the baptism of believers. Were a thousand baptisms found in the New Testament, they could not all serve for the baptism of the commission; nor relieve the believer from his obligation of being baptized on the belief of the truth.

Though, therefore, no evidence could convince me that it is possible to reduce infant baptism to the commission, I am willing to examine the practice of the apostles, to find whether they used an other baptism with respect to the infants of believers. I have no hope that we shall find any such thing; for the apostle tells us that there is but one baptism, as well as

one faith. Let us try, then, whether the apostle has told the truth in this matter ; and whether his practice give the lie to his assertion.

How did the apostle Peter preach baptism on the day of Pentecost? Did he preach infant baptism? No, he preached a baptism connected with repentance for the remission of sins. Let us hear the account given of his doctrine on this subject by the Holy Spirit, Acts ii. 38 ; "Then Peter said unto them, Repent, and be baptized every one of you, in the name of Jesus Christ, for the remission of sins, and ye shall receive the gift of the Holy Ghost." Here baptism is connected with repentance and remission of sins. This baptism, then, cannot extend to infants. If infants have a baptism, it must be essentially different from this,—more different than John's baptism is from Christ's. Well, a number of them did repent, and were baptized. But were any infants baptized with them? Not a word of this. "Then they that gladly received his word were baptized." This does not express infants, nor can it include them. No explanation could make this account extend to infants. It may be said, that it is possible that infants were baptized at the same time. This is possible, just in the same way that it is possible that the apostles administered honey and milk to the baptized persons. It is not in evidence, either expressly, or by implication. Infants are excluded out of the number who are said to be baptized ; because they only are said to have been baptized, who received the word gladly.

The next account of baptism occurs in Acts viii. 12, "But when they believed Philip preaching the things concerning the kingdom of God, and the name of Jesus Christ, they were baptized, both men and women." Here, also, only they who believed are said to have been baptized. But it is remarkable, that the account specifies *women*.

Had the account said nothing of women, yet it would have included them as believers; and the

commission would have extended to them. But to make the thing palpably clear, women are not only included, but expressly included. Now, is it not remarkable that the Holy Spirit should be so precise as to women, yet not say a word of infants? This is unaccountable, if they were baptized. How many volumes of controversy would the addition of a word have prevented! How liberal was the Spirit of Inspiration as to the information about the baptism of women! But on the supposition that infants were baptized, how parsimonious with respect to the baptism of infants!

The baptism of Simon proceeded on the supposition of his faith; and though he was not renewed in the spirit of his mind, he was baptized on the same ground with all others. "Then Simon himself believed also: and when he was baptized," &c. The baptism of the eunuch was on the same principle. These examples illustrate the commission, as requiring baptism on the belief of the truth. True, indeed, it is possible that faith might be required in adults and not in infants. But the former is the only baptism included in the commission, and the only baptism that these examples illustrate.

The baptism of Paul, Acts xxii. 16, shows that baptism is a figure, applicable only to those who are washed from their sins. "Be baptized, and wash away thy sins." Paul's sins were already washed away by faith in the blood of Christ. Yet he is commanded here to wash them away in baptism. This shows that baptism is a figure of washing away sins, with respect to those who are already washed. To infants, it can be no such figure. Even if all the infants of all believers, were assuredly to be brought to the knowledge of the truth, yet this is not done in infancy. Infant baptism, then, and believer baptism, are not the same ordinance. To the former, it would be a sign that their sins would hereafter be washed away; to the latter, that their sins were already, by faith, washed away. But who will say that there is

any evidence that all the children of all believers will ever come to the knowledge of the truth ?

But surely the households will settle the business. Here is a word comprehensive enough for including infants. This battery, then, we cannot take. Well, I once talked of the households myself, and sheltered myself here as long as I could fire a gun. But my own conscience obliged me to give up the battery at last. I maintain that it is impossible to defend the cause of infant baptism by this battery. It cannot point one gun on the enemy. Mr. Ewing and Dr. Wardlaw have made the best of it, yet their fire is quite harmless. The noise of their guns may startle the inexperienced soldier ; but if he can command as much nerve as will enable him to examine the direction of their fire, he will soon get under it. I shall begin with Dr. Wardlaw.

“ In the first place, then,” says Dr. Wardlaw, “ there is one point of fact undeniably clear, namely, that the Apostle baptized *households* or *families*.” Granted ; but it is as clear that these were *believing households*. This fact signifies nothing. A household may include infants, and it may not include them. It cannot, then, give evidence on this point. In such a case, the extent of the baptism must be determined by the commission. Nay, if I were assured that there were infants in every one of the households, I would with equal confidence deny that they were baptized. According to the commission they could not be baptized. And such phraseology always admits exceptions, with respect to those known to be excluded from the thing spoken of. When I say that such a man and his family dined with me, I am known not to include infants. In like manner, as the baptism of the commission cannot possibly extend to infants, even if they had been present in the families, they are not included among the baptized. I will go a step farther. I will suppose, for sake of argument, that the Apostles did baptize infants ; even then, I will deny that the infants were baptized according to

the commission. It must have been a different baptism, and would not prevent the same infants from being baptized with believer baptism, as soon as they should believe. Now, try, Dr. Wardlaw, to make your guns bear upon me. *If you prove one instance of infant baptism, I will baptize infants; but a million of such examples, would not set aside believer baptism.*

"It should be noticed too," says Dr. Wardlaw, "that a man's house, (*οικος*,) most properly means his children, his offspring, his descendants,—and is generally used to denote these even exclusively." This word as properly, both from its origin and use, includes all domestics as children. It properly signifies all the residents in a house. It is capable, indeed, of being limited to descendants, when the connexion or known circumstances require it. It is therefore very often used with respect to them exclusively. It is also often used to denote, not only descendants, but ancestors and collateral relations. But in all these instances, it does not mean residents at all. The passages to which Dr. Wardlaw refers, respect descendants without respect to abode, 1 Kings, xiv. 10, &c. That it also with equal propriety includes all domestics, is clear from its use, 1 Kings, iv. 7, v. 9, &c. It must then be the connexion or circumstances, that, in each occurrence of the word, will declare its extent. I will allow Dr. Wardlaw to limit it, when, from the connexion or circumstances, he proves his limitation. He must likewise allow me to limit it by the same principles. If it may, by the connexion or circumstances, be limited to descendants, it may also be limited to adults, by the necessity arising from the commission.

Dr. Wardlaw, in reasoning on these households, seems to forget the difference between answering an objection and founding an argument. *It may be so*, is enough to establish any thing as an answer to an objection; *it may not be so*, is enough to overturn it as an argument. When I attempt to prove believer baptism, I must produce arguments to establish it, and my op-

ponent will succeed, if he can show that these arguments do not establish my point. In obviating an objection, I succeed, if I can show that there is any way of understanding it consistently with my doctrine. Now, with respect to the households, we merely stand on the defensive. It is our business to reply to the objection grounded on this fact. As our opponents use the fact as an argument, they must prove that their doctrine is in it. It is enough for us to prove, that this fact is consistent with our doctrine. If they do not prove that infant baptism is necessarily here, the passage is useless to them. If we prove that infant baptism is not necessarily here, we have all we wish. Now with respect to *οικος*, *house*, it is enough for our purpose, that the word may include all domestics. But it is not enough for them, to show that the word may signify descendants exclusively, unless they show a necessary limitation, from the connexion or circumstances.

But as concerns the point in debate, I care not that it was established that *οικος* applies to descendants only. I will still limit it farther by the commission to adults. Even one of the passages referred to by Dr. Wardlaw himself, might have taught him this. "One that ruleth well his own house," 1 Tim. iii. 4. The nature of the thing asserted, determines it to apply to adults only, or at least to children capable of government. Newly born infants are excluded. I require no more, in repelling the objection from the households. As the ruling of a house cannot apply to infants newly born, so the baptizing of a house cannot refer to any in the house, but such as come under the commission. Common sense every day makes the necessary limitations in such indefinite forms of speech. It is only the perverse spirit of controversy that finds any difficulty in them.

"*Secondly*," says Dr. Wardlaw, "To an unprejudiced reader of the New Testament, it must, I think, be equally clear, that the baptism of families is mentioned in a way that indicates its being no *extraordi-*



nary occurrence,—but *a thing of course.*” The baptism of households was just as common a thing as the faith of households, and nothing more so. Both were evidently, in the days of the Apostles, very common. That the baptism of a household was as a matter of course on the faith of the head of it, without the faith of the family, there is not the slightest appearance. We are, indeed, informed of the baptism of Lydia’s house, without being informed of their faith. But that they had faith, the commission leaves no doubt. The narrative tells us that the house of Crispus believed, but it does not tell us that they were baptized, Acts xviii. 8. We know, however, that they were baptized, because the commission enjoins it. In like manner, when we are told that Lydia’s house were baptized, we know that they believed, because the commission warrants the baptism of none but believers.

Instead of stating that the baptism of Lydia’s house was a thing of course on her faith, without theirs, the narrative states, as a piece of important information, that ought to be a lesson to every age, that baptism is so closely connected with the belief of the truth, that not only Lydia herself, but her whole family, were baptized, before she invited the Apostle to partake of her hospitality. “And when she was baptized, and her household, she besought us, saying, If ye have judged me to be faithful to the Lord, come into my house, and abide there. And she constrained us.” The work of the Lord was first attended to, and then attention to the Apostle.

That Lydia had any children, either infants or adults, is not in evidence; and therefore, as her house may have exclusively consisted of servants, the fact can never serve the cause of infant baptism. Indeed, from the way in which she speaks of *her* house, and from her being a stranger on business in that place, there is reason to believe that her family consisted solely of servants. But I will not build any thing on even the highest probabilities. I will lay no stone in

my building, that time will corrode. I care not that she had no servants; her baptized house must be believers, because the Apostle had no authority to baptize others. I care not that she had infants of a week old; they could not be included, and the form of the expression does not require that they should be included. When it is said that a certain nobleman "believed himself, and his whole house," John iv. 53, does it imply that there were no infants in his house? Does it not evidently refer to those in his house who were capable of believing, and to all such in his house? When it is said that Cornelius "feared God, with all his house," is it necessary to assert that there could have been no infants under his roof? Surely not. Why, then, is it supposed that the baptism of households should imply the baptism of infants, who, by the commission, are excluded?

"*Thirdly*," says Dr. Wardlaw, "Having thus the unquestionable fact of the *baptism of families*,—a fact according with the ancient practice of the circumcision of families, and supported by the use of a word that properly denotes a man's children or offspring; we are warranted to assume, that such was the usual practice."

Here Dr. Wardlaw shifts the ground of his argument, and very conveniently takes for granted the thing to be proved? What is the unquestionable fact in his past observations? *The baptism of families*. This is unquestionable, because it is expressly said. But what is the thing that is unquestionable? Why, that the word household is so applied. Is it unquestionable that the household were baptized, not on account of their own faith, but on account of the faith of the head of the family? No; this is not unquestionable. This is the point in debate. But this is what Dr. Wardlaw's third observation takes as unquestionable. If it is not unquestionable in this sense, it is nothing to his purpose. It does not accord with the ancient practice of the circumcision of families. If the household believed and were baptized, it does not accord with the circumcision of a family without

any regard to faith. Dr. Wardlaw must take for granted his own sense of the phrase ; and when this is granted to him, he will very easily prove his point. If it is granted as a thing unquestionable, that unbelieving families were baptized, as unbelieving families might be circumcised, the debate is at an end. But Dr. Wardlaw must prove his meaning of the phrase, before he takes it for granted.

We are indeed warranted to assume, that it was the usual practice to baptize every family that believed. But from the baptism of a thousand families, we are not warranted to conclude the baptism of every family when the head of it believed. The baptism of one family will prove that all families in the same circumstances ought to be baptized. This is the turning point of the argument. If we read that a man and his whole family were hanged for murder, this will prove that every family that joins with the head of it in committing murder, ought to be hanged. But it will not prove that every family ought to be hanged with the father, when he is guilty of murder. If Lydia's family were baptized on account of her faith, having none of their own, it would prove what Dr. Wardlaw wants ; but if this is not in evidence, he cannot take it for granted. Dr. Wardlaw, you must prove that these households were baptized, not on account of their own faith, but on account of that of the head of the family. This is what you can never do. All the apparent strength of your reasoning depends on the assumption of false principles. No man is more convincing than Dr. Wardlaw, if it is lawful to take for granted the thing to be proved.

Dr. Wardlaw, in the *fourth place*, examines, "the principles on which they endeavour to set aside the inference from the examples in question." He thinks that they have not proved that Lydia had no children. And does Dr. Wardlaw think that this proof lies upon us ? He is a man of war from his youth ; and has he yet to learn the laws of the combat ? The proof of the fact that Lydia had children, lies on those who need the assistance of the infants. I maintain

that it is not in evidence that she was ever married; and you cannot found an argument on what is not in evidence. That she may not have had a child is consistent with all that is said here. This is sufficient for my purpose. Before you can deduce an argument from this fact, you must prove not only that she had children, but infants. You must do more. I care not that she had infants, the form of the expression does not require that they were baptized, and the commission makes it certain that they were not baptized.

Dr. Wardlaw has a very long, and certainly a very satisfactory discussion, showing that the term *brethren*, in verse 40, may not refer to Lydia's household, but all the believers of the place. Now, if our argument required us to prove, that the *brethren* here must be only Lydia's household, we never could prove it. But our argument requires no such thing. This term can be a proof on neither side, for it is consistent with both.

"Equally futile," says Dr. Wardlaw, "are the proofs adduced, that there were no infant children in the households of the jailor, and of Stephanas." Now, if there are any on my side of the question who think that it is necessary to prove this, I refer them to Dr. Wardlaw for a most triumphant refutation of their sentiment. But did not Dr. Wardlaw perceive that he was here cutting his own carotid artery? Did he not perceive that the very same arguments which prove that the language, with respect to the faith of the households of the jailor and of Stephanas, is consistent with the supposition that there might have been infants in them, equally prove that there might have been infants in them, without being baptized? When it is said with respect to the jailor, that Paul "spake the word of the Lord to all that were in his house," I admit that there might have been infants. And when it is said that a family were baptized, infants might have been in the house, without being included in the baptism. The commission as effectually excludes

them from baptism, as their infancy excludes them from the number of those to whom the gospel is preached.

Dr. Wardlaw evidently does not understand the argument that we draw from the above source. We do not attempt to prove that such phraseology is inconsistent with the supposition, that infants were in the families. But we allege these facts, to show that if there were *baptized families*, there were also *believing families*; and that if, in a *believing house*, there may be unbelieving infants, so in a *baptized house*, there may be unbaptized infants. By the very same arguments that our opponents show that there might have been unbelieving infants in *believing houses*, we will show that there might have been unbaptized infants in *baptized houses*. But the facts alluded to are especially important, because they apply to the very houses that are said to be baptized. This not only shows that it was possible that there might be believing houses, but it shows that there were such houses. Two of the three baptized households are expressly shown to be believing households. If this is not said of the house of Lydia, it may have been the same; and the commission requires that it should be so. And if we are informed of the baptism of Lydia's house, and not of their faith, we are told of the faith of the house of Crispus, and not of their baptism. When we are informed of the one, the other is necessarily understood. Why do our opponents speak of their households at all? If the jailor had a baptized house, had he not a believing house? If Stephanas had a baptized house, had he not a believing house? And why may not Lydia have had a believing house? Our cause requires no more than that the baptized houses may have been believing houses. We found here no argument; we merely reply to an objection. But that two of the three baptized houses were believing houses, is actually in evidence. There is here no cover for infant baptism.

"I add," says Dr. Wardlaw, "as a *sixth* observa-

tion, the extreme improbability, that a change, which must have been felt so important by those whose minds had been all along habituated to the connexion of their children with themselves in the covenant of promise, should have taken place without the slightest recorded symptom of opposition or demurring." This is a mode of reasoning utterly unwarrantable, and deserves no attention. We learn what God has enjoined from what is written. Even if the fact here stated could not at all be accounted for, it could not be admitted as evidence. A thousand things might account for it, of which we are ignorant. Is every thing recorded that took place in the apostolic labours? Their adult children in unbelief were admitted to all Jewish ordinances; is there any recorded complaint of their exclusion from Christian ordinances? Why should they not complain, that, as all their offspring were admitted to the passover, and all the privileges of the Jewish church, they should be kept from the Lord's table? But, in fact, their zeal was for the law, and nothing would satisfy them in the room of it. Their prejudices were not at all concerned about the extent of Christian ordinances. What offended them, was the giving up of old customs. Of the extent of baptism, whatever it was, they could not be ignorant. Why then should they murmur against the known will of God? Upon the principle of this observation, there were a thousand things of which they might have complained, but of which no complaint is recorded. This takes for granted, also, that there was a spiritual connexion between the Jews and their offspring, which is the thing to be proved,—a thing which is not only not admitted to be true, but which I will prove to be false. This observation proceeds, from first to last, on false principles. It takes for granted, that every disagreeable change must have been a cause of murmuring; and if there was murmuring, it must have been recorded. There might have been a disagreeable change, the principle of which might be so well

understood, as to prevent murmuring; and there might have been great murmuring without any record.

“Another remarkable circumstance,” says Dr. Wardlaw, “akin to the preceding, is, that when the Judaizing teachers insisted on the Gentile converts submitting to circumcision,—although there can be no doubt that this was done, in every case, *in connexion with their children*; yet, when the doctrine and practice of these perverters of the gospel came to be discussed in the assembly of the apostles, and elders, and brethren at Jerusalem, no notice whatsoever is taken of the inconsistency with the spirituality of the new dispensation, of administering *any* sign to *children*, on the admission of their parents into the Christian commonwealth.” This is egregious trifling. Are all things recorded that were said on that occasion? Was there any need in that assembly to discuss every error connected with the circumcision of the Gentiles? By cutting off the circumcision of the Gentiles, was not the circumcision of their infants, and every error connected with it, cut off also? But such observations, so far from deserving an answer, deserve no mention. Must the apostles give a whole body of divinity, when they denounce a particular error? Dr. Wardlaw, we are willing to listen to any thing you can allege from the Scripture in support of your opinion. But such arguments merit no consideration. This observation takes it for granted, that the apostles could not condemn one error, without expressly denouncing every other error connected with it; and that we have, in the records of the Acts, every thing that was said in the celebrated meeting at Jerusalem.

“Let it be further considered,” says Dr. Wardlaw, “that we have no recorded instance of the baptism of any person, grown to manhood, that had been born of Jewish converts, or of Gentile proselytes to the faith of Christ.” This would try the patience of Job. Is there any need of such an example, in order

to show that the children of such persons should be baptized when they believe? What difference is there between such and others? Is not the law of the commission sufficient to reach them? Is it not sufficiently clear? "He that believeth and is baptized?" "Nor have we," continues Dr. Wardlaw, "in any of the apostolic epistles to the churches, the remotest allusion, in the form of direction, or of warning, to the reception of such children by baptism into the Christian church, upon their professing the faith in which they had been brought up." A very good reason for this. The same law applies to all. There is not the smallest difference between the ground of receiving the child of a heathen, and the child of the most devoted saint. When they believe, they are received equally to every thing.

"This supposition," says Dr. Wardlaw, "let it be further noticed, is in coincidence with the fact of children being addressed in the apostolic epistles to the churches of Christ. Thus, in Eph. vi. 1, 'Children, obey your parents in the Lord, for this is right.' Col. iii. 20, 'Children, obey your parents in all things; for this is well pleasing unto the Lord.'" Now, this argument is deduced from Scripture; and it merits an answer. That answer, however, is easily found. The children, here addressed were believing members of the churches. That they may have been so, is sufficient for my purpose. This will refute an objection. But that they must have been such, is beyond question, from the address itself. Their obedience to their parents, is to be "*in the Lord*," which applies to believers only. The reasons of their obedience, also, show that they were such children, as were capable of faith. "*This is right*."—" *This is well pleasing unto the Lord*." These are motives quite suitable to believers. As soon as children can evidence that they act from these principles, they ought to be baptized, and to walk in all the ordinances of the Lord.

But Dr. Wardlaw thinks that the children here addressed cannot merely be such adult children as were



members of the churches ; because it is immediately added, "and ye fathers provoke not your children to wrath ; but bring them up in the nurture and admonition of the Lord."—"Fathers, provoke not your children to anger, lest they be discouraged." Now, as the duty of fathers extends to all their children, Dr. Wardlaw thinks that the children addressed, must be all the children capable of receiving instruction. But if he were not eager in the pursuit of something to defend his system, his powers of discrimination would discern that in these injunctions, neither the children nor the fathers of the one injunction, correspond to the children nor the fathers of the other. In fact, it might happen that not one of either might correspond. When the apostle addresses the children, he addresses all the members of the church who had fathers ; but not one of these fathers might be in the church. When he addresses fathers, he addresses all the members of the church who had children ; but not one of those children might be in the church. So far from being necessary to suppose, that all the children of the one address are the same as the children of the other address, it is not necessary to suppose that one of them was the same. When the children are commanded to obey their parents, their obedience is not to be confined to such fathers as were believers and members of the church ; but to fathers, whatever they might be. And when fathers are commanded not to provoke their children, &c. the injunction extends to all their children. The fathers addressed may not be the fathers of the children addressed ; and the children addressed may not be the children of the fathers addressed. Surely Dr. Wardlaw must be in the habit of teaching according to this distinction. I would not be so much surprised to find this indistinctness of conception in those who make no distinction between the church and the world. In the church in which I labour, there are very many children whose parents do not belong to us ; and there are some parents whose children belong to other denominations. Yet these

apostolical injunctions are constantly inculcated. Children are to obey their parents in the Lord, even if these parents were infidels; and parents are to train up their children in the nurture of the Lord, though they are not in the church.

“Do our Baptist brethren,” says Dr. Wardlaw, “wait till their children are members of churches, before they venture to put their finger on the passages we have quoted, and say, ‘This is addressed to you?’” No man who speaks correctly, can say that Ephes. vi. 1, Col. iii. 20, are expressly directed to any but believers. But we can teach the most disobedient children their duty from these passages. Though we cannot tell unbelieving children that these exhortations were originally addressed to such as they are, but to believing children; yet the duty inculcated is equally incumbent on all. The moral duties inculcated on believers, are equally the duty of unbelievers. The duty of obedience to parents is not a new duty, that results from connexion with a church, or with receiving the gospel. What, then, in this respect, is inculcated on believing children, equally shows the duty of unbelieving children. Dr. Wardlaw will not say, that unbelieving fathers are directly addressed in the above injunctions; yet could he not apply the injunctions, so as to make them bear upon unbelieving fathers? Could he not urge on unbelieving fathers, their guilt in not training up their children in the nurture of the Lord? Children from the first dawn of reason, may be taught their duty from such passages, without falsely telling them that they were originally addressed to children as young as themselves. Now, Dr. Wardlaw, of your eleven observations, this is the only one that has even a show of argument; yet I am sure your good sense will admit that it is answered.

“X. The circumstances of the early history of the church, after the apostolic age, are unaccountable on Anti-pædo-baptist principles.” So, Dr. Wardlaw, you are returning to your old mode of reasoning from dif-

faculties. Well, then, I will admit, for sake of argument, that the thing is unaccountable. It may be true, notwithstanding. Many things that would cast light upon this point, may be buried in the ruins of antiquity. I am not obliged to account for it. I will not neglect an ordinance of Christ, I will not adopt an ordinance not founded by Christ, from any difficulty arising from Church History. My Bible, like that of Mr. Ewing, ends with the Book of Revelation.

But there is nothing more obvious to a candid mind, than the origin of the early introduction of infant baptism. As soon as baptism was looked on as essential to salvation, infant baptism would naturally follow. Dr. Wardlaw, indeed, says, that we may as well suppose that the *opinion arose from the practice*, as that the *practice arose from the opinion*. It would be easy to show that this is not the case. But that the opinion may have given rise to the practice, is enough for my purpose. I am answering an objection, and any thing that will account for the difficulty is sufficient. *It may have been so*, is quite enough for me. Even this much I am not bound to give. Infant communion was practised as well as infant baptism. No matter what was the origin of either of them; if one of them is allowed to be an error, the early practice of the other cannot be alleged as proof of its truth. Even were it granted that infant communion was grafted on infant baptism, still, as it was universally received so early without having been from the Apostles, infant baptism may have been grafted on some similar stock. It is impossible to argue consistently for infant baptism from the argument of antiquity, and reject the same argument for infant communion. If infant communion was a thing not instituted by the Apostles, yet universally adopted so early, why may not any other practice have been adopted universally without apostolic institution? The practice of the earliest antiquity, with respect to the ordinances of Christ, is a matter of much interest; and I am convinced that the subject has never been

set in that light, which the remains of antiquity would afford to candour and industry. If God spares me life and leisure, I may yet endeavour to exhibit its testimony. But an ordinance of Christ I will never ground on any thing but the word of God. Many things true, may be wholly unaccountable.

“XI. I have only one other particular,” says Dr. Wardlaw, “to add to this series. It is the remarkable fact, of the entire absence, so far as my recollection serves me, of any thing resembling the baptism of *households* or *families*, in the accounts of the propagation of the gospel by our Baptist brethren.” Now, at first sight, this has an imposing appearance, but, on reflection, it vanishes into air. There are not now any examples of the abundant success that the gospel had in the Apostles’ days. We do not find that men now believe by households, more than that they are baptized by households. I suppose that the Baptist missionaries have a *baptized household*, as often as they have a *believing household*. They will baptize Krishnoo and his family, if Krishnoo and his family believe. I have never seen three thousand baptized on one day, yet I have no doubt that three thousand believed on the day of Pentecost.

In fact, I have never examined a series of arguments more flimsy than these. The whole chain is no better than a web of gossamer across the high road. It cannot stop the passage of a child. Josephus, on one occasion, took a town, by presenting a fleet before it, in which each ship had only four mariners. If any man surrenders to Dr. Wardlaw’s fleet, it must be from want of knowing what is in the ships. The man who can satisfy himself with such arguments as these, need never want proof of any thing which he wishes to be true.

Let us now take a look at Mr. Ewing’s generalship, with respect to the households. “Family baptism,” says Mr. Ewing, “as mentioned in the New Testament, is the more remarkable, that no other ordinance, and no privilege of any kind, is mentioned in

the New Testament, as given to families." The reason is obvious. Baptism belongs to individuals, and when a household believed, it was baptized on the same footing as an individual. The Lord's Supper belongs to Christians, not as individuals, but as a church. It might as well be asked, why is baptism given to an individual, seeing the other ordinances are observed socially? Mr. Ewing gives the answer to himself, in the next sentence. "Mention," says he, "is made of churches in the house of some; but it is not said that these churches consisted of a believer and his house." To this the reply is obvious. If a believer and his family were not a church, why is it strange that they had not the ordinances that belong to a church? "Neither is a believer and his house," says Mr. Ewing, "ever said to have received the Lord's Supper." I reply, If they were only a part of a church, why should they have the Lord's Supper? If they were a church, they had the Lord's Supper, whether it is recorded or not. There is no necessity for any such record.

"I shall now be asked," says Mr. Ewing, "if all or any of the families of believers, where the family baptism is said to have been practised, can be proved to have contained infants?" Yes, Mr. Ewing, we will ask this question, and notwithstanding all you have said, we will continue to insist on this question. "I answer," says Mr. Ewing, "that 'a house' or family is a term which includes, in its meaning, infants as properly as adult children; and that, in not one of these families mentioned in connexion with baptism, is any exception made, for the purpose of excluding infants." This is granted fully. But it is more difficult to conceive how such arguments can impose on a sound understanding, than it is to answer them. *House* or *family* includes infants as well as adults—if infants are in them. But from the term itself, this cannot be learned. This is the point, Mr. Ewing. A house may have infants, or it may not have infants; therefore from the term we can learn nothing on this

subject. The eunuch, no doubt had a house ; and if his house had been said to be baptized, Mr. Ewing would not contend, that his infants were of necessity baptized. We would know, without any intimation, that the term house did not include his children. Just so from the commission, we know that infants are not included among those who were baptized in the households. The commission is as sure a commentary on the households of Lydia, Stephanas, and the jailor, as the state of the eunuch would have been in a like case. But Mr. Ewing says, infants are not excepted in these households. Nor are they excepted in the supposed case of the eunuch. There is no need for the history to except them. They are excepted by that commission that must guide all practice. It is a matter of the highest astonishment to me, that Mr. Ewing and Dr. Wardlaw can see the necessity of an exception in so many other cases to such indefinite phrases, and yet not have the candour to admit the possibility of a like exception here. If the commission does not include infants, are they not of necessity excluded with respect to the households? Can any thing be more obvious to common sense, than that as a house or family may or may not have infants, the baptism of a house is no proof that infants were baptized? Can any thing be more obvious, than that as we every day use such phraseology with the supposed exceptions, there may be such exceptions as to the households? Even if infants were proved to have been in those houses, it would signify nothing. The phraseology admits the exception of them, and the commission demands it. The pertinacity with which our opponents continue to rest on the households, is a discredit to their good sense, as well as their candour. There is no axiom in mathematics more clear, than that the households are nothing to the purpose of infant baptism. *If the term household does not necessarily imply infants, then there is no evidence from the term that there were infants in those households.* Again, as such phraseology is, in daily conver-

sation, used with exceptions ; so, though infants had been in those households, the known limitations of the commission would except them. This is as obvious as that two and two make four. It is useless to reason with any who are so perverse as to deny what is self-evident. Their disease cannot be cured by argument. When Mr. Ewing says, that in the narrative of the households there is no "exception made for the purpose of excluding infants," it is virtually admitted, that such phraseology admits exceptions. If so, may not the exception in the commission be as valid as an exception in the history ? Nay, the exception of the commission makes an exception in the history perfectly unnecessary. The commission enjoins the baptism of believers, and from that baptism all others are therefore for ever excluded. When a household were baptized according to this commission, they must have been believers. The commission cannot be extended farther. Nay, if a commission had afterwards been given to baptize infants, it could never be reduced to this commission. It could not have been explained as included in it, nor a part of it. It would be a perfectly distinct commission, containing a quite different ordinance. Till infants are believers, they can never be baptized according to a commission that enjoins the baptism of believers. If there is a commission to enlist recruits six feet high, when we afterwards read that a family were enlisted, without specifying their height, we know that none of them were under the standard. Were it not for the strength of prejudice, this form of expression could not for a moment embarrass the weakest of the children of God.

"If a man and his family are degraded," says Mr. Ewing, "does not the degradation include infants ? If a man and his family are ennobled, does not the nobility include infants ?" It does so, not from the necessity of the phraseology, but from what is known of the laws. Were it said that a man and his family were hanged for murder, his infants would be excluded. Were it said that after a rebellion a man

and his family received the thanks of his Majesty for their loyalty, it would not be supposed that the infants had carried arms. "If a man and his family," says Mr. Ewing, "are baptized, does not the language convey a similar meaning, namely, that the baptism includes infants?" No, Mr. Ewing, because it is known from the commission that infants are not included: whereas in the other cases, it is known that infants are included. In neither case can we learn the extent of the application of the phrase from the phrase itself. It is indefinite, and may include all, or may admit exceptions.

"In calculating," says Mr. Ewing, "as some do, the probability of the case, many confine their attention to the four families mentioned in Acts x. Acts xvi. and 1 Cor. i." Calculating probability! Is a law of God to depend on a calculation of probabilities? I would as soon calculate nativities by the stars. "But these," he continues, "are only a specimen of the hundreds and thousands of families, which, in the propagation of the gospel, were treated in the same way." Who told this to Mr. Ewing? Has he got it in a dream, or in a vision? If Mr. Ewing has not facts enough from which he may reason, he can make them. There may have been many other households of the same kind; but that there were so, is not in evidence, and I will not admit it. But I reject it not for the sake of this question; because, if there were a million of such families, for every one that is mentioned, they were all believing families. The commission leaves no doubt of this. Of the three families mentioned, two of them are expressly represented as believing families. Why might not the other be so? I do not profess to have the gift of second sight. I do not know how many hundred families resembled these in their baptism. But I can judge of the evidence before me; and what number of families soever were baptized, the same number believed.

But it seems there is one baptized household at least, in which it is even certain that there were no



believers but the head of the family. "When Lydia was baptized with her house," says Mr. Ewing, "we are made certain that they were none of them believers excepting herself." Whence, reader, can come this certainty? You will say, I suppose, that Mr. Ewing has received some secret revelation on this point. No, no, I assure you, Mr. Ewing professes to get this evidence out of the narrative itself. The evidence is this: "For she urged Christian character, as the argument for prevailing with Paul and Silas to accept her hospitality. Unquestionably she put her argument as strongly as she could; yet as it was *her* heart only which the Lord opened, ver. 14, so she could not include so much as one in the family, along with herself, as a believer; but was obliged to use the singular number, saying, 'If ye have judged *me* to be faithful to the Lord, come into *my* house and abide.'" Now, this is so shadowy an argument, that it is as difficult to get at it, as it was for Fingal to strike the Ghosts. It is as thin as vapour. Had she possessed a thousand servants all believers, would she have spoken in a different manner? Had there been a thousand, the house was *hers*, the hospitality was *hers*, and the ground of the Apostle's receiving it must be *her* faithfulness. The household had nothing to do with this invitation. Their faithfulness had no concern in it. At what a loss must the cause of infant baptism be, when such a man as Mr. Ewing is obliged to make such a defence? Must Lydia have been schooled by Sir Roger de Coverley's old butler, that she must say, *our house, our faithfulness*? &c. The man who can take this for evidence, will never want evidence for any thing to his taste. I never met any writer more intrepid, than Mr. Ewing, in cutting down opposing evidence; nor more easily pleased with evidence on his own side.

Alexander himself would not more rashly draw his sword to cut a Gordian knot; and in other things popish credulity itself cannot be more easily satisfied with the proof of the obedience of the Church. What

Mr. Ewing here considers certain evidence, I maintain is not even the shadow of evidence. If the Scriptures did not furnish me with better arguments for my sentiments, I would let them sink to the bottom of the ocean. Mr. Ewing is right in not surrendering a battery, while it is capable of defence. But why will he keep his flag flying, while it is evident, from his fire, that the ammunition is expended? Mr. Ewing is not at all startled at the consequence of this opinion, namely, that the unbelieving adults of Lydia were baptized on her faith. His boldness is not to be frightened. It requires a more than an ordinary audacity to say, in the face of the commission of Jesus Christ, that unbelieving adults should be baptized, if they happen to be in the house of a believer. Jesus Christ has commanded believers to be baptized. Mr. Ewing commands all the unbelievers in every believer's house to be baptized. Christians, whether will ye obey your Lord and Saviour, or Mr. Ewing? How long, Mr. Ewing, how long will you make void the commandment of God by your inventions? Hath not Jesus said, "he that breaketh the least of these my commandments, and teacheth men so, shall be called the least in the kingdom of heaven?" The language of Lydia is consistent with the supposition that there was not an unbeliever in her house. So far is it from implying that her family were all unbelievers.

"The house of Stephanas," says Mr. Ewing, "addicted themselves to the ministry of the saints," 1 Cor. xvi. 15. "Were this a proof that they had among them no infants, we might find a proof that the house of the Rechabites had among them no infants, because, in Jer. xxxv. 2—11, they addicted themselves to perform the commandment of their father." Now, this is true: and this is the very argument by which we prove, that, even if the households had contained infants, there is no necessity that they should be supposed to have been baptized. We do not argue, that, because the baptized households were believing households, there could not be any infants in the houses.

But we argue, that if there were baptized households, these households were believing households; and that in the household of the jailor and of Stephanas we have direct evidence. We could have known this by the commission, had the narrative been silent. But when the narrative itself shows that they had *believing households*, what difficulty is in the expression *baptized households*? Is not the one commensurate with the other? The importance of the fact of the believing households is, not to show that there could be no infants in those houses, but to show that it is an historical fact that there were in those houses believers to be called a baptized household; and to show that if there were infants in those houses, they may not be included among the baptized, as they certainly are not included among the believing. The fact is very important, for in replying to it, our opponents are obliged to refute themselves. If there may have been infants where a house is said to believe, without supposing that infants are believers, so where a house is said to be baptized, there may have been in it infants, who were not baptized. If any man cannot understand the weight of this argument, it is not argument can convince him.

Mr. Ewing asks his opponents, "if they admit the general fact of family baptism, why they do not practise accordingly?" And do they not practise according to the view in which they admit this fact? Is there any inconsistency between their practice and their admission? Are they inconsistent with themselves because they practise according to their own views, and not according to the views of Mr. Ewing? Mr. Ewing and Dr. Wardlaw strangely take it for granted that the households were baptized, not on their own faith, but on that of the head of the family, which is not hinted in the narrative, and is contrary to the commission. "To say they baptize whole families, when whole families believe," says he, "appears to me to be treating the historical Scripture as nugatory." But why, Mr. Ewing, does this treat the

historical Scripture as nugatory? "Any view of this subject," says Mr. Ewing, "would lead us to baptize whole families, or whole nations, if they all believed." Doubtless. And may we not say the same thing of individual baptism? Is the history of the baptism of the eunuch and that of Paul nugatory; because, if neither of them had been recorded, we would have known from the commission that believers ought to be baptized; and that faith is necessary to baptism? There may be much use in recording these facts, though they do not bear Mr. Ewing's inference. It is not warrantable to say, that a portion of Scripture must have a certain meaning, because we can see no use in it, if it has not that meaning. "It would not have made the slightest difference in the practice," continues Mr. Ewing, "had no mention been made of family baptism at all." Not the slightest difference. Nor would it have made the slightest difference with respect to the baptizing of individuals, had no example of baptism been recorded. Yet none of the examples are nugatory. The perverseness of Christians requires them all. The family baptisms recorded, can warrant no family baptisms but *such* as are recorded; and two of these are expressly stated as believers, and the remaining third must be according to the commission. "Unless, therefore," says Mr. Ewing, "we admit some peculiar connexion between the extent of a family, and the extent of the administration of baptism, I apprehend that family baptism is a Scripture fact which we do not yet understand." Does not Mr. Ewing perceive that the same thing might be said with as good reason with respect to the house of the Rechabites, and all the examples quoted by Dr. Wardlaw of similar phraseology? On Mr. Ewing's principles, might I not say, unless every infant of the house of the Rechabites was brought into the house of the Lord, and a command given to him to drink wine, the statement of Jer. xxxv. 2—11, is absurd? Suppose the government issues a commission to raise a number of regiments, and to enlist all men fit for service. In the

course of the execution of this commission, we read that they enlisted A and his family, B and his family, C and his family. Would we not know, without a word on the subject, that the enlisted families were men fit for service? There might be infants in the houses, but they were no part of the enlisted families. We would not require to be informed that two of these families were active and brave, in order to convince us that they were not infants or women, but men. It is only the perverseness of Christians in the things of God that requires such illustrations. What shall we say of the person who would observe, that, unless it is admitted, that whenever the head of a family is enlisted, every member of his family, man, woman, and child, are enlisted also; he can see no meaning in the statement of the enlistment of the three families? The fact that three families are enlisted with the heads of the families, does not imply that all families are enlisted with the heads, nor that men, women, and children are enlisted. It is strange that our acute opponents cannot see so obvious a truth. It is only in the things of God that men are children.

Mr. Ewing here takes it for granted, that it is an admitted fact, that all families were baptized with the head, and on the faith of the head, without any faith of their own; nay, except they contradicted and blasphemed. This is not in evidence. The three examples of baptized households state nothing of the baptism of the household on the faith of the head, and the commission forbids the thought. There might be many such families, but how many is not known; nor can the number at all influence the question. How many soever they might be, they must all have been believing households. To justify Mr. Ewing's observation, the commission must have been, *baptize believers and their households*.

"I wished," says Mr. Ewing, "to induce my friends, who have no experience on the subject, to compare their feelings with the feelings of those who have such experience." Feelings have nothing

to do with this question, more than with a demonstration in Euclid. This consulting of our feelings is the ground of a great part of our opposition to the word of God. Peter consulted his feelings, and when God said, "Rise, Peter, kill and eat;" he arrogantly replied, "Not so, Lord, for I have never eaten any thing common or unclean." Shame, Peter, is there any thing unclean that God commands to be eaten? What made certain meats unclean to Israel but God's command?

"You keep aloof," says Mr. Ewing, "from this practice from your apprehension of difficulty with the case of infants." Not so, Mr. Ewing; had the command been to baptize the households of believers on the faith of their heads, we would find no difficulty with infants. We would baptize them, if the command included them, as soon as we would baptize the Apostles. "Now, I frankly confess," says Mr. Ewing, "that were any thing, after getting a divine warrant, to deter me from the practice, it would be rather the case of adults." Strange language, indeed! This sounds harshly in my ears. Deter from a practice for which there is a divine warrant! He must have a scrupulous conscience indeed, who will speak of being deterred from executing a divine warrant. I would baptize Satan himself, without the smallest scruple, had I a divine warrant. Give us a divine warrant, and we have no objection, from our feelings, to baptize infants. But it appears that Mr. Ewing finds some difficulty in the case of baptizing unbelieving adults on the faith of the head of a family. I am glad of it. He may yet be led to see that it is an awful thing to allege a warrant from Jesus to baptize unbelievers, when the apostolical commission includes believers only. "But the truth is," says Mr. Ewing, "infants and adults are precisely on a footing, in regard to the regenerating work of the Holy Spirit, of which baptism is a figure." But are adult unbelievers to have the figure of regeneration which they have not yet experienced? This

contradicts every thing exhibited in the figure of baptism, which always supposes that the person baptized is already regenerated. Mr. Ewing says, that "in the original propagation of the gospel, when the head of a family believes, 'salvation is come to his house,' Luke xix. 9; and consequently the whole house may be, nay, ought to be, baptized along with him, (with no exception because some of them may be young, but) except they have grown so old, and so rebellious against both their Father in heaven and their parents on earth, as to refuse the ordinance, and to contradict and blaspheme the truth which it accompanies." This is a most astonishing avowal. Mr. Ewing saw where his doctrine would lead, and he has boldly avowed the consequences. Every unbeliever in the house may be baptized, on the faith of the head, except he refuses. I do not envy the conscience that can receive this without qualms. I think it will be swallowed with difficulty by many of the Independents. But when Mr. Ewing has avowed this monstrous doctrine, where will he find a warrant? Not in Luke xix. 9. This cannot imply that the moment the head of a family believes, all the members of the family also believe, or are actually made partakers of salvation. If not, it is no warrant to baptize them. But if it does imply that they all actually believe with the heart, then it is believer baptism. Nor does this passage imply that all the members of a believer's house will at last believe,—though even this would be no warrant for their baptism, which implies faith at the time of baptism. Is it a fact that all the slaves and servants, and children of a believer, will certainly be saved? Let us hear the passage itself. "And Jesus entered and passed through Jericho. And, behold, there was a man named Zaccheus, which was the chief among the publicans, and he was rich. And he sought to see Jesus, who he was; and could not for the press, because he was little of stature. And he ran before, and climbed up into a sycamore tree to see him, for he was to pass that

way. And when Jesus came to the place, he looked up, and saw him, and said unto him, Zaccheus, make haste and come down, for to-day I must abide at thy house. And he made haste and came down, and received him joyfully. And when they saw it, they all murmured, saying, That he was gone to be guest with a man that is a sinner. And Zaccheus stood, and said unto the Lord, Behold, Lord, the half of my goods I give to the poor : and if I have taken any thing from any man by false accusation, I restore him four-fold. And Jesus said unto him, This day is salvation come to this house, forasmuch as he also is a son of Abraham. For the Son of man is come to seek and to save that which was lost." Now, the salvation that came to his house, appears to me to be evidently his own salvation. Zaccheus had been a man notoriously a sinner. The people all murmured, even when Jesus proposed to be his guest. The Lord touched the heart of Zaccheus, and enabled him to give in his confession—the clearest evidence of his conversion. The Lord, therefore, recognises him publicly before the people, who murmured, and declared that Zaccheus was not only worthy of being his host, but that he who was among the chief of sinners, was now a member of his kingdom : Salvation was now come to that house, which the crowd looked upon as so unworthy to receive the Messiah. It was now the house of a saved sinner. Jesus next gave the reason for saying that salvation was come to that house : "He also is a son of Abraham." That he was a natural descendant of Abraham, there was no question. But now he is a son of Abraham's faith. The Lord Jesus closes with a reason that confirms this view : "For the Son of man is come to seek and to save that which is lost." As if he had said, "Think it not strange that Zaccheus is saved, and that I have called him a son of Abraham. He was a notorious sinner, indeed, but I have come to save such."

Many suppose that the phrase, "Salvation is come



to this house," means that others in the house had believed; or that it was an intimation that they would believe. As far as concerns the question of baptism, I have not the smallest objection to either of these views. My objection is, that they are not the import of the passage. I am quite willing to admit, I am joyful in believing, that when the gospel comes to a house, it generally spreads. But this is no foundation for baptizing an unbelieving family, and does not seem to be contained in this passage. If salvation comes to a house, let the house be baptized as far as the salvation is known to reach.

But by what authority does Mr. Ewing make the exception, with respect to those who refuse the ordinance and blaspheme? Children have no right to refuse; and slaves may be forced to submit. Those must all be baptized with the household. Ah! Mr. Ewing, is such a household as you represent to be entitled to baptism, at all like the house of the jailor, and the house of Stephanas? How unlike to your commission to baptize, is the commission of Christ! Christ says, "believe and be baptized:" Mr. Ewing says, "baptize all the unbelievers of a believer's house, except they refuse." Is it not a fearful thing to have on record before heaven and earth, a document at such variance with the commission of Christ? I know Christ will forgive the ignorance of his people; but to teach his children to err from his commandments, is not the way to gain ten cities in the day of judgment.

Was there ever any thing so absurd as to stretch the commission to baptize, by the use of an indefinite word in the history of the execution of the commission? Must not the commission limit this indefinite word? Does not Mr. Ewing, does not Dr. Wardlaw, show examples that justify such limitation of indefinite or general language? Why do they contend, that there may be infants in a believing house, though they do not believe, when they will not allow that there may have been infants in a baptized house,

without being baptized? None can be baptized, according to the commission, but believers; the phraseology about the households is perfectly consistent with this, according to daily use in all nations: why then conjure up a difficulty, when not a shadow of difficulty exists? An infidel, who should read the Scriptures, just to learn what was actually the practice on the subject, in the Apostles' days, would not find a moment's delay from these households. He would at once see that the word household may extend to every inhabitant of the family, or admit of certain exceptions, according to known limitations. The limitation of the households he would find in the commission. He would never dream that the Apostles would baptize any but such as are commanded to be baptized.

Let it be recollected, that we stand on the defensive in this matter; and that it is perfectly sufficient for our purpose, if the term household will admit the limitation for which we contend. To serve our opponents, it must be proved, that infants were in the families. Even this will not serve them. They might have been in the households, yet not have been baptized. But was it even proved that infants were baptized, it would be a baptism different from that of the commission, and could not stand in its room. Even in such a case, I would call on all who believe to be baptized with the baptism of the commission.

"The case of the little children," says Mr. Ewing, "brought to Jesus, as narrated, Matth. xix. 13—15, entirely agrees with this view," namely, that the disciples of our Lord baptized infants. There must truly be a great scarcity of proof when it is sought in such a passage as this. No view of which this transaction is capable, has any bearing on the subject. We might as well seek a warrant for infant baptism in Magna Charta, or the Bill of Rights. Infant salvation does not imply infant baptism. Baptism is an exhibition of the faith of the gospel; and of course cannot belong to any but those who appear to believe the gos-

pel. But infants are saved without the gospel. These infants are not brought to Jesus for baptism, nor for any ordinance of the gospel, but to be blessed by him. Can they not be blessed by Jesus without baptism? This passage, then, can have no concern with the subject.\* "True," says Mr. Ewing, "baptism is not mentioned in the passage, but our Saviour's condescension, which the passage does mention, and which he so beautifully displays both to children and to parents, is by no means EXCLUSIVE of the baptism of the former, but apparently in addition to it." *Our Saviour's condescension, here mentioned, not exclusive of the baptism of infants!* What an argument! Does our Saviour's condescension to children, suppose that they must have been baptized? It is a shame for human understanding to urge such arguments as these. The children taken up into the arms of Christ could speak nothing more childish. Divine truths we must receive like children, but if we receive infant baptism on the authority of such arguments, we must receive it as simpletons. Christ commands us to be like little children, but he never commands us to be idiots. "In malice be ye children, but in understanding be men." The gospel itself must have evidence; and we are required to believe nothing without evidence. Is our Saviour's condescension in blessing children any evidence that they ought to be baptized? This passage, does not, indeed, EXCLUDE children from baptism. And many a thousand passages might be quoted, that do not EXCLUDE infants from baptism. But is every passage that does not forbid infant baptism, a proof that infants ought to be baptized? It seems, however, that this passage does more than not exclude infants from baptism, though, in such a lack of evidence, that itself is a great deal. The blessing is apparently in ADDITION to the baptism. Now, how this is apparent, is what I cannot see; and though I should wear out my eyes in the search, I am afraid I

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\* To this day, Jewish children are brought to the Rabbi, who lays his hand on them, and prays.

can never discover it here. The man who can see infant baptism here, may descry the inhabitants of the moon with his naked eye.

Mr. Ewing quotes a passage in his note, that is subtle without penetration. *Of such is the kingdom of heaven*, "that is to say," says Mr. Hallet, "the kingdom of God *belongs to*, or *comprehends* such infants as these." No, Mr. Hallet, to say this, is to say what the passage does not say. It is not said, that the kingdom of God *belongs to* such, or *comprehends* such; but that the kingdom of God *is* of such, that is, such persons constitute this kingdom. If we are not pleased with this paraphrase, Mr. Hallet gives us another, which must be abundantly edifying; "or," says he "if any one would have the words so stiffly rendered, *Such's is the kingdom of God*, like, *Theirs is the kingdom of heaven*, Matth. v. 3." But the latter passage ought to be translated, "of them is the kingdom of heaven." The kingdom of heaven consists of the poor in spirit, and of the poor in spirit only. There is not another in the kingdom. The meaning is not that the poor in spirit will obtain heaven as their inheritance; but that there is none in the kingdom of heaven but the poor in spirit. Neither of these passages import, that the kingdom of heaven is the property of such persons, but that such persons constitute the whole kingdom. There is not one in heaven but the poor in spirit; nor is there one in heaven who is not such as the children. However, were it even supposed that the expression was, "the kingdom of heaven belongs to such," the import of the term *such* is not altered. Even *such's is the kingdom*, makes no difference. Every way in which the words can be understood, imports that the heirs of the kingdom are *such as children*—not that they are children. Observe the difference between the expression, Matt. v. 3, from the expression in this place. In the former it is αὐτῶν "of them," in the latter it is τοιούτων "of such." The kingdom of heaven is of the poor in spirit, and of them only: but it is not of children only,



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but of those who *are such* as children. They resemble children in their character. Had *αὐτῶν* been here used instead of *τοιοῦτων*, it would have imported, that none but children are members of Christ's kingdom. It would have said, that all children are members of Christ's kingdom; and that none but children were included in that kingdom.

Mr. Hallet says, that if we understand the term *such* to refer not to the infants, but to persons resembling them, it will be impossible to make out the force of our Saviour's argument. But let what will be the consequence, this is actually what our Saviour has said; and nothing else can the words import. "The kingdom of heaven *is of such*," cannot possibly mean that the kingdom of heaven *is of them*. The term *such* does not signify identity—cannot signify identity, but likeness. Besides, to understand it so, would imply, that none but children could be saved. For if the kingdom of God is *of children*, by consequence none but children are of the kingdom. I am not bound, then, to satisfy Mr. Hallet with a view of the passage that will make out the force of our Saviour's argument. I will show him what concerns this argument, and I will insist that so far the meaning must be what I contend for.

"The meaning seems to be," says Mr. Hallet, "of *such* kind of infants *as these is the kingdom of God*, that is, of such infants as have been partakers of the seal of the covenant, of such infants as have been baptized, or, at least, circumcised like these." No, Mr. Hallet, this is a forgery. This is a vile and a wicked forgery. Many have been hanged for forgery, who have not made such alterations on writings as this makes on the book of God. There is nothing either expressed or implied with respect to the baptism or the circumcision of the infants brought to Jesus. Nor does what our Lord says apply to those children more than any other children. It is not, *Suffer these little baptized or circumcised children to come*, but *suffer little children*, any little children, to come to

me. Does not the parallel passage, Mark x. 15. apply to children in general? It is the temper of children to which our Lord gives his approbation, and the things referred to are found in all children. Does not this illustration show this? Does not Matt. xviii. 1. confirm this? Why does Mr. Hallet look for a reason of approbation, not only not mentioned by Jesus himself, but different from that which Jesus has mentioned? All children possess what Jesus here approves. But while these dispositions of children are such as to afford a proper figure to represent the teachableness, humility, &c. of the disciples of Jesus, there is no reason to suppose that they are such as are entirely conformable to the law of God. There may be something in them that will need the atonement of the blood of Christ, while they afford a likeness to the character of the disciples. Indeed, the dispositions of children are not considered here in reference to God, but in reference to men. Children believe their parents implicitly; and they are comparatively unambitious. But they are no more ready to believe God than adults are. The approbation therefore of infants contained in our Lord's words, does not imply that they are teachable and humble in the things of God. Our Lord may approve of children here, just as he loved the rich young man in unbelief. The young man had lived in such a manner, that in his own view he had kept the law of God from his youth up. To live so, was commendable, though he was in error. Accordingly, "Jesus beholding him, loved him."

But in whatever way the thing may be explained, the ground of our Lord's approbation of children, is their teachableness, humility, &c. and this as it respects all children equally. If Mr. Hallet will not take edification in my way of understanding the force of our Lord's argument, let him look for something to please himself. That the term *such* has the reference for which I contend, does not admit doubt.

That children are capable of being brought to



Christ and blessed by him, is clearly established by this passage ; and in this light it is of inestimable value. Let every Christian, then, bring his children to Christ. Let him bring them to Christ in his prayers night and day ; for their salvation is beyond every earthly consideration. Let him bring them to Christ in his word, and in every thing in which Christ has appointed them to be brought to him. But let not Christians think, that to practise on their infants a religious ordinance of human invention, is to bring them to Christ, but to increase their own sin. Had man appointed an ordinance of imposition of hands on children, from the authority of this passage, it would not have been so strange. But to argue that children must be baptized, because they may be blessed by Jesus, has no colour of plausibility. The whole argument may be reduced to a single sentence. *Children may be blessed without being baptized, therefore the blessing of the children by Jesus is no argument for infant baptism.*

In short, whether our Lord's expression imports that the kingdom of God *consists* of such, or is the *property* of such, the term *such* must necessarily mean not *them*, but persons *like them*—of such as children, not of children such as these. The ground of our Lord's approbation of children is their resemblance to his disciples in certain characteristics of mind, which are to be found only in rational creatures ; and they are permitted to come to Christ, because they are capable of being blessed by him.

The fact here recorded, however, instead of affording evidence for infant baptism, affords a presumption against it. If infants were every day brought to be baptized, why did the apostles object to their being brought to be blessed ? Mr. Ewing has been aware of this difficulty, and has obviated it by a resource worthy of Ulysses, “for wiles renowned.” “The disciple of Christ,” says he, “never thought of forbidding the children to be brought to **THEM**, which they would be, (John iv. 2.) in order to be bap-

tized. They only objected to their being brought also to their Master, "that he should put his hands on them and pray." Now, is this a thought that would ever occur to any simple mind in reading the passage? Is there any thing that intimates a double purpose in bringing the children, first for their baptism to the apostles, and next to Jesus for his blessing? What an eagle eye must he have that can discover these things? But there is here a distinction never once made in the history of Jesus,—a distinction between coming to him and to his attending disciples. There is no instance of coming to his apostles for any thing in his presence. Jesus indeed did not personally baptize; but he baptized by his disciples. All things were done by his directions, and whoever came for baptism came to Jesus, as much as for any thing else. This distinction, however, if admitted, will not serve. Still, it is asked, if children were baptized, why did the apostles object to their coming to Christ to be blessed? Jesus vindicates the propriety of bringing children to him, by arguments that equally apply, whether it is to himself personally, or to his apostles acting for him.

But let this passage be ever so finely wiredrawn, it cannot include infant baptism. It applies to children in general, and not merely to the children of believers; and though the children of believers only were included, they may be brought to Christ for his blessing without being baptized.

"The language of the Acts of the Apostles," says Mr. Ewing, "on the subject of baptism, previously to the history of the propagation of the gospel among the Gentiles, in which family baptism is first mentioned, is always equally comprehensive with that of the gospels, Acts ii. 38, 39." *On the subject of baptism!* Does the baptism, enforced in the passage referred to, at all include any but those who repent? "Then Peter said unto them, Repent, and be baptized, every one of you, in the name of Jesus Christ, for the remission of sins, and ye shall receive the gift of the

**Holy Ghost.** For the promise is unto you, and to your children, and to all that are afar off, even as many as the Lord our God shall call." Does this imply the baptism of any but of those who repent? They who repent, and they only, are to be baptized. "Repent, and be baptized." Can language be more clear? Are they not to be baptized into the remission of sins? Does not this show, that in baptism, repentance and remission of sins are supposed with respect to the baptized? They are not to be baptized, that repentance and remission of sins may follow. Instead of proving infant baptism, this passage proves that none ought to be baptized, but such as repent, and have their sins forgiven. Is it not expressly said, that all who are thus baptized shall receive the gift of the Holy Ghost? The promise is indeed said to be to *your* children; but is it not also said, that it is to all that are afar off? And is it not, with respect to both, confined to those whom the Lord shall call? Children denotes posterity, and not merely infant children, and the promise of the Spirit is to them and to their posterity, and to all that are afar off, only on their repentance. It is not said, that when a man repents, his children shall receive the gift of the Holy Ghost, whether they repent or not; for this is false. His children, and all that are afar off, shall receive this gift, just as he himself received it, when they repent and are baptized. Does Mr. Ewing believe, that when a man believes the gospel, his infants, and all the unbelievers of his house, receive remission of sins, and the gift of the Holy Ghost? If not, there is no ground to give them that baptism that implies both remission of sins, and the gift of the Holy Ghost. This promise is to the children, just as it is to the parents; and it is to all that are afar off, just as it is to parents and children, on their repentance. And it is actually communicated only to those whom the Lord calls. Mr. Ewing says, "that when the apostle added, 'To all that are afar off, even as many as the Lord our God shall call,' the meaning plainly is, that the pro-

mise which was to the Jews first, and to their children, should be to the Gentiles also, and to their children." No, Mr. Ewing, this is not the plain meaning. This is a very forced and unnatural meaning. There is no doubt that the promise here spoken of, is to the children of the Gentiles, just as it was to the children of the Jews ; that is, on their repentance, they shall be made partakers of the gift of the Spirit. But the words referred to have nothing to do with this. The last clause is a limitation of the promise with respect to the three classes mentioned, restricting it to such of each as the Lord shall call. This is as clear as language can make it ; and nothing but perverseness can mistake it. The promise is unto you ; the promise is likewise to your children ; the promise is likewise to all that are afar off. But it is to none of any class, but such as the Lord shall call. The three distinct classes are coupled by *and*—you *and* your children, *and* all afar off. The last clause is not coupled with the rest by *and*, but added to the whole, as a limitation. And does not the whole word of God confirm this view ? Do any receive the gift of the Spirit, but such as are called ? Do the unbelieving children and servants of a believer receive this gift ? It is strange that any Christian should contend for a view of this passage, so unfounded and so forced.

But if Mr. Ewing will be so perverse as to hold to this view, it will profit him nothing as to infant baptism. Whatever the promise here may import, to whomsoever it is made, the baptism here spoken of, is to such only as repent. Besides, even according to his own explanation of the passage, he must view all the infants and unbelievers of a believer's house, as possessing the gift of the Spirit. This is a species of unbelievers unknown to the word of God,—unbelievers possessing the Holy Spirit!

Nothing but perverseness, and an obstinate attachment to a system, could make our opponents rely on an argument founded on the indefinite phrase, *your children*. Does not God promise to "pour out his

Spirit upon all flesh ?” Might it not be as plausibly argued from this, that the Spirit must be given to every individual of the human race, or that *children* here must mean either all children, or infant children? Even if no explanatory and limiting phrase had been added, the indefinite term must be limited by other known truth. But our opponents are so perverse, as to contend for the unlimited sense of an indefinite term, after it has been expressly limited in the passage itself by the Holy Spirit.

Dr. Wardlaw asks, How would a Jew understand the term children in this passage? I answer, no man of common sense can mistake its meaning, if he takes the meaning from the words. The apostle explains himself, so as not to be innocently mistaken by either Jew or Gentile. Paul says, “Men and brethren, children of the stock of Abraham, and whosoever among you feareth God, to you is the word of this salvation sent.” Did not the Jews believe that the blessings of the Messiah’s kingdom would be confined to themselves? How then, I might ask, would they understand this language? Would they not have much greater reason to conclude from this, that Paul confined salvation to the Jews, than that Peter extended the gift of the Spirit to the whole offspring of believers, without any respect to their faith? He says nothing here to guard them from this conception. But Peter expressly limits the term children, as applicable only to those called by the Lord. Is the gospel sent only to the Jews, and such as feared God? Is it not sent to all? Yet Paul, on this occasion, speaks of it as sent to the stock of Abraham, and such among them as feared God? Just so Peter speaks of the promise to them and their children, but he explicitly limits the blessing to those whom God shall call. The most prejudiced Jew could not innocently mistake this language.

“Are we, then, to suppose,” says Dr. Wardlaw, “that this ‘holy man of God, speaking as he was moved by the Holy Ghost,’ would, without explana-

tion or restriction," &c. *Without explanation or restriction!* How can Dr. Wardlaw use this language? Is not the last clause an express limitation?—"as many as the Lord our God shall call." But even had there been no limitation, it is rash in Dr. Wardlaw to use such language. Jesus himself used expressions that were capable of being misunderstood. Prejudices are no excuse for perverting the word of God. If ~~the~~ Jews took less or more out of the words of the apostles than they express, they were blameable.

Does Dr. Wardlaw believe, that when the head of a family receives the gospel, all his infants receive the Spirit? If not, why does he baptize them on account of this promise? Even if they did receive the Spirit, they are not to be baptized by this passage, except they repent. Does he say that the promise implies that they will repent? But the promise is, that penitents shall receive the Spirit, and not that the children of such shall repent in time to come. Besides, if there was a promise that all the children of all believers would repent, this would not entitle them to that baptism that supposes repentance.

But if *your children* respects children, without limitation from the concluding clause, then the promise is, that all the children of a believer will receive the gift of the Spirit on his believing. Does this imply that all the children of a believer believe also at the same time? If not, does the promise import that unbelieving adult children will receive the Spirit? According to our opponents, this promise secures the gift of the Spirit to the children of believers, as well as to themselves. If so, except it is a false promise, such children will receive the Spirit. Unless, then, all the children of a believer receive the gift of the Spirit, as well as himself, the gift of the Spirit cannot here be promised to his children, except they believe.

Let it be observed, that the gift of the Spirit, as respected his miraculous operations, was given to their children with the limitation for which we contend. Some of them, indeed, might be children under age,

but none of them were unbelieving children. They were old enough to prophesy : " And it shall come to pass in the last days, saith God, I will pour out of my Spirit upon all flesh : and your sons and your daughters shall prophesy." This is the promise to which Peter refers, and it was fulfilled, as far as concerned miraculous gifts, in the gift of prophecy conferred on their sons and daughters. Surely these prophesying sons and daughters, were believing sons and daughters,—not unbelieving sons and daughters, nor infant sons and daughters. Now, does not the very nature of the gift promised to their sons and daughters, limit the gift to believing sons and daughters ? Nothing can be more clear. But why do we waste time in ascertaining the nature and extent of this promise, or of any other promise ? Neither this promise, nor any other promise, respects baptism. For argument's sake, let it be granted that the Spirit is promised to all the seed of all believers ; this does not imply their baptism, except it implies faith. The commission limits baptism to believers ; and the baptism that Peter here preaches, is limited to those who repent. Whatever a wild fancy may extort from the promise mentioned, it has no concern with baptism. That the promise of the gift of the Spirit is limited to those whom the Lord shall call, with respect to them, their children, and those afar off, is as clear as the light of heaven ; but let it be extended as it may, baptism is not attached to it. The passage has no possible bearing on the subject. Our opponents have a popish perverseness in clinging to arguments that have a thousand and a thousand times been shown to be inefficient, and which they cannot themselves say bear the weight of their conclusion, but have merely some favourable aspect toward it. It is a most vexatious thing, that, in the dispute about infant baptism, the greatest part of the arguments brought to support it, have no concern with baptism at all. Is it not evident, on the very face of the business, that infant baptism is not in the Scriptures, when its advocates are obliged to shelter it un-

der such subterfuges ? Had they real evidence, they have talents to exhibit it. Had they only one sound argument, they would not degrade their understanding by resting on arguments that have no reference to the subject.

"Precisely in the same strain," says Mr. Ewing, "and almost in the same words, the Apostle Paul asserts the interest which believers from among the Gentiles have, in the family promise made to the Jews ; and in the same way as Peter does, he connects this family promise with family baptism, Gal. iii. 13, 14, 26—29." *Family promise, family baptism?* How are such things to be found in the passage referred to? Is not the blessing of Abraham, that comes on the Gentiles, justification by the faith of Abraham, in the seed of Abraham ? Is it not such only who receive "the promise of the Spirit ?" Do any but believers receive the promise of the Spirit ? Is it not here expressly said, that the "promise of the Spirit" is "through faith ?" Is it not expressly said, that the blessing of Abraham has come on the Gentiles, that "we might receive the promise of the Spirit through faith?" Can this blessing, then, extend farther than the promise of the Spirit connected with it, and to be given through it? This promise is confined to faith, which clearly determines what the blessing is, and strongly confirms our view of the parallel passage from Acts ii. 39.

But Mr. Ewing says that Paul here, as Peter does, connects this promise with family baptism. No, Mr. Ewing, neither of them connects this promise with family baptism. There is not a shadow of foundation for such an assertion. Peter says nothing of the baptism of the children to whom the promise is made. There is no doubt that such children would be baptized as well as their parents, because they were believers, and had received the gift of the Spirit through faith. But this is not said in the passage, nor implied any other way than, as their parents, they repented, and through faith received the gift of the Spirit. In Gal. iii. 14, even believer baptism is not spoken of as



connected with the blessing of Abraham, though it is truly connected with it. In ver. 26, 27, the Apostle speaks of the import of baptism, but not as connected with ver. 14. But where is family baptism? How can it be extorted from ver. 27? Mr. Ewing, you might as well assert that family baptism is connected with the breach of the sixth commandment. Shall any man suffer his understanding to be imposed on, by submitting to believe that family baptism is spoken of in such passages as this? Can a righteous cause require the aid of such support? Give me Scripture for infant baptism, and I will receive it. Give me any reasoning that is founded on a basis of truth, and I will weigh it. But I can have no respect for a mode of reasoning that founds on nothing, or on untrue assumption. A man would read himself blind, before he would find any thing like family baptism in Gal. iii. It cannot be truth that requires learned and ingenious men to adopt such a mode of defence. Mr. Ewing, either yield, or give us argument. Do not continue to force and misrepresent the word of God, to sanction the traditions of men. You are floundering in a quagmire,—every plunge to relieve yourself, will only sink you more deeply.

“Unless we admit,” says Mr. Ewing, “that infants, nay, every relation, both of affinity and descent, which can be considered as his property, are interested in the privileges of a believer’s house, I see not a satisfactory meaning of 1 Cor. vii. 12—14.” This is an astonishing avowal. Mr. Ewing believes that all the unbelieving children of a believer, and his unbelieving wife, have from him a right to all the ordinances of Christ. Well, this is extravagant, but it is only consistent. Others have founded an argument for infant baptism on this passage, but they inconsistently refused to admit the argument with respect to the unbelieving wife. Mr. Ewing has perceived that the passage cannot be consistently quoted for the one and not for the other, and that it applies equally to the Lord’s supper; he therefore, instead of giving

up the argument, as proving too much, boldly adopts all its consequences. The unbelieving wife, then, is to be baptized, and to be admitted to all the privileges of a believer's house. This privilege, it seems, is granted on the right of *property*. The unbelieving wife is to be baptized as the property of her husband. Slaves have a similar claim. To refute so monstrous a position, is any thing necessary but to state it? Is this like the kingdom of Christ? Can any thing be more contrary to the Scripture accounts of baptism and the Lord's Supper? Faith is necessary to entitle to admission into a church; faith is necessary to eat the Lord's Supper without condemnation; faith is necessary for baptism. How, then, can an unbelieving wife, or unbelieving children, be admitted to such privileges by this passage? Can any passage in the word of God give a warrant to persons to eat and drink condemnation to themselves? Can any passage warrant the admission of unbelievers into a church from which the Lord has excluded them? Can any passage sanction the baptism of unbelievers, when all the accounts of baptism require faith? Can any passage give countenance to persons evidently in their sins, to be admitted to an ordinance that figuratively exhibits their sins, as by faith in the blood of Christ, already washed away? This is an extravagance that, in a person who has any notion of Christian fellowship, and the nature of a church can never be exceeded.

With respect to the passage referred to, it is usually and sufficiently explained, by an allusion to Ezra x. 3, 44; Neh. xiii. 23, 24. The sanctification referred to, must be *legitimacy according to the law of God*. Such marriages were not lawful to the Jews, and both the wives and their children were put away. It is the duty of the disciples to marry in the Lord; but even if they transgress that law, or are converted after marriage, they are not, like the Jews, to put away their wives and children on repentance. The marriage is to continue, and the relation is sanctified, just

as their food is sanctified or blessed to their use. Now this is an important, a most important thing. As Jesus commands his disciples to marry in the Lord, had no provision been made, every marriage contrary to this, must be given up on repentance, just as fornication and adultery; and the offspring of such marriages could not be considered as the children of marriage, according to God's institution. It is said in reply to this, that even the marriages of unbelievers are lawful, and the offspring legitimate. Certainly—because they are according to the law both of God and man. But as Christ commands his people to marry in the Lord, to marry otherwise is contrary to God's law. Neither such marriage, then, nor the offspring of it, would be legitimate according to the law of God, except by this provision. The marriage might be legitimate according to the law of man, and the children legitimate according to the law of man, but neither would be legitimate according to the law of God. This provision, then, is most bountiful and kind. The believer, by remaining in his marriage with the unbeliever, does not continue in sin, as he would by continuing in fornication. His marriage is sanctified to him. I can see no difficulty in the passage. But if any will choose to understand it otherwise, let them have it their own way. In no view of it, can it countenance the baptism of infants or unbelievers. This sanctification, whatever it is, is a marriage sanctification, and not the sanctification of the Spirit through the belief of the truth, which is the only sanctification that entitles to any Christian privilege. If such infants were even as holy as the infant John the Baptist, it would not imply their baptism. They may possess the holiness that will fit them for heaven, without entitling them to baptism. Baptism is for believers, and only for believers.

So, then, Mr. Ewing can see no meaning in this passage, unless it is a warrant to give to unbelievers those ordinances that Jesus has provided for believers, and from which he has excluded unbelievers. If this

passage will give a right to introduce the unbelieving wife and children of a believer into a church, and to give them the ordinance appointed for believers,—if it will enable such unbelieving wife and children to eat the Lord's supper without eating and drinking condemnation ; may it not also introduce them into heaven on the same ground ? It is said, " he that believeth not shall be condemned ; " but if faith can be dispensed with in the ordinance of Christ, in which it is required, may it not also be dispensed with in this threatening ? The same explanation that will baptize an unbeliever, or admit him to the Lord's Supper, will introduce him into heaven, in defiance of the damnation pronounced against him by the Saviour himself. What a wretched thing it is for a Christian to be given up by God to justify the traditions of men, and to fight against the ordinance of Christ ! How wide is the range of this error ! How much of the word of God does its defence oblige its advocates to pervert !

But this is a new, and a strange ground of baptism—baptism on the ground of property ! The unbelieving wife is baptized, not, it seems, in virtue of the promises of the Abrahamic covenant, but because she is the property of her believing husband. The promises of the Abrahamic covenant are to his seed, but the wife is included only as property. Can any idea be more abhorrent to the nature of Christ's kingdom ? Would not this baptize the whole dominions of an absolute king ? I call upon all Christians to reflect on this monstrous avowal. Is it not self-evident that the cause that demands this defence, is not the cause of God and truth ? That the baptism of the unbelieving wife is the necessary consequence of the argument for infant baptism brought from this passage, Mr. Ewing sees to be inevitable ; and therefore avows the consequence rather than forego the argument. It is then utterly vain for more timid minds to attempt to hold the argument and refuse the consequence. Mr. Ewing being judge,

the baptism of the infant must be accompanied with that of the unbelieving wife, and the unbelieving adults of the family. Let them, then, choose which they will. They must take all or nothing.

Well, suppose they are all determined to adopt the shocking consequences avowed by Mr. Ewing, their hardihood will show only their disposition. It will not save their cause. This holiness of the unbelieving wife and children, is a holiness not of the *truth* nor of the *Spirit*; and therefore cannot entitle to any ordinance of Christ's kingdom. It is a *holiness of marriage*, which is an ordinance of God for his people, in common with all men. It is a holiness which is here expressly said to belong to *unbelievers*; and therefore can have nothing to do with ordinances that were intended for *believers*. It is a holiness that demands the believing husband or wife to live with the unbelieving, not to baptize such. The question treated of is solely this. There is no reference to any ordinance of the kingdom of Christ. Why then should this unbelieving holiness admit to the ordinance of Christ's kingdom, more than it will admit to heaven? All the ordinances of Christ imply, that the partakers of them have the holiness of the truth by the Spirit. If this can be dispensed with as to an avowed unbeliever, the declaration "without holiness no man shall see the Lord," may equally be dispensed with for his salvation. The same reasoning that will baptize the unbelieving wife, will introduce her into heaven as an unbeliever.

But why are unbelievers of this description baptized rather than any other unbelievers? Because, says Mr. Ewing, salvation is come to the house. *Salvation come to the house!* But it seems it has not yet reached the wife, or the husband; and though it has reached one of them, it may not have reached the children. The wife is here said to be sanctified while an unbeliever. Then salvation has not come to her, except the Gospel is false, and she can be saved as an unbeliever. Why, then, should she be

baptized, or receive the Lord's Supper, which supposes that she has been already made a partaker of salvation? But it may be said, she will yet believe. I reply, although this were certain, it would be no reason to give her an ordinance that implies faith and sanctification of the Spirit through the truth. This, however, is not certain, for the reason by which the husband is urged to live with her as an unbeliever, is, not the certainty that she will yet believe, but the mere possibility of this. "For what knowest thou, O wife, whether thou shalt save thy husband? or, how knowest thou, O man, whether thou shalt save thy wife?" Here the mere possibility of the future salvation of the unbelieving husband, or wife, through the means of the other party, is urged as a reason to continue in the marriage relation. Nothing can be a clearer confutation of the opinion of our opponents with respect to the meaning of the expression, "salvation is come to this house," than this passage. The utmost that the apostle states as a ground of not forsaking the unbelieving partner, is, that it may turn out to the salvation of such. There is not a single promise pleaded. If this is a ground for baptism, we might baptize any person; for we do not know but he may yet receive the truth.

But I appeal to the common sense of all my readers. If it had been the custom to baptize the unbelieving husband or wife on the faith of the believing partner, would there ever have been a question with respect to the propriety of living with such! If the unbelieving husband or wife was admitted to baptism, would it ever be thought that it was contrary to the holiness of marriage to dwell with such a husband or wife? Would they suppose, that a holiness that admitted to the ordinances of Christ's kingdom, was not sufficient for the sanctification of marriage?

Mr. Ewing has had the boldness to carry the principles that justify infant baptism to their proper extent. But he has done no more. Many persons who hold the argument from this passage, will be

shocked with his sentiment. It is impossible to vindicate the baptism of infants from this holiness, without affording equal ground for the baptism of the unbelieving husband or wife. Mr. Ewing has the perspicacity to see this, and he has the hardihood to adopt it. He is just like Mr. Hume with respect to the philosophy of his time. Mr. Hume, in rearing a system of universal skepticism, did no more than carry the acknowledged principles of philosophy to their just consequences. Granting him his first principles, which were universally taken for granted, he, with the greatest ease, overturned heaven and earth, matter and spirit. He shocked the world by his conclusions; and thus led, by an examination of his first principles, to the overthrow of his doctrine. Specious or popular error will never be abandoned, till it is driven into extravagance. I hope Christians, who have any regard for the ordinances of Christ's house, and the spirituality of his kingdom, will be led to examine, with more attention, the foundations of a practice that requires such a justification. If the whole ordinances of the house of God must be profaned; if the spiritual fabric of his kingdom must be pulled down, in order to make room for infant baptism, surely enlightened Christians may be expected to renounce it. What an awful sentiment has Mr. Ewing avowed! *Baptism into the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, may—must be given to a professed worshipper of Jupiter, Neptune, and Apollo, with the thousands of inferior gods, if the person is the husband, or the wife, or the slave of a believer, and will condescend to submit to this Christian institution!!!* To refute this, is it not enough to state it?

Having considered the evidence arising from the commission given to the apostles, and from the practice recorded in the New Testament, I shall now exhibit the evidence that is derived from such allusions to baptism, as may ascertain who were its subjects. In general, it is quite apparent that baptism is not only a figure of the washing away of sin, but that it is al-

ways supposed that the sins of those who are baptized are already washed away. Now this can be supposed of none but believers. Infants dying in infancy, if saved, have their sins washed away. But millions of persons who have their sins washed away, have not had them washed away in infancy. With respect to such, then, baptism, that supposes sins already washed away, could have no proper application in their infancy.

From John iii. 5. we see that baptism is a figure of regeneration. They who are baptized are represented as born again. Now this is peculiar to believers. Even if there was a certainty that an infant would believe in future time, it would be no ground to baptize it. The ordinance exhibits the baptized person as at the time born again.

The same thing appears from Titus iii. 5. "Not by works of righteousness, which we have done, but according to his mercy he saved us, *by the washing of regeneration*, and renewing of the Holy Ghost." Here baptism is called the bath or laver of regeneration. In the figure, it is the place of birth. The baptized person is represented as born in the ordinance, and is supposed to be already born, or renewed by the Spirit. Now, this cannot belong to infants; because infants dying in infancy are not born of the truth, although they are saved by the blood of Christ; and if they were, how can they be known? The multitude of saved adults were not born again in infancy. To say that it may represent that infants will be born again, is absurd. For the ordinance supposes, that they are born again. Besides, it is not certain that they will be born again. Their new birth is not a matter of course. It would not be the same ordinance, if, when applied to infants, it represented what might take place in futurity, and when applied to adults, it represented what had taken place. None are represented in Scripture as born again, except through the belief of the truth. "Being born again, not of corruptible seed, but of incorruptible, by the



word of God, which liveth and abideth for ever," 1 Pet. i. 23.

Agreeably to this Ananias says to Paul, "And now, why tarriest thou? arise, and be baptized, and wash away thy sins, calling on the name of the Lord," Acts xxii. 16. Here we see baptism figuratively washes away sins, and supposes that they are previously truly washed away. Could our opponents say to the parents of the infant about to be baptized, "Arise, and wash away the sins of thy infant?" The figure supposes that they are washed away, not that they may, in future time, be washed away.

Rom. vi. 3—5, and Col. ii. 12. explain baptism in a sense that suits believers only. They who are baptized, are baptized into Christ's death, as dying with him, and as rising with him to a new life. They are viewed as already risen with him *through faith*. Can any thing be more express than this? Are infants risen with Christ through faith of the operation of God? If not, they are not among the number of those that were baptized.

In like manner, 1 Cor. xv. 29, all who are baptized are supposed, by submitting to that ordinance, to profess faith in the resurrection. Of this faith, infants are incapable.

In 1 Pet. iii. 21, they who are baptized are represented as having a good conscience, which cannot apply to infants.

In Heb. x. 22, 23, baptism is supposed to proceed on a confession of the faith or hope of the baptized persons, which being confessed in baptism, they are exhorted to hold fast without wavering.

That the external washing, or figurative bath, belongs only to believers, is seen in Ephes. v. 26; "That he might sanctify and cleanse it by *the washing of water*, or the laver of the water, *by the word*." Here the bath of baptism is only the figure of that which is done by the word. Believers are washed in baptism only in figure, but the reality of this figure they have had in the belief of the word. Infants are not sanc-

tified by the word, and therefore have nothing to do with that *laver of water* that is appointed for those who receive the word, to their salvation and sanctification.

In 1 Cor. vi. 11, they who are baptized are supposed to be washed,—to be sanctified and justified, in the name of the Lord Jesus, and by the Spirit of our God.

We learn from Ephes. iv. 5, that there is but one baptism. Now, as the baptism of the commission cannot possibly extend to infants, if there is such a thing as infant baptism, there must be two baptisms. If, then, there is but one baptism, there can be no infant baptism.

In 1 Cor. xii. 13, it is taken for granted, all who are baptized belong to the body of Christ. "For by one Spirit are we all baptized into one body, whether we be Jews or Gentiles, whether we be bond or free; and have been all made to drink into one Spirit." They who are baptized, are supposed already to belong to the body of Christ; and for this reason, they are baptized into it. They are, by baptism, externally united to that body, to which they are internally united by faith. None are here supposed to be baptized upon the expectation, or probability, or possibility, that they may yet belong to that body. They are baptized into the body.

Nothing can be more express to this purpose than Gal. iii. 27, "For as many of you as have been baptized into Christ, have put on Christ." Here, baptism is represented as implying a *putting on* of Christ: Surely this is peculiar to believers. Infants cannot put on Christ. Dr. Wardlaw thinks he has entirely overturned this argument, but his reply to it has no just application. He quotes Gal. v. 2—6, as a parallel to the above phraseology. "Behold, I Paul say unto you, that if ye be circumcised, Christ shall profit you nothing. For I testify again to every man that is circumcised, that he is a debtor to do the whole law. Christ is become of no effect unto you, whosoever of you are justified by the law; ye are fallen from

grace." "In the 27th verse of the third chapter of the same epistle, the apostle says, 'For as many of you as have been baptized unto Jesus Christ, (or, 'ye whosoever have been baptized unto Jesus Christ,') have put on Christ.' From this expression," says he, "it has been very confidently argued, that *adults only were baptized*; because of 'putting on Christ,' adults only were capable. Now, let the principle of interpretation, or of inference, be applied to the passage quoted from the *fifth* chapter. It is an address to *adults*; it expresses things of which *adults only were capable*. Are we, then, to infer from this, that *adults only were circumcised*? We certainly ought, on the same principle on which we infer from the other, that adults alone were *baptized*. There is precisely the same ground in the former case as there is in the latter." No, Dr. Wardlaw, the cases, instead of being parallel, are entirely dissimilar. In the one case, the apostle states the import of an ordinance of God; in the other, he is not stating the import of an ordinance of God. He does not allege that their submission to baptism was an evidence of putting on Christ, for it is not such; but it is a figure of putting on Christ. Some of them might not turn out to be real believers, but in their baptism they were taken for such; and without this, baptism had to them no application. It is taken for granted, that all who are baptized have put on Christ. But it is not from the import of circumcision, that the apostle alleges that they were unbelievers who submitted to it. Their receiving of circumcision, as necessary to salvation, was evidence that they were not in the faith, Gal. v. 3. This was decided evidence with respect to every one of them individually, that he was yet in his sins. On the other hand, their baptism was no evidence of their being in the faith; but this was its import. No two cases, then, can be more dissimilar than the two which Dr. Wardlaw here pronounces to be precisely similar. Let Dr. Wardlaw bring an example of similar phraseology, with respect to the import of any ordinance of God,

which yet is divinely appointed for those who are not supposed to "put on Christ," and he will do something to his purpose. Were the Jews ever addressed with such language as this? Was it ever said, "whosoever of you have been circumcised in your flesh, have been renewed in your hearts by the Spirit of God?" No, this could not have been said; for circumcision never imported this.

### THE ABRAHAMIC COVENANT.

As infant baptism cannot be found in the New Testament, its advocates have endeavoured to find a cover for it in the Old. They think they have discovered this in the covenant that God made with Abraham. Of course, that covenant has been much discussed on this subject, and variously explained, to suit the respective sentiments of the different parties. It is lamentable, that the people of God should allow their sentiments on one subject, to influence their decisions, so as to perplex the plainest things. Nothing but the supposed connexion of the Abrahamic covenant with the subject of infant baptism, could produce such a diversity of opinion in explaining that covenant. I have read much that I cannot approve, on both sides of this question; and I cannot but think, that, in many instances, both parties have been more guided by their view of its bearing on the subject of baptism, than by an intense desire to ascertain the import of the documents before them. As I am convinced that truth must be consistent with itself, I have no fear that any real evidence can ever be deduced from the Abrahamic covenant, in opposition to what the Lord has so plainly established in the New Testament. The covenant with Abraham, I am convinced, is, like every other part of the Old Testament, full of instruction to us, and is worthy of the most careful study. But as no view of this subject can have the most distant bearing on infant baptism, I do not think it necessary fully to examine that covenant.

I entirely agree with those who consider this covenant as having a letter and a spirit. For the accomplishment of the grand promise, that all nations should be blessed in Abraham, three promises were given to him. First, a numerous posterity which was fulfilled in the letter, in the nation of Israel. It was fulfilled in the spirit, by the divine constitution, that makes all believers the children of Abraham. The unbelieving Jews were Abraham's children as to the flesh, yet there is a sense in which Jesus denies that they were the children of Abraham. The second promise was to be a God to him and his seed, which was fulfilled in the letter by his protection of Israel in Egypt,—his delivering of them from bondage,—his taking them into covenant at Sinai,—and all his subsequent dealings with them in their generations, till they were cast off by their rejection of Christ. This promise is fulfilled in the Spirit, by God's being a God to all believers, and to them alone, Rom. iv. 11, 12, in a higher sense than he was to Israel, Jer. xxxi. 33. The third promise was of the land of Canaan, fulfilled in the letter to Israel, and in the spirit fulfilled to the true Israel in the possession of the heavenly inheritance. In accordance with this double sense of the promises of this covenant, the kingdom of God in Israel, with its officers, laws, worship, &c. is a visible model of the invisible kingdom of Christ. The typical ordinances, which exhibited the truths of the gospel in figure, form one of the most conclusive evidences of Christianity; and present spiritual things to the mind in so definite and striking a manner, that they add the greatest lustre to the doctrines of grace. What a striking emblem of the incarnation have we in God's dwelling in the tabernacle and temple! How clearly do we see substitution and imputation in the laying on of hands on the victim! How blind must they be, who do not see the atonement by the blood of Christ, in the sacrifices of Israel!

This appears to me to be the only view of the covenant of Abraham, that will suit every thing said of it

in the word of God. That it has a letter and a spirit, is true, and analogous to every part of the Old Testament. But as long as Christians look at this covenant, on the one side to make it a foundation for a New Testament ordinance, and, on the other, to make it as unfit as possible for such a purpose, it need not be expected that the mind of the Spirit will be understood. It will be easy for a little perverse ingenuity on either side, to set it in a light that will perplex the simple. If any one can say with the Psalmist, "I opened my mouth and panted; for I longed for thy commandments," let him come with me beyond the cloud that has been raised round the Abrahamic covenant, and try what we can discover in the sunshine on the other side. Let them make what they will of that covenant, I maintain that it affords no foundation for infant baptism. They tell us that the covenant of Abraham was the New Covenant. Now, for argument's sake, let it be the New Covenant, and I deny the result that they wish to draw. **INFANTS ARE NOT SAVED BY THE NEW COVENANT,** and therefore they cannot be connected with it, in any view that represents them as interested in it. It is a vulgar mistake of theologians to consider, that if infants are saved, they must be saved by the New Covenant. There is no such doctrine exhibited in any part of the book of God. Infants must be saved as sinners, and saved through the blood of Christ; but there was no necessity to give a covenant to man to ratify this. Whether all infants dying in infancy are saved, or only some infants, they are saved just as adults, as to the price of redemption, and as to the sanctification of their nature. But they are not saved as adults, by the truth believed. That sacrifice, which is the ground of the New Covenant, is the salvation of saved infants. But there is no part of the word of God, that intimates that it is through faith in that sacrifice. God, who applies that sacrifice to adults only through faith, can apply it to dying infants without faith,—for faith has no merit more than works. It is only the di-

vinely appointed medium. Theologians have manifested a great want of discrimination on this subject. That necessity of faith which the Scriptures apply to adults, and adults only, theologians have applied to infants, without warrant, as if God was bound to proceed towards them as he does towards adults. Therefore it is that even in Dr. Dwight, we find that strange fanaticism, that speaks of the infant faith of John the Baptist; as if God could not save or sanctify an infant without faith, because none who hear the gospel can be sanctified without faith. Surely it ought to make every sober mind suspect that there must be something wrong at the bottom of these views, that must consider an unconscious infant as possessing faith. Did ever Joanna Southcote say any thing more extravagant?

But this view not only leads to absurdity, it takes its origin in that principle of self-righteousness that is so prone, even in Christians, to work itself into every subject of divine revelation of which they are ignorant. It supposes that it is so necessary for a man to do something as to his acceptance with God, that even the infant who cannot comply with the terms itself, must do it by its substitute. It has its name put into the covenant, or put into the gospel grant. And who is he that will undertake to put a name into God's covenant? What Antichrist will dare to take the throne of Jesus, and put a name into the gospel grant? Even the most pious men, when ignorant of God's ordinances, will attempt to establish the ordinances of man. Even the pious Henry speaks in this antichristian style. So true it is, that we cannot oppose any part of the divine counsel, without loss. Every error is in some way injurious to the grand truth of the gospel itself.

Theologians, justly considering that infants have sinned in Adam, have also justly considered that they must be washed in the blood of the Saviour, but they have, without warrant, and without discrimination, considered that they must be saved by that covenant that was given for the salvation of believers. But

they can have nothing to do with a covenant that requires faith for salvation. Were it true that infants could not be saved but by this covenant, none of them would be saved. This would denounce to condemnation all who die before the belief of the gospel. The New Covenant knows nothing of any salvation but through faith. "He that believeth shall be saved; he that believeth not shall be damned," is the testimony from which it never for a moment swerves. Such a covenant cannot save an infant, who believes nothing. But there is a covenant in which they are included, and which will save as many of them as are included in it,—the covenant of redemption between the Father and the Son, in which he engaged to lay down his life as a ransom for his chosen, whether infants or adults. Though infants are not saved by faith, they can join in the song of the Lamb in heaven, "Thou wast slain, and hast redeemed us to God by thy blood, out of every kindred, and tongue, and people, and nation."

But let us ask Jeremiah, xxxi. 31,—let us ask the Apostle Paul, Heb. viii. 10, 11, who they are that are included in the New Covenant. "For this is the covenant that I will make with the house of Israel after those days, saith the Lord; I will put my laws into their mind, and write them in their hearts." "And they shall not teach every one his neighbour, and every man his brother, saying, know the Lord: for all shall know me, from the least to the greatest." Here we see that all who are included in this covenant, have the laws of God put into their mind, and written on their heart, by himself. Can this be said of infants? The subjects of this covenant, know the Lord—all of them—even the least of them. This surely cannot include infants, who know nothing. Is there not a necessity to teach children, as soon as they are capable of instruction, to know the Lord? Are any children found who need not this instruction? If not, there are no infants in this covenant. The sacrifice of the Son of God, was as necessary for in-



fants as for adults. But had it pleased God that all the elect should die in infancy, there would have been no need of the New Covenant at all. The gospel would then have never been preached. To keep in mind this distinction, would preserve theologians free from many of their embarrassments. The necessity of faith, and the necessity of atonement, are not of the same kind. Ignorance of this, has led to great extravagance. In order to save infants, some have been led to assert that they have faith; others, that they have *imputative* faith; and others, that they have *habitual* faith. Now, all these opinions are grounded on ignorance of the difference between the necessity of faith, and the necessity of redemption or atonement.

2. My second observation is, that the infants even of Abraham himself, were not saved, when they died in infancy, by Abraham's covenant. He was not the spiritual father of his own infant seed. It is a common opinion, that Abraham, by that covenant, was constituted the head of all the redeemed. But this is a grand mistake. He was the head of believers only. By that covenant he was constituted the father of believers in all ages, but of none else. He was made the father of all them that believe out of every nation; and to his own descendants he was "the father of circumcision to them who are not of the circumcision only, but who also walk in the steps of that faith" which Abraham had. So then he was the spiritual father of none among his own descendants, but of such as believed. There was, then, by this covenant, no spiritual connexion between Abraham and his infant seed. His justification was not the pattern of theirs. He was justified by faith: his infants dying in infancy were not justified by faith. They were saved, as all saved infants were saved from the beginning of the world, and will to the end of the world, through the *bruising of the heel* of the seed of the woman.

Dr. Wardlaw calls on his opponents to show where the spiritual connexion between believers and their

infant seed, established by this covenant, is cut off. I cut it off by showing that it never existed.

Abraham himself had no such spiritual connexion with his infant seed. The covenant with Abraham made no new relation between him and his infant seed ; and much less did it constitute a spiritual relation between every believer and his infant seed.

But even had this covenant constituted a new relation between Abraham and his infant seed, Dr. Wardlaw is wrong in throwing the burthen of proof on his opponents, with respect to the supposed similar relation between every believer and his infant seed. There might have been such a connexion in the case of Abraham and his seed, without involving the necessity of a similar connexion between other believers and their seed. Dr. Wardlaw contends, that if such a connexion existed in the case of Abraham, it lies on his opponents to prove that it was discontinued. But surely it is a self-evident truth, that the burthen of proof lies on him who needs as an argument the thing to be proved. For if nothing is proved about it on either side, it cannot be used as an argument. Before any thing can be legitimately built on it, it must be proved, if it is not self-evident. To prove such a connexion, then, between Abraham and his seed by this covenant, is not proof that such a connexion exists between other believers and their seed. The latter must be proved before it is admitted. Granting, then, that there was a spiritual connexion constituted between Abraham and his infant seed by this covenant, that such a connexion exists between every believer and his infant seed, is a thing that must be proved. This proof is sometimes rested on Gal. iii. where the blessing of Abraham is said to come on the Gentiles. But that blessing is not the blessing of a spiritual connexion between believers and their seed, but the blessing of having faith counted for righteousness, or of being justified as Abraham was justified. What that blessing is, we see in verse 9. "So then they which be of faith, are blessed with

faithful Abraham." None, then, are blessed with faithful Abraham, but "they which be of faith." In verse 7, it is said, "Know ye, therefore, that they which are of faith, the same are the children of Abraham." Abraham, then, has no children spiritually, but such as are of faith. Between him and his infants there was no spiritual connexion.

3. My third observation is, that the covenant of Abraham is not made with all believers. Indeed, it is strange that there should be a necessity to make such an observation. The Abrahamic covenant is so evidently peculiar, that it is the most extravagant absurdity to suppose, that it is made with every believer in every age. Let us take a look at this covenant, as it is recorded in Gen. xii. 1. "Now, the Lord had said unto Abram, Get thee out of thy country, and from thy kindred, and from thy father's house, unto a land that I will show thee : And I will make of thee a great nation, and I will bless thee, and make thy name great ; and thou shalt be a blessing. And I will bless them that bless thee, and curse him that curseth thee, and in thee shall all the families of the earth be blessed." Is it not absolute lunacy to suppose, that this covenant is made with all believers ? Has God promised to every believer that he will make of him a great nation ? Has God promised to every believer that he will make his name great ? Is every believer to become as celebrated as Abraham ? Has God promised to every believer, that the Messiah shall descend from him, or that in him all families of the earth shall be blessed ? Every believer, indeed, is to be blessed according to that covenant ; but it is by having his faith, like Abraham's, counted for righteousness, not by becoming, like Abraham, the father of any of the faithful.

Let us look again at Gen. xv. 5. "Look now toward heaven, and tell the stars, if thou be able to number them : and he said unto him, So shall thy seed be. And he believed in the Lord, and he counted it to him for righteousness. And he said

unto him, I am the Lord, that brought thee out of Ur of the Chaldees, to give thee this land to inherit it." Is every believer to have a posterity as numerous as the stars of heaven? Is every believer to have the land of Canaan for his posterity? It is said that every believer has a provision from God. This is granted, but is that a fulfilling of this promise? This is Canaan; and the whole earth, with the exception of that land, would not fulfil this promise. Every believer has a provision from God, but not in virtue of this covenant, nor at all suitable to the inheritance here promised. Abraham's posterity must have that land. No other believer has this promise, nor a promise at all corresponding to it. The most of the Lord's people have no Canaan on earth, though every one of them, with Abraham, is by faith heir of that better country typified by Canaan.

Let us read again Gen. xvii. 5. "Neither shall thy name any more be called Abram, but thy name shall be Abraham; for a father of many nations have I made thee. And I will make thee exceeding fruitful, and I will make nations of thee, and kings shall come out of thee. And I will establish my covenant between me and thee, and thy seed after thee in their generations, for an everlasting covenant, to be a God unto thee, and to thy seed after thee. And I will give unto thee, and to thy seed after thee, the land wherein thou art a stranger, all the land of Canaan, for an everlasting possession; and I will be their God." Now, can any one think that this covenant is made with every believer? Has every believer a promise that kings shall descend from him? This covenant is indeed everlasting. It is everlasting to the carnal seed, first, as the covenant of royalty was everlasting to the seed of David, and as the covenant of the priesthood was everlasting to the seed of Phinehas. But in all such promises there is a spirit and a letter. The covenant of Abraham is everlasting in the full sense of the word, for by it all Abraham's spiritual seed are blessed with him, by having

their faith counted for righteousness to the end of the world. All believers in every age are blessed by this covenant; but to them it is not promised as it was to Abraham, that God would be the God of their seed, for it does not secure that they shall have any offspring at all. This covenant secured to Abraham that he should have a seed,—that God would be the God of that seed. Had not God provided a seed both carnal and spiritual for Abraham, he would have broken this covenant. When God promised to Phinehas, “And he shall have it, and his seed after him, even the covenant of an everlasting priesthood,” Numb. xxv. 13, a posterity is secured by this promise. But believers often have no posterity, therefore they cannot have the covenant of Abraham. Believers have their own place in that covenant, but that is to be blessed in the seed of Abraham, and like him, to have their faith counted for righteousness. The promise to the seed is to Abraham’s seed only—not to the seed of all believers. That Abraham’s covenant is given to all believers, is not said here, nor any where else. Abraham’s covenant is as peculiar to himself, as the covenant of royalty was to David, or the covenant of the priesthood to Phinehas. Even if the covenant of Abraham had promised, that every one of Abraham’s posterity, by all his wives, to the end of the world, should be heirs of heaven, other believers have no concern in it. What was promised to Abraham’s seed, was not promised to their seed. That covenant constitutes all believers Abraham’s seed, and secures to them an inheritance as such. But of their seed it says nothing.

4. My fourth observation is, that the covenant of Abraham is not the new covenant, or the gospel. Dr. Wardlaw supposes that Gal. iii. 8, establishes the identity of the Abrahamic covenant and the new covenant so clearly, that it is a matter of surprise that any should doubt it. “And the Scripture, foreseeing that God would justify the heathen through faith preached before the gospel unto Abraham, saying,

In thee shall all nations be blessed." But this does not make Abraham's covenant the gospel. It preached the gospel by promising, that all nations should be blessed in Abraham. It might be said also of the Sinai covenant, that it preached the gospel, because the giving of the law through a mediator was a figure of Christ. Every part of the legal dispensation preached the gospel, and still preaches the gospel, Rom. x. 4. Will Dr. Wardlaw say, that there was nothing in the covenant of Abraham but the gospel? And that all its promises are promises of the gospel, to be fulfilled to every believer? Is it a part of the gospel, that God will be a God to the seed of believers, as he was to the seed of Abraham? Is this contained in the promise, "In thee shall all nations be blessed?" This is the declaration that is said to have preached the gospel to Abraham prophetically. But it says nothing to Dr. Wardlaw's purpose. Many things essential to Abraham's covenant, are not promised by the gospel to all believers. It is, then, only an abuse of words to call Abraham's covenant the gospel.

5. My fifth observation is, that the promises of the covenant of Abraham, were not to his seed, either carnal or spiritual, exactly the same as to himself. God promised a numerous seed to Abraham. But this is not promised to his seed, either spiritual or carnal, individually. So far from this, the covenant of Abraham, did not secure to any individual of his race, that he should have any descendants, except to Isaac and Jacob, to whom the covenant was expressly given. It would have been quite consistent with all the promises of that covenant, that any other individual should be childless; nay, that the most righteous man of his race might either have no children, or reprobate children. By the covenant, Abraham must have a succession of carnal and spiritual seed; but this is not promised to his descendants. The race of any other righteous descendant of Abraham, except Isaac and Jacob, might have been totally cut off for their sins,

without any violation of Abraham's covenant. No Israelite, then, except Isaac and Jacob, had Abraham's covenant. This is a grand mistake in Dr. Wardlaw. He supposes that every believer has Abraham's covenant, whereas no other man ever had it in all respects. Even Isaac and Jacob had it not in all respects. They were not the fathers of all who believe, while in some respects the whole Jewish nation had the covenant of Abraham. Granting, then, that believers now have the covenant of Abraham, even as his own believing descendants had it till the coming of Christ, this does not give them any promise to their seed. If any man is a believer, God will be his God, according to the covenant of Abraham, or he is by faith one of the seed of Abraham; but that he shall have a spiritual or a carnal seed, is not promised by that covenant. The covenant secures this to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob only; for to these it was individually given. It is as absurd for a believer to claim the promises to Abraham, as to claim the crown of Great Britain. This is a point as clear as the light of heaven, and it overturns all the elaborate deductions that have been drawn from the Abrahamic covenant.

6. My sixth observation is, that the promise, "I will be a God to thy seed," has a letter and a spirit. It is said, that in this promise God must be a God to Abraham's seed, in the same sense in which he was a God to himself. I acknowledge, that from the words of the promise we could learn no distinction. But this is not absolutely necessary, and other Scriptures demand a distinction. Whether it has not an inferior sense in the letter, must be determined by the history of Abraham's descendants. Now, that it has an inferior sense in the letter, is one of the clearest things in the Old Testament. God is every where considered as the God of the whole Jewish nation, even in the worst periods of their history. This cannot imply that he was their God, in the full sense in which he was the God of Abraham.

Let us take a glance at a few passages that esta-

blish this distinction. Exod. xxix. 45, "And I will dwell among the children of Israel, and will be their God." This is spoken of the whole Jewish nation, who never were, as a nation, the true people of God. It might be said that this is spoken with respect to them, as all in the New Testament churches are addressed as saints, though there might be some who were not really such. But this is not an answer. All in the New Testament churches had given evidence that they were believers, though afterwards some of them turned out not to be such. But no such thing was ever supposed with respect to the Jews. They had their privileges, not by evidence of saintship, but by their birth. They were not only born into the kingdom of Israel, but were not afterwards put away for unbelief. There never was a law given them, as it was to the churches of Christ, that none but saints should belong to the nation or church of Israel. In Exod. xxxii. 11, we read, "And Moses besought the Lord his God, and said, Lord, why doth thy wrath wax hot against *thy people*?"—"Turn from thy fierce wrath, and repent of this evil against *thy people*."—"And the Lord repented of the evil which he thought to do against *his people*." Here the worshippers of the golden calf are called God's people; and the ground on which Moses pleads that God would not execute vengeance, is, that his promise of their inheriting the land might not be violated.

The same thing is evident from Lev. xxvi. 44, "And yet for all that, when they be in the land of their enemies, I will not cast them away, neither will I abhor them, to destroy them utterly, and to break my covenant with them: *for I am the Lord their God*." Even in Babylon he fulfilled his promise of being unto them the Lord their God.

Agreeably to this, God is every where in the Old Testament considered as the husband of Israel; and this relation is acknowledged even in her adulteries. Isaiah iii. 14, "Turn, O backsliding children, saith the Lord; for I am married unto you." But it would be endless to quote passages. Now, God was the



husband of Israel only in the letter, which was accomplished in Jesus becoming the husband of his Church.

That the covenant of Abraham has a letter and a Spirit, is not a theory formed to serve a purpose, but is consonant to every part of the Old dispensation, and is the only thing that can harmonize it with the New. The temple was the house of God in the letter; believers are so in the spirit. To call any house the house of God, is as much below the sense which the same phrase has when it is applied to the Church of Christ, as to call the nation of Israel the people of God, is below the sense which that phrase has when applied to the spiritual Israel. Besides, there are many things spoken about the house of God in the letter, in terms that can only fully suit the spirit. "I have surely built thee an house to dwell in, a settled place for thee to abide in for ever," 1 Kings viii. 13. The incongruity of supposing him, whom the heaven of heavens cannot contain, to dwell in a house as a settled habitation, is removed only by referring it to the spirit, or God as dwelling in the flesh. Christ's body is the only temple of which this is fully true. God did not dwell in the temple built by Solomon for ever. But in the spirit, it is accomplished in its utmost extent. God will dwell in the temple of Christ's body for ever.

7. My seventh observation is, that when a promise has a letter and a spirit, it is fulfilled when it is accomplished in either the letter or the spirit. It has two distinct accomplishments, and may be fulfilled in either, or in both. The Scriptures afford many examples to justify this observation. When, then, it is said that both the temporal promises and the spiritual in the covenant of Abraham are to the same seed, all that can be admitted is, that the words of the covenant do not make the distinction. But the distinction is seen in the history of the fulfilment of the promises, and in the explanation of these promises. Paul, in his Epistle to the Romans, clearly shows the distinction between the two seeds; and the history

shows us that the nation in general enjoyed the temporal promises, but only few of them enjoyed the spiritual. Nothing can be clearer than this, and it is useless to reason with any who have so little spiritual discernment, as to think that all who enjoyed the earthly Canaan, were also heirs of the heavenly. The Pharisees and Sadducees enjoyed the earthly rest, while Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, were strangers in Canaan, and died not having received the promises.

8. My eighth observation is, that circumcision neither signed nor sealed the blessings of the covenant of Abraham, to the individuals to whom it was by divine appointment administered. It did not imply that they who were circumcised were accounted the heirs of the promises, either temporal or spiritual. It was not applied to mark them individually as heirs of the promises. It did not imply this even to Isaac and Jacob, who are by name designated heirs with Abraham. Their interest in the promises was secured to them, by God's expressly giving them the covenant, but was not represented in their circumcision. Circumcision marked no character, and had an individual application to no man but Abraham himself. It was the token of this covenant; and as a token or sign, no doubt applied to every promise in the covenant, but it did not designate the individuals circumcised as having a personal interest in these promises. The covenant promised a numerous seed to Abraham; circumcision, as the token of that covenant, must have been a sign of this. But it did not sign this to any other. Any other circumcised individual, except Isaac and Jacob, to whom the covenant was given by name, might have been childless. Circumcision did not import to any individual, that any portion of the numerous seed of Abraham should descend through him. The covenant promised that all nations should be blessed in Abraham, or that the Messiah should be his descendant. But circumcision was no sign to any other that the Messiah should descend from him,—even to Isaac and Jacob this promise was peculiarly

given, and not implied in their circumcision. From some of Abraham's race, the Messiah, according to the covenant, must descend, and circumcision was a sign of this; but this was not signed by circumcision to any one of all his race. Much less could circumcision sign this to the strangers and slaves who were not of Abraham's posterity. The covenant promised Canaan to Abraham's descendants, but circumcision could be no sign of this to the strangers and slaves who enjoyed no inheritance in it. Indeed, even to Abraham's seed, it could not sign Canaan individually. For upwards of four hundred years from the institution of circumcision, Abraham's posterity did not enjoy Canaan, and millions of infants died without having enjoyed it. To these, then, circumcision could not be a sign of their enjoyment of that land. If it is said, that though they did not possess it, they had a right to it, I reply, that they had no right to it more than possession, for God would not do wrong in depriving them of their right. What was the ground of their right? Had they a promise or grant? They had not. The land was promised to the seed of Abraham by Jacob, but not to all of them. Had it been promised to them all, they must have all enjoyed it, for God does not break his promises. To Abraham, it was individually promised, as also to Isaac and Jacob; and to them the promise was fulfilled in the spirit, as it was to many in the letter, who enjoyed not the promise in the spirit. They obtained the better country denoted by the promise of Canaan, and so, though they died not having received the promises, they died that they might receive them. When a prediction, or promise, has a letter and a spirit, it is fulfilled when it is accomplished either in the letter or the spirit. What sort of a right is a right to possess what is never designed to be given? A man may have a right to possess what he never possesses, but assuredly he will have no such right from God. God will not withhold any right: Abraham must have enjoyed what was promised. The promise of the land,

then, must in the letter have respected Abraham's posterity, while it was accomplished to himself in a higher sense. He died, not disappointed, but looking for the promise. As the promises in the Abrahamic covenant were all unconditional, they must have been fulfilled to every individual interested in them.

But whatever may be said about the right of possessing Canaan, with respect to those who did not possess it, the reply of Mr. Innes is abundantly sufficient. "Even this right to Canaan only belonged to one branch of Abraham's family, while circumcision was to be administered to all. To those who were subjected to it, then, it did not, as individuals seal temporal blessings. Again, no one will allege it sealed spiritual blessings to every one to whom it was applied, as it was manifest, that many of those commanded to receive it, had no interest in such blessings."

Much stress has been laid on Rom. iv. 11, in which circumcision is called "a seal of the righteousness of the faith which Abraham had, yet being uncircumcised." It is said that it was a seal of spiritual blessings. Undoubtedly it was a seal of spiritual blessings, but not a seal to the individuals who were circumcised, that they were personally interested in these blessings. It seals the truth of the gospel, namely, that there is righteousness in the faith of Abraham, or that all who have Abraham's faith have righteousness. This is what is sealed when applied to Abraham; this is what is sealed in every instance of its application. But it did not seal, even to Isaac and Jacob, that they had this righteousness. It sealed the same truth when applied to Ishmael or Esau, or the slaves bought with money, as it did when applied to those who walked in the steps of Abraham's faith. It had no individual application to any man but Abraham himself. Words cannot more expressly assert, that the thing of which circumcision is a seal, is *the righteousness of the faith of Abraham*. It was not a seal to others that they possessed the faith of Abraham, Dr,

Wardlaw supposes that such a marked reference to Abraham, would be inconsistent with farther trial. But this is a strange observation from an experienced Christian, deeply conversant with the Bible and his own heart. Were we in the morning assured, by a voice from heaven, that God had accepted us, were Satan to be let loose upon us, and we left to ourselves, it would not secure us till the evening from all the horrors of despair. Had God forsaken Abraham for a moment, he might have doubted whether it was God who had spoken to him in these transactions. Trial is not inconsistent with the utmost assurance that the Christian receives in this world. He may hold the truth this moment with the utmost assurance; let him be given into the hands of Satan to sift him, and he may doubt it the next. Christ himself received his Father's testimony by a voice from heaven, before he entered on his temptations, yet they were not less a trial on that account.

That circumcision was not intended to seal any thing personally to those who received it, is clear from its being applied to those who have no interest in the covenant to which it was attached. For a full, clear, and satisfactory view of this argument, I refer to Mr. Innes, in his work entitled *Eugenio and Epinetus*. Dr. Wardlaw alludes to it, but he cannot be said even to have assailed it. Every position of Mr. Innes remains unshaken. Ishmael was circumcised, who was expressly excluded from the covenant. Abraham's slaves were commanded to be circumcised, without any reference to faith. "He that is born in thy house, and he that is bought with thy money, must needs be circumcised," Gen. xvii. 13. "And Abraham took Ishmael his son, and all that were born in his house, and all that were bought with his money, every male among the men of Abraham's house; and circumcised the flesh of their foreskin in the self-same day, as God had said unto him," 23. Dr. Wardlaw supposes that submission on the part of the adult slaves must have been voluntary. But this is not necessary.

As a master, he had power to enforce obedience, and this commission authorized him. Abraham would have been justified in circumcising his slaves, had every one of them submitted with reluctance, or had endeavoured to resist. If, then, this is the law of baptism, it will justify the Spaniards in compelling the American Indians to be baptized. Nay, it will make it the duty of every master of slaves to have them baptized, whether they have faith or not; for Abraham was bound to circumcise every slave and every person in his house. Dr. Wardlaw speaks of force as being a profanation of a divine ordinance. To this Mr. Haldane's reply is quite in point. "If in Israel a beautiful woman was taken captive, and an Israelite chose to marry her, it was the *divine ordinance* that her hair and nails should be cut. Now, why should there be greater profaneness in cutting off the foreskin?" But this objection is founded on an entire mistake, as to the nature of the profanation of a divine ordinance. How is a divine ordinance profaned? When it is not in all respects applied according to institution. It cannot be a profanation of the ordinance of circumcision, to apply it to those to whom it is expressly enjoined. Had murderers and adulterers been included in the command to baptize, and to eat the Lord's Supper, it would have been no profanation of divine ordinances more than to preach the gospel to such persons profanes the gospel. Does Dr. Wardlaw mean, that to force compliance to his appointments would be profane in God? Man has no right to use force with respect to divine appointments, because God has not given that authority. But God is a sovereign in all respects, and may in justice enforce obedience. Accordingly, he commanded the Canaanites to be cut off, and all idolaters to be destroyed out of Israel. This is a grand distinction between the Jewish dispensation and the Christian. The subjects of Christ's kingdom are all voluntary. To baptize infants is to profane baptism, because it applies the ordinance to those not appointed to receive it. But to force slaves

to receive circumcision is not a profanation, for Abraham's commission warranted force.

But even although the submission to circumcision had not been voluntary on the part of the slaves ; is a voluntary submission all that is required for baptism ? Is any man to be baptized who is willing to submit to the ordinance ? Dr. Wardlaw endeavours to obtain some relief from the faithfulness of Abraham, in teaching his family. But whatever may be supposed as to his faithfulness and success in teaching his slaves, their circumcision is not grounded on this, but on their being his property, and in his house. The command will apply to one that had been bought on that day, or to the most profane scoffer, as well as to Eliezer of Damascus. But what an extravagant supposition, that every slave in Abraham's house had Abraham's faith ! And if they had not Abraham's faith, they were not such as had a right to baptism. If all Abraham's household were so well taught, Abraham was much more successful with his slaves than Jacob was with his sons. But we need not waste time in refuting a supposition that is altogether apocryphal. There is nothing said about the knowledge or faith of Abraham's slaves ; and they were commanded to be circumcised, not on account of their faith or knowledge, but on account of being the property of Abraham.

The circumcision of the slaves, which destroys the system of our opponents, is not only consonant to our views, but appears as suitable as the circumcision of the natural seed of Abraham by Isaac and Jacob. It is one of the patterns of heavenly things. As natural birth gives a title to circumcision and the earthly inheritance, which was a figure of the title of all who are born of the Spirit, to enjoy the heavenly inheritance ; so the circumcision of the slaves bought with money, represented that all who enter into Christ's kingdom are bought with his blood. The circumcision of the slaves is as instructive as the circumcision of Isaac. He had a typical holiness, per-

fectly the same with the natural posterity of Abraham. The purpose of God in the circumcision of both Abraham's posterity and of their slaves, was totally independent of personal character.

Such a circumcision, then, could not imply, that the individuals had an interest in the spiritual promises of the covenant. Indeed, the circumcision of slaves did not make them partakers even of the temporal promises. "Servants," says Mr. Haldane, "although circumcised, did not possess the privileges of the children of Abraham, nor were looked upon as the people of God. They had no share of the land, and there was no precept against selling them to another nation, when they would lose all privileges of Israel. This also manifestly appears from many considerations. In many of the laws, the distinction between Israel, who were the Lord's servants, and the stranger, is stated. Thus they might lend on usury to a stranger, but not to their brother, Deut. xxiii. 20. They were not to eat what died of itself. They were to give it unto the stranger that was in their gates, that he might eat it, or they might sell it to an alien, and the reason given is, "For thou art an holy people unto the Lord thy God," Deut. xiv. 21. They might also buy bondmen and bondmaids, not only of the heathen round about them, but of the children of the stranger that sojourned among them, but they could not keep an Israelite a bondman, Lev. xxv. 39—46. Thus it appears, that a person being circumcised, did not thereby become entitled to the privileges of the children of Abraham, or of God's peculiar people." The Shechemites also, as Mr. Haldane observes, were circumcised not only without evidence of faith, but even without a profession of it, which could not have been done with the approbation of Jacob, had it been unlawful. Here, then, persons are circumcised not only who had no evidence of being interested in the promises of the covenant, but who were shut out from its temporal promises most expressly. From the spiritual promises they were



excluded as long as they continued unbelievers, but from the temporal promises they were excluded for ever. Persons, then, were circumcised who never could obtain an interest in some of the blessings of the covenant of which circumcision was the token. How absurd then to make this the law of baptism !

But that circumcision as a seal, had a personal reference to infants, is impossible. Our opponents generally say, that circumcision was a seal of spiritual blessings; but the spiritual blessing of which it is said to be the seal, is *the righteousness of the faith of Abraham*. Now, of this spiritual blessing infants do not partake. They do not possess the faith of Abraham. Circumcision, then, cannot seal what is not true. **TO ALL INFANTS IT IS EQUALLY UNSUITABLE AS A SEAL.** None of them possess the faith of the righteousness of which circumcision was the seal. The argument, then, from circumcision for the baptism of infants is utterly groundless. The former was applied to those who were manifestly destitute of an interest in the blessings of the covenant of Abraham.

The spiritual or emblematical meaning of circumcision, the change of the heart by the Holy Spirit, is also without personal reference to the circumcised infants. Infants are circumcised in the flesh, but were not circumcised in the heart. Fanaticism itself cannot suppose, that all the male infants of Israel, and of the slaves of Israel, were renewed by the Holy Spirit before the eighth day. The thing, therefore, that is shadowed by circumcision, is not to be found in the infants who were circumcised. In this it differs by the distance of heaven and earth from baptism.

That circumcision had no personal reference to the individuals circumcised, is also evident from the fact, that when a stranger desired to eat the passover, all the males of his family must be circumcised. "And when a stranger shall sojourn with thee, and will keep the passover to the Lord, let all his males be circumcised, and then let him come near and keep

it," Ex. xii. 43. Here there is no faith required in the person who desires to eat the passover, nor in his adult males, whether children or slaves, who are to be circumcised as the condition of his eating the passover. The circumcision of his whole male family takes place as a matter of course. There is then no law that requires even a profession of faith in the God of Israel, in order to entitle a stranger to eat the passover. There is no condition of either faith or character. And had he a thousand unbelieving children and slaves, he has a divine warrant to circumcise them.

Our opponents are in the habit of insisting that baptism has come in the room of circumcision, or that it is the Christian circumcision. But this is the most groundless figment, for which there is no plausible foundation in the word of God. Yet the thing is so generally received, that it is taken for granted as a first principle. To overturn it, nothing more is necessary than to call for its proof. Coll. ii. 11, 12, is usually appealed to as giving some countenance to the idea; and Mr. Ewing is confident that, on any other principle, the apostle's reasoning is inconclusive, and even his language unintelligible. Now, it is very strange how this passage can be made to speak so decisively on this point. Let us hear it speak for itself: "In whom also ye are circumcised with the circumcision made without hands, in putting off the body of the sins of the flesh by the circumcision of Christ: Buried with him in baptism, wherein also ye are risen with him through the faith of the operation of God, who hath raised him from the dead." This passage says not a word about the subject, either expressly or by implication. How, then, does Mr. Ewing extract his notion from it? Why, by the help of a little management. He represents the apostle as saying, "Being buried with Christ by the washing of baptism, they are circumcised with the circumcision made without hands." Ah, Mr. Ewing, can your conscience allow you to put so profane a hand on the word of God? He that can take this liberty with the Scrip-

tures, may prove or disprove any thing. Does the apostle say, "Being buried, ye are circumcised?" This makes the apostle assert, that they were circumcised with the circumcision made without hands, by baptism. But this is not the apostle's assertion. He asserts, that they were circumcised with the circumcision of Christ, in or by the putting off the body of the sins of the flesh by the circumcision of Christ. What is said of baptism is something additional. By no torture are the words capable of Mr. Ewing's gloss. The apostle himself minutely explains how they were circumcised in Christ. It is a circumcision made without hands. It cannot, then, be baptism; for it is not without hands. This circumcision consists in putting off the body of the sins of the flesh. The external circumcision cut off a part of the flesh; the circumcision without hands puts off the body of the sins of the flesh. This is the circumcision of Christ, the other was the circumcision of the law. It is the circumcision made without hands, the putting off the body of the sins of the flesh, that is here expressly called the circumcision of Christ. It is called the circumcision made without hands, to distinguish it from its type, the circumcision of the flesh: it is called the circumcision in which is put off the body of the sins of the flesh, to distinguish it from the typical circumcision, which did not cut off sin but flesh: it is called the circumcision of Christ to distinguish it from the circumcision of Moses. No language can be more express, or less capable of perversion. The circumcision here spoken of, could not possibly be baptism; because it is a circumcision which Christians are not only said to have without any external operation, but which they have in Christ: "*In whom ye are circumcised.*" Christ himself performs the circumcision, and we have it in him.

This passage clearly shows us what came in the room of circumcision. The circumcision made without hands, came in the room of the circumcision made with hands; the putting off the body of the sins of the

flesh, came in the room of the cutting off the foreskin; the circumcision of Christ came in the room of the circumcision of Moses. All Christians are circumcised in heart, as all Jewish males were circumcised in the flesh. The Christian ordinances do not come in the room of the Jewish ordinances. Were this the case, every Jewish ordinance is equally entitled to a substitute or successor. Circumcision has no peculiar right to a preference. Every Jewish ordinance signified spiritual things, as well as circumcision. They are all fulfilled in their emblematical meaning, not in corresponding ordinances. For any thing which we could learn from the Old Testament, there might not have been any ritual ordinance in the New.

Circumcision and baptism correspond in meaning. They both relate to the renewal of the heart. The Lord's Supper and the Passover have a resemblance still more close; yet the one is not said to come in the room of the other. Christ himself has come in the room of the Passover; for it is said, "Christ our Passover is sacrificed for us." The Lord's Supper is a feast of like nature, but with this fundamental difference, which equally applies to baptism and circumcision, it does not belong to the same persons. The Lord's Supper, as well as baptism, belongs solely to the true Israel of God; the Passover belonged to the carnal Israel, without respect to their faith or character. The persons whom John drove from his baptism, had as good a right to all the Jewish ordinances as John the Baptist himself. The Scribes, and Pharisees, and Sadducees, with the whole unbelieving body of the Jewish nation, enjoyed all the ordinances of the Jewish dispensation, by as valid a title as the apostles of Christ. Neither Jesus nor his apostles ever forbade this, nor made any observations on it as an impropriety. The ministrations of the priests were never objected to; because they were carnal men, and rejected the Messiah when he manifested himself to Israel. This is the grand distinction between the Jewish ordinances, and the ordinances of the church

of Christ. The former shadowed good things to come, and were appointed for the nation in general, which had only a typical holiness; the latter are appointed only for the true holy people, and take it for granted, that all who partake of them enjoy the thing figured by them.

If baptism came in the room of circumcision, it would not have commenced till the other had ceased: nor would it have been applied to circumcised persons. Why did John baptize the circumcised Jews, before the manifestation of Christ? Why did Jesus baptize till after the end of the Jewish dispensation? But why shall we labour to overturn a mere figment? There is no need to establish, by arguments, that baptism did not come in the room of circumcision. Our opponents must prove that it did; and for this they have not the shadow of proof. They have the saying of divines, but this is the highest authority. It rests on no better evidence than the doctrine of the Pharisees for the washing of hands before meat. It is a tradition of the elders. Even if it did come in the room of circumcision, this does not import that it must have the same subjects, or be regulated by the same laws. How far they agree, and how far they differ, must be learned from what is said of them respectively. It is impossible to ascertain, from general principles, how far likeness extends.

Our opponents found the right in the child on the faith of the immediate ancestor. But if the law of circumcision is to regulate baptism, the posterity of a believer have a right to baptism, to the remotest generations, if all their intermediate progenitors were atheists. The child of a Jew must be circumcised without any respect to the faith of the parent. If, then, none but believers have a right to obtain baptism for their children, the law of circumcision does not apply to it. Why then should it apply in any thing else?

It is said, that if the children of believers are not baptized, the privileges of the Jewish Church are

greater than those of the Christian Church. As reasonably may this be said, if slaves are not baptized with their masters, and if we have not all an earthly Canaan. "We have no earthly inheritance like Israel," says Mr. Haldane, "nor are Christian servants entirely exempted from work one day in seven, nor have we a sabbatic year, nor a jubilee when our debts are discharged." As to parents and children, circumcision was no privilege at all. Had circumcision made the children of the Jews heirs either of Canaan or of heaven, it might be considered as a privilege, but it did neither. It was not enjoined, nor ever explained as a privilege to individuals. It was enjoined by the most severe penalty, even death. The females had no loss by the want of it. They enjoyed every spiritual privilege equally with the males; and the want of circumcision did not deprive them even of any temporal privilege, which they would have enjoyed. It is true, indeed, that Paul says that there was much profit in circumcision, Rom. iii. 1, 2. But it is evident that this includes females, and refers to Israel as the circumcised nation. Circumcision is here taken for the whole legal dispensation to which it was attached. For the chief of these privileges was, "that to them were committed the oracles of God. Now the females had this privilege equally with the males. It was then rather a privilege to the females to be freed from this painful rite. Indeed, nothing can more clearly prove that circumcision could not be a spiritual privilege, than that the females were excluded. There never was a spiritual distinction between male and female. Circumcision was a part of that yoke, from which the spiritual Israelites were delivered by Christ. It is strange then, to hear Christians speaking of it as a spiritual privilege. It arises from the same spirit that in the apostolic age made both Jews and Gentiles so prone to return to the weak and beggarly elements. He must be a babe in Christ, who cannot see how much the privileges of the new dispensation exceed those of the

old, without taking into the account any ordinance in the room of circumcision. The Church of Israel had the circumcision of the flesh,—the church of the New Testament have the circumcision of the heart. Is not this an immeasurable enlargement of privileges? The child of the Christian is perfectly, as to spiritual things, on the footing of the children of the Jews, for circumcision implied nothing to them individually. It did not mark them as the children of God. The children of believers may be said, in one point of view, to have better privileges, for they have a clearer revelation. They possess the oracles of God in a much greater proportion than the Jews did. *Circumcision secured to the circumcised person no blessing, either temporal or spiritual : it was enforced by the penalty of death : it was not enjoined on all Jewish children : it was not enjoined on believers in other nations : it could not then be a spiritual privilege to individuals.* The edification that it contained was as available to females, who were excluded from it, as to the males on whom it was enjoined.

Nothing can more clearly prove that circumcision had no personal application to the circumcised individual, than the circumstance that this ordinance was inapplicable to females,—the one half of the seed of Israel. Had it been of any spiritual advantage, or had it been appointed to mark the character of those to whom it was applied, would females have been excluded. Were they not heirs of heaven equally with the males? Had circumcision then been appointed to designate the heirs of the everlasting inheritance, it must have been extended to females. It is said, the Abrahamic covenant contained spiritual blessings : infants had its seal ; why, then, shall not infants have baptism? I reply, the one half of Jewish infants had not the seal, which demonstrates that the seal had no personal application to the individual.

It is said, that there is no better evidence that women should eat the Lord's Supper, than there is that

infants should be baptized. Now, were this true, what is the consequence? Not that we should baptize infants to be consistent in admitting females to eat the Lord's Supper; but that females should be excluded from the Lord's Supper, as well as infants from baptism. This is the Popish argument to induce Protestants to receive the traditions of the Romish Church. They tell us, "Ye have changed dipping into sprinkling by the authority of the church; ye have no better authority for infant baptism itself: why then do ye not receive transubstantiation on the same authority?" I always reply, that my brethren, who practise infant baptism, do not ground their practice on the authority of the church, but on their view of Scripture; and that the argument is false, because it justifies one tradition by another. They tell us also, that we have no authority for the change of the Sabbath, but the authority of the church; and some pædobaptists tell us, that we have no better authority for the Lord's day than for infant baptism. I give the same reply to both. As soon as I am convinced that this is the case, I will give up the Lord's day. Much as I value that day, I will not receive a cargo of Romish trumpery in order to license me to retain it. If the Lord's day has no better authority than the tradition of the church, or the arguments that support infant baptism, let it fall. But this is not the case. The Sabbath rests on pillars as firm as those of creation, being appointed before the entrance of sin, and grounded on reasons that are as lasting as the world. And the particular day is ascertained in the New Testament, as the first day of the week, and the Lord's day. But I will not here enter into proof, because it has nothing to do with this controversy. Even granting that it has no better proof than infant baptism, the latter is not relieved. In like manner, if there is no better authority for the eating of the Lord's Supper by females, than there is for infant baptism, both must fall together.



But they who make this objection, must have read the Scriptures with little reflection. That women did eat the Lord's Supper, there is the fullest and most direct evidence. "And upon the first day of the week, when the *disciples* came together to break bread," Acts xx. 7. Here it is said of the *disciples* without any exception, that they came together to eat the Lord's Supper. If then, women are *disciples* as well as men, there is here the most direct evidence that they ate the Lord's Supper. Paul delivered the Lord's Supper with the rest of the ordinances to the church at Corinth, without exception, 1 Cor. ii. 23; if then there were females in the church, they are included equally with the males. That females were members of the churches, is clear from the same chapter: for Paul speaks of a regulation with respect to them. Besides, from the whole account, it is evident that all in the church are equally concerned in eating the supper: "When ye come together, therefore, into one place, this is not to eat the Lord's Supper." This shows that the primary intention of their meetings was to eat the supper; and that they partook of it without exception. The word translated *man* also in the directions, verses 28—34, includes both male and female. Besides, it is expressly said, that under this dispensation, there is neither male nor female.

But though I have shown that there is direct proof that women ate the Lord's Supper, I do not consider that this is necessary. Had I no other evidence than that they were baptized, I would consider this perfectly sufficient, if no restriction were given in any other part of Scripture. I do not object to inference. On the contrary, I receive what is made out by inference, just as I receive the most direct statement. But an inference is not a guess, or conjecture, or probability, or conceit, drawn at random. It must be the necessary result of the principle from which it is deduced. If it is not, it should not be dignified with the name of inference. The person who is admitted

to one ordinance of a church, is admitted to all if there is no limitation. Indeed, the person who is admitted into a church, must have all the ordinances of the church, if there is no limitation. Is it not for these ordinances that a church exists? But are we for this reason to infer, that as infants under the Jewish dispensation received circumcision, a rite that supposed no character in the person circumcised, they should under the Christian dispensation receive baptism, which supposes that all baptized persons are washed from sin through the belief of the truth? In giving the Lord's Supper, had any directions been added that confined it to males, as the commission confines baptism to believers, then no inference could establish the right of females. There is not the smallest similarity between the cases.

It is often said that the Jewish Church was the same with the Christian. There is just such a portion of truth in this assertion, as to enable it to impose on the ignorant. But with respect to every thing which can concern this argument, it is manifestly false. Is the church that rejected the great body of the Jewish church, the same with the church which, by God's own appointment, contained those that were rejected? Was the church into which its members were born, the same with the church whose members must be born from above,—born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God? Was the church that admitted any stranger to its passover, without any condition of faith or character, merely on complying with a certain regulation that gave circumcision to their males, without any condition of faith or character, the same with the church that requires faith and true holiness in all who enjoy its ordinances? Was the church that contained the Scribes, and Pharisees, and Sadducees,—the most cruel, determined, open and malignant enemies of Christ,—the same with that church into which such persons could not enter without a spiritual birth? The church of

Israel was the nation of Israel, and as a whole could no more be called the church of Christ, in the sense of that phrase in the New Testament, than the nation of England can be called the church of Christ. It is said that a similar corruption has taken place in the church of Christ. But this observation proceeds on a fundamental mistake. The very constitution of the Jewish church recognized the membership of carnal persons. It did not make the distinction between those born after the flesh, and those born after the Spirit. There was no law to exclude the Pharisees, or even the Sadducees, from the Jewish Church. Their doctrines and practices were condemned by the Old Testament; but it was no corruption of the constitution of the Church to contain them. On the other hand, the constitution of the churches of Christ rejects such persons, and provides for their expulsion. It is a corruption of the church that receives or retains them. The distinction between the two cases is as wide as the distance between earth and heaven.

As to the ordinances of the Jewish Church, they are all abolished. Christ himself, when on earth, could not be a priest in it, but he is the only priest of the Christian Church. "For the priesthood being changed, there is made of necessity a change also of the law." Whatever unity may be supposed to be in the Jewish Church and the church of the New Testament, it does not consist in sameness of members, or of ordinances. The one, by its constitution, included carnal members; the other, by its constitution, admits spiritual members only. This, then, is the only point of view in which the subject can have any reference to the controversy on baptism. This difference existing, no number of points of coincidence can avail our opponents.

The Church of Israel was the type of the church of the New Testament, containing no doubt the body of the people of God at that time on the earth, and in this point of view, may be called the same.

Both are called the kingdom of God, and both were such, but in a different sense. The one was a kingdom of this world; the other is a kingdom not of this world. God's kingdom of Israel contained many who did not belong to his spiritual kingdom; and some belonged to his spiritual kingdom, who did not belong to the typical kingdom. All the believers belong to the church of Christ, but all believers did not belong to the church of Israel.

As the church of Israel was the church of God, typical of his true church, and containing in every successive age a remnant of the spiritual seed of Abraham, according to the election of grace, the New Testament Church is spoken of in the Old under the figure of Israel, Zion, Jerusalem, God's holy mountain, the tabernacle of David, &c. &c. This cannot possibly apply literally, and is explained by the apostles as referring to the calling of the Gentiles. In like manner, the book of Revelation speaks of measuring the temple. The reality is spoken of under the name of that which was its type. The restoration of the Jews, also, is spoken of as a reunion into their own olive-tree. A correct view of this peculiarity is of great importance, and I perceive that it is very much misunderstood by our opponents; but as it has no concern with this controversy, I will not enter on any discussion foreign to my subject. As to this controversy, I care not what sameness our opponents may pretend to find between the church of Israel and the church of Christ, as long as they are different in members and ordinances.

9. My ninth observation is, that baptism is not the seal of the New Covenant. That baptism and the Lord's Supper are seals of the covenant, is a doctrine so common, and a phraseology so established, that it is received without question as a first principle. They who measure truth by the attainments of our ancestors, look upon the questioning of this dogma as a kind of impiety and heresy; and even the modern Independents, who have professed to be guided solely by the Bible, have very generally continued to speak

in the same language. While I highly respect and value the ancient writers who speak in this manner, I strongly protest against it as unscriptural, and as laying a foundation for receiving other things on the authority of man. Let our ancestors have all the esteem and gratitude to which they are entitled,—but that esteem is much misplaced, if it leads us to follow them in any thing in which they have not followed Christ. In many things their attainments were great, and their writings are worthy of the most careful study. But in some things they were mistaken, and reverence for them ought not to induce us to receive their errors. It is disgraceful to Christians, that they continue to hold the errors of their worthy ancestors, and to feel a reverence for the unscriptural phraseology of ancient divines, similar to that of the Pharisees for the traditions of the Elders. Is there any Jewish tradition more void of scriptural authority, than that which designates baptism and the Lord's Supper *seals of the New Covenant*? There is not in the New Testament any single portion that can bear such a meaning. And what can the wisest of men know about these things, but what God has told us? He has not said that baptism is a seal. Circumcision was a seal of the righteousness of the faith of Abraham. This was God's seal to that truth, till the letter was abolished. The spirit of the truth is the seal, and the circumcision of the heart by him is the thing signified by circumcision in the flesh. The circumcised nation was typical of the church of Christ, for the Apostle says, "we are the circumcision, which worship God in the spirit;" and "circumcision is that of the heart, in the spirit, and not in the letter." The circumcision of the Jews was the letter, of which the circumcision of the heart in Christians is the spirit. The Christian, then, has a more exalted seal than circumcision. He has the Spirit of God, "whereby he is sealed unto the day of redemption," Ephes. iv. 30. When sinners believe in Christ, they are sealed with that Holy Spirit of promise, which is "the earnest of their inheritance until the redemption of the pur-

chased possession," Eph. i. 13. The seal, then, that comes in the room of circumcision, is the seal of the Spirit. Circumcision sealed God's truth to Abraham, and all who ever shall have the faith of Abraham. It was applied to the typical nation without respect to character, but the seal of the Spirit is applied to none but believers, and to believers of all nations as well as Jews. When the Holy Spirit himself, in the heart of the believer, is the seal of God's truth, there is no need of any other seal. Baptism represents the belief of the truth in a figure, and takes it for granted that they are believers to whom it is applied—but it is no seal of this. They may appear to be Christians to-day, and therefore ought to be baptized; to-morrow they may prove the contrary, and therefore they cannot have been sealed by baptism. He that is once sealed by the Spirit, is secured to eternity.

10. My last observation is, that to place the grounds of infant baptism on the Abrahamic covenant, is to make intelligent obedience impossible to the most of Christians. If no believer can know what the Lord requires in this matter, till he understands the covenant of Abraham, very many could not act at all. Can any man think that God would leave the grounds of this duty so enveloped in darkness? When the most illiterate heathen, the most ignorant savage, believes the gospel, five minutes will be enough to prove to him the duty of being baptized as a believer. But if he has children, when will he be able to baptize them by his knowledge of the covenant of Abraham? The most acute writers, who have been all their lives engaged in the study of it, and in defence of infant baptism from it, are not able to keep themselves from speaking in many things like children. And after all their striving, they have not been able to make out a consistent scheme. It is only the prejudices of the public, which are universally and strongly in their favour, that screen them from the ridicule of the most childish trifling. Many

of themselves, after wasting perhaps a quarter of a century in adjusting a scheme, are obliged to tear it down with their own hands. In my ignorance, I made the attempt, as well as others; but I must either give up the Bible, or give up infant baptism. If, then, it is so difficult a thing, to make out a plausible case in defence of infant baptism from the Abrahamic covenant, even with all the advantages that constant study affords, what must be the situation of the newly converted pagan? Has God left him in such a condition that he cannot know whether he ought to baptize his children, till he can penetrate the deep recesses of the covenant of Abraham? Mr. Ewing complains that many persons go over from the Independent churches to the Baptists, before they are thoroughly acquainted with the subject. Now this may be true, if he means that they are not able to discuss with him the popping system, or the Abrahamic covenant. But it is not true, as respects the knowledge of the scriptural grounds for that ordinance. Five minutes are sufficient to convince any man, who is open to conviction, and who comes to the Scriptures like a little child. I have written a large book to prove what I believe might be clearly pointed out in a few minutes, if all the disciples of Christ had in all things the teachableness of a little child. Every believer must be as a little child; he cannot receive the truth but as a little child. But it is only with respect to the truth itself, that all Christians are of this character. With respect to any thing in which we are not taught by the Spirit, we are as unteachable and perverse as the world. Christ's institutions, therefore, it is much to be lamented, are despised and corrupted, even by his own children. How soon was the Lord's Supper corrupted by the church at Corinth! And by our long sojourning in Babylon, we have been so accustomed to speak her language, that we have in a great measure corrupted our own. Babylonish words, Babylonish accent, Babylonish rites, may still be discovered in the School of Christ.

It is well if ever we fully recover the language of Jerusalem.

There is not one of all the ordinances of the Lord Jesus Christ, that has been left untouched by the wisdom of man. Some of them have been abandoned as worn out by time : others of them have been entirely new-modelled, so that not a feature of them remains as it came from his Lord : and many things have been added, of which no vestige is found in the word of God. Baptism has been changed both in its form, and in its subjects ; and it is lamentable to observe, with what perverseness even Christians cling to the innovations. In this we see remarkably fulfilled what our Lord charges on the Pharisees. The commandment of God requires children to support their parents when destitute, but the Pharisees delivered men from this commandment by substituting something for it. "Thus," says Christ, "have ye made the commandment of God of none effect by your tradition," Matt. xv. 6. Now, the like has taken place with respect to baptism. The ordinance that Jesus appointed was an immersion in water, as a figure of the death, burial, and resurrection of Christ, and of the believer with him. The wisdom of man has changed immersion into pouring or sprinkling a little water on the face, without any reference to death, burial, and resurrection. This is the substitute for the Lord's commandment. Is not this the very thing that Christ charges on the Pharisees ? The Pharisees told their disciples that the *corban* or gift would be a substitute for obeying the commandment of God ; and we are told, that though *immersion* was the original mode of baptism, yet *pouring* or *sprinkling* will answer the same end, and be sufficient for baptism. Others whose principles will not allow them the use of this antichristian liberty, do still greater violence to the Scriptures, by forcing them to speak what they wish. Ah, my fellow Christians, why will ye follow the Pharisees in making void the commandment of God ?

In like manner, the invention of man in bapti



infants has totally set aside the ordinance of God. Jesus commands believers to be baptized ; but since men have introduced infant baptism, Christ's baptism is not known, so far as the other extends. The baptizing of persons in infancy is made to stand as a substitute for the baptism of believers, which Christ appointed. Christ's ordinance, then, has been totally abolished, and a human invention both in mode and subjects has taken its name. So true it is that every invention of man in the things of God, has a tendency to supplant some part of divine truth.

Thus have we seen, from the most impartial examination, that infant baptism has not in the word of God an inch of solid ground on which to stand. The apostolic commission commands the baptism of believers, and of believers only. No lawful interpretation can introduce infants into that commission, or give authority to dispense with the baptizing of believers. No instance of the baptism of an infant is to be found among the documents of the apostolic practice. A child may perceive the insufficiency of the argument from the households. The Abrahamic covenant has no bearing on this subject. Baptism, I have shown to be immersion, by a strength of evidence, that no true scholar—no sound critic—will ever attempt to overturn. Let the children of God renounce the traditions of men ; let them submit with humility and with gratitude to the ordinance of Christ. In the keeping of his commandments, there is a great reward. “ He that hath my commandments, and keepeth them, he it is that loveth me, and I will love him, and will manifest myself unto him. This is the love of God, that ye keep his commandments.—Why call ye me, Lord, Lord, and do not the things that I say ? ”

**AN EXAMINATION**  
**OF**  
**DR. DWIGHT'S DISCOURSES**  
**ON**  
**BAPTISM,**

**CONTAINED IN**  
**HIS SYSTEM OF THEOLOGY EXPLAINED AND DEFENDED.**

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**BY F. L. COX, D.D. LL.D.**  
**OF LONDON.**

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## EXAMINATION.

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THE celebrity of the writer, not the force of his arguments, induces me to notice distinctly, but briefly, the erroneous statements of Dr. Dwight, on the subject of baptism. They occur in the volumes, entitled "Theology," which have obtained an extensive circulation in this country; but, in remarking upon them, so far am I from any desire to detract from the general merits of the publication, that I hail its appearance, and rejoice in its popularity.

The discourses in question comprehend a view of the reality and intention of baptism—the objections against infant baptism—the direct arguments in its favour—the subjects—and the mode of its administration.

In the first of these Sermons, there are many just and important sentiments, and only one passage that requires particular animadversion. The Doctor states, that "when children die in infancy, and are scripturally dedicated to God in baptism, there is much, and very consoling reason furnished, to believe that they are accepted beyond the grave." He further says, "there is, I think, reason to hope well concerning other children, dying in infancy; but there is certainly peculiar reasons for christian parents to entertain strong consolation with regard to *their* offspring."

Will it be believed, that the only passages Dr. Dwight adduces, in support of his theory, are in *direct opposition* to it? Yet such is the fact; and how so sensible a divine could have been betrayed into such an inconsistency, seems really inexplicable; unless it be imputed to the grossest prejudice. He quotes from Matt. xxi. 16. "Out of the mouth of babes and sucklings, thou hast perfected praise;" which is our Saviour's application of the prophecy in the viiith Psalm, to the circumstance of the children in the temple, crying "Hosannah to the Son of David." What application have these passages to the *baptism* of infants, or to their *dying in infancy*? Dr. Dwight, indeed, has attempted to excite in his reader's mind the idea that there

is some relevancy, by insinuating that "it is, perhaps, improper to say, that praise is perfected on this side of heaven." How can it be improper to say so when Christ has himself declared, that it was the case—that, in whatever sense the term is to be understood, it was *perfected* in the celebrations of the children in the temple? Besides, whether perfected in heaven or on earth, were these exulting children *infants*, and were they the *baptized* offspring of *believing* parents? Dr. Dwight also adduces—"Suffer the little children to come unto me, and forbid them not, for of such is the kingdom of heaven." Did they come to be baptized? Surely not, but to be "*blessed*." Were these little children the offspring of *believing* parents—and is the language *exclusive* in its meaning, or *discriminating* in its terms? Were they not a promiscuous assemblage? And admitting that the words are applicable to the state beyond the grave, do they not comprehend all children—children *as such*—children of every class?—The only other citation is, "The promise is to you and to your children;" and the comment is sufficiently curious—"If this promise is extended in any sense to those who die in infancy, and conveys to them any blessings, they must be found beyond the grave." Whether any one ever thought of so extending it, or whether the Doctor intended his doubt to be taken for proof, we cannot tell; in either case, the statement does not merit a formal refutation. Where then is the "*peculiar* reason," for the exclusive consolation which christian parents may, it is supposed, entertain? And why, if baptism is to confer the heavenly glory, is there *reason* to "hope well" of "other children?"—Really, the confusion that pervades this whole paragraph, is such, that had it been found in the work of a judicious and sensible divine of a distant age and another language, few critics would have hesitated in pronouncing, from intrinsic evidence, upon its spuriousness!

The next discourse relates to the proper subjects of baptism; these are, it is said, "all those who believe in Christ, and publicly profess their faith in him," and "the infant children of believers:" the latter doctrine, it is added, has been extensively disputed and denied; Dr. D. therefore proposes to state, and answer the objections against it. I shall not now inquire, whether he has omitted to mention any of the objections, but examine his replies to those

which he has introduced. For the sake both of brevity and perspicuity, I shall adopt a methodical arrangement of the objections, the Doctor's answer, and my own reply.

*Obj. I.* "It is stated by the opposers of this doctrine (Infant Baptism,) that it is not enjoined by any express declaration in the Scriptures."

*Dr. D's Answer.* There are many duties incumbent on us which are neither expressly commanded nor declared in Scripture. The principle on which the objection is founded is, "nothing is our duty which is not thus commanded or declared in the Scriptures." According to this, women are under no obligation to celebrate the Lord's Supper—parents to pray for their children—mankind to observe the Sabbath—rulers to defend the country, or to punish crime. It is impossible the Scriptures should specify all the doctrines and duties necessary to be believed and practised.

*Reply.* Dr. Dwight has confounded in his argument, the obvious distinction between a positive duty and a moral obligation. A moral duty is *commanded*, because it is *right*; a positive institute is only *right*, because it is *commanded*. All moral duties arise out of general principles; the principles being given, the diversified application of those principles does not require to be stated in detail. For instance; the kind offices of the good Samaritan were not performed from obedience to any specific command; but his sympathies being excited by distress, his duty arose out of the principle involved in the general precept, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." On the other hand, all positive institutions are founded on express Scriptural directions; so that the obligation to observe them can be traced to no other source than simply the expression of the divine will. Consider for a moment the flexibility of Dr. Dwight's argument, and how a Protestant would be annoyed by it were it in the hands of a Papist. The latter would require nothing more of his Protestant antagonist, than the admission of a principle which should confound this distinction. Once admit the inferential reasoning with regard to positive institutes, which is legitimate as applied to moral duties, and you open a door wide enough to admit all the mummeries of Popery.

*Obj. 2.* "There is no certain example of infant baptism in the Scriptures."

*Dr. D's Answer.* There is no instance in which it is

declared in so many terms that infants were baptized.—  
 'There are instances in which the fact is involved :—*house*  
 and *household* denote children.

*Reply.* If according to the doctor's concession, there is no instance in which it is declared infants were baptized, the objection is valid; for of course there *could be*, by his own showing, no *example* of infant baptism. If it were even *involved*, there is still no *example*; it is only *inference*, and an inference which has nothing to sustain it; for that *house* and *household* necessarily denote children we deny, both on critical and historical grounds.

*Obj. 3.* "Children cannot be the subjects of faith; and faith is a necessary qualification for baptism."

*Dr. D's Answer.* John the Baptist was filled with the Holy Ghost from the womb; and was "unquestionably a *subject of faith in such a manner, that, had he died in infancy he would certainly have been received to heaven.*"

*Reply.* The doctor has confounded the distinction between faith and holiness. An infant may be sanctified from the womb, but cannot believe. The remark therefore, amounts to nothing, as directed against the principle which requires *faith*, not *holiness*, as prerequisite to baptism.

*Obj. 4.* "Infants cannot make a profession of faith; and such a profession is a necessary qualification for baptism."

*Dr. D's Answer.* That a profession of faith is necessary in all instances cannot be proved. Cornelius and they that were with him made no such profession, and none was demanded by Peter, Acts xi.

*Reply.* Of the persons in question it is said that they *spake with tongues, and magnified God.* The Doctor has not informed us how those who spake with tongues, and magnified God, were *silent* and *passive* recipients of baptism! Suppose, however, it were proved that a *profession* of faith was not demanded, did the apostles dispense with the *possession* of that principle! It is for the *possession* of faith we contend, and for the *evidence* of that possession. The objection is not fairly stated: we demand either profession or evidence in all cases; the latter is generally given by means of the former, as well as by the general conduct of the individual. But infants are incapable either of professing or giving evidence of that of which they cannot be the subjects.

*Obj. 5.* "Persons baptized in infancy prove that they

were improper candidates for this ordinance by the future degeneracy of their conduct."

*Dr. D's Answer.* The real amount of this objection is, that no persons can be proper subjects of baptism, to the human eye, who, after their reception of this sacrament, prove themselves to be unregenerated. The objection fails because it proves too much. If we are required to baptize none but those who are regenerated, it is necessary we should know whether the candidates are regenerated or not.

*Reply.* It is necessary that we should have satisfactory *evidence* of the regeneration of the candidate for baptism prior to the performance of the rite; to *know* what is the state of the heart is the exclusive prerogative of Deity. With respect to those who have arrived at the period of personal responsibility evidences may be obtained, according to our Saviour's declaration, "By their fruits ye shall know them:" *they* are capacitated to repent, and to "bring forth fruits meet for repentance." But what can be said of unconscious infants, who are altogether incapable of supplying evidence of any kind that they are the proper subjects of baptism, if the sanctification of their incipient powers be a prerequisite to the administration of this ordinance? They are heirs of a depraved nature; and what evidence can any one give that he is or ever will be the subject of that grace which alone can sanctify the soul? That all are not renewed in infancy is lamentably evinced by the subsequent lives of thousands with regard to whom the symbolical representation of their regenerate state is awfully premature. That some may be sanctified from the womb we do not question; but we possess no means of distinguishing between them and others; the difference, wide as it is, can only be evident to him in whose purposes of sovereign mercy they are included. This, however, is not the condition of adults, who are both capable of professing their faith in Christ, and of proving the genuineness of their profession by the purity of their conduct. That these signs may, in some instances, be counterfeited is nothing to the purpose. In fact, Dr. Dwight has confounded the distinction between being misled by *false evidence*, and acting *without any evidence at all*.—A jury may be deceived, and often have been, by false and perjured witnesses; but who would thence infer the safety of condemning men without evidence? The application



of the principle of Dr. Dwight's argument to judicial proceedings will at once illustrate its fallacy. It would be a singular position, indeed, that the *absence of all evidence* is a sufficient ground of action. The question, therefore, returns,—Would the apostles have baptized any one *without even the slightest evidence that the candidate was the subject of that moral transformation which the rite of baptism was designed to symbolize?* Let our opponents seriously consider and candidly answer this question.

*Obj. 6.* "All baptized persons are, by that class of Christians to whom I have attached myself, considered as members of the Christian church; yet those who are baptized in infancy are not treated as if they possessed this character. Particularly they are not admitted to the sacramental supper, nor made subjects of ecclesiastical discipline."

*Dr. D's Answer.* The conduct and opinions of those with whom I am connected are, in a greater or less degree, erroneous and indefensible. If baptized infants are members of the Christian church, we are bound to determine and declare the nature and extent of their membership. That they are members of the church I believe.—All persons are baptized not *in* but *into* the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit; that is, they are introduced into the family of God, and are called *godly, christians, spiritual, sons and daughters of God, and children of God*, throughout the Scriptures. All persons baptized, therefore, are members of the Christian church. Still they are not members in the sense commonly intended by the term. The word *church* has various significations; denoting the *invisible* kingdom of Christ, consisting of all who are *sanctified*—the *visible* kingdom consisting of all who have publicly professed religion, and their baptized offspring—*any body of christians*, holding the same doctrines, and united in the same worship and discipline—and christians who worship together in the *same place*. Hence, when persons baptized in infancy, are said to be members of the church, the word cannot be used in all these senses, and therefore something beside baptism, or a profession of religion, is necessary to constitute a membership of any particular church. When persons are dismissed from one church to another, they are not members of any particular church till they have uni-

ted to the other church in form. A minister, by his ordination, is constituted not a minister of a particular church, but of the christian church at large: hence, a person may be a member of the church at large, and not a member of a particular church. When the eunuch was baptized, he became a member of the church general only, not of a particular church. Thus persons baptized in infancy, are members of the *church of Christ*, that is, of the *church general*. Baptism renders any person capable of membership in a particular church, if he is disposed, and otherwise prepared; but neither this, nor his profession of religion will constitute him such a member; this is to be done only by means of a covenant between him and the church. Persons baptized in infancy, are baptized on the ground of that profession of religion which their parents have made—whenever they themselves make the same profession, they become entitled to communion at the sacramental table. I have therefore shown, that a profession of religion is necessary to constitute us members of the church of Christ, and that what may be called a church covenant is indispensable to constitute us members of particular churches.

*Reply.* At the very outset of this statement, our opponent is guilty of the most glaring sophism. He dexterously changes the term, *baptized infants*, to *persons*, adding, they are introduced into the family of God, and are called godly, christians, spiritual, sons and daughters of God, and children of God. But *who* are so introduced, and so called? *Baptized infants*, or *persons*? Dr. Dwight himself, at the conclusion of the passage, denies that the former are introduced into the family of God, for he declares, that baptism only renders a person *capable of membership if he is disposed*. Perhaps, it may be said, that he limits the statement here to a *particular church*: be it so—will our pædobaptist brethren admit, that baptized infants are introduced into the family of God? Here is, in fact, another sophism, lurking under a change of expression; for the argument would fail, even upon his own principles, unless the phrases, *church, general*, and *family of God*, were to be deemed synonymous. But even a profligate may be a member of the *church general*, if baptized in infancy, using the term in the vague sense in which our author employs it; for, according to him, that is sufficient to constitute such membership; but, is a profligate

therefore introduced into *the family of God*! If not, then baptized infants are not so introduced, although adult *persons* may, by giving evidence of their piety: in this case, however the two phrases have different significations, and yet are applied to the same thing. Besides, are *baptized infants* denominated *godly, christians, spiritual, sons and daughters of God, and children of God*?—Our opponents will not contend it; consequently, though *persons* (or individuals in the exercise of their understanding, and under the influence of genuine piety,) may be so designated, the description is totally inapplicable to infants.

We may further demand, what is the *church general*, as distinct from the collective bodies of particular churches? In what conceivable sense can it be said, that a person belonging to no one of the churches that constitute the church general, nevertheless is a member of that church general? And what is the *church general*, if it be not the *family of God*? And yet, it is presumed, that an individual may be actually a member of this family, and yet not qualified to be a member of it! If any thing is here maintained, it is that a person may be a member of the family of God, and not a godly person; which is certainly not a very intelligible statement for so distinguished a divine.

Dr. Dwight, and many of our pædobaptist friends, continually *assume* that an infant is a member of the visible church, or church general; but where do they find the proof? It is assumed, as necessary to the support of pædobaptism, and of episcopalianism, of which the former is an essential pillar, and without which a national church could not easily be founded. On the other hand, we assume nothing in our argument without positive demonstration, and demonstration which even our opponents admit to be conclusive in its nature. For instance, we assert and substantiate by an evidence which all parties acknowledge to be valid, that *adults were baptized*, and that they were baptized *upon a declaration or an evidence of their faith*. The narrative of the eunuch, and the rest of the cases in the Acts, are precisely in point, and will be admitted as proofs of this statement! if our brethren proceed to aver, that infants were also baptized, of course without profession, and when incapable of it, and made members of the visible church, the *onus probandi* devolves

pon them, and it is a burden which they cannot sustain. If, in the New Testament, *persons* of any class, baptized children or adults, are represented as members of the church, either general or individual, *while destitute of faith in Christ*, let the paragraph be cited; for ourselves we distinctly affirm, *it is no where to be found*; and if it be not, Dr. Dwight's whole statement is sophistical and utterly fallacious!

Having thus noticed several objections without refuting them, our author proceeds to "direct arguments for infant baptism." Three are specified; of which the first relates to the Abrahamic covenant. The reasonings here are similar to those of Dr. Wardlaw and others.

The second consideration adduced is, that "all the observations made on this subject in the New Testament accord with his view of it, and confirm the doctrine of infant baptism." What are these? The expression of Christ, in Mark ix. 31, to "receive a child in the name of Christ," is, he affirms, "to receive him because he belongs to Christ;" which is "no other than that of receiving infants into the church." His own brethren differ from him in this interpretation; besides, the expression is not as here quoted, but "whosoever shall receive one of such children in my name; and the *Syriac*, *Arabic*, and *Persic* versions, agree in rendering it *one like to this child*. Our Lord also refers afterwards expressly to "one of the little ones who *believe* in him." Two other passages, (Mat. ix. 13—15; and Acts ii. 38, 39.) have been often explained, and seen perfectly plain. How Christ's *blessing* them in the former case, and speaking of the *posterity* of the Jews in the latter, implies either *baptism* in the one instance, or *infants* in the other, is inconceivable! Mr. M'Lean has most forcibly argued, with regard to the former passage, that so far from countenancing infant baptism, it is a clear example to the contrary. "Here are children brought to Christ, declared of his kingdom and blessed, and thus became visible subjects; yet we read nothing of their baptism. We are sure that Christ did not baptize them, for he baptized none, (John iv. 2.) and it is certain his disciples had not baptized them formerly, else they would not have forbid their being brought to Christ; nor did our Lord command them then to baptize them, though he declares them of his kingdom, and blesses them. Hence we learn, that infants may be acknow-

ledged to be of the kingdom of God without baptizing them." The only remaining example is taken from 1 Cor. vii. 14. "The unbelieving husband is sanctified by the believing wife, and the unbelieving wife by the husband, else were your children unclean; but now are they holy." It denotes, says our author, that the unbelieving parent is so purified, by means of his relation to the believing parent, that their mutual offspring are not unclean, but may be offered to God; or, as he before explains it, may come into his temple. The children of believing parents may therefore be offered to God in *baptism*. The Doctor has evidently here lost sight of the distinction between the legal and evangelical senses of the term holy. The unbelieving parent is *purified* by the *believing* one! Is this a doctrine to be found in Scripture? Does it accord with the universal representation throughout its hallowed pages of the *personal* nature of religion? How is an unbeliever *purified* by a believer? The apostle moreover, is not writing upon the subject of baptism, but obviating the scruples of Christians about the continuance of their marriage relation with infidels. The children, he says, would not be *holy* unless the parents were so; the holiness mentioned therefore must be of the same nature in both cases, and the meaning is, the marriage continued to be lawful, and neither party should be discarded on account of the Christianity of the other, because this would produce endless difficulties and litigations with regard to posterity. The argument is, "You must not put away your unbelieving wives, if they are willing to remain with you, otherwise you must also discard your children, as the law of separation from the heathen obliged the Israelites to do with regard to the children who were conjoined with the unclean party (Deut. vii. 3. Ezra x. 3.) Under the Gospel dispensation, both the unbelieving party and the children are to be retained."

Dr. Dwight also maintains, as a third *direct* argument, that infant baptism was uniformly practised by the early Christians. It is singular enough, that Dr. Dwight, and others, who profess to trace infant baptism to the *apostles*, quote only incidental allusions from one or two writers of at least a *century or more afterwards*, and from passages of questionable authenticity and doubtful meaning!

In the last discourse upon the subject (Sermon 159)

there is little to require particular animadversion; the former part of it consists, in fact, of a repetition of the sentiments already discussed; the latter part respects the mode of administration. The point of difference regard the assertion, that "water may be administered indifferently, either by sprinkling, affusion, or immersion," He affirms, that "*the body of learned critics and lexicographers declare, that the original meaning of βαπτίζω and βάπτω, is to tinge, stain, dye, or colour, and that when immersion is meant, it is only a secondary and occasional sense.*" This is passing strange, and I confess, that the only way in which, upon the principles of Christian charity, I can account for so untrue a statement is, by concluding that Dr. Dwight *never examined them!* Let any one look at *Scapula*: the first meanings are *mergo seu immergo*, to dip, to plunge: let him consult *Stephanus, Hederic, Suicerus, Schleusner*, all the authorities. I demand only a *simple inspection* of them, as an answer to this strange and erroneous representation.

I pass over several citations, which are refuted in the discussion of Mr Ewing's statements, and I omit to comment on the remarks, that it is *incredible* that John should have immersed the people, and *impossible* that Peter and his companions should have done so on the day of Pentecost, as really unworthy of a serious refutation.

"Christ has *expressly* taught us," says the Doctor, "that immersion is unessential to the administration of this ordinance." The attempted proof of this assertion is founded on the narrative in the thirteenth chapter of John, respecting the condescension of Christ in washing the feet of Peter; particularly the words of our Lord—"He that is washed, needeth not save to wash his feet; but is clean every whit." The argument is, that symbolical washing, that is, sanctification, of which the act in the present instance is considered to have been the sign, is *perfect*, although applied only to the feet; as perfect as if applied to the hands and head: but the expression extends to every other symbolical washing, and therefore to baptism.

A remark or two will suffice to show the entire fallacy of this statement.

1. Christ has not *expressly* taught us any thing, in this passage, upon the subject of baptism, if by the word *expressly*, we are to understand "in *direct terms*," which

is its essential signification. If any thing is taught, it is obvious by *implication* only ; but that the implication is, that "immersion is not essential to baptism," cannot be maintained.

2. Were it admitted, that any thing is taught by inference respecting baptism, the fair deduction would be in favour of the sentiment which Dr. Dwight opposes.— There is an allusion in the narrative to washing the whole body, and to washing the feet ; but, in either case, the washing is of a kind to imply immersion. Bathing, the practice alluded to in the former case, will be allowed to have been performed by immersion ; washing the feet is also an act of immersion, as commonly performed, and as specifically represented in this passage. Jesus "poured water,"—not upon the feet, but—"into a basin, and began to wash the feet of the disciples." If this action, therefore, be considered as symbolical of baptism, so far as the mode is concerned, it would require immersion.

3. There is a lurking sophism in the use of the expression, "symbolical washing." It may be true, that the washing represented *sanctification*, or rather sincerity of heart ; but, it is not said, to represent *baptism* ; it was not therefore baptism.

If there were any propriety in the phrase, "symbolical washing," or any such significance in the conduct of our Lord as would sustain the pædobaptist objection, this must have been the performance of an ordinance, not a simple expression of humility.

It was in every sense a *common washing of the feet*, and not a *symbolical rite* : intended solely to give a practical exhibition of the spirit which it became the disciples to cultivate—"If I then, your Lord and Master, have washed your feet, ye also ought to wash one anothers' feet." From the cleansing nature of the water, the Saviour takes occasion to advert to the general purity of his followers, and to the lamentable exception which existed in the particular case of Judas. But are we justified in denominating this action a "symbolical washing," because our Lord availed himself of the favourable opportunity of allusively communicating some important truths ? And if we were, has this any connexion with the rite of baptism ? The argument of Dr. Dwight would amount to this—"because Jesus washed the feet of the disciples, and because washing the feet was as good an emblem of sanctifi-

cation as washing the whole body, therefore baptism may be administered by sprinkling or pouring !” Is it possible to conceive of any statement more illogical and inconclusive ?

If, however, it were even conceded, that there is an allusion to baptism, it might admit of another inference which would not be at all gratifying to our opponents, but which would certainly be much more natural and obvious than that which Dr. Dwight endeavours to establish. The inference would be, not, as he says, that immersion is unessential to baptism, but that *washing the feet is essential*.—We might demand of our opponents, why they *pour*, and *sprinkle*, and do not *wash* ? And why they pour or sprinkle, or simply touch with a drop of water *the face*, and not *the feet*, or *the hands* ? Where is their *symbolical washing*, when they *never attempt to wash at all* ?

The last citation intended to substantiate the pædobaptists doctrine of the mode of administering baptism, is from the thirty-sixth chapter of Ezekiel—“Then will I sprinkle clean water upon you, and ye shall be clean ; and will put my Spirit within you, and cause you to walk in my statutes.”—“*It cannot be denied*,” says Dr. Dwight, “that this is symbolical language, in which God thought it proper to denote regeneration, by the affusion of the Spirit upon the soul.” But it is obvious, that so far from representing the *affusion* of the Spirit *upon* the soul, God is declared to *put* his Spirit *within* his people. Whatever interpretation be given, it must be admitted, that *pouring upon*, or *sprinkling*, are very different acts from *putting in* or *implanting*. Instead of this statement, being *undeniable*, one would suppose it to be *impossible not to perceive* its entire inconclusiveness and fallacy.

THE END.

















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